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ABSTRACT
Bobbio’s prose emphasizes the polemical duality of the palazzo and the piazza -  
the uneasy relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, 
and their perennial yet necessary rivalry in a mature democracy. Although no 
overreaching moral theory can resolve all of the ethical tensions that exist today, 
Bobbio chooses to prioritize the prevention of the abuse of power at the 
individual and group level in developing his own form of democratic liberalism. 
Bobbio’s message is that Fascism and anti-Fascism must not merely pass into 
history.
In this thesis, I set out to prove the validity of Bobbio’s tenet that political and 
social democracy cannot be satisfied through the exclusive pursuit of economic 
democracy. Democracy, he claims, can only be realized through the 
implementation of democratic institutions that guarantee international 
participation. I aim to define the politics of culture that Bobbio prescribes to 
preserve the role of culture, and to show that anti-Fascism is necessary to 
liberalism. Anti-Fascism permits individuals to articulate their needs and ideals in 
society, unlike Fascism which stifles these through its monoculture.
I also explain the applicability of anti-Fascism as a contemporary political 
method, and I reinforce the idea that democratic values are strengthened 
through the addition of an anti-Fascist component. I illustrate how the history of 
anti-Fascism and the intellectuals who are committed to preserving its memory 
and political utility need no longer form part of a side-lined “grey zone". On the 
contrary, they indicate a path to contemporary democratic theory. I argue that the 
ideals of the Partito d’Azione, although formulated in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, have significant relevance to the questions of the current epoch. The 
Partito d’Azione gave rise to a popular vocation for liberty that has today become 
the target of the neo-liberal Right. The political programme of that Right is based 
on the dismantling of the anti-Fascist corpus of ideas -  including the validity of 
debate and of non-conformist views -  as developed by the members of the anti- 
Fascist intellectual community of Turin. The neo-liberal Right seeks to transform 
Italy into a market with US-style flexibility and to discredit the entire baggage of 
Italy’s post-war Left. With Communism out of the picture in terms of political 
relevance, all that remains of the Left in Italy is Bobbio’s social liberalism. 
Bobbio’s political agenda was never limited to the prerogatives of labour but 
sprang to the defence of the under-dog, that is, those whose citizenship puts 
them at risk, or whose basic rights at the international level are threatened.
My thesis provides a historical context through which Bobbio’s work can be 
approached, through an examination of his role as a protagonist of the anti- 
Fascist movement. In Chapter I, I illustrate the importance of Bobbio’s intellectual 
forebears and their writings, which gave rise to Bobbio’s central concept of a 
politics of culture. I define the politics of culture within the context of Bobbio’s
liberalism, where he draws on the thinking and life experience of other Italian 
intellectuals - all of whom reiterate their affinity with a tradition of politics that 
developed as liberal socialism (Liberalsocialismo).
In Chapter 11,1 outline the contours of Bobbio’s form of liberalism, which is rooted 
in anti-Fascism. Liberalism for Bobbio is linked to the politics of culture as a 
methodology of non-violence. It focuses on the question of how one governs 
rather than who governs. Fascism negates all possibility for political debate and 
ideological struggle. Responding to this deep inadequacy leads Bobbio to call for 
the separation of culture from politics -  while not ostracizing those who endorse 
Marxism.
In Chapter III, I analyze Bobbio’s conception of philosophy as a political tool. He 
emphasizes that intellectuals must not wed political causes, but should maintain 
their distance from politics to prevent culture becoming the maidservant of politics. 
Some of the tensions reflected in the Interaction of political forces throughout the 
history of the 20th century are illustrated through a comparison with the 
contemporary intellectuals Rorty and Bauman. Bobbio is committed to the 
seriousness of moral issues, to classic essentialism and to the belief that the 
intellectual’s role has changed little over time. Rorty and Bauman, among others, 
present a contrary and “post-modern” view.
In Chapter IV, I conclude that Bobbio pursues a truly liberal agenda that has 
developed through furthering the primacy of debate and dissension while 
undertaking a close study of post-war Italian politics. Italian social liberalism can 
provide a valid model for political philosophers and can thereby enrich liberalism 
everywhere. Although the historical legacy of anti-Fascism has been subject to 
attack, Bobbio’s method of upholding the politics of culture brings together the 
strengths of liberalism and socialism in a progressive combination, and as a 
sound political prescription. This combination envisages that i) liberalism requires 
socialism to evolve progressively; and ii) socialism requires liberalism for its 
procedural rules and its credo of self-reliance.
The long Communist parenthesis resulted in the concealment of other possible 
roads to liberalism. The major political options capable of fusing the principles of 
freedom with social emancipation were squeezed nearly out of sight by the all- 
encompassing conflict between anti-Communist liberalism and Communism. 
Bobbio’s anti-Fascism, rooted in the politics of culture, can serve as a guide to 
intellectuals on the Left. Forging a socialism with a liberal face is still required 
today, and no longer seems utopian.
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Biographical Note
Norberto Bobbio or Bindi, as he is known to his closest friends, was born in Turin in 
the Italian region of Piedmont on 18 October 1909. He has always made Turin his 
home. His university teaching career spans the years 1935 to 1984. From 1935 to 
1972 he taught courses on the philosophy of law at several Italian universities, 
namely Camerino, Siena, Padua (1940-1948) and Turin. From 1972 to 1979, he 
taught political philosophy at the University of Turin, where he has been Professor 
Emeritus since 1979.
Bobbio was awarded a degree in jurisprudence in 1931; his thesis supervisor was 
Gioele Solari, who had also supervised Gobetti’s thesis in 1922. In 1932 Bobbio 
spent two months in Germany (one month at the University of Heidelberg) and one 
month, August 1932, with Ludovico Geymonat and Claudio Treves at the 
University of Marburg. In 1933 Bobbio took his degree in philosophy; his thesis 
concerned Husserl’s phenomenology (supervisor Annibale Pastore).
In 1935 and again, in 1943, he was arrested for anti-Fascist activity (as the Fascist 
regime intensified its efforts to dissolve Giustizia e Liberta). He was arrested in 
December 1943 and he was released from prison in the spring of 1944.
Bobbio was an active member of the Partito d’Azione and a major influence in the 
Resistance. He was a member of the partisan movement Giustizia e Liberta and 
was among the founders of the Partito d’Azione in 1942. The Italian anti-Fascist 
movement was divided into two groups comprising activists within Italy and those 
abroad, know as fuorusciti or exiles; Bobbio has analyzed all strands of the Italian 
Resistance to Fascism.
From 1976 to 1979, he was a regular contributor to the Turinese newspaper La 
Stampa. Since the foundation of the Centro Studi Piero Gobetti in 1961, Bobbio 
has been its president.
In 1946 Bobbio was an unsuccessful candidate in the post-war elections of the 
Partito d’Azione in Padua.
In 1984 Bobbio was named Senator for Life by former President Sandro Pertini 
(Pertini was a CLN leader and President of Italy from 1978-1985). in 1992 his 
name was put forward as a possible candidate for the Presidency of the Republic.
Most of his life has been dedicated to philosophical research and teaching. His 
principal area of study is the problems of political theory, although in 1993 he wrote 
a book dedicated to the problems of intellectuals, II dubbio e la scelta (Doubt and 
choice). He was among the first contemporary thinkers to undertake research into 
the philosophy of language, logic and analytic philosophy. Bobbio’s major 
intellectual interests are the philosophy of law, which he approaches through the
study of classical theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegei, 
and secondly the history of political doctrines, which he has used to develop his 
own political theory, the politics of culture. Bobbio has also played a major role in 
the development of sociology in Italy. His interests include political debate on 
current affairs, particularly on issues related to peace and democracy. Ideological 
debate, discussion of whether it is necessary to leave behind a political scenario of 
two major blocs and the effort to formulate a third way somewhere between 
liberalism and Communism have characterized his most recent work.
In 1988 Bobbio became Honorary President of the Association “Comprendre”; 
previously he had been a member of its Promotional Committee, along with Julien 
Benda, Benedetto Croce and Thomas Mann, among others.
He has written a vast series of books and essays, some of which can be 
consulted in the References section below. A more comprehensive list of 
Bobbio’s 2,025 publications can be found in Carlo Viroli’s Bibliografia degli scritti 
di Norberto Bobbio 1934-1993, Laterza, 1995. A significant part of Bobbio’s 
personal library has been donated and catalogued by the Centro Studi Piero 
Gobetti in Turin, which is also the home of the Istituto piemontese per la storia 
della Resistenza e della societa contemporanea and the Archivio nazionale 
cinematografico della Resistenza. In association with the Compagnia di San 
Paolo, the Centro Studi has compiled a bibliography of all Bobbio’s works 
(http://www.erasmo.it).
English readers became familiar with Bobbio in the 1980s. Bobbio’s writings have 
been translated into nineteen different languages*.
*See Bonanate, L, 2000. ‘Norberto Bobbio: Profii bio-bibliographique’ in Cites, no. 2
Non che io ritenga necessario e giusto confrontare le 
particolarita di uno Stato con quelle di un altro! Quando al 
confine dell’ltalia mi ricordo del confine della Russia, questo 
succede soltanto perche quotidianamente in giornali, riviste e 
opuscoli il fascismo viene paragonato al bolscevismo, la 
dittatura alia dittatura e Mussolini a Lenin. Io soggiaccio in 
qualche modo a un desiderio, ma anche all’influenza 
dell’opinione pubblica, quando faccio dei confronti. Ma per il 
momento trovo soltanto differenze (Roth, 19951:18).
INTRODUCTION
Norberto Bobbio’s philosophical outlook and political experience can provide us with 
a better understanding of Italy’s historical development and of the country’s 
increasing importance both within Europe and throughout the world. The new 
millennium has to some extent extinguished the ideologies of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, and there are even suspicions that liberalism may have depleted the 
moral, social and economic capital of western states. Bobbio is not entirely willing to 
change his brand of politics. It is true that the first Italian republic was ridden with 
scandals and problems of bribery, but he worries that the republic which replaced the 
first one will prove to be much worse. This new republic, he fears, threatens to 
undermine the gains of social democracy itself. Bobbio argues in favour of the 
continuity of the intellectual heritage, although he admits that the arguments in
favour of discontinuity are just as strong. In his view, the political legacy of the
philosophers of ancient Greece “has lost none of its descriptive and explanatory 
power” (Bobbio, 1989b:62). The analysis of historical change and comparative 
politics, as society moves from one form of government to another is “as useful as 
ever for contemporary political analysis” (ibid.:63), he argues. The themes of war and 
peace are perennial ones and the commentaries of pre-modern philosophers are still 
valid, even inexhaustible, sources of instruction that serve to allow intellectuals to 
compare relations between states in the modern age.
in the pages that follow, I attempt to contribute to the discussion of how the 
function of intellectuals has changed since the beginning of the modern State. I 
undertake this task in two ways: i) by delineating Bobbio’s conception of the task of 
intellectuals, including its historical derivatives; and ii) by comparing his view of the 
intellectual with that of other contemporary thinkers. In the past, metaphysics and 
religion could give answers that were considered to be sufficient, but the 
development of secular culture and numerous ethical possibilities have culminated
in a plurality of values. It has become increasingly arduous to orient oneself, and 
this is perhaps the greatest intellectual challenge of liberalism.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the first Italian Republic have unhinged 
politics: the paradigm has changed. Bobbio’s arguments assist the reader in 
exposing several key blindspots and muddles of the Left and they help to clarify the 
advantages and disadvantages of the democratic method (Keane in Bobbio, 
1989b:xxvii). The main reason for lack of direction on the Left “is due to the fact that 
in the modern world, problems have emerged which the traditional movements of the 
Left never [before] had to face” (Bobbio, 1996c:99). Moreover, some assumptions on 
which the Left based its plans to transform society have not materialized. “After 
1989, the end of Communism, the end of work as production and, in Italy, the end 
of mass parties, all that was of use to us in understanding reality is now useless” 
(ibid.), Bobbio claims. The way forward includes a redefinition of the Left, and the 
definitive healing of the enduring rift between Italian Communists and Socialists, 
which dates from 1921. That healing process can be furthered by viewing the last 
century of organized socialism, historically speaking, as humanity’s struggle to 
leave a condition of inferiority (Foa and Foa, 1995:33).
After the defeat of Communism, Bobbio argues, the world is no closer to having 
solved its problems and the strength of democracy has been weakened. He agrees 
with Emmanuel Levinas who says that, although Communism was accompanied by 
excesses, it represented an expectation that wrongs committed against the weak 
could be put right. Communists did not devise a ready solution, “but there was the 
idea that history had a sense and that living was not senseless living” (Bobbio, 
1997a:247). Great social change has put enormous pressure on the intellectual to 
“deliver”; “if we only take the case of Italy, the contemporaneous end of the DC and 
the PCI also meant the end of two political conceptions: two systems that kept 
ideology, action and societal vision together have collapsed and we find ourselves 
considering the future of democracy” (La Stampa, 2/07/98:19). Yet, at the same 
time, Bobbio argues, “this void has opened up virgin space in political culture and
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one can now build the new bases of knowledge required for good government" 
(ibid.).
in formulating Bobbio’s conception of the intellectual, I draw together the 
identifying features of anti-Fascism based on his essential prescription: the politics 
of culture. Bobbio’s politics of culture requires one to uphold a healthy scepticism, 
that is, a preference for moderation of judgement and a sense for the complexity of 
arguments. It means accepting neither a religious nor political figure, whether a 
god or a populist leader, nor a political system en bloc, in developing one’s moral 
code of conduct. A politics of culture means that the individual must develop a set 
of principles that are not handed down from a higher authority, except where 
personal security, and that of others, is concerned. The State defends the liberty of 
the individual and prevents men and women from harming themselves or others; 
this authority of the State arises through the reciprocal consent of individuals.
The advent of Fascism in Italy, which was both anti-liberal and anti-socialist, 
caused Bobbio to change the course of his thinking. In the early days of Fascism, 
Bobbio did not oppose Mussolini’s regime with any determination2; he joined the 
PNF [Partito nazionale fascists] in 19283. Later he openly contested Fascism, 
following the persecution of Italian Jews, anti-Fascists and intellectuals4. While 
carrying out the historical reconstruction of that decisive phase of Italian history, 
Bobbio challenges intellectuals of the Right and the Left to define both the meaning 
of historical revisionism on the basis of Italian example, and the requirements for a 
“normalization” of Italian history. The politics of culture Bobbio seeks to preserve 
includes an interpretation of anti-Fascism that comprises not only a set of 
unrenouncable values but also what Rusconi refers to as a “soggetto storicamente 
consistente”5 [a historically significant branch of knowledge], knowledge that is not 
subject to revision. That branch of knowledge rests on a rich and vast pool of liberal 
intellectual sources, although the contribution to liberalism made by each one varies 
in strength and import. With his politics of culture, Bobbio proposes a method, a 
“cure”, a means of protecting liberal and democratic political culture from 
contamination, from that which detracts from liberty. The intellectual, he advises,
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acts as the promoter of culture who uses culture to influence political debate, yet 
without marrying a political cause or forgetting about his or her cultural mission to 
disseminate knowledge and sow doubt.
At the outset of Fascism, Bobbio was at first subject to “the rules and authority of the 
regime under which he was obliged to live" (ibid.), but his experience as an anti- 
Fascist and his prominence after the war as a representative of the Italian Left 
without party affiliation (except for two brief periods when he joined the PdA and the 
PSU), attest to his commitment to heed the “’danger of the Right’ in the name of anti- 
Fascism’’ (ibid.). In his work Autobiografia, Bobbio describes the influence that 
socialism exerted. Fascism, war and the passing of racial laws caused his 
generation to be obsessed by the danger of the Right. Bobbio admired the strength 
of the Communist Party but hoped to liberalize Communism by injecting it with 
democratic principles. We see this synthesized in Bobbio’s private letter to 
Amendola6: ‘We need your strength; but you need our principles’ (Bobbio, 
1997:123).
In accommodating a partial revision of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, 
however, Bobbio argues that the superiority of Communist ideals vis-a-vis Nazism 
and Fascism must be acknowledged. Bobbio defends Communism as the morally 
superior “ism” of the three. Before the advent of Fascism, Italy had a liberal and 
parliamentary government, yet in the space of a few years “Fascism imposed an 
anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal and anti-democratic regime” (Antonicelli, 1975:153).
In the post-war period, Bobbio undertook an open dialogue with the Communists, 
using his politics of culture as a pedagogical method which influenced the tone of the 
debate in a positive sense. It resulted in a less authoritarian version of Communism 
that was able to wield more national influence. Bobbio’s dialogue with leading Italian 
Communists ultimately moderated the anti-Communist propaganda which had 
“created great confusion among the clandestine and semi-clandestine apparatus of 
the Party” (Bocca, 1973:405) and helped shape an Italian Communism that 
remained distinct from the Soviet version. Bobbio’s special relationship with the
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Italian Left under the hegemony of the PCI was full of contradictions, but also 
constituted an innovation in Italian political life. Bobbio contested Communism's 
hegemony, which diminished the importance of the non-Communist Left. The non- 
Communist Left Bobbio represents has lost none of its validity; it continues to pursue 
a cultural strategy of non-hegemony and inclusion through democratic dialogue with 
ail political adversaries. That strategy remains the lifeblood of the democratic state.
The values that were forged during the struggle for liberty and democracy in the anti- 
Fascist Resistance need to be preserved as intellectual tools. They need to continue 
to be linked to the history of Nazism and Fascism, though their current and future 
applications may be different. Bobbio provides the basis on which to undertake 
intellectual struggle through the recognition that there is both moral and political 
value in being able to identify evil7. The liberal state, he thinks, must promote some 
particular notions of the good, insofar as these notions are historically contingent or 
known to be true through experience. This view contrasts with the views of many 
other intellectuals and competing versions of liberalism.
Fascism, Bobbio believes, is the ideology of violence. He does not believe that 
Fascism and Nazism evolved in reaction to Communism. "The essential nucleus of 
Fascist ideology occurred much earlier than anti-Communism, anti-democracy” 
(Bobbio, 1998a:15). Fascism “claimed to be an alternative to socialism” (ibid.) 
while, with regard to democracy, it embodied its radical overthrow, since Fascism 
was a regime based on power from above and the principle of hierarchy. Neither 
Fascism nor Nazism can “morally” compare with Communism owing to their basic 
concepts, Bobbio contends. Nazism “is, in itself and from the very beginning, 
theoretically false and morally evil for it is based on the superiority of one race over 
all others: the horror of Nazism existed in its conception” (ibid.).
He believes it is necessary to move beyond the narrowness of reflecting only on 
the Italian case, for “the debate on Fascism and anti-Fascism cannot be treated as 
only an Italian matter” (Bobbio, ee:2). Rather, the Italian Resistance was a 
fragment of the European Resistance. Resistance took place in all the countries
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occupied by German troops, but the merit of the Italian Resistance was that of 
having Italy participate in a great European movement (ibid.), whether or not its 
participants were Communists. Whoever forgets European resistance is also 
forgetting Hitler’s aggression and, Bobbio argues, for that reason Fascism and 
anti-Fascism cannot be placed on the same plane.
In defining Bobbio’s politics of culture I find it useful to consider one of the strands 
of liberalism found in Richard Bellamy’s book, Liberalism and Modem Society 
(1992). In the final chapter, ‘From Liberal Democracy to Democratic Liberalism’, 
Bellamy refers to a particular liberal tension that also features in Bobbio’s prose. 
Rather than a set of universal truths, Bellamy emphasizes the historically 
contingent nature of liberalism and the fact that in today’s advanced capitalist 
economies, the social environment that once lent ethical liberalism its coherence is 
no longer able to function on the basis of one single set of norms (Bellamy, 
1992:252). A more reality-based liberalism is required, Bellamy affirms, one that 
takes account of the historical context and the perennial flux and differentiation of 
values, which cannot be ordered in terms of correctness or superiority. Bobbio is a 
realist liberal in that he focuses “on conflict and the role of power in holding a 
community together” (ibid.:253). He cannot, however, be described as a purely 
realist liberal, for although he endorses Hobbes’ covenant and the diffusion of 
collective agreements that reflect the rational convergence of views, he is adamant 
that liberalism must have a moral basis. “Do not kill” and “do not practise violence” 
have moral meanings for all citizens, Bobbio believes, and there is no need to 
forego those basic values, which most people everywhere share. The main 
problem, he believes, is implementing national and international conventions 
based on democratic consensus, contracts that offer more than mere intentions.
Although Bobbio recognizes that there are many different worldviews, he believes 
there is an objective way of judging the legitimacy of competing claims to authority. 
Coexistence can be regulated peacefully through observance of the rules of 
democratic liberalism and the lawful respect of human rights, but the legitimacy of 
values must be judged on the basis of “the technique of reason” (Bobbio, nn:3).
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The principal task of the intellectual in society is that of the bearer of “a seed of 
reason of an epoch”, a task that compares to that of sociologists and scientists. 
Indeed, there is no distinction to be made between the function of intellectuals in 
contemporary society and the function of intellectuals per se: to be an intellectual 
is to play an enduring role. The task of intellectuals is to develop, enlarge, fortify 
and defend the domain of reason (ibid.), even at the price of seeming old- 
fashioned. Bobbio contends that intellectuals must combat the idols of our time, 
lending their ears to neither fanatics nor conformists, even at the risk of remaining 
alone or within a restricted group. The politics of culture is a commitment to remain 
loyal to the spirit from which philosophy as rational thought was born (ibid.). Bobbio 
can thus be defined as a classic intellectual rather than a post-modern one, for the 
post-modern intellectual is not loyal to any particular interpretation or conception of 
history.
There are at least two contentious aspects of liberalism raised by Bellamy that are 
useful to keep in mind while examining Bobbio’s politics of culture. Bellamy 
recommends that to “avoid a moralistic politics, politics must be kept separate from 
ethics” (ibid.:256). Yet Bobbio emphasizes that anti-Fascism is a moral duty above 
all, so he thus affirms the validity of anti-Fascism as a common good. The second 
aspect Bellamy refers to is that “contemporary moral experience lacks the 
regularity the advocates of a framework of absolute basic rights require [... for] 
even the most essential of civil and political rights come into conflict with each 
other" (ibid.). Bobbio, by contrast, emphasizes that the recognition and protection 
of human rights form the foundation of modern democratic constitutions. Peace 
within and among states is a prerequisite for the defence of human rights and, he 
maintains, the process of democratization of international relations is the only road 
to follow in pursuing the ideal of perpetual peace.
Bobbio’s prescription for government is the inverse of Fascism, thus liberal and 
socialist government. The tradition of anti-Fascism Bobbio hails is the tradition 
shaped by the movement Giustizia e Liberta [Justice and Liberty] and the Partito 
d’Azione [Action Party] (1942-1948). GL was the product of a group of democratic
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individuals’ generous and rich political-cultural effort. They sought to free socialism 
from overly narrow and dogmatic ideological conditioning, and to render it a 
revolutionary force capable of interpreting in an unbiased way the new changes 
which had occurred in the economy and society of contemporary Italy (De Rosa, 
1985:421). That “revolutionary” agenda was the abolition of the monarchy and the 
establishment of the Italian Republic.
Since the Communist Left has been dismantled and to some extent discredited, GL 
and the PdA represent the “still-standing” non-Communist Left. Attempts are 
sometimes made to neutralize the importance of Bobbio’s philosophical contribution 
through claims that his main project from the mid-seventies was essentially to expel 
Marxism from Italian cultural and political life. The political stakes involved in this 
controversy are enormous. Anti-Fascism produced an authentic ruling elite that was 
able to ensure that democracy took a firm hold in Italy. That achievement is 
especially noteworthy in the light of the revisionist claim that “most Italians endorsed 
Fascism” (Casucci, 1976:809). The preparedness and efficacy of the PdA and the 
elite that emerged from the Resistance can be seen through that elite’s role as a 
legitimate counter-weight to the forces of the monarchy and the Vatican, the forces 
of tradition and stability which counted most at the time. The PdA was a new cultural 
force that was able to convince the allies of Italy’s European vocation as a republic. 
Opposing forces, on the other hand, would likely have constituted a post-war 
government led by an authoritarian military regime, similar to that of Franco’s Spain, 
and including, perhaps, some of the moderate Fascists who had ousted Mussolini in 
July 1943. Italy’s anti-Fascist elite alone was able to find a “pertinent response to the 
problems that the collapse of Fascism caused” (ibid.).8
Bobbio’s strategy was one of engagement with intellectuals of the Left, in order to 
achieve the reformation of Communism. His success in that endeavour was 
witnessed by the emergence in the 1960s of a group called the “anti-anti-Fascists”, 
led by Renzo De Felice9, who by no means agreed with Bobbio’s deprecation of 
Italy’s Fascist past. Indeed, anti-anti-Fascists of today’s ilk maintain that the negative 
interpretation of Fascism has its greatest use in contemporary politics, and serves to
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privilege the working class, trade unions and those institutions and ideas which 
Fascism had opposed and repressed. De Felice and other intellectuals who profess 
his ideas -  some of whom seek to exculpate Mussolini -  have concocted a version 
of the past which has become “grist to the mill of a rising Italian new Right” 
(Bosworth, 2002:3). The Right’s principal concern is to undercut the importance of 
anti-Fascism. Its members do this by placing it within the context of an ethical and 
political crisis which persists to the present day. In other words, anti-Fascism would 
need to be accompanied by the destruction of the “myth of the Resistance” in order 
for Italy finally to be able to recognize the problem of national consciousness, and to 
come to grips with the delicate balance between the nation and democracy. The 
anti-Fascist Left, it is argued, has translated the Resistance and a particular phase of 
Italian history into ideology. The new Right intends to substitute the centrality of anti- 
Fascism with a more general scenario in which the Resistance and the puppet 
republic of Salo are merged into “one history of Italy”.
Bobbio does not believe that the Resistance produced the original weakness of 
Italian democracy. He rejects De Felice’s view that the Left produced a patriotic 
deficit and encouraged both the fragmentation of Italy’s political and social life, and 
the prevalent participation of the Communist Party in the Resistance. Renewed 
condemnation of “the assumptions of anti-Fascism” are today expressed by Italian 
politicians like the post-Fascist Gianfranco Fini and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. 
Fini claims to have paid Fascism’s dues and to have brought it through the customs 
barrier in January 1995 by denouncing Fascism’s anti-Semitic past. Berlusconi, 
“outmatches Mussolini’s own efforts to be a journalist in politics by offering instead 
the spectre of a media magnate in politics” (Monbiot, 2002:13). The influence and 
consensus-building that the media wields is examined in Chapter II under the section 
that addresses some of Bobbio’s most important concerns about the development of 
liberalism in modern society. Bobbio’s view on intellectuals reflects a great degree 
of pessimism that derives from such “new contributors” on the cultural front. He 
laments the fact that intellectuals in the new millennium do not count as much as 
their predecessors. More than the articles that intellectuals write and the interviews 
they grant, Bobbio argues, the Italian political scene has been changed by a rude
9
illiterate like Umberto Bossi, a capable businessman like Berlusconi and an 
efficient demagogic orator like Fini (Bobbio, ii:1). To Bobbio’s annoyance, he 
himself is old-fashioned: he prefers the written word to dialogue, to live personal 
interviews and to the unbridled debate that characterizes today’s mass media. 
Many of those live interviews and debates lead to misunderstanding, he believes 
(Bobbio, jj:1). Bobbio sees television and other mass media as performing the task 
once left to intellectuals.
In Chapter I, ‘Intellectual Alliances Against Fascism’, I set out to establish Bobbio’s 
link with anti-Fascism, with particular emphasis on Gobetti’s contribution to Italian 
liberalism. The most important ideal Bobbio and Gobetti share is two-sided: i) the 
autonomy of the individual before the State; and ii) the condemnation of Fascism 
for having attributed ethical value to the State while the individual was reduced to a 
mere instrument of political power. By closely following the experience of the 
Communists of Turin in the early twenties during industrialization, and as a 
collaborator of Antonio Gramsci’s publication Ordine Nuovo10, Gobetti affirmed a 
spirit of participation and critical vigilance. The most important outcome of initial 
anti-Fascist criticism, following the entreaty of Gobetti, was that liberal intellectuals 
were encouraged to broaden the scope of their criticism and to embrace every 
sphere of public life. It is this branching-out that laid the foundations of an entire 
outlook and political blueprint that culminates in Bobbio’s liberalism. Bobbio is 
closely linked to Gobetti, morally and culturally. Both affirm a need for a strategy of 
inclusion on cultural grounds and have sought interlocutors from all political 
streams. Gobetti acclaimed the liberating force of the Russian Revolution and 
affirmed the autonomy of culture in overcoming the unnatural divide between East 
and West. Bobbio continued that tradition during the Cold War, but did not remain 
deaf to the evils of the Soviet empire.
I then examine the influences and historical imperatives imposed on Bobbio’s 
philosophy by Piedmont. The corpus of ideas culminating in a pattern of action which 
Bobbio defines as the politics of culture has Turinese anti-Fascist roots. I introduce a 
group of preferred authors or maestri that Bobbio has acquired, the members of
10
which share his political passions -  Piero Calamandrei, Aldo Capitini, Piero Gobetti, 
Rodolfo Mondolfo, Gaetano Salvemini and Carlo Rosselli.
In Chapter II, ‘Political Community: Liberalism over Multiculturalism’, I discuss the 
newly emerging challenges for liberalism. In Italy, the liberal experience is unique 
since for roughly 2000 years Rome has been the spiritual capital of Catholicism, in 
this sense, Italian liberalism differs from that of all the other European countries. 
The Catholic Church opposed the creation of secular and independent regions and 
institutions. Italy was also slower than most European nations in developing a 
strong state tradition and a sufficient level of industrialization.
Since positivism constitutes a move away from theological or metaphysical 
knowledge, it contributes to the sphere of liberal thought. In Bobbio’s view, then, both 
positivism and Marxism “could be taken for one another... because they shared the 
major ideal of this century, the ideal of science” (Bobbio, 1995e:13). Under the aegis 
of science, the transformation of society could be better guided and “no longer 
entrusted to the forces of chance or to the invisible hand of a superior Providence” 
(ibid.:13). Both are secular philosophies although they do not share the same 
conception of history; both constitute reformist philosophies but “became the target 
of concerted attacks from the traditional intellectuals who launched the cultural 
movements of the new century” (ibid.: 14).
Given the many challenges of modern life, the very idea of progress and the 
individual as the driving force behind it has returned to the forefront of all 
discussion. Addressing such issues of social concern has a direct bearing on the 
question of the future of democracy for, Bobbio warns, “the process of 
democratization has not even begun to scratch the surface of the two great blocks 
of descending and hierarchical power in every complex society, big business and 
public administration.” (Bobbio, 1987:57). If the success of these two blocks 
continues to hold out against the pressures exerted from below, the democratic 
transformation of society cannot take place or be completed. Bobbio fears that that 
transformation may not even be possible.
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In reconstructing the history of Italian liberalism, one must necessarily 
acknowledge the importance of the resistance to Fascism. I therefore discuss the 
role of Gobetti as an intellectual influence on Bobbio, and examine their different 
understanding of liberalism. As the two lived under different times and 
circumstances, their anti-Fascism developed in distinct ways. Gobetti’s death at 
the age of 25 in 1926 did not permit the full realization of his anti-Fascism, but 
Bobbio consistently looks to Gobetti for his liberal mission as a publisher and 
disseminator of Italian, European and Russian historical texts. Gobetti’s journals, 
the first of which he published at he age of 17 (Energie Nove), set an example that 
Bobbio followed, that of writing and debating his views, thus proffering them for the 
scrutiny of fellow intellectuals.
By the 1930s, a force with limited membership comprising mostly intellectuals and 
left-wing politicians developed into a much more broadly based Resistance, which 
was “formidable, both psychologically and militarily” (Koff and Koff, 2000:13). The 
PdA, along with the Democrazia cristiana (DC)11, Partito comunista d’ltalia (PCI)12, 
Partito socialista italiano (PSI) and Republican parties, formed a Comitato di 
Liberazione Nazionale (Committee of National Liberation - CLN) after the fall of 
Mussolini. Of the parties that formed the CLN, the PdA, which had not existed 
before Fascism, did not outlast the Resistance. Both GL and the PdA were created 
to counter Fascism and in this respect they are unique elements of Italian political 
history. They emerged after the victory of Fascism and were not tied to pre-Fascist 
ideology. They constituted a reaction to Fascism, “to what Fascism meant and 
caused in Italian political life" (De Rosa, 1985:422). The PdA signalled a call for 
renewal, based on a critique of the institutions and parties of the pre-Fascist 
period. GL and the PdA had a revolutionary and subversive character (Aga Rossi 
in De Rosa, ibid.). The PdA was the expression of cultural commitment and 
political vocations that had a radical meaning and included various traditions of 
progressive Italian liberalism that went from Mazzini to Gobetti and Salvemini.
12
Bobbio believes Marxism to be on an equal footing with positivism since both “isms" 
are secular and share the ideal of science. Communism is necessarily included in 
Bobbio’s vision of liberalism since he believes a rejection of Communism would be 
incompatible with freedom. Indeed, one of the most interesting debates in Italy is that 
of intellectual responsibility for the political drift to the radical Right. The vision of an 
Italy that needs to overcome Marxism to achieve the nation’s modernization, to expel 
Marxism from Italian history -  as Marxism is a totalitarian and pre-modern culture 
that is extraneous to the thought that emerged through western Enlightenment -  is 
portrayed by Pasquale Serra as Bobbio’s main pursuit13. However, Bobbio’s 
preference for Marxism and his abhorrence of Fascism did not mean that he 
reserves no criticism for Marxism. It is Bobbio’s conviction that Marx’s genius lies 
primarily in his achievement as a critic rather than as a system-builder (Bobbio, 
1988:163). He reminds us that Marx believed proletarian democracy to be more 
democratic than bourgeois democracy and also “heralded the emergence of a new 
type of state which would inaugurate the process of the withering away of the state” 
(ibid.: 106). Bobbio envisages a different relationship between democracy and 
socialism, wherein it is not the case that all states are characterized negatively.
Communism’s attributes, Bobbio argues, are evergreen, despite the grave errors 
committed in the name of Communism. The PCI waited several decades before 
distancing itself from the Soviet Union, as it was caught up in the mythology of the 
Russian Revolution. After 1948, Italy encapsulated the Communist ideal of 
difference, of diversity, in a post-war political landscape held in the sway of the DC 
and, at the same time, gave strength to other non-Communist groups of the Left. 
Although the PCI was wrong to reject social democracy and caused Italian 
socialism to oscillate between pro-Communist positions and pro-DC positions, its 
culture fostered Italian political maturity. Representatives of the PCI formed a 
major component of anti-Fascism, helped draft the Italian Constitution, defended 
democratic institutions and also supported a vast campaign to eradicate illiteracy.
In the immediate post-war period, from the pages of the journals Rinascita (from 
1948-1955) and II Politecnlco, Elio Vittorini and Palmiro Togliatti14 headed two
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different ideological currents. Vittorini emphasized the autonomous and separate 
role of intellectuals vis-a-vis political parties. Togliatti did not deny that separation of 
roles but was adamant that politics towered over culture; culture, in his view, 
depends on politics. At the beginning of the fifties, Bobbio sparked new debate 
concerning these two visions of the intellectual by responding to the initial positions 
of Vittorini and Togliatti15. As the Cold War took definite shape, intellectuals were 
faced with the obligatory and radical choice of taking sides, given that the world had 
been split into two blocs. Perplexed by that state of affairs, Bobbio decided to take 
refuge in intellectual commitment rather than seek an active role in politics. Although 
he was deeply interested in politics, “he never accepted the diminished role of the 
‘organic intellectual’” (Mancarella, 1995:39). Bobbio’s position was that of the political 
critic, without an anti-Communist vision. During the immediate post-war period, he 
concluded that Italy, in the years leading up to the conflict, had undergone a phase 
characterized by the divorce of culture and politics. That divorce, he believed, 
derived from the poor functioning of the “social organism”, typical of weak democratic 
societies. In a society that does not function properly, he argues, it is inevitable that 
the process of transformation rests on the shoulders of intellectual minorities. It is 
they who must “educate” or indoctrinate the masses, that is, teach them ideology. 
Indeed, that process has already been witnessed in history. In the 18th, 19th and, in 
the case of Italy, early 20th centuries, the influence of intellectuals culminated 
respectively in the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and Fascism.
Bobbio’s discussion of Italian political culture also includes a dialogue with 
Catholics and how their direct experience of Fascism culminated in staunch anti­
communism. Their position contrasts with Bobbio’s in that he considered the 
Communists to be the anti-Fascist allies of the Partito d’Azione. Through his 
exchange with the Catholic historian Augusto Del Noce, Bobbio emphasizes the 
lack of democracy that characterized Christian democracy in the post-war period, 
but also acknowledges the importance of the Catholics in building genuine 
liberalism. That exchange concerned the necessity of a politics of the centre for 
post-war Italy, the question of overcoming anti-Fascism and whether Togliatti’s 
Communist Party would eventually become a democratic party16. Although both Del
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Noce and Bobbio spoke as direct witnesses of Fascism, there was a fundamental 
difference concerning their relationship with the Communists: Del Noce and the 
Catholic party of the centre were adversaries of the Communists in the anti-Fascist 
movement while Bobbio and the members of the PdA were their allies.
Later in Chapter II, I discuss Bobbio’s preference for Hobbes’ model of the State. 
The span of Bobbio’s lifetime has coincided with the “reversal of the relationship 
between the state and the citizen, which typifies the formation of the modern state” 
(Bobbio, 1996a:viii,ix). Politics today puts more emphasis on the rights a citizen 
can demand than on the duties of a citizen. The individualistic conception of 
society has ail but blocked a view of politics from the sovereign’s perspective. 
Bobbio proposes the replication of Hobbes’ contract between individuals and the 
State to benefit nations through international conventions, but this proves to be 
ambitious and difficult terrain. International enforcement mechanisms such as the 
International Criminal Court have not been accepted by all states and there is no 
general consensus on the benefit of states’ subjecting themselves to international 
standards of accountability. The power of criticism voiced by the media and the 
rule of international law lead government leaders to fear prosecution before an 
international court. The development of international institutions indicates that the 
defence of human rights and the effective administration of justice are not priorities 
shared -  or shared equally -  by all states.
In Chapter III, I discuss Bobbio’s formula and recommended agenda for 
intellectuals: the politics of culture. The tools required to pursue that agenda are the 
research of facts and their interpretation. These lead inevitably to the realization that 
the genuine historical danger for Italy was Fascism rather than Communism, since 
Communism represented the lesser threat to liberty. Contemporary attempts to 
attribute equal cultural dignity to Fascism and anti-Fascism are not acceptable to 
Bobbio. This revisionism aims to discredit historical truth, leaving an empty political 
space in which anything can be constructed. The cult of power, contempt for 
minorities, racist propaganda and praise for authoritarian systems have been 
sharpened by the revisionism permeating contemporary Italian culture. Bobbio
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implemented his politics of culture by crossing the last century in awareness, and by 
providing documents that consisted of "watchful recollections” that would encourage 
debate.
The essential elements of the politics of culture and inclusion comprise, among other 
things, the cultural activities of debating, writing and publishing and the absolute 
autonomy of the same, reacting to others’ views, disregarding the dogma of external 
authorities such as the Church and the party and celebrating the value of diversity 
through open and varied political association. The process of debate serves to 
develop new positive values that are required in the political arena.
Bobbio warns us not to identify only those involved in artistic, literary or scientific 
pursuits, or those who transmit a particular cultural heritage as intellectuals. 
Intellectuals do not form a homogeneous class “and they are never represented by a 
party” (Bobbio, 1993a: 157). As minute coachmen, the intellectuals who form the 
intellectual class are not the bearers of a sole body of ideas. Rather, according to the 
ideas they defend, they are libertarians or authoritarians, liberals or socialists, 
sceptical or dogmatic, secular or religious. Each group has its own intellectuals and 
ideals.
Bobbio disagrees with intellectuals who believe that involvement with politics 
represents a kind of dishonour17, but he also warns that they must not betray their 
primary role as teachers and disseminators of culture. Intellectuals run two risks vis- 
a-vis culture, he maintains: if the intellectual plays a central role in affirming a 
particular ideology, he can be said to be betraying his mission. Yet in remaining 
aloof from politics, the intellectual is able to exert little influence on the outcome of 
politics. Bobbio identifies the true intellectual as a militant philosopher who must 
fight the theses that he considers opposite to his own. The intellectual’s major task 
is that of demonstrating his civic commitment as a teacher.
The ideal figure of the intellectual vis-a-vis politics is independence but not 
indifference, Bobbio argues. One of the fundamental characteristics of a society
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that is not free is the exalted supremacy and imposition of politics over culture. In 
such a society, the sphere where the battle of ideas takes place is subject to the 
will of whoever holds power; to retain it the ruler uses the legitimate monopoly of 
force but also claims to have the monopoly on virtue (Bobbio, oo:1).
As a theorist, the intellectual is limited to developing his or her ideas and framing a 
vision of the same. This role contrasts with that of the politician -  the practitioner -  
who turns the ideas into action. The coachman can take the lead but the road 
travelled in political and historical terms is not within his complete control, Bobbio 
argues. The theory framed by intellectuals is reflected in practice, and the intellectual 
himself must be capable of translating theoretically elaborate principles into concrete 
political action. If not, Bobbio argues, the intellectual’s commitment remains sterile 
and abstract (Mancarella, 1995.:40). The role of the intellectual vis-a-vis political 
power is an enduring theme and I indicate where Bobbio stands in comparison to 
other intellectuals, particularly contemporary ones like Bauman and Rorty. As 
concerns Italian intellectuals, his position lies somewhere between that of Salvemini 
and Gramsci: for Salvemini, the domain of politics is incompatible with intellectual 
pursuit while for Gramsci the contrary is true, for politics pervades everything (ibid.).
Bobbio envisages a more innovative role for the intellectual, a role that is 
independent from the two traditional models: politicized culture and apolitical culture. 
Culture must be autonomous, Bobbio argues, yet not entirely apolitical, for it does 
occupy a political level, but it also serves other purposes that are not exclusively 
political. He prefers to use the phrase “politics of culture” in referring to the precise 
social function of culture, which is not necessarily defined as part of a specific 
political formation. To define culture as a political formation would diminish its role, 
for intellectuals are obliged primarily to defend and promote the development of 
culture, to ensure that suitable conditions in which culture can flourish are 
maintained.
Bobbio established a form of debate rooted in anti-Fascism that is of perennial 
validity, for it fills a historiographical gap. He proves that the simple identification of
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the culture of the Left with Communism removes the influence of all other 
ideological matrixes of the Left. The non-Communist Left left tangible signs of its 
pluralist cultural experience, which are "even more significant than those of 
Communist culture” (Mancarella). He welcomes the advent of sociology since it 
brought about a transformation in the intellectual’s role, and split the category of 
intellectuals into two groups -  ideologues, who provide guiding principles, as well 
as a new era of “intellectual experts” who established a relationship with 
policymakers. Ideologues and experts represent intellectuals who provide guiding 
principles and intellectuals who suggest the means to achieve an end, 
respectively. In society, Bobbio argues that we need intellectuals with good 
academic backgrounds to organize consensus since most citizens, realistically 
speaking, do not exert a significant influence on “the way political decisions are 
made”.
The major opponents of the Fascist regime emigrated to France or elsewhere, to 
continue their intellectual struggle against the regime as political emigres. In Paris, 
the Sardinian Emilio Lussu18 and Gaetano Salvemini formed "the anti-Fascist 
movement that took up the task of identifying and promoting methods of 
revolutionary struggle to topple the Fascist dictatorship” (Internet site h). GL 
members objected to the placing of members of the Fascist elite within all the vital 
organs of the State in order to create the hierarchy that would run the country 
(Corvaja, 2001:v,vi). Those intellectuals expressed opposition to the ’’culture of 
politics” that is characterized by what Bobbio refers to as the planning of culture by 
politicians. The politics of culture must defend liberty by removing the material and 
moral obstacles that impede the free circulation of ideas. Genuine culture, Bobbio 
affirms, requires both liberty and truth (Bobbio, 1955:39). Bobbio refers to “truth” as 
a spirit of approach in evoking historical experience, for culture is not practised in 
complete isolation from political ideology. The autonomy of culture is, by the same 
token, not complete; its autonomy is relative. What the intellectual must do to 
preserve that partial autonomy, Bobbio advises, is that even when he associates 
himself with a particular ideology he must still maintain a critical spirit that is not 
influenced by dogmatism. Intellectuals must act when political power uses
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dogmatism as a tool of government, for resistance against it and the defence of 
critical spirit become the moral and political duties of the intellectual (ibid.:40).
Bobbio does not like intellectuals who remain above the crowd, or those who are 
cynical or only try to console themselves. Impartiality, which is a theoretical 
necessity, ought not to be confused with neutrality. Bobbio thinks that the 
intellectual should be an example of moderation. Therefore, to jump headfirst into 
the melee of the daily news, to pass judgement on all and everything based on the 
little reliable information that comes from newspapers, to give advice that has not 
been solicited, to accentuate non-essential details, and then lose, sight of the 
overall, are acts which are not befitting to intellectuals. Militant culture does not 
escape falling into such routine, however, Bobbio warns. The theory of media as a 
modern means for the public to scrutinize the activities of governments has taken 
on increasing importance in Italy. This is hardly surprising since public sector 
television has, traditionally speaking, been riddled with party appointees. The 
freedom of mass media and the undue influence of business and political interests 
are one of Bobbio’s particular concerns in his discussion of liberalism. Control of 
the television news and publishing industry in Italy constitutes a threat to 
democracy. The intellectual is called upon to change this unhealthy practice.
in his consideration of the recurring question of the relationship between intellectuals 
and political power, Bobbio distinguishes between “experts” and “ideologues” who 
contribute to the course of history. “Ideologues” refer to principles that guide, while 
“experts" refer to technical knowledge. The politician and the intellectual are two 
different figures and, according to Bobbio, “when faced with a problem, the former 
has the task of taking a decision, whatever it may be, while the intellectual sets about 
analysing it, to illustrate the pros and the cons of the question” (La Stampa, 
2/07/98:19).
The changing role of intellectuals is a subject that has been researched by many 
contemporary intellectuals. At the end of Chapter III, I look at the views of Zygmunt 
Bauman and Richard Rorty to see how they differ from Bobbio’s conception of
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intellectuals. Bauman distinguishes between the differing roles of intellectuals in 
modernity and postmodernity: formerly the intellectual was a legislator, but in the 
post-modern era the intellectual is an interpreter of events. Still, both cultural 
strategies continue to exist. Rorty is disenchanted with philosophy and is 
convinced that there is no agreed-upon list of central problems that philosophy 
ought to tackle. That position contrasts with the specific aims that Bobbio sets for 
intellectuals. For Bobbio, an intellectual must recognize the benefit of competing 
truths in reinforcing democracy -  yet this benefit itself rests on a moral choice to 
eliminate inequality, all forms of Fascism, and to steer clear of creating a new 
politics by destroying the moral lessons of Europe’s anti-Fascist past.
Fascism had succeeded in uniting in the political-institutional sphere that which was 
intended to remain divided in the social sphere. The principle of “each in his place” 
ensured the perpetuation of a compact and rigidly hierarchical political system. As a 
result of this stratification, “ideas -  not live ideas, workable ones, that are embodied 
in [individuals] and transformed into actions -  but the ideas written in books, were 
the first and only compass for young intellectuals” (ibid.). This theoretical 
accentuation reflected the PdA’s cultural opposition to Fascism. The PdA’s approach 
to politics and opposition to Fascism sought out organizational points of reference 
such as the universities, publishing houses and magazines. The consideration and 
dissemination of ideas signalled a widely felt desire for intellectual liberty. This 
ferment of ideas was also joined by a wish to abandon a limited form of socialization 
in which “students only fraternized with students; professionals, with men of culture: 
not a worker, a farmer, an artisan” (ibid.). The openness to consider ideas was 
united with a strategy of inclusion that opposed Fascism and the 
capitalism/Communism alternative, where PdA adherents put particular emphasis on 
the humanist quality of the person, regardless of his or her social and occupational 
condition.
In democratic society, intellectuals cannot remain aloof, as they would in a 
totalitarian society where the only alternatives are to serve or to refuse to 
participate at all. At the beginning of the century, Benedetto Croce believed that
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Italian politics were such that a person of culture should do his “cultural job” and 
leave politics to the politicians. Intellectuals, he thought, would contaminate culture 
with politics if they acted in the service of politicians. For Bobbio, during Fascism 
exactly this service was exemplified by those university professors who performed 
a “professional duty” by teaching that Fascism was not a dictatorship but an 
ethical, rights-based state that sought to perfect Italy’s constitutional monarchy. 
Such action, however, constituted a betrayal of their roles as intellectuals. All 
opposition groups were silenced and the regime was linked with the deaths of 
many outstanding Italians who had opposed it. For those who praised the regime 
and sought to embellish the ethical principles of the Fascist state, such as 
Giovanni Gentile, Bobbio expresses only scorn in recalling their example of 
intellectual and cultural betrayal.
Cultural militants go from scrupulous but indifferent academic culture to the other 
extreme of cultural militancy which, although partial and biased, is based on 
current problems. There is an ever-present tension between academic culture and 
militant culture. Bobbio’s model is that of the rigorous intellectual who possesses a 
good academic background and a strong civic passion, with a capacity for critical 
restraint that does not wane when it comes into contact with daily problems. That 
kind of intellectual, Bobbio maintains, knows that there are economic, political and 
social problems whose solutions will affect his own life as an intellectual. When 
intellectuals tackle those problems, however, they add value to the discussion of 
them through their sense of critical analysis and their vocation to acquire 
knowledge with no other hidden purpose. To this, intellectuals add respect for their 
adversaries’ opinions; awareness of their adversaries develops as a result of 
mutual study, undertaken to address eternal problems as well as emerging 
questions.
During the Resistance, the relationship between politics and culture seemed to be 
reversed, compared to the first stage of “intellectual duty” exercised on a 
professional level by academics. Fascist academics had demonstrated the use of 
culture in serving politics whereas the Resistance fighters hailed the triumph of
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politics -  a new politics -  directed at culture but independent from politics. They 
had given culture the task of leading national renewal. For Bobbio, until the time of 
the Resistance, Italian intellectuals had been “nothing”, yet had been placed in a 
position to become “everything”. The Resistance marked the liberation and 
redemption of Italian intellectuals from the lowly state they had reached. That 
liberation was characterized by the efforts of anti-Fascist intellectuals who 
dedicated themselves to planning the future organization of the Italian State.
At that time, Bobbio believed in the “irresistible force of the Communist Party” and 
gave little credit to former Socialists and Catholics. He writes: "I thought that 
intellectuals should have worked together with the new classes to effect a radical 
reform of the structure of the Italian State” (Bobbio, 1955:199). The PdA took the 
lead in formulating a politics of after-Fascism. Bobbio does not believe, however, 
that the Resistance was a revolution undertaken by intellectuals -  where writers, 
originators of ideas and programmes and representatives of cultural and spiritual 
life played a very important role. That revolution, he says, was caused by the end 
of Fascist hegemony, where intellectuals were left in “an open sea" (Bobbio, kk:2) 
of many possibilities. The thought of Croce and Gentile was put aside to consider 
French and German intellectual sources. For, Bobbio argues, Italian intellectuals 
felt that it was time to uproot themselves from the national cultural tradition. Part of 
that need was a reaction to the crude nationalism imposed by the Fascist regime. 
When the Italian intellectual tradition was finally abandoned, Italian intellectuals 
experienced an inferiority complex and rushed to catch up for all the years lost 
under Fascism (ibid.). Initially, the new Italian State, born from the partisan 
Resistance, “recognized universities and culture as pillars of the new State” (ibid.), 
although that eventually proved to be an illusion. Bobbio, at least, maintains that all 
the fervour was not accompanied by a sufficient degree of originality.
Traditional or interpretative frameworks have come under attack since the end of 
the Cold War, particularly the Marxist remedy for the failures of liberalism. An 
assessment of the post-World-War II period reveals that there are grounds for 
scepticism about politics and democracy, as well as about political values
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themselves. Under these circumstances, the intellectual’s duty is to remain an 
“eternal doubter”, unlike the political “man of action”. Recently, in a revolutionary 
shift, the analysis of reality has overtaken ideological values, but “ideology can be 
refreshed by reality, particularly from historical lessons learned in acutely adverse 
periods of history, such as during Fascism” (ibid.). A way forward would be “to 
stoke the fires of anti-Fascism" in order to encourage a plurality of views and 
discussion from all corners. If parties of the Left can agree that the exercise of 
dictatorial control, violence and brutality equalled Fascism and constituted a 
negative experience, then their identities are clearly grounded in whatever is not 
Fascism. The 20 years of Fascism was a positive cultural thrust. That experience 
forced those in Italy who stiil had any human awareness left to think seriously 
about the country’s old and new problems, its history, its historical roots, its 
development, the reasons for its unification, its possibilities, limits and faults 
(Garin, 1996:viii). Philosophers then looked for a pluralist source of knowledge and 
found themselves discussing liberty with Martinetti, justice with Calogero, and non­
violence with Capitini. They went back to dreaming of how to achieve perpetual 
peace.
Paradoxically, political dialogue was easier during the decades of the Cold War 
when ideological affinities were clearer. Defining the present era presents a 
deepening challenge owing to the doubts and uncertainties associated with what 
Luciano Violante, former speaker of the house in the Italian parliament, calls the 
problem of problems: the age-old consideration of where the dividing line between 
philosophy and politics lies (La Stampa, 25/5/97:23). At the same juncture, Violante 
comments that “doubt cannot be the permanent attitude of the politician, since in the 
end politics is the dominion of choice and decision” (ibid.). Bobbio chooses the 
metaphor of the labyrinth to describe the human condition in history. Wittgenstein’s 
fly in the bottle is a flawed image, he contends, since “this idea implies that there is a 
way out, and that outside the bottle there is a spectator -  the only one who knows -  
the direction to the way out” (ibid.). The spectator in Wittgenstein’s analogy is the 
would-be philosopher. Bobbio rejects the notion that the philosopher has a privileged 
understanding of reality. He believes each individual has the capacity to find the
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truth. The labyrinth is also more apt than the metaphor of the fish in the net “that 
struggles to find a way out, since there is no exit and the fish is unaware of it” (ibid.). 
The individual who enters a labyrinth is aware that a way out exists, but does not 
know in which direction it lies. Therefore, the individual proceeds gropingly, realizing 
that there are some unsuccessful paths that are not to be travelled further, and trying 
to find which other road will reach the exit.
Bobbio maintains that existence is a continuous attempt to exit from the labyrinth, 
without succeeding to do so. Bobbio urges his readers to be vigilant in recalling the 
lessons of history. This philosophical pessimism derives from what can be called an 
open political wound resulting from unsettled accounts that persistently remain 
unsettled. The labyrinth is synonymous with Bobbio’s thinking since his thought, 
Pasquale Serra affirms (Datanews, 1995), “is too complex, owing to the variety of 
subjects he examines, the quantity of his published writings and his wide-ranging 
approach, comprising various disciplines, to be reduced to any one aspect or 
moment in time” (p. 53). According to Serra, Bobbio sought to expel Marxism from 
Italian politics. He suggests that that process started in 1975, and took on 
increasing importance with the debate on the “crisis of Marxism” that began in 
198519.
In Chapter IV, I conclude that in the post-Communist era “history is moving again” 
(Lucas, 1999:18), and the current moment in time is an appropriate one in which to 
consider the validity of differing intellectual approaches. The question of how to 
proceed amidst the challenges of modernity and the political uncertainty that has 
followed the demise of Communism have occupied the forefront of politics. Bobbio 
describes one such challenge as humanity’s dramatically increased ability to exploit, 
manipulate and deflect nature from its normal course. That manipulation has created 
moral and legal problems which, increasingly, will require political decisions. As 
these will be completely different from any decisions taken in the past, there is a 
greater need for the leadership of intellectuals, despite Bobbio believing that they 
enjoy only the role of minute coachmen.
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Bobbio believes that Communism is morally superior to Fascism, since 
Communists fought to prevent the existence and expansion of Nazi concentration 
camps like Auschwitz. Some may counter this argument by stating that the Soviet 
Union had its own lagers and forced work camps -  the Gulag -  for those who 
questioned party discipline and rejected the artificial uniformity imposed by the 
Communist regime. This regime at times thwarted intellectual creativity and 
resulted in violence. However, it is important to note, as Bobbio does, that the 
Soviet Revolution represented a milestone in the development of human rights, in 
terms of intent. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was part of a process 
that derived from “the rights of a historical man ... which commenced with the 
French Revolution and included the Soviet Revolution” (Bobbio, 1996a:19). Bobbio 
is certain that the job of providing global protection of human rights has not yet 
been finished. As knowledge widens and technology develops, economic and 
social conditions will produce changes in the organization of human life and 
relations that will engender favourable conditions for the creation of new needs 
and new demands for freedoms and powers. By contrast, Fascism has been 
described as a disease and the plague of the twentieth century.
Marxism, a positive philosophy, enriched Italian and worldwide political debate and 
continued to emphasize the force of the Enlightenment tradition. In particular, 
Bobbio hails Marx’s view that progress could only take place by abandoning 
historical precedent and religious dogma. The Marxist hope of uplifting the masses 
set the stage for a liberal interpretation of the political struggle as the motor of 
social progress. Another liberal influence of Marxism was the shift from dynamic 
participation by the State -  which had performed disappointingly in the pre-Fascist 
era -  to participation by the workers.
The cycle or flow of ideas that began with Gobetti is characterized by the need for 
liberals in all historical situations to bring together the interests of antagonistic 
social forces. These interests must be defended since they are tools which 
contribute to the widening of the potential for freedom. The working class not only 
had the economic objective of higher wages, but the political objective of greater
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freedom through greater equality. The strategy of inclusion that still distinguishes 
the Left so starkly from the Right lies precisely in the will to explicate interests in 
this way. Further, the Left tries to engage whoever it can in the struggle to better 
the human condition.
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Chapter I INTELLECTUAL ALLIANCES AGAINST FASCISM
In this chapter, I endeavour to establish Bobbio’s link with anti-Fascism and to 
draw attention to some of the contemporary debates concerning anti-Fascism and 
Italian identity. Bobbio sets out to reinforce the link between himself and Piero 
Gobetti, as a model of liberal anti-Fascism. He is convinced that that link remains 
valid even though Gobetti was largely inspirational, and instructive only in an 
indirect sense. Gobetti was a leading intellectual and influential anti-Fascist of the 
early twenties who attributed Italy’s political immaturity to its lack of a Protestant 
revolution.
Aurelio Lepre defines Gobetti’s liberalism as “existential anti-Fascism”, which 
Giovanni De Luna describes as “a paradigm of identity able to provide a genuine 
alternative to the models that inspired the Italian formed under Mussolini’s time" 
(Lepre, 1997:50). The “Italian” Gobetti envisaged was an “anti-Italian”, who 
eschewed not only Mussolini’s totalitarian project, but also the quietism and 
resignation of those who preferred to “wait it out”, trusting that Fascism would 
eventually pass. Gobetti warned against the fatalistic and resigned attitude of 
those Italians who waited it out, those who bore witness to a time that never 
changed. Gobetti accused the majority of Italians of being attendisti, that is, of 
being lax in countering Fascism. This conception of Italians developed over time in 
response to the slow or indecisive adoption of participatory politics in Italy, and the 
forging of Italian identity.
Some critics emphasize Gobetti’s “intellectual aristocraticism” (ibid.:51), and 
dismiss his “suggestive anti-Fascism” (ibid.) which they find to be very limited. At 
the same time, Gobetti’s critics draw attention to the fact that Gobetti had little 
affection for the common man, whose presence he once described to his wife as 
“a smell of bourgeois chattel" (ibid.). Gobetti’s perception of ordinary people also 
had political importance: he believed in the realization of political ends through 
education, which was the political method adopted by Trotsky and Lenin. He also 
heralded the new epoch that the rebellion of workers signalled during the 1919
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occupation of Turin’s factories (ibid.), and personally identified with those workers. 
However, Gobetti feared that the workers were perhaps too weak to be able to 
drag the masses into their movement, and that the masses “might not have the 
strength to suffer and resist but would prefer to give in” (ibid.). The workers in the 
factories also failed to produce an epos or essential stage of their own epic theme, 
Gobetti argued, for they obeyed their divisional inspectors who commanded by 
pistol (ibid.:52).
Although Gobetti defined anti-Fascism as being physiologically innate and a 
question of instinct, he did not have sufficient time to develop a more practical 
political platform. Bobbio has remained loyal to Gobetti’s somewhat immature spirit 
of criticism and non-conformism in elaborating his own politics of culture. Gobetti in 
particular was influenced by one of the most important Marxist philosophers in 
Italy, Rodolfo Mondolfo. In elaborating his own formula of humanistic socialism 
based on a critical review of the policies pursued by the PS I at the time of its 
congress in 1908, where Mondolfo had “detected an ideological and ethical paucity 
that he tried to address” (Pugliese, 1999:56), he tried to defend socialism from its 
more authoritarian and deterministic variants. Mondolfo was one of Gobetti’s 
intellectual models, for he was an original thinker who looked beyond Marx and 
proposed other intellectual sources like Feuerbach, among others, in proposing an 
autonomous cultural alternative to economic Marxism.
Mondolfo was at pains to illustrate the humanist content of Marxism, and to preserve 
an autonomous interpretation of Marx, one not limited to economic determinism. 
However Gobetti was, in Bobbio’s words, anxious to distance himself from the 
“inertia and immaturity of Italian socialists vis-a-vis a phenomenon like Fascism 
which, in his view, they should have easily been able to cripple, if they had had the 
express political will to do so” (Bobbio, 1986b:95). Although in the early days of 
Energie Nove Gobetti sought to spare Mondolfo from the “continuously harsh and 
anti-socialist polemics that fill his writings from beginning to end” (ibid.), by the 
summer of 1922 Mondolfo had become for him the symbol of the politics pursued by 
Italian socialists. Bobbio describes Mondolfo as a theorist of democratic socialism,
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whereas he sees Gobetti as a theorist or champion of radical and anti-socialist 
liberalism.
Bobbio portrays Gobetti as a theorist who distances himself from the anti-Marxism of 
his maestro, Luigi Einaudi, and who insists on the distinction between Marx the 
scientist and Marx the creator of myths. Marx the scientist is condemned inexorably 
by the science of economics, since liberal or free-market economics “are the only 
scientific economics” (ibid.:93). However, for Gobetti, Marx the creator of myths is 
not to be discounted, and he notes that the oversimplification of Marx the economist 
even serves to boost the greatness of Marx the creator of myths. Gobetti deems that 
Einaudi erroneously “perceived Marx to be an economist, yet he is a philosopher, 
historian, prophet, and political agitator” (ibid.). In 1923, in L’ora di Marx, Gobetti 
renders this distinction clearer, by repeating “the need to differentiate between the 
dead Marx and the living Marx, between Marx the economist, who is ‘dead, along 
with surplus value, the dream of the abolition of classes and the prophecy of 
collectivism’, and Marx the theorist of historical materialism and class struggle; thus, 
not only a creator of myths, but [a theorist] who had provided tools acquired forever 
[to benefit] social science” (ibid.:93,94). This interpretation of Marx, Bobbio says, 
accrues to social science and not merely to political practice; it is at this precise 
juncture that Gobetti reveals that Marxism and socialism no longer constitute an 
identical target. Gobetti’s decision to draw closer to Marxism does not attenuate the 
harshness of his anti-socialist polemics, but is grist for his mill in reinforcing the 
argument Indeed, Gobetti praised the liberal aspects of both liberalism and 
Marxism, to the detriment of socialism, since socialism is based on protection from 
above.
Gobetti argued that one can be both liberal and Marxist (ibid.). For, he argues, 
understood as the theory of class struggle, Marxism is perfectly compatible with 
liberal theory, which has an antagonistic conception of society and history. 
Liberalism has the advantage of not falling into the illusion of a future society 
where all class struggle ceases, yet socialism with its acritical and non-scientific 
faith in economics through the intervention of the state is the antithesis of the
29
liberal idea. For Gobetti, if Marxism were defined as the theory of class struggle, and 
if the new protagonist of its historical movement was the working class (e.g. the 
Turinese Communists who were not socialists), then the first revolution fought in 
Marx’s name was a liberal revolution. All struggle, deriving from the pluralism of 
views and the conflict of opposing opinions and values constitutes progressive liberal 
struggle, in that one class or one force, or a group of forces, seeks to limit the action 
and political thrust of another force(s).
Bobbio’s liberalism is driven by anti-Fascism. This foundation is crucial to any 
understanding of his work, as it also nourishes his later arguments about the 
politics of culture. Although anti-Fascism and Communism had different 
resonances at the time of Gobetti’s death, Bobbio emphasizes the contribution of 
the Red Army in waging the final assault and victory over Germany at the 
beginning of 1945.
The underlying motive for Bobbio’s “acceptance” of, and dialogue with, Marxists 
rests in his utter condemnation of Fascism. Indeed, in the chapter entitled 
Revisionismo nella storia d’ltalia (Bobbio et al., 1996d), Bobbio admits that 
historical revisionism is inevitable and that today’s revisionist will be subject to the 
re-consideration of tomorrow’s revisionist. However he expresses his astonishment 
at Renzo De Felice’s affirmation that “Italian historians continue to skirt the case of 
Mussolini, without ever wishing to face and resolve it once and for all” (ibid.:56). 
Bobbio objects to this stance by affirming that no definitive interpretation of any 
great historical figure can ever be achieved, given that everyone hovers round 
such figures.
It seems that this affirmation is an indication of the polemical soul that at 
times comes close to animosity, with which all historians who have until now 
concerned themselves with Fascism, anti-Fascism and Resistance are 
judged ... All this historiography is called by a deprecating term: vulgata20 or 
vulgate of the Resistance (ibid.).
De Felice maintains that historiographical vulgata is aggressively hegemonic and 
constructed purely for reasons of ideology in order to legitimize both Italy’s new
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democracy of 1945-1946 through anti-Fascism, and the democratic role of the 
Communist Party in overcoming Fascism. He attempts through this declaration to 
destroy a legend which the first republic kept alive for half a century This legend is 
the “mythology” of the Resistance, which causes its ageing partisans to describe 
the world as they would like it to have been.
Bobbio criticizes De Felice’s view that history is a science, based on the truth of 
facts, and asks “if you can call it a science, to which type of science does it 
belong?” (Bobbio et al., 1996d:58). “Judging from the confidence with which De 
Felice contrasts true history with the false history of the various vulgate, one would 
say that it can almost be considered a form of knowledge comparable to that which 
today is called strong or hard science" (ibid.). It is not so, Bobbio counters.
In tracing the relationship between anti-Fascism and anti-Communism, Bobbio 
therefore objects to De Felice’s premise that history can be written either according 
to a vulgata based on ideological and dogmatic prejudice, or scientifically written. 
He finds repugnant the notion of “history as a science, to ascertain what really 
happened, not to absolve or condemn” (ibid.:56). Historical reasoning is opposed 
to political interest. Still, when considering the pros and cons of anti-Communism 
and anti-Fascism, Bobbio rushes to defend the superiority of anti-Fascism. Clearly, 
he believes all Fascists should be condemned, whereas Communists do not merit 
categorical rejection. He notes that De Felice mistakenly contrasts the passion of 
the anti-Fascist vulgata with an equally strong anti-Communist passion. This is 
unacceptable to Bobbio, for Fascism must be named and shamed for what it 
represented.
De Felice insists that the Resistance reached its conclusion more than fifty years 
ago and is too far off to be of significance today. He invites Bobbio and others who 
share his views to bring their “vague reminiscing” to a halt. Indeed, De Felice 
considers that the Fascists, the Germans and the Allies all played an unidentified 
role in the last years of Italian Fascism, and that it is high time that the “tragic
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chorus of partisans” desist in its tribute to the unidentified masses who supposedly 
supported them (De Felice, 1995:12) in the Resistance movement.
Fascism, in its condemnation of Communism, portraying Communists as enemies 
to be conquered, stands in opposition to Bobbio’s own view. He emphasizes that 
the Communists, as fellow anti-Fascists, were interlocutors and welcome 
participants in mutual political dialogue. He refuses to accept De Felice’s portrayal 
of the Resistance, and his glossing over of the Communist contribution in defeating 
Fascism. Today, in Italy, this question remains a burning one, and much of 
Bobbio’s prose is dedicated to an accurate depiction of the forces and events 
which led to the foundation of the Italian Republic. In some quarters, this mission 
of the Italian Left is referred to as "keeping the tiny flame alight” and comprises 
preventive action to keep history from being rewritten.
Bobbio has identified five characteristics of Fascism as a political movement. It can 
be termed anti-Enlightenment, anti-progressive, anti-materialist, anti-individualist 
and anti-parliamentarian. In 1994, whilst participating in a debate on the risks of a 
return to Fascism in Italy, Bobbio stated that “as long as there are Communists, 
there will be Fascists; both are tied together by a double thread” (// Corriere della 
Sera, 8/12/94:11). Here, the reader is reminded of Bobbio’s particular relevance in 
the contemporary political configuration.
‘Fascism can count on at least two good reasons to raise its head again. 
The Communist revolution which was opposed most stringently by the 
Fascists has failed. In part, the First Republic failed, born as it was on the 
ashes of Fascism, its principal adversary’. ... ‘In mature democracies that 
are consolidated out of history or habit, where Communists do not exist 
Fascists do not exist, or they only constitute small groups of no political 
relevance’ (ibid.).
The Communist revolution failed, but the problems that existed before 
Communism remain. Much still remains to be accomplished in the realm of 
equality, human rights and justice. Here, Bobbio tells us that a social revolution is 
still required, perhaps in another form, and he foresees Fascist opposition to that
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revolution. Moreover, he believes that both Fascists and Communists will continue 
to exist in Italy until it becomes a mature democracy.
De Felice tends to minimize both the number of partisans who took part in the 
Resistance, and the attendismo or willingness to wait it out on the part of the Italian 
masses. This induces him to remark that “the best and most animated forces of 
history are ‘ethical-political’ ones, and that a people, such as the Italian people, 
have always demonstrated a reprehensible ethical-political ‘weakness”’ (Bobbio et 
al., 1996d:58). Bobbio claims that De Felice thus suggests a determined, specific 
vision of history, which contrasts with a materialist conception of history.
Bobbio’s discussion of Fascism today draws to a great extent on his own life 
experience. That experience reflects a political maturity gained through the 
recognition of the difference between two political traditions which continue 
alternately to converge and conflict with one another. Medail describes these 
traditions as a liberalism that is rooted in a call for liberty, and a democracy that is 
based on equality (/'/ Corriere della Sera, 18/10/99:25). For Sartori, Bobbio seeks 
an intermediate way between two extremes: that of politicized culture “that obeys 
committees, programmes and the dictates of politicians”, and that of apolitical 
culture which is removed from society and the problems that affect it (ibid.). 
However, through all of Bobbio’s meanderings, he remains loyal to the tradition of 
anti-Fascism and a political legacy that is deeply bound to the city of Turin.
1.1 Liberalism and socialism as the components of anti-Fascism: 
Bobbio following in Gobetti’s footsteps
Although Norberto Bobbio and Piero Gobetti never met, these two thinkers, both 
from the city of Turin, made an immense contribution in the 20th century to the 
larger European project of political integration. Both affirm that a stance of 
cooperation and reconciliation should be pursued on cultural grounds, and that 
cultural autonomy should prevail in overcoming the unnatural divide that existed 
between East and West. That divide still exists, in terms of political maturity and
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cultural influence, as well as the North/South one that rests on inequality. Gobetti’s 
initial dialogue with Marxists culminated in a school of anti-Fascism whose 
adherents can succeed in eliminating those divides through recognition of the 
positive force of political antagonism.
As fierce anti-Fascists who subscribe to the Enlightenment’s interpretation of 
human beings as creatures uniquely endowed with reason and aspirations to 
liberty, both Gobetti and Bobbio look to Communism as a constitutive and 
necessary component of anti-Fascism. Both advocate secularity yet acknowledge 
the indissoluble link between democracy and Christianity. In Europe, relations 
between civil and religious society represented and continue to represent one of 
the central aspects of ideological conflict and political confrontation, and implicitly 
constitute an “alternation component”, as required in any healthy democracy.
In Ne con Marx ne contro Marx (1997a), Carlo Violi sums up Bobbio’s stance vis-a- 
vis Marxism: Communism for Bobbio is a bulwark against Nazi-Fascism. He 
condemns the increasing tendency of some revisionists “to equate those who 
fought to prevent Auschwitz with those who fought to maintain and expand 
Auschwitz on a worldwide scale" (La Stampa, 13/12/97:23). Bobbio’s interpretation 
of political history and his mission as an intellectual reflect Gobetti’s influence, 
which culminated in his joining the PdA. This influence is characterized by a 
conception of liberty as both an ideal and a need to act; the call to action is just as 
strong in Italy today, Bobbio contends, “at a time in which a new political class 
without roots has demonstrated a tendency to make a tabula rasa of our past, 
whether intentionally or not" (II Corrlere della Sera, 21/2/96:29).
In Violi’s words, Bobbio, “through a direct debate with Marxists, carried out in three 
different phases over a period spanning a quarter of a century, following in 
Gobetti’s footsteps, contributed to the birth of a critical and non-conservative 
radical liberalism different from that of Croce and his successors” (Violi, 
‘Introduction’ to Bobbio, 1997a:xxi). While conservative intellectuals in the post-war 
period treated Communism and Fascism with equal remoteness and therefore
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refused all dialogue with Marxists, “progressive intellectuals, although refuting the 
theory and practice of Communism -  above all in its only historical form realized in 
the land of ‘real socialism’ -  were open to critical confrontation” (ibid.:xxi,xxii). Violi 
writes that moral obligation fuels Bobbio’s intellectual commitment as a 
philosopher.
With the defeat of Fascism and the arrival on the political scene of the 
parties of the Left, Marxism -  which between the two wars had been an 
‘underground’ philosophy -  returned to the light of day, along with the other 
militant philosophies of post-Fascism: existentialism and neo-positivism. 
After the discrediting of the idealist philosophies ..., Marxism, as a positive 
philosophy, could only meet with Bobbio’s favour, for as a ‘militant 
philosopher’ he was intensely involved in the political debate, which he felt 
to be a moral obligation (ibid.:xxviii).
Marx echoed the pro-science, anti-superstition premises of the Enlightenment, 
which held that progress could take place only by abandoning over-adherence to 
historical precedent and religious dogma. Marxism continues this emphasis.
Spadolini, in his work Padri della Repubblica, writes that
Gobetti was one of the most representative exponents of the generation that 
emerged from the war [World War I ] , without having fought in it, and one 
who [witnessed Italy enter into Fascism] against his will. He therefore found 
himself in the best spiritual condition to condemn the old political leaders 
who disappeared with the war, and to reject the new leaders who had 
sprung from the war (Spadolini, 1998:28).
Gobetti rejects state socialism and interprets political struggle as the motor of 
social progress. The Italian workers’ movement of the early and mid-twenties was 
in his view mistaken in pursuing doctrines that “promised the achievement of a 
collectivist Eden and harmonious class collaboration under the paternal aegis of 
the State” (il Corriere della Sera, 21/2/96:29). Bobbio’s research has continued 
along these lines, such that socialists must be challenged “to reconsider the 
relationship between democracy and socialism” (Bobbio, 1988:1) since 
“concentration on an essentially unworkable goal for socialism, in which so-called 
‘bourgeois’ freedoms are unnecessary, has seriously weakened socialist political
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practice” (Bobbio, 1988:1). The task at hand is to “rethink the socialist end in ways 
compatible with the preservation of the liberal means” (Bobbio, 1988:1), although 
the task has been rendered more arduous by the fact that “discourse on truth, 
judgement and taste, which used to seem to be administered completely by 
intellectuals, is now controlled by forces over which intellectuals have little or no 
influence” (La Stampa, supplement 12/6/97:2). Foremost among these forces are 
the new authorities: the market, television and global technologies.
Gobetti’s anti-Fascist legacy is tied up with the thought of Antonio Gramsci, Luigi 
Sturzo and several other Italian thinkers. In formulating their opposition to Fascism, 
Gobetti and Gramsci aimed at reconstituting liberalism and Marxism, and sought 
out the Catholics and other possible allies to enlarge their anti-Fascist base. 
Gobetti’s main message was that Italy had never had a liberal revolution, that the 
Risorgimento had not involved the participation of the Italian masses, and that the 
Reformation never really reached most of Italy. Above all, Gobetti’s liberalism was 
expressed as a sense of crisis, a tension towards the new, and a wish to avoid the 
reification of Italy. In place of the nation, Gobetti hoped that workers’ aristocracies, 
which would reach the highest level of development through trade unionism and 
Communism, would rule.
Like Marx, Bobbio envisages his own form of utopia but, whatever form it takes, it 
must necessarily be based on the rule of the law.
My utopia, which is ... an enlightenment utopia, goes beyond European 
unity. The problems of the ‘global village’ can only be ... solved on an 
international level -  through a process of democratization of the 
international system. In Perpetual Peace Kant not only distinguished 
constitutional law ..., which regulates relations between a state and its 
citizens, from international law, which regulates the relation between states 
that Carl Schmitt later called the jus publicum Europaeum, but introduced ... 
a third legal category, which he called ‘world civil law,’ which no longer 
regulates only relations between states and individuals and between 
individual states but also relations of individuals within individual states to 
each other -  it is a law based on the principle that human beings are no 
longer citizens of particular states but ... of the world (Bobbio in Glotz and 
Kallscheuer, 1989:142).
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In Italy, the Enlightenment tradition of liberating minds from dogma, irrationality 
and murk was reflected in Gobetti’s battle against Fascism. He represents, Bobbio 
affirms, “a way of thinking that has followers; a style that will be repeated by others, 
a group of ideas that, far from systematic, has had a great force of penetration, 
and leaves an indelible trace wherever it passes” (Bobbio, 1986b: 123).
Coming to grips with Fascism is a theme that dominates Bobbio’s interpretation of 
liberalism, as it did Gobetti’s before him. In the early twenties, Gobetti confronted 
Fascism and its consequences -  which grew graver day by day -  with a policy of 
absolute intransigence. He defined Fascism “not as a passing evil but as a 
hereditary and mortal disease” (Bobbio, 1995e:117). As Italy had experienced 
neither the liberating process of the Reformation nor the formulation of a protest 
movement vis-a-vis the Catholic hierarchy, it remained politically immature. 
Therefore Gobetti called for an Italian Protestantism, though one not strictly limited 
to the model of modern Protestant nations:
Among us, the Protestant movement must work on a more painful need, a 
problem which is absolutely crucial to Italian life. The victory of Catholicism, 
the conservative and reactionary practice accompanied by demagogic 
artifices that are found in our history are inevitable as long as the current 
and traditional economic conditions prevail (Gobetti, 1997:823).
At the end of 1998, Giulio Einaudi of the Turin publishing house Einaudi for the first 
time “paid tribute to Gobetti in an address given at the University of Turin21” (La 
Stampa, 2/1/99:21). Einaudi affirmed that Gobetti represents a mode! of the liberal 
tradition, who taught “a lesson on the ‘religion of liberty’” (ibid.). In this century, 
Gobetti’s liberalism stands alongside Gramsci’s social-Communist theory and the 
"utilization and verification of the Marxian method” (Bobbio, 1995e:163); both were 
prominent in the political life of Turin in the early twentieth century and developed 
“two youthful movements, each associated with a journal, each aimed respectively 
at reconstituting Marxism and liberalism” (Adler, 1989:131). Gobetti was only 22 
when in 1923 he founded the series il Baretti, one of the three journals that he 
ultimately launched; in the early twenties he also churned out over 100 books on
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literature, philosophy, history and politics, over just a three-year period. Gobetti, as 
Giulio Einaudi wrote recently, “sent out a message of trust and hope in the 
publishing world of ‘creation’, in times of insistent re-creation’’ (La Stampa, 
2/1/99:21). As a youth in secondary school Bobbio subscribed to II Baretti. in 
considering Gobetti, “Bobbio is perhaps the vital link between an amazing 
generation of intellectuals which came of age in Italy during the 1920s (Gramsci, 
Gobetti, Rosselli), and contemporary discussions of pluralism, liberalism and the 
‘new’ social democracy’’ (Adler, 1989:130,131).
Gobetti elaborated a formula of liberal revolution to remedy the weakness of the 
Risorgimento, which had not included a mass uprising. He proposed the launching 
of a new Risorgimento and a workers’ revolution “not inspired by the Socialist ideal 
of collectivism but rather by the classical Liberal ideal of ethical competition and 
laissez-faire economics” (Bobbio, 1995e:117). Gobetti aimed to link “liberty with the 
aspirations of the working class, rather than with the traditional bourgeoisie that 
had become decadent and an obstacle to historical progress” (Adler, 
1989:131,132).
The concept of revolution for the foundation of a new society is also present in 
Bobbio’s work. His thought reflects the ideal of the PdA invoking a transformation 
of culture, though not through a “revolution that slavishly imitated the Soviet 
revolution, which had already exhausted its capacities for the creation of a new 
society” (Bobbio, 1995e:147) early in the post-war period. Only a totally anti- 
Fascist society could bring about the revolution required, building on the lessons 
learned from Fascism. Hence Bobbio, like Gobetti, wanted to broaden the politics 
of change.
The historical ideologies that ... fought Fascism and that aimed at dividing 
its spoils were considered partial ideologies that could never have carried 
through a total renewal of society because each of them would have tried to 
remake the world using economic and political structures that Fascism had 
confronted and defeated. Total renewal could only come from a ‘total’ anti- 
Fascist ideology. Since total renewal implied revolutionary transformation, 
the new ideology opposed all forms of restoration of the pre-Fascist past
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that the Liberals held dear, but it also rejected any attempt at ... Soviet 
revolution (ibid.).
Bobbio remains adamant in acknowledging the decisive role played by 
Communists in the birth of the Italian Republic, particularly as accounts of 
revisionist historiography have increased markedly since the fall of the Soviet 
empire. These accounts call into question the legitimacy of the present Italian state 
and the ideals of the Resistance.
Up to now, Italians have always accepted the idea that the War of Liberation 
fought by the anti-Fascist parties that made up the Comitato di Liberazione 
Nazionale -  the parties that subsequently gave the Italian political system its 
structure -  was what gave legitimacy to the Italian Republic created after 
the fall of Fascism and the defeat of Hitler. With the end of Communism, 
doubt has begun to rise about whether the Resistance could still be 
considered the principle of legitimacy behind the new Italian state. Indeed, 
did not the consideration of the Resistance ... as the historic event out of 
which the new democratic state was born imply recognition that the 
Communists played a decisive role in that birth? (ibid.).
This decisive role of the Communists in defeating Fascism has had an impact on 
Bobbio’s favourable yet qualified opinion of Italian Communists. Initially, his own 
attitude towards Fascism was one of forced complicity, for “intellectuals, artists and 
professionals were forced to join a single syndicate and to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the State, and most did so” (Pamphlet, 1996:2). At the end of the 
thirties, Bobbio “redeemed” himself by joining GL, when he was teaching at the 
University of Camerino. First having sworn allegiance to Fascism, then having 
constructed his anti-Fascism on an exclusively ideal approach, he “matured” and 
moved on to become an active and informed anti-Fascist militant, along with 
Calogero and Capitini. It can be said that in his career he sought to redeem 
Communists in the same way. He made allowances for them, and hoped they 
would undergo a similar maturing process in the same manner, and evolve 
towards a cultural transformation.
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1.2 Gobetti’s anti-Fascist legacy
After World War I, Gobetti and Gramsci aimed at reconstituting liberalism and 
Marxism, respectively. The Catholic position, too, is an essential component of 
early Italian democracy. “While the Communists of L’Ordine nuovo presented 
theses that took their abstract inspiration from Lenin, with little regard to 
differences in the historical situation, to depict a utopia set in the future ..., the 
Catholics, on their return to politics after the war, attempted to respond to the 
highly concrete problem of Catholic participation in the life of the state” (Bobbio, 
1995e:113). Gobetti promoted active association with Gramsci as well as with the 
Catholic leader Luigi Sturzo. Sturzo, however, sought a middle road that kept 
liberals and socialists on the sidelines:
The basic theme of Sturzo’s politics and the novelty in the programme of the 
new Partito popolare italiano (launched ... 18 January 1919), was to combat 
the pantheistic state ‘in its two facets: tampering with the rights of local 
entities and of the citizen in his free personality and activities; and functional 
and bureaucratic centralization, in contrast to administrative 
decentralization.’ Under the cover of this state, ‘which subjects everything to 
its force: the internal and external world, man and his reason for being, 
social forces and human relations,’ Liberals and Socialists had worked hand 
in hand, only pretending to be adversaries. Sturzo rose to the defence of 
liberty against them both, by which he meant not the liberty of single ... 
individuals but the autonomy of groups and the subordination of political 
society to civil society (Bobbio, 1995e:113).
While Gobetti sought deep social renewal and the emergence of another, truly 
different Italian state, yet to be realized, Sturzo, in the face of Fascism, became a 
companion in arms rather than an adversary.
Giovanni Spadolini, in Padri della Pepubblica (1998), recalls that Gobetti’s 
“encounters, his books, his newspapers and memories of old Turin” serves to give 
one a sense of his activism and liberal spirit, for example, when “not having 
reached the age of 20, he wrote theatre criticism for Gramsci’s socialist paper 
‘Ordine nuovo', which was located in four extremely modest rooms in an old 
building undergoing demolition in the centre of Turin” (Spadolini, 1998:37).
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Gramsci and Gobetti became friends despite their lack of shared political 
objectives. In Primo Levi: Tragedy of an Optimist (1998), Anissimov confirms that 
1919 was the year “when the National Socialist Party was founded in Germany and 
when Mussolini created the Fasci italiani di combattimento ... [1919] was also the 
year Gramsci, Tasca, Togliatti and Terracini launched the Communist weekly 
L’Ordine nuovo, in Turin” (Anissimov, 1998:14). Turin is a city that symbolizes 
intellectual vigour, "a city which ever since the early days of Fascism seems to 
have been a proving ground for generations of political ideas in Italy” (ibid.:327). 
Ordine nuovo, as the most important publication of Italian Communism, aired the 
views that were developing among the workers of Turin.
Spadolini stresses the cultural, intellectual and political debt owed to Gobetti and 
the importance of his message that Italy had never had a liberal revolution. In 
reading Gobetti’s view of the Risorgimento, its myth as a people’s revolution is 
debunked: “Liberalism was the sense of crisis, and tension towards the new and 
the Risorgimento had been more of a compromise with tradition than a 
revolutionary crisis, more of a return to the past, to Catholic and Roman Italy, 
rather than a leap towards liberal and modern Italy” (Spadolini, 1998:28). A key 
concept here is Gobetti’s objection to national reification -- to portraying the nation 
as a concrete entity rather than an abstract term. In place of the nation, Gobetti 
“seemed to see the future ruling classes in the workers’ aristocracies, elaborated 
through trade unionism and Communism” (ibid.). Although he rejected the idea of 
the victorious conquest of the Risorgimento, “he remained loyal to the 
heterogeneous currents present in the unification process” (ibid.). Spadolini writes 
of Gobetti that he was a conservative by birth, education and taste who aspired to 
revolution; above all, a moral one. Gobetti was an intellectual, who hoped to free 
himself from intellectualism.
In Gobetti’s Rivoluzione Liberate (RL)22, the central theme is the lack of initiative 
which characterized the Risorgimento, such that Italy failed to demonstrate 
authentic spiritual and political initiative.
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Spadolini describes Calogero, a professor of philosophy at the University of Pisa, 
as a prophet of dialogue and tolerance. Calogero’s marrying of justice and liberty 
resulted in a programme that, in Bobbio’s words, “sought to rekindle fighting ardour 
against democratic ‘inanities’ and reach beyond liberalism and socialism, summing 
up both theory and programme in the slogan ‘justice and liberty’” (Bobbio, 
1995e:138). Indeed this slogan would become the name of the movement GL, 
founded by Carlo Rosselli in Paris in 1930 after he escaped from exile on the 
Sicilian island of Lipari. Bobbio writes that “liberal-sociaiism began as an 
intellectual political movement in Tuscany in 1936-37 among politically 
inexperienced students and young intellectuals inspired by Capitini’s ethico- 
religious dynamism and Calogero’s philosophical theories” (Bobbio, 1995e:212).
At the beginning of the century, “the dominant cultural figure of the age [was] the 
wealthy philosopher and historian ... Croce” (Duggan, 1994:177). Croce reacted 
negatively to Calogero’s programme and accused him of possessing a persistent 
and neo-democratic Enlightenment mentality which resulted in “poor philosophers 
and poor politicians daring to place philosophical principles like liberty and an 
empirical concept like justice on the same plane" (Bobbio, 1995e:139). Yet what 
Croce viewed as merely a “compromise formula” was to become the cornerstone 
of the anti-Fascist movement: “In 1935, Bobbio joined an anti-Fascist group tied to 
GL and headed by Vittorio Foa” (Adler, 1989:132). Spadolini writes that Calogero 
fuelled the debate on the compatibility between liberalism and socialism. This 
would be “the synthesis of the moment of liberty and the moment of justice, which 
would be decisive in the history of the origins and the creation of the PdA -  an 
essential pillar of cultural and political resistance to Fascism, which later became 
military resistance” (Spadolini, 1998:122). In this context Bobbio writes:
The liberal-socialist attitude towards Communism was no different from that 
of the social democrats, who viewed the way the Soviet revolution had 
evolved as a totalitarian degeneration incompatible with socialist ideals. The 
structural remedy that liberal-sociaiism proposed and that was written into 
the programme of the Action Party was a renunciation of total collectivism 
and a division of the economy into the two sectors of public and private. 
What distinguished liberal-sociaiism from the other version of anti-Fascist 
ideology that converged with it in the Action Party was ... a different
42
evaluation of the Soviet Union and ... a different opinion on the need for 
collectivism (Bobbio, 1995e:152).
Towards the end of the Fascist regime, Bobbio wrote of his conviction that the 
ethical presupposition necessary for democracy is the autonomy of the individual 
which precedes the State, while Fascism, by attributing ethical value to the State, 
had reduced the individual to a mere instrument of political power. Today, Bobbio 
is acclaimed for having “attempted to connect the liberal conception of a necessary 
limiting of state institutions with the socialist tradition” (Glotz and Kallscheuer, 
1989:134).
In one of Gramsci’s last essays before his arrest, in which he writes about the 
southern question, he attributes Gobetti with a positive role in developing Italian 
nationhood. He writes that Gobetti helped the proletariat and that Gobetti's friends 
would continue the difficult and gigantic task he had undertaken. These friends -  
northern and southern intellectuals alike -  understood their national role as bearers 
of the two social forces of the future: the proletariat and the peasants. Paolo Spriano 
reinforces the significance of Gobetti’s liberal mission, particularly his warnings that 
large-scale industrial development should not take place without the 
contemporaneous development of the proletariat and its ability to defend and 
conquer (Spriano in Gobetti, 1997:L). Those contemporaneous developments 
Gobetti envisaged as the key to future European history; he invited readers of 
Rivoluzione Liberate to reflect on that truth.
1.3 Modem Turin and Bobbio’s path to Gobetti
Bobbio was among the collaborators of Giulio Einaudi at the Einaudi publishing 
house in Turin and this circle “enjoyed a close and controversial relationship with 
the Italian Communist Party (PCI)” (The Guardian, 9/4/99:11). This aspect of 
Turinese culture reflects a recent polemic, for the influential publisher’s critics 
“accused him of helping to create a Communist hegemony in Italian culture and of 
practising rigid self-censorship over the Soviet system’s shortcomings” (ibid.).
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During the time of World War II, “the Einaudi company continued publishing 
despite persecution by the regime and the destruction of offices in an allied 
bombing raid; Einaudi fled to Switzerland, later returning to participate in the 
Resistance in his native Piedmont” (ibid.). Einaudi, over a span of 50 years, 
compiled “a catalogue of 5,000 titles -  a history of 20th century Italian intellectual 
life” (The Guardian, 9/4/99:11).
There is also evidence that Bobbio supported the work of the publisher 
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. Before his tragic death in 1972, Feltrinelli financed a 
“publishing house connected with the PCI, the Cooperativa del Libro Popolare 
(Coiip) which published, among other things, an invaluable paperback series called 
‘Universale economica’ to circulate the texts of the international socialist tradition” 
(Petrillo, 1998:517). Another important publication, Movimento Operaio23, was “the 
first Italian journal specializing in the study of the workers’ movement, and the 
nursery of an entire new Marxist and Gramscian generation of historians” (Petrillo, 
1998:515). In 1958, “with Feltrinelli’s financial support, ... Pivista storica del 
socialismo (Historical Journal of Socialism) [was published], a periodical intended 
to speak for the Italian Marxist historiography alternative to the Gramsci line” 
(Petrillo, 1998:525). These Feltrinelli publications, followed by those of the 
Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli give the reader an idea of the type of research 
conducted by the Foundation.
Although Bobbio “paid the price imposed by Fascism of a purely formal adherence 
to the regime ..., during the years of the Resistance he was active in the ranks of 
the Action Party” (Bobbio, 1995e:xx), as were many other Turinese. Noted for his 
criticism of the political representation offered by the state in Italy, Bobbio at this 
time claimed that Italy’s permanent defect was that “of an excessive centrism, and 
an insufficient rotation of power” (Bobbio, 1988:82), yet at the same time affirmed 
the validity of the Left/Right distinction in politics, and elaborated his own 
definitions of those terms. Massimo Salvadori, in the foreword to Bobbio’s 
Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy (1995e), maintains that the 
relationship Bobbio has with Turin is of particular significance, since he lived “in the
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capital of Piedmont in the company of other outstanding figures in the realm of 
philosophical and historical culture, such as the famous existentialist philosopher 
and historian Nicola Abbagnano and the celebrated historian of Russian populism 
and the European Enlightenment, Franco Venturi” (in Bobbio, 1995e:xx). Since 
joining the active anti-Fascist resistance in the late thirties when, while teaching the 
philosophy of law at the University of Camerino, he became a member of Guido 
Calogero’s Liberal-Socialist Movement, “Bobbio has lived his career as a scholar 
by locating himself, more than anyone else, at the centre of Turinese cultural life 
and its cultural institutions, from the Einaudi publishing house to the Centro Studi 
Piero Gobetti and the Fondazione Luigi EinaudF’ (Salvadori in ‘Foreword’ to 
Bobbio, 1995e:xxi). Bellamy, too, agrees on the cultural significance of Turin: “The 
cultural and social environment of his native city has a special importance in 
explaining Bobbio’s intellectual and ideological allegiances” (Bobbio, 1987:2).
As the foremost exponent of an Italian liberal democratic tradition inspired by the 
PdA, Bobbio has, in Salvadori’s words, become “the Turinese philosopher’” (in 
‘Foreword’ to Bobbio, 1995e:xxi), much in the same way that Croce was “the 
Neapolitan philosopher”. Yet “there is no hint of provincialism in Bobbio’s loyalty to 
Turin ... thanks to the city’s role in the twentieth century as one of the major 
cultural and political centres of Italy” (ibid.). On the centrality of Turin, Adler writes:
To understand or at least get at the roots of Bobbio’s intellectual formation, 
one has to return to 1920s Turin, which had displaced Florence as the 
intellectual centre of Italy -  at least so far as the young generation was 
concerned. Turin had been associated with Italian liberalism from Cavourto 
Einaudi. It became associated with Marxism in response to rapid 
industrialization (particularly the automobile industry) and the development 
of a powerful, self-conscious labour movement. Yet by the early 1920s both 
liberalism and Marxism were in crisis and soon Fascism would come to 
power (Adler, 1989:131).
It must be mentioned that Turin’s historical and political predominance had briefly 
been challenged by the radical thinkers active in the city of Florence at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Those thinkers were neo-idealist, hostile to 
socialism, and represented a “broad current of anti-modernist, anti-democratic
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thought that ran through the Giolittian period” (Duggan, 1994:178). The Florentine 
magazine Leonardo, founded in 1903, “carried in its first number a characteristic 
attack on the wireless telegraph” and voiced the view that such technical 
discoveries “might make life quicker, ‘but not more profound"’ (ibid.). The 
intellectuals grouped around Leonardo, and the later Florentine magazine La Voce 
(1908), aimed to construct an intellectuals’ party “whose task would be morally to 
regenerate Italy and forge a new ruling elite” (ibid.).
Turin, a city that with the foundation of the FIAT24 automobile company at the end of 
the nineteenth century largely led the way in the industrialization of Italy, also 
became home to a Centre of Methodological Study (University of Turin) in the post­
war period. This Centre provided a forum for “philosophers and scientists, jurists and 
economists, mathematicians and physicists to take up a renewed ‘discourse on 
method’” (Bobbio, 1996b: 125). Bobbio affirms that it was thanks to his active 
participation at the discussions of this forum that he was able to “take a decisive leap 
and leave the ambiguities of the past and the wanderings of his youth behind” 
(ibid.: 125). Above all, this milieu was successful in generating a different cultural 
outlook; Bobbio adopted a dual approach to the science of politics by never 
separating theoretical study from historical study.
He took up the theoretical direction first travelled by another Turinese, Piero Gobetti, 
who, as we have seen, was a champion of radical and anti-socialist liberalism. 
Gobetti maintained that there was a need to differentiate between the dead Marx 
and the living Marx, between Marx the economist, who is “dead, along with surplus 
value, the dream of the abolition of classes and the prophecy of collectivism” 
(Bobbio, 1986b:93,94) and Marx the theorist of historical materialism and class 
struggle. This later Marx is not only a creator of myths, but a theorist who provided 
tools that will forever benefit social science.
Gobetti is both an honourable and dishonourable figure in contemporary Italian 
politics, as can be seen from “the yet to be concluded debate on the PdA, as 
Gobetti’s thought is considered to be one of its original sources” (La Stampa,
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16/2/96:1). Gobetti is believed to be the inspiration behind what remains of the 
PdA and its original ideals. However, Bobbio contends, “the most astute critics 
tend to distinguish between Carlo Rosselli’s liberal-socialism and what is called 
Gobetti’s liberal-Communism” (ibid.). For Bobbio, “Gobetti is a young hero of high 
ethical and political engagement” (Bobbio, 1995e:xxxi) who, while still a young 
man, died in Paris over seventy years ago. Gobetti established an important 
association with Antonio Gramsci, who had studied at the University of Turin. 
Gramsci had been a socialist leader in Turin and in 1921 he was among the 
founders of the Partito Comunista d’ltalia; in 1924 he became the party’s Secretary 
General. However, in Italy, even among men of culture, “Gramsci remained little 
more than a name until 1947 when the publication of Lettere dal carcere revealed 
his great humanity and intellectual stature” (Badaloni, 1977:vii). Yet Gobetti did not 
fail to appreciate Gramsci’s theoretical writings and critical analysis of Marxism, 
long before the letters appeared.
Gobetti describes Gramsci as “a prophet suspicious of all humanity, of the entire 
present time” (Bucchi, 1997b: 102), whose “socialism is first of all an answer to 
society’s offences to his solitude as a Sardinian emigre" (ibid.: 100). “By comparing 
Lenin and Marx, Gramsci realized that the way to rediscover the genuine spirit of 
Marxism was to return to its origins in Italian and German idealistic thought, and 
that Marx himself was ‘contaminated by positivist and naturalist encrustations'” 
(Bobbio, 1995e:111). As Lenin’s revolution had not taken full account of Marx’s 
revolution against capital, Gramsci praised the dynamism of events where “the 
canons of historical materialism are not so rigid as might have been and has been 
thought” (Bobbio, 1995e:111).
And indeed Gramsci was busy implementing his ideas in 1920: “In April 1920 
Factory Councils of workers modelled on the Bolshevik soviets, and led by Antonio 
Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, the future leaders of the Communist Party, took 
over the main industries in Turin and Milan in protest against management plans 
for radical restructuring to meet peacetime conditions” (Absalom, 1995:103) 
According to Kirkpatrick, “There were altogether 1,881 strikes in 1920 ... the
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movement petered out and by the end of the month [April] the factories were 
quietly evacuated, but the episode was a shock to the country” (Kirkpatrick, 
1968:95,96).
From 1921, Gramsci’s Ordine Nuovo switched to daily publication from its previous 
weekly appearance. Gobetti was put in charge of theatre criticism and literary 
review (Cabella, 1998:87). But, Adler tells us that
Gobetti’s group was more diverse and eclectic than Ordine Nuovo; it was 
not directly engaged in politics but primarily a literary circle including Carlo 
Rosselli, Ernesto Rossi, Lelio Basso, Carlo Levi ... Despite obvious 
differences, there were points of contact. Gobetti was a friend of Gramsci 
[... and Gramsci] had written for Energie Nuove -  a journal Gobetti founded 
in 1918 at the age of seventeen ... Moreover, both groups separately 
analysed Fascism as an outcome of the Risorgimento’s shortcomings, as a 
product of failed liberalism. Both groups became part of a joint struggle 
against Fascism; both became part of the city’s intellectual and political 
patrimony (Adler, 1989:132).
Gramsci endeavoured to elevate the proletariat culturally, and to undertake a 
discussion of the new problems that the October Revolution in Russia had brought. 
As Badaloni tells us, he was especially concerned with problems concerning “the 
creation of a new type of State” (Badaloni, 1977:xxi), the worker state that Lenin 
had created.
For his part, Gobetti’s political experience, enriched by the constitution of the 
factory councils set up in the factories of Turin against the backdrop of the Russian 
revolution, was woven into his brand of anti-Fascism. The demands put forth by 
the workers of Turin came to epitomize Gobetti’s conception of liberalism. Cabella 
writes: “He was convinced that the upper and middle classes were not capable of 
renewing a society that appeared sluggish and incapable of change: he therefore 
had hope in the creative attitude of workers and peasants; he hoped that the men 
who rose from the multitude would continue and perfect the work of that small 
handful of aristocrats and liberal bourgeois who had made the Italian 
Risorgimento” (Cabella, 1998:31).
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The red thread linking Gobetti with Gramsci is entwined with the white thread 
linking Gobetti with the most progressive figures of the Catholic Popular Party. His 
intense correspondence with those individuals who dominated the political and 
cultural world of his time, his “literature of testimony”, renders him, in Bobbio’s 
words, “a Plutarch-type hero, who stands alone in his greatness” (Gariglio, 
1997:17). De Rosa recalls how Gobetti waged an intransigent battle against 
Fascism and against “the infinite transformistic ability of the moderate class, which 
affected all political factions and parties during the liberal State’s years of agony” 
(ibid.:9). The vice of trasformismo25, it must be said, indicates the tradition of 
switching sides regardless of previous alliances. Yet, De Rosa adds, Gobetti was a 
dynamic purveyor of culture, the craftsman of a rich network of relationships built 
around his publishing house that extended from Turin to Milan, to Romagna, Rome 
and Sicily. “In the wide network of Gobetti’s correspondents, Catholic intellectuals 
were privileged and, in one way or another, inclined towards the figure of Luigi 
Sturzo, who embodied a secular and modern, liberating democratic conception of 
Church-State relations and those between State and society” (ibid.). Sturzo’s 
Popular Party, which aimed to occupy the centre of the political arena, “was to 
protect Catholics from the secular state but also, by means of a coalition of 
organized Catholic forces, to defend a social order threatened by revolution” 
(Bobbio, 1995e:32).
Gobetti developed a more positive attitude towards the Popular Party (PPI) as the 
Fascist movement began to gain success in the spring of 1922. However, he 
sought out not the PPI in general, but only those men of the PPI such as Sturzo 
who took up a position against Fascism..
Gobetti’s acknowledgement of the ethical-cultural and civic validity of 
popularism was not immediate; he also shared in the liberal world’s climate 
of suspicion and reserve vis-a-vis Sturzo’s party ... Many had at that time 
re-evoked the spectre of anti-Risorgimental clericalism and had spoken of 
the PP! as a Trojan horse that had entered the moderate citadel (Gariglio, 
1997:10).
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Gariglio, in analysing the change in Gobetti’s view of the PPI, mentions the 
influence that Gramsci’s thought had on him, for its use of the concept of 
overturning praxis. By using a language of liberty, Gobetti thought, the PPI would 
end up becoming liberal, beyond the actual intentions of Catholic leaders. The 
notion at work here, the overturning of praxis, is a key concept of the early Marx: 
the idea is that human beings have the means to change their circumstances. This 
idea was reflected in the work of Antonio Labriola, Rodolfo Mondolfo and Gramsci.
Indeed, this expectation, that individuals can autonomously find solutions to 
problems through // mestiere di vivere or the occupation of day-to-day living, with 
no divine intervention, was to some extent borne out. “Don Sturzo conceived of the 
entrance of Italian Catholics into their nation’s political life as both natural and 
necessary: they would appear not as agents of the Papacy, but as citizens offering 
the contribution of Christian ideals towards the solution of the social and political 
problems of the age" (Webster, 1961:19). It is clear that Sturzo’s written work is 
centred on a criticism of “an increasingly gigantic and suffocating state 
bureaucracy and the defence of local government, which must be freed from state 
controls: a blueprint for pluralistic democracy” (Bobbio, 1995e:113). Gobetti 
capitalized on Sturzo’s political action, on “his anti-transformist rebellion, his 
messianic will to reform, which made him an extraordinary figure amid a political 
class that had started to perform the last act of surrendering institutions to the 
hands of Mussolini” (Gariglio, 1997:11). Gobetti edited and published Sturzo’s 
works, as well as those of other members of the PPI.
Both Bobbio and Gobetti consider the Communists to be their interlocutors; in 
Autobiografia, Bobbio affirms that “he saw Communists, particularly Italian 
Communists, not as adversaries but as interlocutors” (Bobbio, 1997:104). This 
reveals a more general political design to pursue a strategy of inclusion. Bobbio 
seeks to exchange civilized dialogue with everyone -  with Catholics and 
Communists alike (Bobbio, 1997:104).
As for me, ! have tried to follow a mode of reasoning that weighs the pros
and the cons, so as not to eliminate all space for another’s opinion, and not
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to render his reply impossible. This attitude allowed me to maintain cordial 
relations not just with Communists ..., but also with the party ... The debate 
that led to the collection of articles in Politica e cultura started with a civilized 
dialogue with Ranuccio Bianchi Bandinelli and Galvano Della Volpe, my two 
principal interlocutors. ... Today it is difficult to imagine the spirit of the 
crusades that pervaded the opposing parties and what little willingness 
there was to understand the reasons of one another. The articles in Politica 
e cultura represented an attempt to make a breach in the wall that divided 
us. [Those articles] demonstrated that a dialogue was possible, even 
during those times that were marked by the ... Cold War (Bobbio, 
1997:104,105).
The city of Turin is unique in that it fostered the emergence of northern elites. 
Thanks to its modern industrial civilization, a number of historical forces culminated 
in formulation of the iiberal-socialism of Gobetti and Bobbio. As Gramsci wrote in 
The Historical Pole of the Cities (translation, 1994), referring to the example set by 
the Turin and Milan of his time:
Turin is not the capitalist city par excellence, but it is the industrial city, the 
proletarian city par excellence. The working class of Turin is compact... and 
distinct as in few other cities in the world. Turin is like one great factory ... 
(Gramsci, 1994:137).
Italian “Protestantism” was experienced first in Turin, as will be described in the 
next section. Protestantism introduced a liberal element into Italian politics, what 
Gobetti would refer to as an “experiment in the politics of Enlightenment” (Bucchi, 
1997b:59). The early experience of Protestantism in Piedmont resulted in the 
Piedmontese developing a practical method with which to understand human 
action and to accept the benefit of posing problems. Within the complexity of social 
life, problems are excellent points of reference, even tools to use in identifying both 
crises and vital forces present in political equilibrium (ibid.:59).
Camillo Cavour played the greatest role in shaping Piedmontese politics after 1849 
and gave them their liberal imprint. His success has been attributed to the fact that 
he had Swiss-Protestant relations: “It was largely from them that he absorbed 
some of his concern for freedom, religious tolerance, and the work ethic” (Duggan, 
1994:122). Cavour, in seeking to end the Catholic Church’s monopoly of
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education, attempted to reduce the dominance of “one Church” as a centre of 
power. More than a century later, another Piedmontese recalls that society is best 
governed when power is distributed, when centres of power are many and those 
centres remain vigilant vis-a-vis the corridors of central power (Bobbio, La Stampa, 
21/09/76:3). The Protestant legacy of Turin fostered the development of secular 
politics in Italy where “Protestantism” became a bulwark of the liberal state.
1.4 Italian Liberalism and the “Protestant” inspiration of Gobetti’s 
Turin
During the Italian Reformation, things took a turn different from that in England. 
There, in the early 1700s, tolerance could be equated chiefly with the political 
thrust of the Whigs to ensure toleration of dissenters, and with a move to put the 
entire Church establishment on the defensive, given the rising secular challenge 
and reaction to it. In Italy, however, individual conscience was unduly influenced 
and limited by the presence and strength of predominantly one Church.
Gobetti looked to the English as a mature people who “believed in precise 
ideologies and were willing to face danger to ensure they prevailed” (Bucchi, 
1997b:61). He envisaged the worker in Italy as an indispensable dynamic element 
in the productive process, where the experience of work was synonymous with a 
school in which the worker could learn pride, humility, and the dignity of labour. In 
other words, “this apprenticeship was the latest great revolution, after Christianity” 
(ibid.). Above all, Protestantism in Italy “had to fight economic policy sustaining 
parasites and the unanimity of the petite bourgeoisie” (ibid.), a process through 
which the workers could demonstrate their ability to lead, that is, to produce 
capable leaders with a need neither for dictatorship nor theocracy. Yet, for Gobetti, 
change in belief was also the core of freedom, in this case, the workers’ freedom to 
prepare their own leaders through the experience of the production process.
There is something Protestant -  in an extended sense -  about the heritage of 
ideas in and around Turin. The towering presence of the papacy in central Italy
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made it more difficult to adopt a form of Protestantism as envisioned by Gobetti, in 
which class struggle takes on all the energy and ferment of the Reformation. The 
papacy has generally demonstrated its intransigence towards Protestantism. Yet 
such a “Protestant" movement was alive in Italy long before the Reformation. In the 
twelfth century, Pierre Valdes, a merchant from Lyons, founded “The Poor of 
Lyons" movement. Adherents were to live in poverty, in the imitation of Christ, and 
were to preach the gospel. But the Church, increasingly worldly, resisted the 
movement, and it dispersed. Only a few groups survived, and these settled in the 
Piedmontese Alps. After the Synod of Chanforan in 1532, these groups were 
associated with the Reformed Swiss. It was only in 1848 that the king, Charles 
Albert, issued an edict granting religious freedom. This edict, which included the 
Jewish emancipation of 1848, also assured “that the Waldensians26 achieved 
religious freedom and started a vast missionary campaign in Italy and in other 
countries” (Enciclopedia del Novecento, 1989:884).
Gobetti adopted Protestantism as a form of historical consciousness. He did not 
limit himself to religious issues but addressed political concerns as well, setting out 
to mitigate the influence of Italian Catholicism. Gobetti notes that Northern Europe 
and Britain were more advanced in having a plurality of cultures. He saw pluralism 
-  in this sense, the view that there are many moral values, some of which are or 
can be incompatible -  as acting positively on a country’s development, and 
fostering its progress.
At the time of the Fascist regime, Gobetti and those allied with him sought another 
“space”, a Protestant space focused on the city of Turin. Turin was the centre­
piece of the Resistance, of progress and of modernization. From Turin, the seat of 
anti-Fascism, the Church received the message that belief in the word of God was 
only one dimension of pluralistic Italy. As the workers’ movement gathered 
strength, Protestantism stood out as the middle way between Marxism and the 
Church. Human responsibility, not the economic process envisaged by Marx, and 
not the word of God, was at the core of Gobetti’s conception of Protestantism.
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Gobetti sought to revive and encourage new forms of consciousness through his 
liberal revolution modelled on a plurality of cultures.
It must be recognized that various outlooks in European society originated with 
Protestantism but have not remained confined to Protestantism. The religious 
pluralism brought about by Protestantism has made secularism possible. For 
Gobetti, and those thinkers who followed in his footsteps, the pluralism introduced 
through Protestantism is intrinsically good, and secularism constitutes a liberal 
revolution.
In Italy, there was never any large-scale Protestantism. Still a minority of 
Protestants, including Jews like Mondolfo and Rosselli, who were “Protestant” in 
their intransigence and in their pursuit of individual liberty, introduced ideas and 
attitudes to Italian thought which can be traced back to the earliest forms of Italian 
liberalism. By denying the universal authority of the Pope, this minority pursued a 
political agenda.
This “meeting of new ideas with the Latin world” cannot be overlooked, and has 
been well documented by Giuseppe Gangale in Revival (Sellerio, 1991), a work 
which constitutes a “solid basis for any serious discussion of heretical movements 
in Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Gangale, 1991:108). Gangale’s 
Protestantism was adopted by Gobetti to imbue Italian philosophy with different 
strands and to enrich Italian cultural debate in terms of human identity. Gobetti’s 
view that Italy had not undergone the Reformation and that it was in the absence 
of protest that the reasons for the immaturity of Italian ideals and politics could be 
found led him to seek a relationship with Gangale. A closer look at Gangale’s 
Protestant interpretations presented him with a chance to weld pluralism to Italian 
experience, and to ensure the expression of dissenting views, For the Protestant 
revolutions across Europe had “demonstrated their vitality in the creation of new 
moral types; Luther and Calvin had been the harbingers of the morality of work 
postulated by the newly born democracies of production” (Bucchi, 1997b:60).
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According to Gangale, “In 1818 there were no Protestant groups in Italy other than 
the Waldensians” (Gangale, 1991:10). Sismondo dei Sismondi, from an Italian 
family exiled in Switzerland, “was the vanguard voice of that group of Italians in 
Geneva ... that would create the first Protestant nuclei in Tuscany around 1840” 
(ibid.:11). Sismondi was a political liberal who rejected Mazzini and the socialists, 
both of whom he believed to be theocratic. Gangale identifies Sismondi’s influence 
on this Protestant revival, centred on spirituality and moderateness. Though it 
originated in Switzerland, it “spread, in Piedmont, among Waldensians and, in 
Tuscany, among Jansenists” (ibid.:13).
From the political point of view, there was clearly foreign interest in the Italian 
problem of effecting religious reform, and it was the Protestant voice in Switzerland 
that first mediated in Italy. The question of humanitarian Christianity was also at 
issue, given the servile situation of many small Italian states. Religious reform was 
supposed to result in spiritual reform in the Italians themselves and produce 
greater liberty.
Cavaglion comments on what the word ‘Protestant’ has come to mean in the Italy 
of today.
‘Protestant’ is a ... metaphor, almost a category of the spirit. The term ...is 
used to indicate something that is equivalent to anti-conformist, rebel, 
opponent, radical, one of a third force (neither Catholic nor Communist), 
anti-concordat, pacifist, anti-militarist, against violence, ascetic. There are 
cities, for example Turin, whose Calvinist vocation is continually displayed 
... There is a paucity of serious studies on the evangelical presence in the 
culture of our century. Given the semantic amplification of the word, ... 
writers of different persuasion and politicians who share ... the common 
denominator of strenuously Kantian, inflexible moral rectitude, have been 
catalogued as ‘Protestants’: Gaetano Salvemini, ... Ernesto Rossi, ... 
Goffredo Fofi. Yet ethical rigour is only one aspect of Protestant reality. It is 
its genealogy -  in its Methodist, Waldensian and Lutheran ramifications -  
naturally, it cannot be limited to an arbitrary list of Protestants 
(ibid.:107,108).
Bucchi adds that Luther and Calvin proclaimed the religion of autonomy and
sacrifice, of initiative and frugality, to the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Capitalism was
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born from this individualistic revolution of consciences educated in personal 
responsibility, the taste for property, the warmth of dignity. In this sense, the spirit 
of Protestant democracies is identical to the liberalistic morality of capitalism and to 
the libertarian passion of the masses (1997a:60).
It ought to be mentioned that Gobetti took up the theme of Protestantism from 
Gangale. He published Gangale’s works and then published eight articles of his 
own in Gangale’s journal Conscientia. This journal was meant for “all those who 
believed that the future of Italy was closely linked to its spiritual renewal” (Gangale, 
1991:115). Gobetti lauded Gangale’s Protestant revival not so much for the 
purpose of reawakening religious faith but for its cultivation of new ideas and 
respect for diversity.
Here again, Gobetti demonstrates a particular regard for minorities, thus revealing 
his “strategy of inclusion”. He is in dialogue with all and sundry voices to establish 
a pluralism of views and spirits that could unite in defeating Fascism. In ‘Piero 
Gobetti’s Interpretation of Culture as a Form of Historical Consciousness’ (Bagnoli, 
1998a:2), Bagnoli considers Gobetti’s liberal approach to culture as a component 
of anti-Fascism:
Behind his intention of shaping an alternative Italy to the official Italy ..., 
Gobetti paid particular attention to minorities, to the defeated and the 
heretical. This attention did not derive from a solipsistic minority-inspired 
vocation, but was an official choice to have the history of Italy rewritten 
according to a potential thread of political culture. Gobetti wanted to 
demonstrate that the arguments he sustained were not abstract, but had a 
strong historical foundation; that culture is such only if it is rooted in a 
general process of liberty, which does not necessarily accompany events or 
can be taken for granted, but which only a willingness to subscribe to values 
and the exercise of politics can generate (ibid.).
Bobbio later adopted a similar stance in seeking a cultural revival after the fall of 
Fascism; "the reawakening was marked by an impatience to explore new terrains 
that had emerged and to test their fertility” (Bobbio, 1995e:159). This cultural 
renewal was also characterized by a strategy of inclusion, as east and west were
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offered equal participation in the world of culture, despite the hardening political 
divide. There is a big difference, however. Gobetti and the young intellectuals who 
had believed in World War I as a war of liberation for Italy suddenly found 
themselves among the vanquished owing to the intensification of the Fascist 
dictatorship. On the other hand, "after World War II, the new generation that had 
participated in the war of liberation found themselves, or persuaded themselves, 
once the ogre had been felled, that they were on the side of the victors" (ibid.). At 
that time, the chief enemy was “once again spirituality” (ibid.). It turned out 
however that the gains of the Resistance -  unity, the spirit of innovation -  did not 
survive in politics. The political scene was fragmented, the people dispersed and 
lived day by day with no clear overall goals. Where the spirit of Resistance did 
survive, however, was in culture (ibid.).
1.5 Defending the Gobetti heritage today
Bobbio accuses his cultural opponents in Italy of committing Thersitism, or of being 
examples of Tersitismo culturale, that is, acting in the manner of Homer’s 
Thersites27. Such behaviour constitutes a form of impropriety resulting from their 
unacceptable and indecorous conduct. Bobbio aims to overcome this Thersitism, 
reaffirming that the intellectual movement of the post-war period still constitutes a 
valuable cultural heritage for Italy and beyond. In addition, he endeavours to 
preserve the heritage of Protestantism against new attacks from neo-liberalism 
and its proponents. Neo-liberalists, claiming to be a “new” culture, portray the Left 
in a simplified form as a dwindling army of straw men.
Today, both Gobetti and the members of the PdA, including Bobbio, are exposed 
to the same criticisms. In 1996, Bobbio identified these as: (i) an elitist conception 
of power; (ii) a moralistic interpretation of politics; and (iii) an anti-Fascism so 
radical and intransigent that it becomes the opposite, namely Fascism (La Stampa, 
16/2/96:8). In addition, the followers of the PdA have been (iv) accused of 
legitimating Communism. The first criticism amounts to mere fanciful chatter; the
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second, concerning the PdA’s moral approach to politics, is considered to spring 
from an abstract utopianism; and the third criticism, that of the detrimental effects 
of virulent anti-Fascism, is identified as the reason for PdA’s political failure. Yet 
according to the La Stampa, “On the political level, ... the major fault of Gobetti’s 
followers and PdA members is alleged to be that of accepting the responsibility of 
legitimating the Communist party -  as a democratic party” (ibid.).
Bobbio attributes the demolition of Gobetti’s myth as well as that of the PdA to two 
sources, but on opposite sides: “from the Catholic intransigence represented at 
first by Del Noce, and in more recent years by Communion and Liberation28 and 
some of its disciples, and from Galli della Loggia’s and Dino Cofranceso’s neo­
liberalism, as well some contributors to the magazine LiberaL (ibid.). Although this 
debate is not new, it is tied to current accounts of revisionist historiography. 
According to Bobbio, this revisionism is manifest in two ways: “that of attenuating 
the wrongs of Fascism and, on the contrary, of rendering more intense the wrongs 
of anti-Fascism and that of affirming, in some respects, the continuity - from the 
Fascist regime and the first Republic - of both the excessive power of political 
parties and the exaggerated expansion of the public sector of the economy” (ibid.).
The two political groupings share the belief that Gobetti and the PdA, though they 
claim to represent the liberal democratic tradition, are in fact extraneous to it. Still, 
as La Stampa indicates, there is a difference between the groups:
For Del Noce, the ‘intellectuals’ party’ [PdA] was politically defeated, but it 
had its victory in the sphere of culture, so much so as to impose secular 
reforms such as divorce and abortion on the politically hegemonic Catholic 
party; for the neo-liberals, the harmful influence of Gobetti and the PdA, 
allies of the Communists, supposedly impeded and slowed down the 
development of a liberal democratic culture in our country (ibid.).
In the late 1990s, there was a new interest in Gobetti’s “liberal revolution”, and 
consequently in the PdA. La Stampa noted in 1996 that Paolo Flores d’Arcais, the 
editor of Micromega, in his introduction to the 1995 edition of Gobetti’s La
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Rivoluzione Liberate, discusses the “surprising currentness” of Gobetti’s thought. 
He urges the present Left to become libertarian, azionista -  and Gobettian.
For Bobbio, all exaggerated forms of aversion towards Gobetti are expressions of 
“tersitismo culturale”.
I can add that one’s judgement of whether or not a person or a group of 
ideas is of current [contemporary] significance depends on the subjective 
judgement each one of us has of the situation in which we live. If one 
speaks of Gobetti’s bearing on the present, this cannot be measured here 
and now. His contemporaneousness transcends history. It is the 
contemporaneousness of Alfieri’s hero, the ‘odiator dei tiranni” [hater of 
tyrants] - he himself being a tragic hero - who inspired his first book on the 
political thought of Vittorio Alfieri29 (La Stampa, 16/2/96:8).
The problem posed by the opponents of the PdA, according to D’Arcais, is that 
“against the Italian Right which [he accuses of being] plebiscitary and Peronist, a 
liberal revolution is needed" (Internet site e:1). This is the solution D’Arcais 
proposes to the Italian Left: he invites ail democrats and progressive reformists to 
back-track to the path Gobetti prescribed, to ensure that a bourgeoisie respectful 
of institutions prevails, and to reach a pact with workers (ibid.). The true Italian 
handicap is “the ‘D’ factor” -  the lack of a democratic Destra (Right); “it is not 
Communism” (ibid.). Repeating Bobbio’s accusation that many neo-liberals are the 
expression of cultural Thersitism, Arcais judges opinion makers of the “centre”, 
such as Panebianco, Colletti, Vertone, Pera, and Della Loggia, “guilty of ‘not 
perceiving the problem, or of passing off as liberal a Right that is not liberal at all”’ 
(ibid.).
1.6 Italy’s flawed post-war settlement
In L’anticomunismo e I’antifascismo in Italia (1997), Aurelio Lepre discusses 
Franco De Felice’s conception of the debate on how to reconstitute Italian 
citizenship. This debate is centred mainly on two interpretations of Fascism. One 
includes “a reductive revision of Fascism”, to the point of diminishing its
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importance as well as that of the Resistance. In this view, anti-Fascism has lost its 
utility and its relevance has been exhausted; it ought to be put aside as it cannot 
enrich the great debates about Europe’s future. This interpretation views anti- 
Fascism as the “bearer of ambiguity and unsolved contradiction that weighs upon 
the modernization of Italy” (Lepre, 1997:10). The second interpretation is based on 
the “rescue of citizenship through critical historical evaluation that steers clear of 
simplification” (ibid.). Such evaluation must include a clear statement of the 
importance of anti-Fascism and the Resistance, both historically and currently. 
Franco De Felice links that task with the complex theme of historical memory and 
its construction. At issue is the “transferability of that experience” (ibid.), and the 
context of the European and international significance of anti-Fascism and the 
Resistance.
The term “anti-Fascist party” expressed a convergence in its identification of a 
common enemy, and proposed what De Felice refers to as the reconstruction of 
the nation and of democracy. The anti-Fascist “party” was able to grasp the 
relationship between class and nation, and mediate between the two.
The ‘anti-Fascist party’ delineated a proposal of social organization that 
diverged more and more from the Fascist one. [The Fascist Party] proposed 
an internally militarized and an externally aggressive solution while anti- 
Fascism sought to renew the pact between those who governed and the 
governed by not only preserving democracy but by guaranteeing social 
security and work (ibid.: 11).
Lepre recalls Bobbio’s affirmation that Italy, unlike any other country in the world, is 
one where “Fascist” and “Communist” are still common epithets in the political 
debate. Communism and Fascism as they existed in the historical experience of 
the 20th century are no longer with us and “we all agree that if democracy is to 
survive it must be neither Fascist nor Communist” (Bobbio, 1994d). Lepre contests 
Bobbio’s affirmation. He believes that “the accusations of Communism and 
Fascism have lost a lot of their virulence while post-Communists and post-Fascists 
consider each other as adversaries rather than enemies” (Lepre, 1997:7). Indeed, 
Lepre believes that, as methods of political struggle, anti-Communism and anti-
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Fascism have been entirely abandoned, thus allowing for calm and sobre analysis 
of their origins. In Italian history, Lepre affirms, the conflict between Fascism and 
anti-Fascism and Communism and anti-Communism did not represent an 
anomaly, but derived directly from the construction of democracy in Italy.
Lepre warns that anti-Fascism is not an appropriate political term, for there were 
many anti-Fascisms expressed by different generations in Italy over the course of 
time. All of them, it is true, were a form of what Marco Revelli describes as “essere 
contro", of “being against", of demonstrating even more democracy than ordinary 
“democratic culture” (ibid.:9). Lepre refers to another anti-Fascist, Vittorio Foa, who 
describes anti-Fascism as “the anxiety of needing to intervene against injustice, 
whether of small or large scale, and to counter every threat to liberty” (ibid.). Anti- 
Fascism, adds Foa, is both political pluralism and social pluralism that legitimates 
diversity; democracy represents participation as well as a guarantee.
Lepre calls anachronistic those who follow Bobbio’s formula of “stoking the fires of 
anti-Fascism”, believing that power emanates from below. The values anti-Fascists 
embrace and the identity they claim today, Lepre argues, are but a throwback to 
1968, expressed as ideology rather than political practice. The genuine forces of 
the Resistance, those who gave life to real anti-Fascism -  from the Communists to 
the liberals -  are not included in that 1968 conception.
Lepre contrasts the position of anti-Fascism with that of Pietro Scoppola, who 
denies that anti-Fascism is a form of enhanced democracy. Quite the contrary, 
anti-Fascism offers less than democracy, for “the identification of democracy with 
anti-Fascism is not reversible: democracy can only be anti-Fascist but not all anti- 
Fascisms are necessarily democratic” (ibid.). Scoppola also argues that anti- 
Fascism lacks a complete set of democratic reasons and values.
To make progress in the Italian political debate possible, Lepre recommends that 
the study of anti-Fascism not be separated from that of anti-Communism. He 
urges that the similarities and differences between the two be set out, and greater
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emphasis be placed on the many strands of anti-Communism. Lepre’s aim is to 
redeem some of those strands, since unlike the case of anti-Fascism, there has 
been no identification of anti-Communism with democracy. That absence “cannot 
be explained through a purported hegemony of Communist intellectuals on Italian 
culture” (ibid.:11). The genuine problem, he believes, is that Fascism’s use of anti- 
Communism in the 1920s and 1930s rendered it suspect after 1947, when the 
government of national unity, comprised of all anti-Fascists parties, fell (ibid.).
Within the anti-Communist ranks, there were non-Communist forces that chose 
anti-Fascism over anti-Communism because they believed that anti-Fascism 
offered greater democracy, Lepre argues. That is the true lesson of Italian history. 
Since there had existed a Fascist regime in Italy, anti-Fascism was able to build its 
foundation through actual experience. But there had never been the risk of a 
Communist regime taking hold in Italy. Thus, Lepre argues, anti-Communism 
appears to have been an imported ideology that had to resort to experiences that 
were not its own to give itself valid causes and political collateral. Since those 
experiences had not been lived directly by Italians, but only indirectly, many fell 
prey to propaganda that had no national foundation.
After the war, Bobbio withdrew from active politics at a time when “many 
intellectuals returned to their studies” (ibid.:136). In Autobiografia, the very first 
paragraph is a sort of ode to experience and to a generation of new intellectuals 
“who had lived through a time riveted by two opposing Italian realities” (Bobbio, 
1997:3). Bobbio writes:
In a given moment of our life -  the twenty months that separated 8 
September 1943 from 25 April 1945 -  we were involved in events that were 
bigger than we were. From a total lack of participation in Italian political life, 
... we found ourselves ... morally obligated to occupy ourselves with politics 
in exceptional circumstances, which were those of German occupation and 
of the war of Liberation. ... Afterwards we were therefore no longer as we 
had been before. Our life was divided into two parts, a ‘before’ and an 
‘after’. ... In the twenty months between September 1943 and April 1945 I 
was born into a new existence, completely different from the previous one, 
which I consider as a pure and simple anticipation of authentic life, which
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started with the Resistance, in which 1 participated as a member of the PdA 
(ibid.).
This passage gives one both a personal and political picture of the drama Italy had 
undergone. The historical debate concerning the Italy that emerged from Fascism 
is a subject of lively debate today.
Only one wing of the PdA was of liberal-socialist inspiration, but Croce’s input was 
to influence the Catholic philosopher Augusto Del Noce (d. 1989). Del Noce wrote 
of the opposition between “the Christian, who must first of all adopt methods of 
struggle that respect the human person, and the PdA member, who sought ‘the 
genuineness’ of Marxism in his conciliation with the idealistic culture of Croce’s 
‘religion of liberty’, or the secular faith of modern man” (Bobbio and Del Noce, 
1995a: 13). Dei Noce’s view, or rather the criticism of his view, is therefore a key to 
understanding Bobbio’s account of modern Italy and his specific brand of liberalism 
as it compares with orthodox liberalism. Bobbio considers Dei Noce as a political 
adversary, and has undertaken an examination of Del Noce’s objections to the 
PdA. An anti-Fascist during the years of Fascism, for moral reasons Del Noce 
soon found himself in disagreement with the culture of anti-Fascist unity that had 
formed in Italy immediately after the conclusion of World War II, As early as 1945, 
Del Noce affirmed this position in a series of articles. “Curiously the reasons for 
anti-Fascism and those for the rejection of the myth of anti-Fascist unity are the 
same” (// Corriere della Sera, 29/12/94:31).
For Del Noce, Fascism found its cultural synthesis in the philosophy of Gentile30. 
Gentile took Marx’s dialectic and separated it from its materialistic part, from the 
economic analysis that identifies the proletariat as the instrument for the 
affirmation of a new conception of the world, totally immanent and atheist. In 
discussing Del Noce’s “politics of the centre”, Bobbio writes that his condemnation 
of Actionism was not only cultural, but also political. Starting from the consideration 
that democracy can only find its place at the centre -  where the middle classes are 
-  Del Noce maintains that all forms of abstract revolution would end by pushing 
them towards the Right. Del Noce believed that “Jacobinism does nothing but work
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for reaction”. The PdA was a political failure. This failure was, for Del Noce, the 
best proof of the philosophical error on which it was founded, and a historical 
demonstration that democracy can only be constructed on Christian values, 
foremost among which is respect for the person (Bobbio in Bobbio and Del Noce, 
1995a:13).
In the post-war configuration, those Catholics who had participated in the 
Resistance were of particular interest to Bobbio. During the Resistance, parish 
priests31 and local peasantry had helped partisan detachments and “in the postwar 
Italian Republic these masses became the bedrock upon which the Christian 
Democratic electoral plurality rested” (Webster, 1961:162.). Italian Catholics, after 
their experience of Fascism, had to admit that the 20th century could not be 
reduced to purely religious categories. As one of the major parties that dominated 
post-war politics, along with the Communists and socialists, the Christian 
Democrats were instrumental in thwarting the revolution of the Left, even if cabinet 
positions were filled successively by many of the liberal elite’s jurists and 
economists.
Italy came out of World War II in a truly revolutionary situation. The State’s 
prestige and authority had touched bottom, the reigning dynasty was 
discredited, and the three parties of the Left -  the Communists, the 
Socialists, and the Party of Action -  were ready to govern the nation through 
the Committees of National Liberation, the organs of the Resistance. Only 
the Western occupying powers and the Catholic movement upheld what 
was left of the State and kept it from falling into the hands of the Left. From 
1945 to 1947 an uneasy ... coalition of the parties of the Left and the Centre 
ruled Italy under Allied supervision (ibid.:178).
In 1995 Bobbio chose to publish a “posthumous” interview with Del Noce precisely 
to reaffirm his own ideals, which derive from Piero Gobetti, Carlo Rosselli, and his 
fellow members in the PdA. These men lived through conflicting Italian realities but 
also strived to maintain a lively dialogue with both Communists and Catholics, and 
to include the views of all those who had made their anti-Fascist stance clear. 
Bobbio’s membership in the PdA reflected his criticism of both the Italian 
dictatorship and Stalin’s Soviet dictatorship, as had been expressed by Rosselli in
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Socialismo Liberale. But it also makes clear his respect for the opinion of others in
helping him to formulate an understanding of all aspects of any question.
In an article entitled ‘La psicologia del ceto medio’ (Psychology of the middle 
class), of January 1946, Del Noce observed that the middle class, by virtue of its 
nature and social position, is not a revolutionary class. Rather, it tends to lean 
towards the Right when it fears the threatening prevalence of the revolutionary 
Left. Therefore, “its politicization cannot take place along revolutionary lines” (Del 
Noce in Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a:15).
Political prudence and mediation were to inspire a “politics of the centre which 
constituted the only exit from Fascism; the Democrazia cristiana would perfectly 
embody this role, by preventing a frontal confrontation and its resulting
consequences between the groups of the Right and of the Left” (Del Noce in
Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a:5).
For Bobbio, “after the victory and the expansion of the Soviet revolution ... it 
became a choice between civilizations and a choice that militant Catholic thought 
could not escape” (Bobbio, 1995e:165). For Del Noce, Marxism was an 
“overturning, and its decisiveness lay in a shift in Marx’s thought from a concept of 
philosophy as understanding to a concept of philosophy as revolution” (Bobbio, 
1995e:165). He writes:
Even if the explanation that Del Noce gives of the anti-revolutionary quality 
of the middle class, which would derive from ‘a greater cultural awareness’ 
compared to the proletariat, and therefore from a greater concern for 
methods, is not at all convincing, the conviction that only the middle class 
can form the strong nucleus of democracy rests firm. ... If Right means 
conservation and Left innovation, the centre in the positive sense of the 
term should represent a position of ‘creative fidelity’. A difficult politics, but 
also the only possible type in an age of moral, cultural and political 
reconstruction a fte r... Fascism, if one doesn’t want to fall into the same old 
errors (Bobbio in Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a:15).
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Although Del Noce embraced the centre party of the middle classes, he entirely 
rejected the parties of the Left. The parties of the Left were seen as revolutionary 
ones “that would want to impose the Republican solution by force” (Del Noce in 
Bobbio and Dei Noce, 1995a: 16). “For Del Noce, Marxism, as a practical fulfilment 
of the atheism implicit throughout the course of modern rationalism, was absolutely 
irreconcilable with the tradition of Christian thought, which meant that the road to a 
‘restoration’ of Christianity lay beyond Marx" (Bobbio, 1995e:165). Del Noce’s 
hostility towards the Left contrasts with his attitude towards the Right: “A party of 
the centre, that depends on the consensus of the middle classes, must know that 
the politicization of the middle classes cannot come about by raising the flag of 
revolution and that, between the fear of revolution and safety through reaction, the 
lower middle class chooses the latter” (Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a: 16).
Having identified Del Noce as the most authoritative contributor to the revision of 
the history of the Italian Resistance, Bobbio notes Del Noce’s insistence “that a 
religious vision of history is a prerequisite of a free and just society" (Bobbio, 
1995e:201). This view is “in contradiction to the secular culture that has long held 
sway in Italy” (ibid.). Bobbio recapitulates that Del Noce considered democracy to 
be a form of government that excludes the use of violence as a means of resolving 
political conflict. Yet by defending the political centre as the party of democracy, 
between Left and Right, Del Noce defines “democracy as ‘giving to all the means 
to live and to express freely one’s own will’: therefore democracy is the ideal of 
pacific and free cohabitation” (Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a: 14). He writes:
A ‘real’ democracy ... includes ‘a profound and structural economic reform’, 
as there can be no true democracy if the inequalities of property are not 
contained within the limits of real equality of power (not formal, as in the 
pre-Fascist democracy). ... There cannot be full democracy if, in addition to 
the values of non-violence and liberty, one does not include, within certain 
limits, the value of equality (Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a: 16).
What Del Noce is describing is a programme of social democracy which, Bobbio 
notes, is not that different from that of the deprecated PdA, even if Del Noce’s 
criticism was directed only at the Jacobin faction of the PdA. “The motto of the PdA
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was ‘democratic revolution’: for the moderate wing this expression meant that after 
Fascism and during the pre-Fascist era when there was no real democracy ... 
democracy for our country represented a revolutionary turning point that aimed to 
re-establish the rules for that free political struggle in Italy that Fascism had 
repressed” (ibid.: 16,17).
Although Del Noce and Bobbio seem to be describing the same type of 
democracy, there is a marked difference. As Bobbio has repeatedly said, for the 
PdA, to go beyond Fascism meant to oppose a regime that had been illiberal in 
politics and capitalist in economics with another regime, one inspired by the 
principles of liberalism in politics and of socialism in economics. For Del Noce, as 
Bobbio reads him, this meant opposing a regime of the Right, whose reaction 
could have provoked a move to the Left, with a regime of the centre, neither to the 
Right nor to the Left.
The most obvious difference between Del Noce’s "centre” ground and that of the 
PdA was their relationship with the Communists. The PdA was an ally of the 
Communists while the Catholic party of the centre that Del Noce joined was then 
and throughout the first republic the major adversary of Communism. Del Noce 
had hoped that the Parri government would fall, to the benefit of “the three parties 
of the Right, the Christian Democratic, Liberal and Democratic Labour parties32” 
(ibid.15,16). Del Noce wrote that if the Communist idea could not evolve in a 
democratic sense, the Communist Party, being made up of people who were 
destined to live and to work within a certain context, i.e., a democratic one, could 
still evolve towards the full acceptance of democracy. Bobbio agrees that from this 
point of view Del Noce was absolutely right. Many young people had rallied to 
Communism exclusively from fear that the other parties would not have sufficient 
force to defeat Fascism; Del Noce argues that such youths had been motivated by 
sincere democratic conviction. Therefore, Del Noce did not exclude the possibility 
that praxis influenced theory and therefore that “if brought to the level of 
democratic practice, the Communist Party could finish up by ... slowly transforming 
itself into a democratic party” (ibid.: 17). There was no need to teach democratic
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theory to Marxists. One could be confident that the democratization of the 
Communist Party would take place as its members would be operating in a 
different context from that of Soviet Communism.
Reading the writings of Del Noce is worthwhile because of their historical 
interpretations, but also because Del Noce examines several linkages between 
democracy and Christianity. In his analysis, “the centrality of the Catholic party in 
defending democracy from two extreme ideologies -  Fascism and Communism, 
both of which are anti-democratic -  is evident, given the political failure of all 
secular parties, and in particular, the PdA" (Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a:18). 
Here, Del Noce is criticizing the political platform of the PdA, but implicit in his 
criticism is a condemnation of ontology, interpreted as “intelligence of the real”. For 
Del Noce, the sphere of isms “is that of perversion, where human activity is 
transformed into an idol”. Such perversion “is rationalism ... which in the modern 
age emerged as secularity33” (Castellano, 1992:83). For Del Noce, contemporary 
history is simply the epoch in which the phenomenon of atheism is manifested.
In the aftermath of the liberation, proponents of liberal-sociaiism were the sternest 
of all political formations in their condemnation of Fascism. They sought to develop 
“realistic expedients to prevent Communism from degenerating into totalitarianism” 
(Bobbio, 1995e:153). Absalom describes that effort thus:
In the first place, the attraction and power the Church possessed was a 
focus, after the removal of Fascism and its institutions, for all the forces of 
reaction in Italian society, whether ... monarchists, Fascist-trained 
bureaucrats, landowners ..., or industrialists threatened by the new 
militancy of their workers. In the Church they sought and found ... a doctrine 
... and a legitimation for opposing all the pressures for social and economic 
change: insofar as the Church’s secular political representation was the 
Christian Democrat party, it was inevitably to that party that they turned ... 
(Absalom, 1995:193).
Although Del Noce was convinced that a historical comprehension of Fascism was 
necessary for a practical overcoming of it, “he did not agree that the doctrine of
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counter revolution, or Fascism and Nazism emerging in reaction to Communism, 
constituted a way out of Fascism” (Bobbio and Del Noce, 1995a:7).
Material and moral poverty were the causes underlying Fascism, in Gobetti’s view. 
He believed that in Italy the “most serious attempts at heresy corresponded with
the period of free economic activity that flourished under the city states or
communes” (Gobetti, 1997:824). Local forces surfaced to foster prosperity “in 
many Italian cities in the early Middle Ages [following] the breakdown of
centralized political control after the ninth century" (Duggan, 1994:37). This
“economic heresy” was a genuine form of liberty that eventually declined under the 
centralized monarchy following the age of Italian city-states. The highly centralized 
state resulted in widespread universal poverty, which was particularly acute 
following World War I: this poverty became a weapon of the Church. The strong 
state, Gobetti warned, formed an alliance with the nobility and the Church, and that 
alliance thwarted economic development and brought the dynamic force of heresy 
to a halt. He writes:
With ... the discovery of America, the Italian economy entered a standstill 
phase: commerce was undergoing a crisis; agriculture ... had been 
damaged by feudal domains belonging to the nobility as well as by 
ecclesiastical domains which were run according to a regime of charity; a 
class of industrious crop-growers could not be identified; the artisans were 
only sufficient in number to lessen the hardship of a few Northern cities. In 
these general conditions of life, one could only celebrate the triumph of the 
Counter Reformation34 (Gobetti, 1997:824).
According to Gobetti, the Church’s response to pagan Rome and the modern State 
resulted in “a dogmatism that imposed itself upon obedient and humiliated spirits” 
(Gobetti, 1997:824). Moreover, he believed the lower classes remained Catholic 
mostly owing to the solace of charity. In this manner, moral renewal was toppled, 
whereas all the Protestant revolutions of Europe “had proven their vitality in 
creating new moral types” (ibid.). Fascism, on the other hand, Gobetti saw as a 
form of moral pauperism which undermines personal consciousness and self- 
reliance. In his view, Catholicism requires liberalism since its historically dogmatic 
character -  such that it eschews all forms of secularism - needed to be tempered
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by other streams of human thought. As that counterbalancing never took place 
before Gobetti’s time, and has taken place at a slow pace during Bobbio’s time, it 
can be said that in Italy Catholicism opened the door to Fascism. “With perfect 
logic, Fascism is Catholic: if one considers that it places itself in the Italian crisis in 
a moment of economic unemployment, and scholastic reform, is [acutely] 
reactionary and uses religious teaching to take away any boldness of rebellion in 
the popular classes” (ibid.).
Because of Catholicism, no individualistic revolution occurred. As a result, maturity 
did not develop in the masses, and this contrasted with the democratic spirit of the 
Anglo-Saxon peoples who embraced capitalism. They followed the message of 
Luther and Calvin who praised the work ethic and the “religion of personal 
autonomy".
At the close of World War II, Italian intellectuals busied themselves with assessing 
the Fascist period. For Bobbio’s generation, which had endured five years of war 
culminating in the German occupation of a part of Italy and a domestic fratricidal 
conflict, the war left deep wounds that have still not healed today. As Bobbio 
describes it:
For someone like me who had undertaken juridical and philosophical 
studies and had been forcibly occupied with politically ascetic studies, it was 
natural that when the war ended and liberty had returned the great 
problems to be tackled were democracy and peace. The history of my life 
as a scholar began there and all that had gone before was prehistorical 
(Bobbio, 1996b:164).
What Bobbio describes as the “prehistorical" cannot be ignored. He is convinced 
that there are no definitive political solutions “and that one must take one step at a 
time, without ever having the pretension of wanting to start anew, although one 
must be ready at all times to take a step backwards" (Bobbio, 1997:193). He has 
indicated his interest in peace, one of “the great problems”, and has written of war 
and peace in Una guerra giusta? (1991). War, a state of antagonism, he also 
defines as a “competition between opposing forces or for a particular end"35.
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1.7 Turin as the fulcrum of anti-Fascism: Giustizia e Liberta
In Italy, no city compares with Turin and no region compares with Piedmont as 
emblematic settings of antagonistic forces and social transformation. Turin’s early 
and successful industrialization, the fact that the first factory councils in Italy 
emerged there, the effects of migration of workers to Piedmont from the south, and 
Turin’s key role during the student protests of the late sixties, reveal a crucible which 
has had a strong influence on the rest of Italy. Labour and industrial development 
were among the first concrete entities that animated politics since the mediation 
between the two sectors endowed politics with new margins of power. In 1975, 
Turin’s Communist mayor, Diego Novelli, spoke of the “two lives” of the city, its 
“working-class, union-led life and its bourgeois life that seemed impervious to the 
[dramatic condition of the] proletariat” (Bobbio, 1997:172).
As I have discussed above, Turin was a important working-class city and one of 
the centres of the anti-Fascist movement. Claudio Magris describes Turin as
the city of a new bourgeoisie and a new proletariat that acquired the self- 
consciousness of liberalism, of socialism and Communism; the Italian 
Detroit or Leningrad that elaborated a culture that took care in reconciling 
the progress of the masses, the masses’ possibility of becoming a ruling 
class, with liberty, a culture which was open to great European perspectives 
and nourished with the robust ... virtues of concreteness, hard work and 
responsibility which made it an intellectual capital [... and] a bulwark of anti- 
Fascism (// Corriere della Sera, 20/11/98:35).
Alessandro Galante Garrone, in II mite giacobino (1994) recalls how on 25 April 
1945, the day of Italian liberation, after he had hidden for a couple of days in a 
tannery with other partisans of the Comando militare regionate piemontese 
(CMRP), the German command advised them through the Curia of its willingness 
to evacuate Turin. The condition was that two German divisions could march 
through the streets of the city over a period of 48 hours. The reply of the Comitato 
di liberazione nazlonale (CLN) was that only an unconditional surrender would be
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acceptable. This was despite a representative of the local archbishop repeating the 
German request for the third time on 27 April, and relaying the message that if the 
occupying forces were not given permission to leave Turin as they wished, they 
would perpetrate "a second Warsaw”. The reply of the CLN remained unchanged: 
unconditional surrender. The Germans left. Today, Galante Garrone recalls that 
moment of Turin’s triumph as a stimulus which, nonetheless, leaves him with a 
sense of regret for the end of that magic moment and enthusiasm which failed to 
be incorporated by Italian reality.
Contemporary Turin is a vanguard of industrial conflict and trade unionism owing 
to its being home to Italy’s largest private company, FIAT. As La Stampa puts it, 
"The history of FIAT is above all the history of an irreducible conflict between 
company management and that which was once called the workers’ movement” 
(La Stampa, 23/11/98:14). Workers occupied the FIAT factory in 1920. Since then, 
industrial relations have evolved with the growth of trade unions, with management 
change and of course with technological progress. A great number of Southern 
Italians left their home towns to work in the North, swelling the population of Turin. 
This migration resulted in a social fabric that exists nowhere else in Italy, and it has 
presented social challenges and new social issues.
This industrial conflict was a positive force, as the historian Giuseppe Berta 
reminds us:
In this reconstruction which retrieves pieces of collective memory, the idea 
that the mark of Gramsci is imprinted upon the working class movement in 
Turin is fundamental; that is, ... that the workers should oppose 
management power: that workers, because of their professional value, felt 
themselves to be the real managers of the firm (ibid.).
Berta goes on to say that the management of FIAT has always needed an 
antagonist on which to base its strategy; now that this antagonism no longer exists, 
one ought to be concerned. In the heated years of 1919 and early 1920, “Agnelli 
[the founder of FIAT] looked to America and his model was Ford; he succeeded in 
re-establishing significant entrepreneurial control over the workers” (ibid.). The city
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of Milan did not enjoy the same success in managing its industrial relations, and in 
1921 and 1922, Fascists intervened there to quell workers’ protests. Turin, 
however, did not undergo further industrial conflict.
Modern Turin has made its influence felt in many different ways. As Bobbio puts it, 
"the history of Turinese culture and politics merges with Italian culture at its highest 
levels” (Bobbio, 1995e:xxi). Like all hegemonic cultures -  as Turin’s was for a long 
time -  this culture had its faults and limitations, but overall it represented the best 
Italy. It embodied the continuity of tradition and innovation, the unitary sense of the 
State and cosmopolitan life, and liberalism and democracy (il Corriere della Sera, 
20/11/98:35).
Secular politics are very much associated with Turin and the industrialized North, 
given their role at the forefront of the socialist movement. Ginsborg tells us that "A 
survey of 1961 revealed some remarkable facts: the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) 
had nearly three times more members in Foggia than in Florence, and almost as 
many in Cosenza as in Genoa, Turin and Milan put together" (Ginsborg, 
1990:168). The greater influence of the Church in southern Italy corresponds with 
a lesser degree of industrial development, investment and technological capability. 
The northern city of Turin stands as an example of both the pros and the cons that 
accompany widespread industrial development and employment questions. Those 
involved in formulating current regional and European policies on immigration, for 
example, may stand to benefit from the study of Turin’s experience of southern 
Italian migrant workers and its development of suitable integration strategies.
Following the assassination of the socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti and 
Mussolini’s own admission of responsibility in his death, “Mussolini stated 
(3 January 1925) in a speech before the Chamber that he assumed ‘political, 
moral, and historical responsibility for all that has happened’” (Bobbio, 1995e:211); 
“Matteotti became the symbol of anti-Fascism and of anti-Fascist heroism” 
(Rosselli, 1988:265). When Rosselli36 and Gobetti met him in Turin, “they were 
struck by his seriousness and anti-rhetorical style” (ibid.).
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Mussolini recruited his first Fascist squads from the masses of veterans who 
returned victorious from World War I but found hardship and unemployment at 
home. Popular discontent was intensified by waffling politicians and Mussolini’s 
focus on striking unions. Rosselli’s involvement in the war caused him to be 
inspired by the brotherhood he had experienced at the front and he hoped that 
Italy would undergo a process of reform that would culminate in justice and liberty, 
the name he gave to the movement and the journal he founded. Vittorio Foa 
recalls the time he joined the ranks of GL, which developed into Italy’s principal 
non-Marxist anti-Fascist organization:
The group had few illusions about overthrowing the government; its purpose 
was to keep independent and anti-Fascist thinking alive until the day when 
Fascism would stumble, its primary tool was its newspaper, published in 
Paris. Since GL’s leaders were in exile, they depended ... on a network of 
sources within the country to cut through the smoke-screen of official news. 
Operatives collected information about Fascist economic and military policy, 
about working conditions, unauthorized ... strikes and peasant uprisings 
(Stille, 1991:98,99).
The early leaders of GL in Turin were investigated by the Operazione di Vigilanza 
per la Repressione dell’Anti-Fascismo (OVRA), and on 31 March 1935 Sion Segre 
and Mario Levi were arrested by OVRA as “Jewish anti-Fascists working with 
exiles abroad” (ibid.: 100). As Fascist police investigations and interrogations 
continued with the help of an informer37, more arrests came in May 1935, including 
those of Foa and his brother.
While not a material threat to the regime, GL had great symbolic importance 
because of the prestige and cultural sophistication of its members and the 
writers and readers of its paper. Composed mainly of intellectuals and 
professionals of the upper middle class, the ... members of GL moved in 
tightly knit, respectable circles, bound closely by friendship, blood and, 
sometimes, religion. Tracking their movements did not automatically reveal 
who the leaders were; unlike the full-time revolutionaries of other groups, 
they went on with their normal lives (Stille, 1991:102,103).
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The Turinese intellectual milieu of the thirties included the writer and painter Carlo 
Levi, who “used his artistic pursuits as a cover for conspiracy, having Foa and 
other GL members sit for portraits while discussing political plans” (ibid.:103). His 
trips to Paris were often a pretext which allowed him to consult with GL leaders 
there. The close proximity of Piedmont to France was also important as this 
facilitated communication between Rosselli in France and the Turinese members 
of GL.
Salvadori writes of the symbolic importance of the GL circle and Foa’s personal 
recollection of the Turin of the late thirties as valuable tools in giving one an 
understanding of Bobbio’s “unceasing scholarly attention to Turinese cultural and 
political history” (Salvadori in ‘Introduction’ to Bobbio, 1995e:xxi). Bobbio 
understands history “primarily as a reconstruction of the various personalities who 
have played prominent roles, hence his predilection for ‘portraits’" (ibid.). He 
applies this method to the legacy of Gobetti and Foa, in his adoption of a style that 
clearly reflects his “ethical and intellectual penchant for biography" (ibid.).
The partisans of GL made an immense contribution to the defeat of Fascism but in 
Duggan’s words, “their contribution to political mythology was much more 
significant" (Duggan, 1994:244). Bobbio and other PdA members today strongly 
object to this use of the term “myth” in describing the partisan movement. For 
them, it was closer to what Gramsci described as “the effective historical forces ... 
of Turin and Milan” (Gramsci, 1994:137), of the industrialized North in general. As 
Duggan relates events,
With the end of the war in sight, a general insurrection was proclaimed to 
liberate the main cities ahead of the Allies. The number of partisans 
suddenly grew from about 80,000 in March 1945 to about a quarter of a 
million by the end of April; and ... the major centres of the North were 
handed over to the British by anti-Fascists. This was of great psychological 
importance; but it was economically significant, too, for the partisans were 
able to prevent the Germans from blowing up factories ... as they withdrew 
(Duggan, 1994:243,244).
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In the wake of the German departure, there was hope that “the new order in Italy 
would be built upon the Values of the Resistance’: democracy, freedom, honesty, 
accountability, openness, and modernity” (ibid.:244). It was hoped that “Italy would 
begin again: it would wipe away the stains of Fascism and liberalism, destroying 
the old structures of power and releasing the pure pent up moral energy of its 
people” (ibid.). Stille describes it thus:
At the end of World War II, the anti-Fascists who had been outcasts 
suddenly became the leaders of the new democratic Italy. ... a number o f ... 
former co-conspirators were elected to parliament as members of the newly 
formed PdA, the successor of GL. But the Italy of the anti-Fascist resistance 
was short-lived. ... Italy underwent no socialist transformation. The PdA 
[was ... composed] mainly of intellectuals with little mass following, it was ... 
‘an army with all generals and no infantry’ (Stille, 1991:322).
Yet, "the cleansing ‘wind from the North’, as it was known, was combined with a 
deep sense of national humility and a strong desire to be accepted back into the 
international community” (Duggan, 1994:244). But it was not defeat alone that 
awakened this desire. “It was also part of Italy’s long dialectic with modernity, that 
had begun in the eighteenth century and then continued during the Risorgimento, 
and which had given rise over the decades to much political impatience and anger" 
(ibid.).
The moral renewal that was hoped for never materialized, as lamented by 
Calamandrei in Questa nostra costituzione (1995b). The South had not had the 
same level of participation in the resistance as it “had been liberated by the Allies 
and had thus produced no resistance movement and no new ruling elite" (Duggan, 
1994:244). Indeed, in Southern Italy, the end of the war “meant a confirmation of 
the old order: the big landowners and their bourgeois (and mafia) clientele, who by 
turns had been liberals and Fascists ...” (ibid.). More generally, across Italy, 
“renewal broke down in the face of political realities" (ibid.). The elite who emerged 
from the resistance movement in the North did not have the necessary experience 
to be successful at statecraft, a criticism also advanced towards Mussolini’s 
squadristi of 1922.
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Many of the Resistance leaders were Communists or revolutionary socialists and 
the funding of Italy’s reconstruction after the war by the USA, and the extremism of 
the Fascist years sealed their fate; “the era of the Cold War put them beyond the 
pale” (Duggan, 1994:244). The failure to institute a new moral order and the 
recycling of the men and the institutions inherited from the Fascist state constituted 
a recipe for instability. Duggan writes:
The symbols, the rhetoric, and even the constitution changed; but most of 
the old personnel and many of the former institutions remained untouched. 
For those who had believed in a new moral order, the sense of 
disappointment was great; and their frustration was to prove a major source 
of instability in the [future], encouraging anti-system parties, protest 
movements, and terrorism ... (ibid.).
Turin, home to great industries, was again the centre of much tension and debate. 
Anissimov relates that “In the eyes of Marxists who called the tune in working-class 
Turin of the 1960s, work was pure alienation” (Anissimov, 1998:267). Once again, 
Turin was the focus of the labour movement, and remains so today, although the 
numbers of factory workers continue to dwindle. There was an economic boom in 
Italy during the 1960s. During that time, Anissimov writes:
Turin ... saw its population double in ten years. Workers arrived in the 
thousands to join the production-lines, ... where the many strikes ... were 
met by violent police repression. ... Six months after May 1968 in Paris, 
Turin witnessed the upsurge of a violent radical movement in which 
students joined with workers in open warfare against the consumer society, 
capitalism, and private property. Turin lived through the era of Lotta 
Continua, Potere Operaio, and the Red Brigades, while far-right neo-Fascist 
groups with Mafia links developed their ‘strategy of tension’ by organizing 
murderous terrorist attacks (ibid.:293).
The southern workers who had migrated to Turin in the sixties had epitomized the 
North-South divide. Still today, for Bobbio, in his conception of the Left, going 
beyond the nation state is not as crucial as the economic divide between North 
and South and the international order. Indeed, as he sees it:
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If we understand the ‘Left’ as those standing on the side of the socially 
underprivileged -  the poor, the oppressed ... -  then today this principle has 
its meaning above all in that we take a position with respect to the relation 
between North and South in the world economic order. We are concerned 
with two-thirds of humanity. But if we broaden the problem to the 
international order, then we are concerned with a relation of not only two- 
thirds of the poor and oppressed, but perhaps as much as nine-tenths of the 
world’s population as opposed to one-tenth in the industrial nations (Bobbio 
in Glotz and Kallscheuer, 1989:141).
it is clear from the discussion above that a re-examination of the historical origins 
of Italy is necessary. Such an endeavour would illustrate the overriding role played 
by the region of Piedmont in the process of Italian unification. The heritage of 
Piedmont was taken up by Gobetti and Burzio in the early twenties, and it was at 
the forefront of other traditions, namely liberalism, opposition to Fascism, and re- 
evaluation of the concepts of politics, intellectuals and elitism. But as Bagnoli says, 
“The theme of Piedmont ... is indicative of a fundamental tendency that animates 
the other themes as well, owing to the way of life in this region in terms of shaping 
their values and the ethical dimension they use to interpret history and politics” 
(Bagnoli, 1998:30). During the postwar years, Turin has remained at the centre of 
Italian cultural development, as Anissimov makes clear:
In Turin, a group of intellectuals with links to the Resistance had gathered 
around the president of the Piedmont Liberation Committee, Franco 
Antonicelli, publisher of If This Is A Man [by Primo Levi]. They explored a 
whole range of ideas about the relations that had to be established between 
culture and politics, and between men of culture and the masses. They 
founded an association, TUnione Culturale (the “Cultural Union"), which held 
meetings and organized lectures ... they debated the question of whether 
the new culture ought to be popular... or whether instead they should push 
for an avant-garde culture, which Fascism had stifled. ... A centre for 
methodological studies also started up in 1946, under the influence of 
Ludovico Geymonat38 ... The circle included mathematicians, physicists, 
and biologists ... In the cultural landscape of postwar Turin, the Communist 
Catholics also enjoyed a short-lived influence ... (Anissimov, 1998:270,271).
Turin, the city that most symbolizes Italian liberalism, was also the city that voiced 
the greatest opposition to Fascism. The form of liberal politics hailed by Gobetti in 
the 1920s was taken much further by Bobbio, since he sought to achieve an Italian
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liberalism by reforming Communism and by drawing from the thought of liberal 
thinkers from abroad. A closer look at liberalism generally, and at Bobbio’s 
discussion of Italian liberalism in particular follow in the next chapter.
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Chapter II: POLITICAL COMMUNITY: LIBERALISM OVER MULTI-
CULTURALISM
Every society suffers from the same fundamental problem, Bobbio declares. Quite 
simply, there is conflict between the different spheres of human action in politics, 
private life, art, law, and so forth. Some fundamental and general rules of human 
conduct, habitually called moral laws, are necessary. Without them, human 
’’cohabitation” would not only be very unhappy, it would virtually impossible 
(Bobbio, 1994c: 105).
Bobbio begins with the premise that there are three stances that can be taken vis-a- 
vis any form of government, namely: (i) all existing forms are good; (ii) all existing 
forms are bad; and (iii) amongst the existing forms of government some are good, 
some are bad (Bobbio, 1976:6). Point (i) above is the historicist view, whereby every 
form of government springs from the historical events that preceded its inevitable 
emergence. Point (ii) recalls the Platonic assertion that all forms of government are 
bad in that they are removed from the organic ideal of initial perfection (ibid.:17). 
Point (iii) is perhaps the closest to the truth, and owes something to Aristotle. 
Individuals and associations tend to nostalgic recollection of the "good government" 
of their forefathers, attempting to reconstitute a previous form of optimum 
government. This usually involves idealizing this or that historical model or form, 
whether crystallized around the figure of a particular politician, mass movement or 
spiritual star.
The spiritual star guiding Italian social liberalism in Bobbio’s view is the ideal of 
equality (Bobbio, 1996c:60). That equality is not based on multiculturalism and 
ethnicity, but on the reciprocal agreement to recognize principles, rules and 
institutions. Particular cultural roots, which cannot be generalized are deliberately left 
aside. Bobbio’s sense of laicita -  of belonging neither to the religious clergy nor to 
the hegemonic clergy -  concerns the institutions of the state. These attempt not only 
to neutralize the claims of different cultures and religions and promote tolerance, but 
also to erect a legal contract as a means of protecting diversity. Yet that protection
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also comprises a method of “overcoming” diversity in that individuals of all races and 
preferences acquire equality in terms of their status in law, although there are 
differing levels of awareness in the perception and utility of that status. This 
approach to democratic liberalism aims, in Bellamy’s words, to construct “a workable 
set of democratic institutions capable of providing the modus vivendi necessary to 
arrive at these agreements” (Bellamy, 1992:261). The importance of equality is also 
seen in Bobbio’s additional comment concerning how to distinguish between good 
and bad forms of government. He calls attention to Aristotle’s affirmation that good 
government does not depend on consensus or force, on legality or illegality but 
rather on whether government reflects the public interest or Tinteresse personate 
[individual interest] (Bobbio, 1976:36). Good government exists in states where 
those who govern do so based on the public interest rather than that of the 
individual.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how Bobbio’s anti-Fascism builds on the 
initial foundations of liberalism rooted mainly in religious and material concerns 
and comprises a discussion of i) the issues important to Bobbio; ii) how he 
constructs his own liberalism (and with whom he debated it); and iii) what residual 
problems arise in evaluating it. In assessing Bobbio’s liberalism, I attempt to 
illustrate to what extent it is a response to historical events. Bobbio’s politics of 
culture can be seen as an ethical thrust. Specific debates about the state, the 
autonomy of scientific research, the independence of magistrates, and other 
questions, are then different contingent expressions that “reflect the cultural core” 
behind Bobbio’s method of debate.
2.1 The anti-Fascist thread that runs through liberalism
Historically speaking, liberalism developed based on the ideas of the 
Enlightenment particularly the “conviction that the power of reason which human 
beings have in common enables us to improve our condition” (Gray, 1998a:49,50). 
Western society's emancipation and progressive liberalism are centred around two
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spheres: religious/spiritual matters and material concerns. Both of these spheres 
are reflected in the relationship between morality and politics. Bobbio writes: 
"Among moral questions, the relationship between morality and politics is one of 
the most traditional ones, along with that of the relationship between morality and 
private life ... or that of the relationship between morality and law, between morality 
and art" (Bobbio, 1994c: 105). Morality, in the case of liberalism, is not based on 
content or particular truths but on procedural rules under which politics, private life, 
art and the administration of law are carried out.
The Church cannot be placed on the same level as the empire and the city-state, 
as its raison d'etre was not to oversee social and political life, but Manent notes, 
“by its very existence and distinctive vocation, it posed an immense political 
problem to the European peoples" (Manent, 1994:4). The Church was a new form 
of association. Here it is essential to establish that "the political development of 
Europe is understandable only as the history of answers to problems posed by the 
Church" (ibid.). The primary aim of the Church was to pursue human salvation but 
as overseer of human actions, an unnatural grafting of secular and religious 
functions resulted. This, in turn, led people to seek a form of government which 
would limit the Church's intervention, as "paternalism was the hallmark of papal 
rule" (Gross, 1990:7). The Church maintained that its control over all political 
regimes was exercised indifferently, thus acknowledging that it did not wish to 
impose a particular political regime. Consequently, when the secular world later 
regained its strength, it had the latitude to seek the political form that could best 
resist the Church's claims (Manent, 1994:5).
By the end of the eighteenth century, liberal ideas had gained much ground. 
"Liberals believed that the people had a right to some say in government and that 
this was best achieved by a representative assembly or parliament, elected by 
property owners" (Stiles, 1986:8). The middle class favoured constitutional 
monarchy, for they feared the two political extremes of absolute monarchy and 
republican democracy. Such political extremes, they believed, were a "threat to 
their political, economic and social position, for most liberals were middle class"
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(ibid.). In opposition to the middle class were the radicals and extremists "who 
wanted social reforms and a redistribution of wealth and were prepared to use 
revolutionary means to obtain them" (ibid.). Their aim was for political power to rest 
with the people rather than parliament.
Below -  need to say more about this debate and who Toglia. Is since unclear 
why mentioned here
Bobbio’s vision of liberalism can be read as offering a series of abstract principles 
rather than responses to events, but his intellectual approach takes up all the main 
themes of the Italian, European and wider cultural debate. Bobbio’s debate with 
Togiiatti provides an example of intellectual commitment in its discussion of the 
task of the PCI. The question is how to build an appropriate agenda for the Italian 
Left, and what the impact of the Cold War has been.
Bobbio’s liberalism is driven by anti-Fascism and that anti-Fascism feeds into his 
later arguments about the politics of culture. Indeed, as the Fascist regime began 
to suppress all forms of non-Fascist political expression, those intellectuals who 
did not adhere to or support the Fascist Party “put their noses into their books”. 
This was a crucial lesson, Bobbio reminds us, that pursuing research is a liberal 
activity that was not then permitted in the public sphere. Research was a 
specifically anti-Fascist pursuit which brought into view the separation between 
culture and politics -  and the nobility of the former.
Bobbio advises that “one way of understanding the present liberal revival is by 
seeing it in terms of its historical progression ..., which can be summed up as 
follows: in the past the liberal crusade was directed against socialism, which in its 
collectivist version ... is its natural enemy” (Bobbio, 1987:115). In Italy, that 
crusade took on a particular urgency in the 1880s, when the vote was extended to 
seven percent of the population. Although that small electorate was “manageable”, 
all Italian politicians were preoccupied with the social question, “what to do about 
that great mass of the population who remained outside the political system” 
(Bosford, 2002:48).
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The cultural traditions of both the middle class and the more radical groups were 
later reflected in European opposition to Fascism. This antagonism constituted a 
bifurcated intellectual heritage, an independent liberal consciousness against aii 
forms of academic and scientific inhibition. The positive effect of this natural 
reaction of thinking people was a turning point as significant as the fall of Soviet 
Communism, but of gargantuan proportions. It signalled the beginning of a natural 
process, whereas the end of the bipolar world was a return to nature, in that, 
historically speaking, the upturned balance of political influence caused a new form 
of chaos. Yet it must be recognized that during all the years of the Cold War the 
Italian Communist Party was excluded from government and only recently has the 
Left finally won power at the national level39.
Under Fascism, the conception of liberty based on a sense of the inviolability of the 
person and human freedom was obscured. Consequently, definitions of Fascism, 
the reasons for its advent, and how the country emerged from the dark years of its 
regime are all vital components of the historical significance of Italian liberalism. In 
Italy, there remains an indistinct demarcation -- what Arrigo Levi refers to as a 
"grey zone" -  between what was known as actually existing socialism, inspired by 
Lenin and Stalin, and socialist ideals that have a significantly different temporal 
and historical dimension. Today, ex-Communists and ex-Fascists have begun an 
intensive effort to "re-read" the past; that effort is complicated by an earlier 
mistaken reading of history. The participants at the International Conference of 
Writers for the Defence of Cultural Freedom [Paris 1935], for example, lauded the 
reign of Stalin by claiming repeatedly that only in Soviet Russia had liberty and the 
new man triumphed. These writers, including Gide and Malraux, maintained at the 
time that all "bourgeois" countries, on the contrary, were "Fascist" (// Corriere della 
Sera, 2/4/98:3). Salvemini was one of the few writers and historians who rejected 
this opinion, which contrasted with the view of the majority of the 230 delegates at 
that conference. Indeed, "the Communist Ambrogio Donini said he had 'listened 
with nausea' to Salvemini's ... denunciation" (ibid.). On that occasion, Salvemini 
had explained that one cannot place all bourgeois societies on a par with Fascism
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because there was a considerable difference between, on the one hand, the Italy 
and Germany of 1935, and, on the other, "bourgeois" countries like France and 
England. Above all, the liberal must be aware of differences and ensure that not all 
things be considered alike. His warning to Gide, who had bowed to the would-be 
'individualist communist society', was that "one must not scorn one's liberties, but 
defend them obstinately" (ibid.).
An example of Bobbio’s liberalism through pursuing an agenda of anti-Fascism is 
illustrated by the importance he attaches to books. He takes up the theme of liberty 
by defending the need to preserve libraries and the books in them as part of 
cultural heritage. His message prevails upon politicians to protect culture. That 
protection is part of Bobbio’s wider project of superseding “the aristocratic concept 
of culture”. He calls attention to the negative characteristic of many intellectuals: 
they do not have either sufficient regard for books or adequate organizational skills 
to ensure the preservation and dissemination of books as a cultural resource. 
Although there is an abundance of books, there are no adequate structures to 
ensure their circulation among readers. There are, Bobbio emphasizes, books that 
deserve to be read and they ought to be read by those who wish to do so (Bobbio, 
ff:1). A good library must satisfy the needs of readers in any particular community 
as rapidly as possible. Moreover, Bobbio insists, a good library must ensure that 
“the right books are purchased at the right time and are made available to as many 
as possible in the shortest time possible” (ibid.).
During the Fascist regime, “the subject of history was disciplined and twisted ... to 
illustrate Italian ‘primacy’ in many ... fields” (Mack Smith, 1997:364). Certain books 
were eliminated altogether. “Over a hundred history textbooks were forbidden by a 
special commission in 1926, and ten years later [only] a few standardized texts 
were in compulsory use” (ibid.). Bobbio’s liberalism demands that the individual not 
only ascertain facts, but try to interpret them. Under Fascism, access to facts was 
limited, or facts were twisted for political purposes. Indeed, culture was used as a 
political tool to thwart liberal education. The result was that young Italians
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educated under Fascism did not benefit from a great democratic culture (Bobbio, 
1997:91).
Bobbio’s prime task as an intellectual is to conserve the memory of anti-Fascism, 
for it was the foundation on which the Italian Republic came into being. Since the 
Resistance comprised partisans of many political views, it was a genuinely liberal 
movement and remained so even during the worst years of Fascist violence. The 
exercise or practice of liberalism gave the partisans a “special licence” to be at the 
forefront in building the new Italian State after the demise of Fascism. The school 
of anti-Fascism was, therefore, a lesson in liberalism that involved formulating a 
new government and constitution by first coming to terms with the Communists 
and with those Italians who sought the restitution of the monarchy.
Laws and rules are to be followed by all in an economic system based on free 
enterprise, in a society free from the excesses of fanaticism, national rhetoric and 
ideological attack on cultures and peoples. In the liberal state, a citizen exchanges 
his precarious natural liberty for civil liberty, but the exchange is made with his own 
resources and responsibility rather than through an authoritarian ruler.
2.2 Liberalism: continuity and change
Other than the quality or state of being liberal, "liberalism" can be defined i) as a 
movement in modern Protestantism emphasizing intellectual liberty and the 
spiritual and ethical content of Christianity; ii) as a theory in economics 
emphasizing individual freedom from restraint and usually based on free 
competition and the self-regulating market; iii) as a political philosophy based on 
belief in progress, the essential goodness of man, the autonomy of the individual 
and the protection of political and civil liberties; and, finally, iv) as the principles 
and policies of a liberal party (Webster's, 1985:688). The study of liberalism can be 
approached from several perspectives. In this section, the question has been 
tackled by a) establishing the principles of liberalism and their derivatives; b) taking
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stock of the common ground found in "liberal thinkers"; and c) examining Bobbio's 
claim that socialism must have a liberal character. The power of the west is stili 
rooted in the fact that it found forms of social, economic and political organization 
which allowed individuals to make more of their human potential than had ever 
been possible before (Buzan and Segal, 1998:22). Breaking down the excesses of 
earlier institutions - family, class and state, which had hitherto blocked the 
possibility of individual development, freed the individual and served to unleash 
huge resources of energy and creativity which could be translated into new forms 
of power and cultural variety.
Although the core principle of liberal doctrine is the theory of the minimal state, it is 
nevertheless necessary to identify "which liberalism" one is referring to. The values 
which underpin a particular definition constitute "minority cultural values" vis-a-vis 
the norms of liberal secular culture. Bobbio writes:
[Liberalism] can be investigated in the same way as any ideology generally 
is, by providing answers on such matters as when it originated, what its 
main ... 'schools' have been, which authors play a major role in its evolution, 
etc. However, ... liberalism is a movement in the history of ideas which 
develops via a host of writers that are quite distinct from each other, such as 
Locke, Montesquieu, Kant, Adam Smith, Humboldt, Constant, John Stuart 
Mill, Tocqueville ... (Bobbio, 1987:104).
The liberal or limited state is based on the philosophical presupposition of natural 
rights or natural law. All persons, regardless of personal will or the will of others, by 
nature possess fundamental rights to life, liberty, security and happiness. The 
state, or those with legitimate power, must respect and guarantee these rights.
To attribute a right to someone is to recognize that the individual ... has the 
capacity to act or not to act just as he pleases, and also the power to resist, 
availing himself in the last instance of the use of force ..., against whoever 
may transgress that right: so that potential transgressors have in turn a duty 
to abstain from any action which might interfere ... with this capacity to act 
or not to act (Bobbio, 1990:5).
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The State, or a surrogate of the State in particular communities, is required to 
permit human activity to take place. Human activity requires the security provided 
by the State. Otherwise a segment of the population will emerge that takes over 
the State’s function by providing security in the manner it deems fit, with little or no 
accountability. “In the absence of a superior ... safeguarding power, individual 
forces try to preserve themselves ..., uniting with each other according to their 
closest affinities, and thus provide that minimum of security which is indispensable 
to ... their activity” (de Ruggiero, 1966:1).
Most versions of liberalism can be derived from a limited, universally valid set of 
authoritative prescriptions. The moderate intent of liberalism includes a gradual 
transformation from absolute regimes to constitutional regimes where legitimate 
representatives undertake legislative and economic reform. This contrasts with 
Mazzini's utopian vision of the God of humanity living through the people rather 
than through the Catholic religion. The earliest beginnings of liberal doctrine hold 
that the state of rights founded in law emanates from civil society; "John Locke 
considered civil society to be the source of the social pact, and the origin of 
legitimate legislative and executive powers" (Ferrari, 1995:27). The minimum 
conditions of economic and political liberalism also require the rule of law and an 
independent judiciary to prevent the manipulation of democratic political 
procedures by those hostile to liberal democracy. In addition, a free and varied 
range of mass communications media is required, “for this preserves the possibility 
of criticism of those in power and allows the public an informed choice at elections” 
(Roberts and Lovecy, 1984:2).
Three additional pillars of liberalism are freedom of conscience, of speech and of 
religion; these tenets are based on the affirmation that every view either leads to 
the truth or does not do so. Each view must therefore be explored. The pluralism of 
views, identities, associations and natural difference is essential to the democratic 
state. This endorsement of pluralism - a real acceptance of diversity - provides a 
guarantee for equality before the law, equality of opportunity in education and in 
the workforce. If put into practice on a larger scale, it would lead to greater
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academic and artistic creativity and the flowering of human potential. The positive 
attribute of liberalism is its celebration of unity in diversity, and its creative 
freshness.
2.3 Issues of importance to Bobbio
Bobbio advises his readers to accept the fact that classical liberal ideals are in the 
continuous process of being re-evaluated in the light of new problems. Many of 
these problems have international as well as personal importance, such as 
pollution, religious fundamentalism, ethics and the future development of fields 
such as science and genetics. As Bellamy says, “Compromises and rules can only 
emerge in an ad hoc manner” (Bellamy, 1992:261); the effort to control abuses of 
power is articulated on the basis of each new political debate. Indeed, for Bobbio, 
the central theme of all political debate is that of power. To his mind, there is “no 
doubt that the working class movement was primarily interested in the various 
ways that power can be seized” (Bobbio, 1988:34). That primary interest was 
mistaken, since the question of “how power is exercised” (ibid.), once it has been 
attained, is the genuine liberal concern.
Pluralism and participation form part of the characteristic prescription of the historic 
Left. However, a society characterized by the ideal of equality vis-a-vis public 
affairs carries with it, Bobbio argues (in the fashion of Tocqueville and Mill), the 
danger of “the tyranny of the majority”, if all participate as equals, it is as if no one 
participates. Participation in capitalist society is not between equals, for inequality 
is the founding principle of society. Power requires authority, a hierarchy of powers 
that have achieved consensus, and thus inequality means that not everyone can 
participate in power. The pluralist response intends “to legitimate and stabilize 
social conflict, maintain the status quo and mediate conflicts where central 
authority is unable or unwilling to do so” (Fraser, 1981:198,199). This response 
includes an argument against the bureaucratic repressive state, which does not 
permit participation. When the majority is all-powerful, such as is the case in some 
contemporary democracies, this populist majority can actually undermine
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democracy by fostering conformity and the elimination of legislative autonomy. In 
this case, Bobbio argues, numerous ill effects ensue, among them the instability of 
the legislative body, the often arbitrary exercise of power by officials, conformity of 
opinion, and a dearth of people worthy of respect in the political domain (Bobbio, 
1990:53).
Pluralism is problematic in that the state must remain unassailable to permit 
human activity to flourish. Bobbio calls attention to the importance of Tocqueville’s 
question of whether liberty can survive in a democratic society (Bobbio, 1990:52). 
However, Bobbio is confident that political parties can bolster the power of the 
state. “There seems ... a logical distinction between participation against, or 
outside, the state, which is a critical and potentially conflictual relation, and 
participation on the periphery, represented in ... a pluri-party state which is 
supportive and confirms power hierarchies” (ibid.). Political parties are the 
legitimate means through which contemporary disagreement and agreement are 
voiced. Consensus is shared, however, in that ail parties agree on the rules of 
competition, or the rules of the game. The onus is also on the parties to preserve 
the reasons of the state, that is, to preserve democratic political life (Mauro in 
Bobbio, 1995b:xiii).
Bobbio stresses that there are two different aspects to consider in defining the 
“limited state”. One limit refers to the powers of the state, and the other concerns 
the functions of the state (Bobbio, 1990:11). Limits to both the power and functions 
of the state are parameters that influence types of liberalism. “In respect of the 
limits of power one speaks currently of the rights-based state, while the term 
minimal state is used in reference to the limit on functions” (ibid.). Today, liberalism 
conceives of the state as both rights-based and minimal. By contrast, Bobbio 
maintains, the social state is rights-based and non-minimalist, while the state of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is minimalist yet not rights-based.
The rights-based state is counterposed to the absolute state, while the minimal 
state stands opposite the maximal state. At the historical level and in practice, the
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two emancipatory impulses do not always coincide and this is the fact on which 
Bobbio’s view of liberalism hinges. It also explains to some extent why it was 
necessary for Bobbio to take Hobbes as a model, and also to build on that 
Hobbesian model (this will be considered below under section 2.6).
Bobbio and his forebears believe that the liberal state can be a socialist state, 
since it preaches liberty and the philosophy of liberty. Social democracy is a form 
of renewed liberalism, "fighting everywhere for individual freedoms, political 
freedoms, freedom to vote, and freedom of conscience" (Rosselli, 1994:84). The 
freedom attained by independent states sets an example in liberal practice. Later, 
individuals sought their emancipation as workers, based "on the proletarian 
struggle and the proletarian ascent, on the effort o f ... society to supersede the ... 
unjust terms dictated by bourgeois society, on the eternal thirst for ... freedom" 
(ibid.).
Those who support liberalism today stress civil rights, such as the right to 
education, to health care and to a healthy environment. Individual responsibility is 
of paramount importance in preserving these rights. Human responsibility is rooted 
in the fact of living with others: "The man who acts according to duty is no longer 
alone in the world; he stands face to face with another, in whom his original self is 
duplicated; and this fundamental relation is the source of all human relations" (de 
Ruggiero, 1966:352). The question of duty is a constant element in Bobbio’s form 
of liberalism; he appeals to our sense of the moral values reflected in all human 
action, though he focuses primarily on the political sphere. It is in the name of a 
universal morality, superior to professional and corporate ethics, that Bobbio 
contemplates Italy’s shortcomings. Scardocchia identifies some of these failings as 
corruption, malfeasance, mass illegality and the political and intellectual mediocrity 
of Italy’s ruling classes (Scardocchia in Bobbio, 1995b:x).
Liberalism is primarily an approach to economic and political development. It has 
therefore been called "a capitalist front". At first the employing classes in Northern 
Italy viewed the Allied occupation of Italy as a shield against social revolution, but
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when the demands of the Communists took on sharper contours, these classes 
were swift to act. Many entrepreneurs and businesses made their fortunes under 
Fascism, but after its collapse they tried to protect their assets by converting to 
free market liberalism. The employers wanted nothing to do with state intervention 
that included socialist planning.
For some, liberalism seems profoundly impoverished because of its secular basis 
and its lack of emphasis on collective morality. Some intellectuals link their 
criticism of liberalism to a perception of morality; more specifically, the morality of 
individuals is to be considered as one thing, and that of collectives another matter 
altogether. Yet Bobbio seeks a common public morality to limit the consequences 
of sottogoverno [the invisible level of government underneath visible government], 
and he warns against creating separate public moralities. Hegel identified the 
Enlightenment as the struggle against religion, a "critical spirit, as 'pure ingenious 
thought' tearing down everything that stands" (Goldmann, 1973:6). Yet in the 
liberal mindset, public and private actions are morally different. John Stuart Mill 
distinguished between self-regarding actions and actions which injured others, the 
former being private and exempt from legal control, while the latter public actions 
could be subject to legal control.
Part of the historical rethinking of liberalism has been to determine whether there is 
room for socialism within liberalism. "Classical liberalism's conflict with central 
planning was not over the shared goal of enhancing the well-being of the greatest 
possible number of people but over the way to achieve that goal" (O'Driscoll, 
9/5/95). Arguably, therefore, liberalism and socialism are not directly opposed. 
Socialism’s aims hoid merit, even if both freedom and economic success were 
thwarted by central planning. Liberals thus criticize the means used to realize 
socialism. Particularly in Italy, a politics based on social liberalism that culminated 
in the formation of a distinct school of intellectual thought played a central role in 
the moral and political reconstruction of the nation after Fascism. Other illiberal 
effects of capitalism, such as the widening social polarization between rich and 
poor, might also bring liberalism and socialism closer. Anderson challenges
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Bobbio’s belief in reforming liberalism, because liberalism has culminated in so 
many failures, such as "trends within the major capitalist democracies towards 
attenuated civil liberties, chauvinist intolerance, and increasingly secretive 
administrative-political elites” (Anderson, 1988:1). The inadequacies of liberalism, 
and disenchantment with classic liberal ideals do signify, however, that “the project 
of a liberalized socialism, or of a socially responsible and authentic liberalism, may 
well appear to hold out the best of both worlds” (ibid.). While Anderson proposes 
injecting some socialism into liberalism, Bobbio today proposes injecting liberalism 
into socialism, in the manner of the young hopefuls who emerged from Fascism.
in Italy, liberalism acquired new meaning after Fascism’s oppressive dictatorial 
rule. The preceding phase of liberalism, that of the early years of the nineteenth 
century, was also the subject of much criticism, however, owing to the 
ultraconservative stance of many Italian liberals who did not pay sufficient attention 
to the needs of the emerging working class. The progressive reform of Marxism by 
Bobbio and his peers was a liberalizing task, as they argued that Marxism required 
the injection of liberal values.
In the kaleidoscopic conditions of Italian society after the First World War, in 
which so many social and ideological elements were shaken into unfamiliar 
patterns, liberalism did not fade but took on some new ... colours. ... 
Among a younger generation, further to the Left, the ... force of an insurgent 
working class - and sometimes of the Russian Revolution beyond it - 
produced an ... array of ... attempts to weld proletarian and liberal values 
into a new political force (ibid.:14,15).
Bobbio reminds us that the first and most celebrated attempt to weld proletarian 
and liberal values was Gobetti’s programme for a “Liberal Revolution”. Gobetti had 
published Mill in Italian; he upheld free trade, yet he also admired Lenin and 
collaborated with Gramsci in L'Ordine Nuovo. Later, the path of Italian liberalism 
encountered many challenges, since Bobbio and his contemporaries faced a 
certain "limit" in their political intention. The doctrine of liberal-sociaiism was forged 
on the basis of their struggle against Nazi-Fascism, where anti-Fascism 
constituted, in Foa’s words, a "narrow path to politics" (Foa, 1991:87). Liberal-
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socialism formed the basis of GL's and the PdA's political action and "was certainly 
a solemn and strong affirmation of the values denied by Fascism - liberty and 
social justice - but at the same time it was both restrictive and simplified" (ibid.). As 
Fascism began to lose ground from about 1935, liberal-socialists had only 
succeeded in skimming over the historical antithesis between liberty and social 
justice. "This complex question forms the basis of contemporary history and could 
not simply be limited to the robust and valid negation of Fascism" (ibid.).
As Anderson suggests, Bobbio's political coordinates are in some ways more 
complex than those of his principal predecessors, for he represents three major 
contending traditions -  liberalism, socialism and anti-Fascism. By conviction, 
Bobbio is a liberal, albeit a liberal of anti-Fascist ilk.
But Italian liberalism has always been a phenomenon apart ... In Italy, ... 
national unification was achieved not over the body but under the very 
banner of liberalism. Moreover the liberalism that emerged victorious from 
the Risorgimento had a double legitimation: it was both the constitutional 
ideology of the Piedmontese Moderates, codifying the structure of their 
dominance under the monarchy, and the secular definition of an Italian 
State created against the will of the Roman Church (Anderson, 1988:13).
The emergence of new social classes and political parties is a feature of the 
liberal, rights-based society. Bobbio asks us to take a look at those classes and 
parties to consider whether they require myths to survive and develop in a 
democracy, which, after all, is a very different political system than the 
authoritarian regimes of the past. A committed ecologist would not consider 
ecology to be a myth, but a utopia. Does power require myths and legends like the 
figure of Che Guevara?
For Bobbio, the word “myth” is mostly negative, particularly in Italy; perhaps it is 
true that to ask oneself whether ecology is a myth is to view it with suspicion. The 
evocation of the past and the future assists in the creation of myths. Myth, Bobbio 
argues, appeals to our faculty of desire, whereas ideology bases its efficacy on the 
claim of meeting our interests (Bobbio, gg:2). Myth excites our passions, while
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ideology offers the hope of fulfilling our needs. The practical and major function of 
myth is to build a principle of legitimacy of power. In Bobbio’s conception of 
liberalism, the only principle of legitimacy attributed to democratic power is the 
execution of free elections on the basis of established rules. In a genuinely liberal 
polity, only ideals are above the rules. Bobbio maintains that Marx and Marxist 
movements deal with the realms of science and utopia, that is, two forms of 
reason, one demonstrative and the other constructive. Utopia is a rational 
construction projected towards the future, while myth appeals to passion and is 
rooted in “the time of times”, in the time of a lost past whose historical memory has 
been lost (ibid:1).
A key issue for Bobbio is the inclusion of Marx’s utopian vision in political liberal 
debate. Scientific discourse that is purely theoretical is valid; it rests on an ideology 
that addresses our needs. He sees the direct and practical function of myth as 
both non-scientific and linked to the followers of Fascism, who sought to "form 
political will through a gospel of political fictions that trigger political energy as a 
primitive form of battle” (ibid.).
The border shared by politics and power is a facet of liberalism that must 
accompany any discussion of the modern state. Bobbio warns that vigilance is 
necessary in all areas of public life. Later in this section I have considered one 
particular aspect of political power that affects liberalism: that of the control and 
use of mass media. Bobbio is convinced that television helps politicians to speed 
up the realization of their aims. Mass media can detract from liberalism at the 
international level and even culminate in its demise, he argues, for economic and 
political power have joined forces to transform their power. The anomaly is the 
absence of regulation to provide “liberal balance" in the relationship between 
political power and the power of television. The wider political debate concerns the 
illiberalism manifested in those societies where political power and the mass media 
have formed alliances, thus no longer providing the cultural variety and facts 
necessary to forge liberal citizens. Television, the press, internet publications, 
mobile telephones, in addition to the potential new technologies that can be
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mastered by political agents: all this gives liberals cause for concern. Governments 
prefer "a press that makes their job easier, that allows them to proceed with 
minimum public accountability” (Stephenson, 2001:18).
The current debate concerning the redistribution of power exercised by Italian 
television is but one example of a discussion that defines the prerequisites of a 
minimal but rights-based state. Bobbio draws our attention to the real and 
fundamental problem of contemporary society: new forms of power. Traditionally, 
power has been conceived as ownership of the means of production or, 
antagonistically, as organization of the labour force. Now, however, power derived 
from the possession of means of communication is very much in play. The 
excessive power of Italian television must be corrected, Bobbio argues, particularly 
since Berlusconi, the successful entrepreneur and Prime Minister of Italy, is 
engaged in an intense political mission of fusing state and corporate power 
through the channels he controls. As Monbiot comments,
In Italy [that power has] condensed into the ... figure of ... Berlusconi [... 
who] is worth around $14bn. ... His control of most of the private media ... 
and most of the public media (through the government) means that he can 
exercise a dominion unprecedented in a democratic nation over the 
thoughts and feelings of his people (Monbiot, 2002:13).
In more general terms, the public/private debate is a crucial issue for Bobbio. 
There is a contemporary tendency of Right-wing governments in the developed 
world to deregulate employment while granting concessions to big business. 
Intellectuals, he argues, are in a position to describe the historical and 
psychological effects of government, including any threats to liberal government, 
intellectuals must reinforce the human ideal of individual liberty by “transmitting 
and re-elaborating the juridical techniques of free cohabitation”, making sure that 
the rules of the game are respected (Bobbio, hh:2).
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2.4 How Bobbio constructs his own liberalism
Bobbio teaches that the bourgeois state need not necessarily be an illiberal one; 
Nazism, Fascism and Soviet Communism constituted genuine threats to liberalism 
itself, more than to the liberal state. Bobbio cooperated with Palmiro Togiiatti to 
formulate “una politica possibilista”, a possible politics that the PCI could follow to 
overcome the ambiguity of the Stalinist line, so as to ensure that the “two truths of 
the popular front and the revolution could co-exist” (Bocca, 1973:242). Whereas 
Bobbio concentrates on the theory of the state, that is, the study of those 
institutions through which political power is exercised, Togliatti’s focus is the role of 
the party. Bobbio emphasizes that reformist and revolutionary socialism have an 
identical concern: the transition to a new state.
Fear of Hitler caused both Bobbio and Togiiatti to respond to Nazi-Fascism, but 
one major difference separated the policies they advocated: Togiiatti invited the 
PCI to work within Fascist organizations. Thus we read Communist propaganda 
referring to “black-shirted brothers" (ibid.). Bocca argues that penetrating Fascist 
organizations to reach the masses was not an option for other anti-Fascist forces, 
including GL, “for whom the aversion to Fascism was moral, above all” (ibid.).
Bobbio claims that from the time of the French Revolution socialism has been 
linked with liberalism. The principles of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man 
were a historical milestone that influenced governments and served as an 
inspiration and as a model of enlightenment to other men. The restoration of the 
social contract inspired the people who were struggling for freedom, but at the 
same time it was an object of contempt for reactionaries of all confessions. The 
right to freedom of thought and freedom of the press, Bobbio recalls, was 
considered by Pope Pius VI, who lived through the revolution, to be a “monstrous 
right inferred from the equality and liberty of all men” (Bobbio, 1996a:114). It is 
important to realize that such a counter-revolutionary stance existed, since in itself
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it testifies to the gains -  and threats -  of freedom. The Church was one of the first 
institutions to condemn the establishment of equality and liberty.
Bellamy sums up Bobbio’s position on Marxism when he writes that "Bobbio had 
not denied the inadequacies of liberal democracy, but had doubted whether 
Marxism had the resources to transcend these problems in a realistic manner..." 
(Bellamy in Bobbio, 1988:25). Throughout his exchange with interlocutors from the 
PCI, Bobbio criticized the PCI's efforts to combine liberal democracy and Marxism; 
hence, he believed "that the PCI must ... concentrate on how to achieve a 
socialism compatible with liberal democracy" (ibid.). The best solution, one that he 
continues to prescribe, is that of "reconciling the individualist premises of liberalism 
with socialist notions of distributive justice" (ibid.:26).
In the course of creating a prescription for liberalism with a socialist character, 
Bobbio built on Salvemini's denunciation of Stalin's Russia and his protests against 
the methods of the Nazi Gestapo and the Fascist OVRA. Salvemini was one of the 
first historians in the mid-thirties to warn against the Soviet political police and the 
failings of the Communist utopia, when most members of the European Left were 
still enthusiastic about the initial promise of the Russian Revolution. For Arturo 
Colombo, Salvemini was the only one to express candidly that "in Germany there 
were concentration camps, in Italy there were islands used as prisons, and in 
Soviet Russia there existed Siberia" (ibid.) and the gulags that were the final 
destination of Soviet political prisoners.
Another theme that reflects Bobbio's views on liberalism is that of non-violence. It 
is important to distinguish between the violence that quashes free speech and thus 
smothers life, and the violence that allows free speech and leaves space for 
resistance. "Daily life is full of violence of this latter type: there is violence when 
one does not alleviate poverty, degradation, physical or moral handicap; this 
violence, however, has two sides, one of oppression but also one of possible or 
real resistance" (Foa, 1991:90). In this sense, the ability to vocalize one's 
disagreement or alternative view is an antidote to "daily violence". This antidote,
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coupled with the acceptance of diversity and the socialist aim of the equitable 
division of resources, is definitive to Bobbio’s liberalism. As Bellamy writes, 
“socialists need to establish a plausible basis for the more equitable division of 
resources on which a socialist democracy must rest [and ...] these foundations 
must be consonant with the traditional liberal political rights protecting the 
individual” (Bellamy in Bobbio, 1988:25).
At the same time, Bobbio does not eschew Erasmus' ideal nation of Christian 
Europe or the community of the Church. He cites Erasmus' teaching to illustrate 
the credo that the only republic is the one that transcends borders, where scholars 
recognize one another and argue different points of view: "If the name of [a] nation 
serves to unite, we must recall that [our] common nation is the world" (Bobbio, 
1997b:39).
Bobbio holds the conviction that faith in reason is not as absolute as faith in divine 
Providence, despite the fact that Providence is losing ground in the popular mind. 
The reason for this condition is that reason "non e, ma diviene" (Bobbio, 
1994c: 198) - reason "is not but becomes". Rational beings, he maintains, have 
always suspected or professed the possibility of error, and admit "the insufficiency 
of their knowledge without divine help" (ibid.:197). For Bobbio, the affirmations of 
rational humans are subject to continual revision. Questions that they cannot 
answer through their reason are metaphysical ones, ones that concern the 
problem of evil -  whether caused by nature or history.
It is ... a fact that the history of the liberal states coincides both with the 
demise of confessional states and the rise of states ... agnostic in their 
attitude to the religious beliefs of their citizens; ... the demise of the 
privileges ... of feudalism and the emergence of the demand for free 
disposal of wealth and liberty of exchange [mark] the birth and development 
of the bourgeois mercantile society (Bobbio, 1990:16,17).
The Italian political experience is unique "in the sense that it differs from all the 
other European countries in one essential fact: Rome has been for almost 2000 
years the spiritual capital of Catholicism and the home of the papacy" (Allum,
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1995:112). Therefore, the relations between Church and state in Italy are 
significantly different from those of other European countries.
In view of the historical Right's complicity with Fascism and Giolitti's failure to tame 
the socialists, the consideration of Church-State relations is useful in analysing the 
process of Italian modernization. The deepest liberal significance of those relations
lies not in the attempt of the State to assert its independence, and even 
control, of the Church; nor in the attempt of the Church to resist interference 
on the part of the State; fo r ... each of these liberties conceals an aspect of 
servility; but in their conflict itself, as cancelling out many of the ir... claims, 
... thus facilitating the free development of the individual’s conscience" (de 
Ruggiero, 1966:397,398).
Although for many centuries popes held temporal sway over central Italy, in 1859- 
60 and 1870 the Papal States became part of the Kingdom of Italy. The dispute 
with the Church was settled only in 1929, the year in which Mussolini agreed to a 
concordat between the State and the Vatican40, which stipulated the independent 
sovereignty of the Holy See and included financial compensation for the Roman 
Catholic Church's loss of temporal power in 1870. The sovereignty of the Church is 
embodied in the Italian Constitution of 1948, Article 7.
Bobbio has adopted a rational stance vis-a-vis religion although his scepticism is 
more apparent in his later works. For Bobbio, fear of God is not a necessity for 
personal or public morality. He states "none of the constitutions in force in liberal 
states, democratic and secular, ... [preclude] the liberty of having no religion" 
(Bobbio, 1994c:172).
Bobbio distinguishes between religion and religiosity (religiousness). By 
religiousness he means having a sense of one’s own limits, knowing that human 
reason is but a tiny flame that illuminates a minimal space, compared to the 
immensity of the universe. The only thing of which he is certain, within the limits of 
his reason, is that he is not a man of faith, for to be of the faith is something that 
belongs to a world that is not his own. He does, however, experience the sense of
100
mystery, which is common to both the man of faith and the man who does not 
believe in any religion. The profound sense of mystery surrounds us, Bobbio says, 
and that is what he refers to as religiosity (Bobbio, 2000:7).
In one of Cavour's speeches of 1861, he called for "a free Church in a free state" 
(Absalom, 1995:55) and he tried to make Rome - the spiritual capital of 
Catholicism - the capital of the newly unified Italian State, in Martinengo 
Cesaresco’s view, "more than any man of any party he had reckoned the cost of 
ranking the Church with its vast potential powers for good, for order, for public 
morality, among the implacable enemies of the nascent kingdom; therefore, his 
last public utterance was a cry for religious peace" (Martinengo Cesaresco, 
1910:338). The events that resulted in the unification of Italy also culminated in the 
decidedly secular aspect of Italian liberalism. Thus, Tortarolo writes, "the entire 
decade that preceded the proclamation of the Kingdom ... was marked by the 
discussion and ... promulgation of measures inspired by the effort to do away with 
the ties between public institutions and the Catholic church" (Tortarolo, 1998:60).
From the time of Cavour, Italy struggled with the issue of religion vis-a-vis public 
fife. "In the complex legislative panorama of those years the liberal democratic Left 
in the Piedmontese Parliament fought for measures that aimed at the 
secularization of the life of the State" (ibid.). The Siccardi laws, which were 
approved in 1850, and provided for the abolition of the ecclesiastical court41, 
resulted in a "politics centred on the redefinition of the competence of the State in 
secular terms" (ibid.). Moreover, a wide consensus was reached, particularly 
among the parliamentary forces and the educated middle classes, whereby the 
process of secularization was considered to be an opportunity for the 
comprehensive modernization of the Italian State. Secularization was envisaged as 
providing a premise for the aspirations of national unification, regardless of the 
form it would take.
Secularization thus contributed to the realization of liberalism, for it contrasted 
decisively with the Hapsburg Empire: "the Constitution of 1849 repudiated the
101
separation between State and Church" (ibid.). Above all, among the secular 
Piedmontese, Cavour played a key roie in orientating the politics of Piedmont vis- 
a-vis the Church. "In Cavour we can find direct experience of the irrepressible 
vitality of freedom" (ibid.:61). Cavour's conception of the relations between Church 
and State was dominated by his consideration that both the Christian religion and 
the State should welcome the requirement for liberty in the modern world and 
should therefore abandon their traditional dogmatisms and principles of authority. 
To paraphrase Cavour, “Might Italy not forget the cradle of her liberties when her 
seat of government was firmly established in the Eternal City!” (Martinengo 
Cesaresco, 1910:337,338).
Cavour appealed to the Pope42 and asked him to renounce temporal power in 
exchange for freedom: his appeal is important politically and intellectually since it 
illustrated the effect of Italy’s contact with liberal European culture. It indicates a 
fully secular awareness of religion as a stabilizing element in society and as a 
natural constituent of the human soul. Cavour's secular attitude was characterized 
by "an element of energetic state interventionism, that obliged the ecclesiastical 
institution to respect the secularity of the cosa pubblica [public domain] as well as 
the 'free institutions and the national cause'" (Tortarolo, op. cit.:61).
Cavour's attention to the question of Church-State relations was a central theme of 
all the Italian liberals who followed him. "Cavour [perceived] the backwardness of 
the milieu in which he [lived] and knowingly [used] the instrument of the State to 
endow the emerging liberal society with public opinion, [to render that society] a 
subject aware of the public space made available by the new institutions" (Cavour, 
1995:10). He proclaimed the full liberty of all religions as one of the fundamental 
tenets of the social pact. Above all, the institution of laws to separate the Church 
from the State derived from his conviction that “the Catholic clergy, penetrated by 
the truth of the dogmas it professes ..., should not seek by force, by privilege, by 
restriction, [to buttress] the cause of religion (ibid.: 104).
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In line with that tradition, Bobbio's call for and defence of "the rules of the game" 
moves the nucleus of human existence and society to the republic: the focus and 
beneficent source of morality lies in the republic, not in the prayers of men. This 
"new" morality is more in keeping with the modern spirit and moves civic 
awareness away from the mysterious, non-predictable sphere of divine revelation.
Bobbio follows the tradition of Salvemini, Gobetti and Capitini in claiming that all 
humans, as members of a universal community, merit equal treatment under the 
law. It is only through a documented legal framework that one can ensure objective 
and universal tutelage of all individuals. The objectivity of law, however, is based 
on a subject’s decision to respect it. Thus such precepts as promoting behaviour 
conducive to harmonious coexistence need to be developed in the contractarian 
state.
Gobetti sought to include the Communists and the Catholics as interlocutors of 
liberal Italy; Bobbio continued on the same path and this "strategy of inclusion" 
induces him to consider the rights of all, regardless of their religious affiliation. As 
illustrated by Colietti (1974), Marxism was concerned with one society only - 
modern capitalist society. Bobbio, however, discusses society in general and 
"regards the factor of 'consciousness' as the specific element of human society 
and history, and accordingly holds that societies should be investigated exclusively 
at the level of ideological social relations" (ibid.:3). Lenin objected to this approach 
to the study of man:
For in this perspective the juridical and political forms of such societies ... 
must inescapably appear as 'originating in this or that idea of humanity' and 
hence as mere products or moments of thought. It follows that analysis 
cannot engage with a real object, but only with an ideal objectivity. The 
relation between the theory and its object contracts, due to the ideal 
character of the latter, into a mere relation of idea to idea ... The object of 
analysis thus slips through our fingers; it is impossible for us to undertake 
any study of the facts, of social processes, precisely because we are no 
longer confronting a society, a real object, but only the idea of society, 
society in general (Lenin in Colietti, 1974:4).
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By concentrating uniquely on capitalism, Marx is concerned with a particular 
historical occurrence, a particular event in time. Marx’s weakness is that he is 
bound to the particular in a way that Bobbio, with his larger historical agenda, is 
not. Bobbio’s strategy of inclusion does not alienate those who do not work or have 
no business interests. He seeks to build on Capitini’s lesson of benefiting the 
weakest members of society, whether they be minority groups, the ill or the 
handicapped, and to have them represented in this “age of rights”. Bobbio seeks 
the protection of all citizens, not through morality, but through law, where "it is not 
good law which makes the good ruler but the wise legislator who brings about 
good government by introducing good laws" (Bobbio, 1987:150).
It is clear that our moral problem is not relativism but pluralism, or the enduring 
conflict between competing definitions of “the good". Michael Ignatieff expresses it 
thus: "A liberal has to acknowledge that his own values are not hegemonic; in 
place of consensus we have confrontation" (Ignatieff, 1998:20). Religious and 
racial differences shape the liberal society but also remind one of the double- 
edged truth of liberal value neutrality in terms of religion, such as described by 
Ignatieff: "Liberal secularism - to a convinced Muslim - masquerades as value 
neutrality; in reality, it is not value neutral" (ibid.). Indeed, despite Europe's 
multicultural society, "Islam made us realize that core identity was less secular 
than we had supposed" (ibid.). Christianity played an important role in promoting 
the institutions we associate with liberal democratic-capitalist modernity; 
Christianity provides a complete narrative, or rather a number of different 
narratives that serve to make sense of the confusing universe. The question of 
faith illustrates the existence of "majority culture", an ever-present challenge to 
liberal values.
This need for a pluralist variety of all religious and non-religious views is echoed in 
the work of Bobbio and the thinkers who figure in his intellectual biography. 
Capitini, for example, defined the essence of liberalism as
the sense of present [spontaneous] creation, of the ongoing and full
presence of the soul, of spiritual creation through values (aesthetic,
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philosophical, ethical, political, etc.), which constitutes inner liberation and 
an affirmation of the best. Whilst the Roman Church was established on the 
basis of the revelation of some facts like miracles and angels, attested to by 
a book, and interpreted by an institution that has dogma in its structure and 
culminates in Papism, we today believe that history is broader than any 
institution, however much institutions maintain a simply historical value 
(Capitini, 1996:40).
History is a broader sphere than any one church or institution, and the workings of 
the soul are “more profound than history” because the soul -  the individual person 
-  adds value to history through his intervention in the historical process. In other 
words, the concept of “value” ought to be separated from religious value and 
instead be appraised on the basis of individual value. The individual’s intervention 
in history corresponds with "the modern conception of occurring value” [valore in 
atto]. This value is at the same time immanent, non-spatial and non-temporal. If we 
take temporal to mean “of this life” or secular, we see that Capitini places the 
individual’s expression of liberty on the same plane as religious experience. This 
experience is not of the Church, but constitutes a fundamental affirmation of 
liberalism in that individual interiorita43 has a liberal value. Thus every religious 
need has an explicitly liberal character.
It is apparent that all nations in the modern age must use their state education 
system to teach the values of secularity and science. Without such a core, 
religious minorities will secede from the community and reproduce themselves on 
the basis of values which would make their young people unfit to understand or 
participate in the wider national culture (ibid.).
After the events that occurred at Auschwitz, Bobbio argues, God can no longer be 
considered omnipotent. "God is not omnipotent and for this he suffers" (ibid.:198). 
This has resulted in a condition where "It is no longer God who saves us but we 
who must save God" (ibid.). Society nowadays is torn by anxiety that derives both 
from a weak theology and a weak philosophy. One can consider God to be 
impotent and fallible and, Bobbio asks, "how far away is the radical overturning of 
the traditional view of the universe, according to which God is the creator and man
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is the creature, in the equally radical humanistic vision according to which God is a 
creation of man?" (ibid.). What one is confronted with is a God who, like modern 
reason itself, is in a process of "becoming" rather than in a permanent state of 
being. This new, fallible and impotent God, he affirms, increasingly resembles 
man.
As a liberal and an “intellectual mediator”, Bobbio chooses to subject both the 
dogma of the Church as well as the doctrine of Marx to critical review. Socialism 
must not be based on a doctrine of salvation, whether terrestrial or divine. The 
moral thrust of Christianity and that of Marxism is limited, respectively, to 
Christians and Marxists; both thus exclude the participation of the other members 
of society.
Bobbio's consideration of justice in his discussion of evil reflects his view that all 
human suffering involves a wrong perpetrated by those who cause it. Bobbio 
distinguishes between two types of evil which exist through two types of human 
reality: maliciousness and suffering. Maliciousness can be described as active evil, 
and suffering as passive evil. "When we consider evil in general we think of an 
episode of violence or of pain" (ibid.:199), he writes. All suffering is at the same 
time a cry for justice, Bobbio argues, since suffering springs from an active evil. 
"The model of this interpretation can be found in the daily life of any human society 
in which one of the fundamental rules that must be respected, so that pacific 
cohabitation is possible, establishes that crime must be followed by punishment" 
(ibid.:200). The entire universe, overtime, has always been governed "according to 
the fundamental principle of retributive justice" (ibid.:201). Therefore, Bobbio 
argues, “as long as there exists a link between evil and human behaviour, one can 
still sustain the cause of retributive justice: man in general is responsible for all the 
actions of men” (ibid.:203).
Bobbio highlights the fact that “though democracy has, for the last century at least, 
been considered the natural progression from liberalism, its ideologies prove to be 
no longer compatible once democracy has been taken to its logical extreme of a
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mass democracy, a democracy of mass parties, which produces the Welfare 
State" (Bobbio, 1987:114). Rather than a philosophy of choice, Bobbio's 
reformulation of liberalism can be called a philosophy of ideology where the 
language of politics and aesthetics constitute evocative forces, and the state, 
whether strong or weak, is the factor on which liberalism hinges:
If the banks which were theoretically supposed to confine the state have 
burst, it is difficult to deny that what happened is that they were swept away 
by the flood of popular political participation which was unleashed by 
universal suffrage. It has often been said that the Keynesian economic 
strategy was an attempt to save capitalism without abandoning democracy, 
so rejecting the two opposite solutions of either destroying capitalism by 
sacrificing democracy (Leninism in practice) or destroying democracy so as 
to save capitalism (Fascism) (Bobbio, 1987:114).
The doctrinal texts of Soviet Russia were crammed with citations from "canonical 
texts" and this use of citations “belongs to the logic of a system founded on the 
principle of authority" (Bobbio, 1997a:31). For a proposition to be considered true 
in a book of Soviet doctrine and to be included in the system, the following criteria 
had to be met: "(i) the same proposition had to be found in a text of Marx or 
Engels; or (ii) from any proposition one had to be able to extract, through the usual 
expedients of textual hermeneutics, the same proposition in (Marx and Engels); or 
(iii) it had to be in conformity with the propositions affirmed in official party texts ..." 
(ibid.). Bobbio uses one of Lenin's texts in illustrating that the value of original 
sources is based largely on authority rather than empirical verification.
Marx's doctrine is omnipotent because it is just. It is complete and 
harmonious, and it gives men an integral conception of the world that 
cannot be reconciled with any superstition, with any reaction, with any 
defence of bourgeois oppression. Marxism is the legitimate successor of all 
the best that humanity has created during the XIX century, classical 
German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism 
(ibid.:30).
Bobbio asks us to imagine the same words he has italicized being spoken by a 
physicist praising the discoveries of Newton or Einstein - on doing so, one can 
immediately recognize a false note, if one were to change the identity of the
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speaker -  to that of a loyal subject or believer -  within the same context, such 
words would not seem strange, as "he would be reciting his adhesion to the 
doctrine of salvation of which he is a follower" (ibid.).
2.4.1 The liberal challenge: future of the Welfare State
The debate on the Welfare State that ensures the welfare of the citizen “from 
cradle to grave” is a contentious one. An increasingly anarchic global market that 
has followed the technological boom has served to bolster business interests 
attached primarily to profit. That reality has caused many intellectuals on the Left 
to warn that the statist solutions pursued by the old or traditional Left are no longer 
sustainable. Some thinkers, such as Paul Hirst, even argue that globalization is a 
myth designed to “sap political will among those committed to old-fashioned left 
ideals of solidarity and ... conservative concerns about social stability” (Gray, 
1998:43). Although the middle road between state socialism and laissez-faire 
capitalism does not yet incorporate a significant body of political thought, it is 
interesting to take a look at Bobbio’s views on the current necessity to maintain the 
achievements of the Welfare State, particularly as concerns the defence of 
democracy.
Stalinism and a lengthy enunciation of the shortcomings of planned economies are 
no longer required to justify the mixed market, which provides a system of checks 
and balances where "[a] stable and prosperous economy could be secured 
through macro and micro government economic policy; the ensuing economic 
growth could provide the tax revenue to fund an expansion of the Welfare State" 
(Eatwell and O'Sullivan, 1992:5). In recent years, the liberal crusade, often referred 
to as neo-liberaiism, is "directed against the Welfare State, i.e. against the 
watered-down version of socialism" (Bobbio, 1987:115). This crusade is effectively 
against democracy, however.
Not only is the Welfare State jeopardized, in other words the great historical
compromise between the working-class movement and advanced
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capitalism, but democracy itself is at stake, i.e. the other great historical 
compromise which preceded it between the traditional privileges of the 
propertied classes and the world of organized labour, which gave birth 
directly or indirectly to modern democracy (via universal suffrage, the 
formation of mass parties, etc.) (ibid.).
Proponents of neoliberalism in Italy question the role and strength of the State. 
Bobbio warns that these people, who are not true liberals, criticize the Welfare 
State on two counts: (i) the Welfare State is not a minimal state, the best state 
according to liberal doctrine; and consequently (ii) the Welfare State is no longer 
able to carry out its principal function, that of governing. The issues are rendered 
more complex by the hope of "strong"-state neo-liberals to attain their goal of 
working towards the demolition of the Welfare State. But Bobbio refutes such 
arguments:
The antithesis minimal state/maximal state, which is the aspect of the 
controversy most frequently discussed, is not to be confused with the 
antithesis strong state/weak state. Two different oppositions are involved 
which do not necessarily overlap. The charge which neo-liberalism makes 
against the Welfare State is not just that it has violated the principle of the 
minimal state but also that it has given rise to a state which is no longer 
capable of carrying out its proper function, which is to govern (the weak 
state). The ideal of neo-liberalism thus becomes one of a state which is both 
minimal and strong (ibid.:116).
Political society is a joint undertaking, "the plans for which need to be constantly ... 
reformulated, a project which is never definitive, but needs to undergo continuous 
revision" (ibid.:116,117). Although Bobbio agrees that after the events of 1989 and 
the fall of real Communism it is appropriate to attempt a redefinition of liberalism, 
he does not see that attempt as itself a liberal process. If the dismantling of the 
Welfare State were to be included in that effort, "the danger is great not only for 
party political reasons, but also for philosophical reasons in the widest sense" 
(ibid.116). Social contracts, collective decisions and written agreements reflect 
what Bobbio refers to as a "new contractarianism" that could, as part of the Left’s 
agenda, oppose those who would have the Welfare State dismantled44.
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The reactionary character of neo-liberal policy continues to thrive "because it is 
rooted in a philosophical outlook which ... gave birth to the modern world: the 
individualistic conception of society and history" (ibid.:116). The Left's failure to 
come to terms with this philosophical outlook as a force in our simultaneously 
capitalist and democratic societies, and to identify the content of what would 
constitute a counter-proposal to "the new social contract" sought by neo-liberals is 
a matter that must be redressed, according to Bobbio. The task of the Left is to 
ensure that the content of any new contracts reflects both the theoretical and 
practical tradition of socialism.
The Left also needs to heed Hobbes’ teaching on contract theory, Bobbio argues. 
Individual passions and interests are regulated, according to modern contract 
theory, in the human progression from a state of nature to forming part of an 
artificial society where individuals are "predisposed to join together ... so as to 
safeguard their own lives and freedoms" (ibid.). For Bobbio, the only way liberal- 
socialism can be discussed "without straying into abstractions or outright 
contradictions is to devise a new social contract" (ibid.:117), one based on 
distributive justice. The ideal of "justice” did, as we saw, form the basis of GL and 
flow into the creed of the PdA. Yet the hostility of the current Italian government to 
the Welfare State provides a major and positive opportunity for the Italian Left: the 
Left’s role is to exercise a critical spirit in all situations. The new contractarianism to 
be pursued by the Left will both deepen and liberalize Italian democracy, 
particularly since the current government opposes the Welfare State. Still, Bobbio 
asks:
But which social contract? A social contract which allows contracting 
individuals to ask ... the government ... only for protection, which is 
historically what contractarians asked for, and what the new generation of 
liberal writers are asking for once more ...? Or should there be instead a 
new social contract, in which what is at the centre of negotiations is some 
principle of distributive justice? ... The crux of this debate is to see whether, 
starting with the same incontestable individualist conception of society and 
using the same institutional structures, we are able to make a counter­
proposal to the theory of social contract which neo-liberals want to put into 
operation, one which would include ... a principle of distributive justice and
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which would hence be compatible with the theoretical and practical tradition 
of socialism. There is new talk ... of liberal-sociaiism (ibid.).
Bobbio thinks that the Welfare State can best be defended once the Left finally 
comes to terms with the philosophical outlook of the individualistic conception of 
history and society. However, that task needs to be accompanied by a move to 
build on the principle of distributive justice. The Left needs to formulate and 
implement a new contractarianism. Further, it must be made clear that whereas 
the Left is concerned with equality, the Right leaves world markets free to take 
care of everything.
2.4.2 Liberty as a moral value and philosophy as a liberal occupation
Political philosophy, in and of itself, is a liberal activity, Bobbio maintains, for it 
helps to clarify the role of different political forces that animate a democracy. To 
sustain a contract that safeguards the interests of individuals (human interests), 
liberalism must take account of their complex reality. The research carried out by 
Gaetano Mosca, although he was a political conservative, constituted a great leap 
from abstract doctrinairism to the analysis of real forces. One of the most 
interesting aspects of Bobbio's liberalism is the importance he gives to the field of 
scientific research in incorporating "the new" in the area of political science. In 
Mosca's Elementi di scienza politica45, published in 1896, there was reflected the 
role of the true scientist reaching out towards the new. Bobbio describes him as 
"an aggressive and authoritative youth who concentrated his studies on the advent 
of the Left in power" (Bobbio, 1966:vii). Mosca integrated the old with the new, to 
"expose the great laws that regulate the organization of governments" (ibid.). He 
dismissed Marxism as a philosophy of history rather than an economic dogma, for, 
in Bobbio’s words, "history cannot be the story of the political vicissitudes of 
classes conceived as entities; ... it can only be the record of the rise and fall of 
oligarchies" (Meisel, 1965:148). If this is true, then the vision of a classless society 
is an illusion, and though humans may well progress, the new world risks being 
just like the one it replaced.
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Mosca considered the strength and weakness of political power and he concluded 
that it is never the majority who hold political power. As Bobbio interprets Mosca, 
irrespective of ideologies or leading personalities all political rule is a process - now 
peaceful, now coercive - by which a minority gratifies its own interests in a situation 
where not all interests can receive equal consideration" (ibid.: 136). Through 
observation of the facts, Mosca sought to confute the errors which hindered states 
in their development, and his primary target was the parliamentary regime. He 
proposed that the intellectual class be considered as the new protagonist between 
two antagonistic forces: wealth and work.
Mosca comes from a school that is both conservative and realistic; "conservatism 
and realism often go hand in hand" (Bobbio, 1966:xxxii). For the liberal mind, what 
is to be extracted from his thought is the realism, "that of the scientist and not of 
the politician" (ibid.). Bobbio contends that "political studies have always been 
based more on the ... observations of conservatives, who only have eyes for the 
past, rather than on the constructions of reformists who have their eyes fixed on 
the future and often do not realize where their feet lead them" (ibid.). In this sense, 
the cause of liberalism can be bolstered through any novel approach to the study 
of government and society. Bobbio thus urges that Mosca be re-read and that his 
views be freshly made known. Socialism, too, would stand to gain from novel and 
reformist approaches.
Liberty is a moral value for Bobbio. "We are nowadays so accustomed to an 
exclusively economic critique of the Welfare State that it is hard to recapture a 
sense of the strong ethical charge carried by early liberalism, and to remember 
that the critique of paternalism had as its principal raison d'etre the defence of the 
individual's autonomy" (Bobbio, 1990:22). Individualism and liberalism go hand in 
hand in their net break away from holism and organicism. "When government 
intervenes outside its allotted sphere of action in the maintenance of internal and 
external order, the result is to create uniformity of behaviour in society and thus to 
stifle the natural variety of character and temperament" (ibid.:21).
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Variety and conflict are to be encouraged, contrary to the organicist view that 
harmony is good, even attained by force, and that parts must be subordinate to the 
whole. Bobbio highlights the positive influence of opposition between individuals, 
groups and nations, "whence the praise of warfare as a nurse of popular virtue" 
(ibid.:22), which has fostered humanity's technical and moral progress.
On the basis of such a general conception of mankind and its history, it is 
no mystery if individual liberty - conceived as an emancipation from the 
chains in which for centuries individuals had been imprisoned by tradition 
and authorities both religious and secular - came to be viewed as the 
essential condition allowing the realization of the 'variety' of individual 
personalities to be viewed as compatible with conflict, and conflict itself as 
promoting the perfection of all (ibid.:22,23).
Antithesis is the mainspring of progress, and "where a society is founded on a 
single ... doctrine it will be closed and hence static, and where there is a plurality of 
doctrines in permanent ... rivalry with each other, the system will be open and 
progressive" (Bobbio46, 1987:101). Bobbio endorses the view that power can be 
limited and closed systems prevented by the 'grafting on' of alien doctrines; these 
serve to upset the original equilibrium of any system. While he agrees with the 
mainstream view that Mill's essay [On Liberty] is the “ABC” of liberalism, he also 
holds that those who support liberalism have not yet got to “Z". He argues that “the 
task of reconstructing a new doctrine of liberty is more arduous than a nineteenth- 
century utilitarian thinker ... could have possibly imagined, and ... more arduous 
than is realized by those strenuous advocates of monetarism who have decreed 
the death of the Welfare State” (ibid.).
Bobbio argues that the principle of justice must be interpreted as fair distribution or 
equality in terms of burdens and rewards, but also as distributive justice, which he 
considers essential to the unity of a society. The criteria used to effect such 
distribution are of the utmost importance, given that "the current debate on the 
Welfare State arises from the divergent answers to this simple question" 
(ibid.: 103). The principle of justice underpins liberal theory:
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The principle of justice which is Mill's sticking-point is that of neminem 
laedere, i.e. do harm to no one. ... But, ... after the neminem laedere ... 
comes suum cuique tribuere, or render to each his own. ... Mill himself 
recognizes ... that the conduct which government can impose consists first 
... 'in not injuring the interests of one another', but goes on to say that ... 
government must ensure 'each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on 
some equitable principle) of the labours ... incurred for defending the 
society or its members from injury’ ... what are these 'equitable principles' if 
not principles of fair distribution? (ibid.:101,102).
The transition from the laissez-faire liberal state to the social-liberal state would 
mean a shift in the legal apparatus, from negative to positive, Bobbio claims. 
Instead of serving a protective-repressive function, the legal apparatus would be 
designed to "foster or promote the features of an ideal society" (ibid.: 102). The 
transformation of the economy would not be sufficient to establish true democracy 
and the proposals of liberal thinkers could best be utilized by the Left as tools in 
creating its own alternative. Bellamy writes:
The manifest shortcomings of liberal democratic states have induced many 
critics on the left to insist on the need for a profound transformation of the 
economy as a necessary ... condition for 'true' democracy to emerge. 
However, the experience of actually existing socialist states casts serious 
doubt on this claim. Bobbio, in contrast, shows that the left must take the 
criticism ... of liberal thinkers seriously if it is to provide a workable 
alternative of its own (Bellamy, Introduction to Bobbio, 1987:4).
Bobbio argues that every juridical system consists of negative and positive 
precepts. However, Bobbio maintains, the administration of justice based on penal 
law is not the true or complete role of the state. Ensuring that others are not 
harmed is not the sole function of the state. It also extends "its sphere of action to 
promoting behaviour conducive to harmonious coexistence or to sheer survival, 
e.g. by encouraging civil defence initiatives as advocated by Mill" (Bobbio, 
1987:102). But as Bobbio points out, the role of the state in introducing elements 
of distributive justice, and elaborating a set of criteria to determine these elements, 
is complicated by the fact that there is no universally agreed upon formula for what 
is to be distributed. Furthermore,
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Whether the positive function of the state is large or small (not only 
prevention but promotion, not only affording protection but also creating 
incentives), the principle of 'commutative justice'... which consists of making 
a good (or bad) deed correspond to an equal and fitting reward (or 
punishment) in accordance with the principle of arithmetic equivalence, will 
no longer suffice (ibid.:102,103).
It is difficult to determine the correct correspondence between injury and 
compensation, as should be clear from the most cursory look at the history of 
punishment. Another challenge lies in establishing legal boundaries in cases where 
claims of injury or damage are made on the part of individuals concerning 
themselves or wider issues such as damage to the environment. The question of 
how to distribute burdens and rewards among society's members represents a 
kind of dividing line between two versions of liberalism: classical liberal and social- 
liberal liberalism. In considering what is to be distributed by the state and what 
criteria are to be used, there is Mill's answer that the state should repress harmful 
conduct. This response has the merit of being unambiguous and universally 
acceptable -  except to those who believe that the state should also repress 
immoral conduct irrespective of harm done to others. Bobbio believes that this 
difference of opinion is the dividing line between advocates of the classical liberal 
laissez-faire state and those of the social-liberal Welfare State.
In his own approach to liberalism, Bobbio stresses the sequence of historical 
events:
The course of history led from an initial state of servitude, by way of a 
gradual process of liberalization, to the conquest by the subject in growing 
areas of liberty, but the doctrine proceeds in the opposite direction: only by 
taking as its starting point a hypothetical initial state of liberty, and 
conceiving man as naturally free, does it arrive at the construction of a 
political society in which sovereignty is limited. Thus it is that the doctrine ... 
inverts the course of historical events, treating as origin ..., as prius, that 
which is historically the result, which occurs posterius (Bobbio, 1990:7).
new section?
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The influence of doubt -  particularly the doubt of moral freedom -  is a positive 
attribute in the sense that it fuels democratic exchange. Real alternatives emerge 
when one force aims to substitute or overtake another force, when one value or set 
of values challenges another value/set of values. Bosetti writes: "As for the doubts 
of the Left, and the fact that the Left's confidence has been shaken, the only 
certainty is that the Left now doubts itself, and a greater number of questions have 
arisen: (i) what is Left? (ii) does "a Left" still exist? and (iii) if it does exist, where is 
it going?" (Bosetti, 1993:83).
The uncertainty has also been reinforced by increasing doubt about the validity of 
the distinction between Left and Right. Those who deny the distinction are usually 
on one side or other but still insist that the line has become blurred. In particular, 
Bobbio recalls that until a few years ago,
it was those on the Right who denied the distinction, because the Right was 
in a state of crisis. ... the temptation to deny that a Right and a Left exist 
affects those who feel threatened by their nebulous position. Faced with the 
cry of victory by the man on the Left [who ... voiced] the defeat of the Right 
by the Left, the man of the Right defends himself by posing this provocative 
question: 'But do Left and Right still exist?1 (Bobbio in Bosetti, 1993:83,84).
The misleading names of many modern liberal democratic regimes that suggest - 
erroneously - that liberalism and democracy are interdependent give one cause to 
re-think the conceptual identity of the Left, to ensure its distinctness from the Right. 
This translation of aims and values serves to keep the liberal state alive, for the R- 
L distinction guarantees pluralism, differing views and alliances. If one defines Left 
as being synonymous with the "social question", there is a democratic guarantee in 
the presence of a Right. Government spending for the disadvantaged, cohesion 
funds and the like, if contested by the Right on the basis of an ideological principle 
or aspect of culture not shared by the Left, is but part of a competitive or 
antagonistic process hailed by liberalism.
The existence of Left and Right camps can assist the individual in overcoming his 
apathy. Bobbio cites Kant and The Idea of Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
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Point of View in confirmation of the view that man's vital energies are put to work in 
the competitive process and result in liberal thinking:
In the absence of unsociability, all human talents would remain confined to 
an embryonic stage men, like the obedient sheep under the shepherd's 
guidance, would ascribe no value whatsoever to their life. ... Let thanks be 
given to nature for the stubbornness she engenders, the invidious ... spirit 
of emulation, the never sated greed for wealth - and for power too! For 
without her, all the excellent natural human dispositions would remain 
forever dormant... (Bobbio, 1990:23).
Rather than eliminate capitalism, Bobbio desires that the benefits of capitalism are 
extended to all; "for the development of a truly democratic system, ... control is 
extended to embrace not only the centres of political and administrative power but 
of economic power as well, this being [aj criterion for a democracy to be more 
advanced than that of so-called bourgeois democracy, which a working-class 
democracy sets out to be" (Bobbio, 1988:45).
As a form of government, "the Iiberalist [sic] state, unlike the absolute and social 
states, has limited powers and the democratic state is characterized by majority 
power, rather than the power of a few, or just one individual" (Bobbio, 1990:1). 
Liberalism in this century has become a subject dear to those on the Left. 
Subsequent to the death of the Marxist dream, Bobbio hopes that this new and 
welcome view on liberalism will mark the end of a period of mutual distrust 
between the supporters of liberal and socialist political cultures.
Bobbio also built on the Weberian distinction between an ethics rooted in 
conviction and one emanating from a sense of responsibility. The politician, Bobbio 
affirms, must act on the basis of the results his action(s) will produce; pure 
intention or conviction does not sufficiently reflect the ethics of responsibility.
Max Weber gathered well ... the difference between he who acts on the 
basis of principle, that which precedes the action, as his rule ..., and he who 
acts keeping in mind the consequences, that which comes after the action - 
its ... result. [Weber] distinguished two ethics, the ethics of ... pure 
intention, and the ethics of responsibility. I have no doubt that the man of
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faith must act according to the first, the politician on the basis of the second 
(Bobbio, 1993a:140).
As an economic theory, liberalism signifies a market economy. As a political 
theory, liberalism signifies the minimal state. Although they are interconnected, the 
two theories are independent and must be considered separately. The chief 
difference between economic and political liberalism is that political liberalism 
comprises the spiritual sphere. The theory concerning the limits of state power not 
only refers to intervention in economics but also extends to the spiritual sphere, 
that of ethics and religion. The liberal state is a lay state, one which “does not 
identify itself with a specific religious denomination” (Bobbio, 1987:104). In 
addition, the lay state adopts no specific philosophical worldview as the foundation 
of its political theory, as does Marxism-Leninism.
2.4.3 The status of law
The secular and liberal state cannot rely on the rule of men rather than on the rule 
of law; the rule of men emanates from the paternalistic or patriarchal authority, 
such as the family. For Bobbio, the force of law is egalitarian whereas the religious 
state is patriarchal. There is no justice in the religious state, since there is no legal 
justice there. "The family ... has always been taken as a model ... of the 
monocratic system where the highest power is concentrated in the hands of a sole 
individual and his subjects are in the legal sense of the word 'incompetent', either 
temporarily, as in the case of children ..., or permanently, as in the case of slaves" 
(Bobbio, 1987:148). In the family, the father is the ethical head of the grouping but 
he is not its head in legal terms since the law he applies is arbitrary and is not 
common to all families.
The bonds which link the father ... to the members of the family household 
are not legal but ethical, or, at the opposite extreme, founded on sheer 
force. As a society of non-equals - the wife ... with respect to her husband, 
the sons with respect to the father, the slaves with respect to the master - 
the household, and also the state when it is conceived as a family, are not 
subject to the egalitarian force of the law. Instead their ordering principle is
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more ad hoc justice than legal justice. Equity, or justice applied in a 
concrete case, can be redefined as the justice of the rule of men instead of 
that of the rule of law (ibid.).
The same principle of paternalism can be applied to the non-secular state, where 
law deriving from a superior power is tantamount to despotism, it is no 
coincidence, in Bobbio’s view, that the definitive critique of the paternalistic 
conception of power derives from Kant’s theories of the juridical state. Kant argued 
that “'a government might be founded on the principle of benevolence towards the 
people, like that of a father towards his children, although such 'paternal 
government' is the greatest conceivable despotism'” (Bobbio, 1987:149).
For the legislator, it is important to consider the origin of the law, and to whom the 
merit of instituting laws is ascribed. Bobbio clearly prefers the rule of law to the rule 
of men. As soon as democracy fails to demonstrate rigorous respect for the rules 
of the democratic game, "it rapidly reverts into its opposite, into one of the many 
forms of autocratic government" (ibid.:156). The figure of the good legislator is vital 
one and "the myth of the great legislator also inspires governments in the wake of 
the French Revolution" (ibid.: 150).
In elaborating an objection to what Catholics refer to as "universal culture", the 
example of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights47 is useful for, Bobbio 
argues, the Universal Declaration represents an unprecedented historical event. 
For the first time in history, a system of fundamental principles for human 
behaviour was freely accepted by the majority of the people living on the planet 
through their governments.
Through this declaration, a system of values is universal ... not in principle, 
but de facto, in that the consensus over its validity ... to govern the destiny 
of the future community has been expressly declared (the values upheld by 
religions and churches, even Christianity, the most universal of the religions, 
has until now involved only part of humanity de facto, that is to say 
historically). Only after the Declaration can we obtain the historical certainty 
that humanity in its entirety shares some common values, and finally believe 
in the universality of these values in a way which is historically legitimate,
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i.e. that by universal we mean not an objective reality, but subjectively 
accepted by the universe of humanity (Bobbio, 1996a: 14,15).
This universal consensus in law, law which can be traced back to traditional 
religious values, has become the inspirational foundation of lasting order or 
perpetual peace. However, those principles had to shed their exclusivity, that is, 
their application to Christians only, to become accepted universally.
2.4.4 Ethical systems
Bobbio often reiterates that conveying aims and values helps to preserve the 
liberal state. For example, in defining the political Left one must at the same time 
define the Right, thus reinforcing democratic differences, in brief, permanent 
values are embedded in social conditions but are experienced or met with in 
specific circumstances. Carl Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy, or 
between differing values formulated by specific groups, can also be used to 
measure political relations. Schmitt's conceptual distinction is based on the 
existence of political relations that take "various forms among independent political 
entities ... [yet are] not always bound by mutually accepted rules" (Schwab, 
1987:194). Or as Bobbio puts it, "Two terms in an antithesis do not always have 
equal force; nor is it necessarily the case that one is always stronger than the 
other" (Bobbio, 1996c: 13).
With the Enlightenment came the realization that the democratic republic as a 
community of men united solely by faith in God or the fatherland was an 
impossible political ideal. Potential adversaries came to be seen as equal in their 
struggle for truth. The responsibility of public institutions to guarantee the "vitality of 
religious sentiment as a source of values for the collectivity" was faced with an 
increasing recognition that "Christianity and, above all, Catholicism, no longer 
[corresponded] to the needs of humanity" (Tortarolo, op. cit.:65). Owing to the 
conflicts between religion and science and religion and society, there arose a 
necessity to transform religion. Marco Minghetti made the observation that "this
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transformation should have been effected by the Church itself' (ibid.:65,66); 
however, the Church did not take up the challenge. The transformation was 
conducted by those outside it.
Bobbio has written extensively about what he considers to be prime human values. 
These writings illuminate the difference between Right and Left and the criteria that 
govern the distinction between the two. The cultural is the non-political, Bobbio 
claims, or one's genuine self and identity as expressed by the conscience. As the 
self develops within the community and as a member of various social groups, as 
one encounters different ideas, politics enters the individual’s sphere of action. 
Politics enrich the individual and result in his increased awareness of collective 
behaviour, in how different social groups confront reality. But at the same time, 
politics challenges the cultural self or the moral self. The consideration of 
otherness and tolerance of awareness is a popular political and philosophical 
theme. Since "Right" and "Left" continue to be used to describe two distinct 
ideologies or worldviews, Bobbio suggests that the problem with these two poles is 
not their legitimacy, but "the criteria proposed for that legitimacy" (Bobbio, 
1996c:38).
To begin an investigation into these criteria, one could examine different streams 
of thought and political activity. Spatial metaphors are one way of getting a grip on 
the ethical systems underlying the Right/Left distinction. Bobbio cites the example 
of Laponce at the University of Toronto, who distinguished "between the vertical 
spatial axis (higher/lower) and the horizontal one (Left/Right)" (ibid.:39). Laponce 
carried out an analysis of spatial metaphors in political language, based on the 
crucial durability of the vertical axis which he considers to be the most important 
one. The Left/Right valence of the horizontal axis originated with the French 
Revolution and was intended to replace the vertical axis. Laponce emphasizes that 
the horizontal has never overtaken the vertical. Bobbio, on the other hand, focuses 
on the separateness of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of politics, which 
"represent two different, independent relationships in the political universe" (ibid.).
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In the perennial conflict between two opposing sides, both terms can have either a 
positive or negative meaning, although,
the vertical and horizontal dimensions of politics are separate, ... Normally 
both dimensions coexist, but either one can disappear in extreme situations: 
the first can disappear in a civil war, and the second in a despotic system in 
which there is a single power at the top and divisions are not permitted at 
the base. Laponce states only that the horizontal metaphor has never 
completely eliminated the vertical one. It should be added that it has never 
eliminated it for the simple reason that it could never eliminate it. The two 
metaphors have different descriptive functions, and the total sphere of 
political relations is only represented by both together (ibid.:39).
Bobbio does not accept Laponce's notion that the Left-Right distinction is 
particularly important in a democracy since "elections divide the competing groups 
into two opposing camps" (ibid.:40). Electoral systems, in Bobbio’s words, do not 
wholly account for the existence of two opposing camps; the tension between 
Right and Left "is a much more universal principle than the electoral system which 
produces dualism in a democracy: it is the principle of majority rule, whereby every 
kind of collective decision necessarily involves a majority and a minority" (ibid.). 
Duality in politics is not limited to democracy since in politics there is an inherent 
duality. Bobbio says that a distinction should be made between opposites such as 
friend/enemy and other comparable dualities, where one term is always positive 
and the other always negative, and the Left/Right pair. Both terms -  Left and Right 
-  “can have either a positive or a negative connotation, according to the ideologies 
and movements they represent, and hence the persons and groups which 
appropriate them” (ibid.).
To identify the Left as the opposite of Right does not involve a negative value 
judgement "because a negative axiological judgement of an opposite depends 
exclusively on a positive axiological judgement of the thing opposed" (ibid.). 
Left/Right is not similar to good/bad or beautiful/ugly. Political terminology is not 
univocal, "because both Left and Right can represent the positive side or ... the 
negative side of the distinction" (ibid.:41). The negative or positive value- 
judgement in each case depends on how one passes judgement.
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Ideological orientation accounts for much of the "content" any researcher gives to 
the terms Right and Left. The content is vital for those who insist that the 
distinction be kept in place, or indeed reinforced.
Laponce ... argues ... that, unlike in traditional and especially religious 
terminology, where Left represents the bad side, in political terminology the 
Left is always associated with highly positive attributes such as the future, 
creativity and justice. While the majority of non-political cultures are 
dominated by the Right wing, at least in the West, contemporary political 
culture is, according to Laponce, dominated by the Left wing ... The 
observation that the Right does not have any publications corresponding to 
magazines like New Left and Keep Left has been disproved by the growth in 
recent decades of a militant and ambitious nouvelle droite (ibid.:41).
Documents on ideological trends abound. But, Bobbio says, the overriding 
consideration in them is "the division between religion and politics, religion being 
considered the positive element in history and politics the negative one" (ibid.:42). 
This negative picture of politics reflects negatively on the Left, since "the 
dominance of the Left is supposed to be proof of the negative nature of politics" 
(ibid.). From this correlation, Bobbio suggests that Laponce provides a basis for an 
additional correlation concerning the positiveness of the Left and the negativeness 
of politics.
Laponce ... manipulates the different proposed distinctions which emerge 
from the various surveys, and uses the contrast between religion and 
politics to give particular emphasis to the fact that the distinction between 
Left and Right ultimately turns out to be a distinction between the sacred 
and the profane, in which other distinctions find their place: the distinction 
between hierarchical order and egalitarian order, and the distinction 
between a traditionalist outlook favourable to continuity and a progressive 
outlook favourable to the new and to a break with the past. [He] ... 
continually asserts that religion is Right-wing and atheism Left-wing (ibid.).
In this manner, the struggle between politics and religion is reduced to a struggle 
between good and evil, "in which the final triumph will belong to religion, in spite of 
any battles lost ..." (ibid.:42,43). Attributing an irreligious or atheistic worldview to
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the Left is unsound, Bobbio affirms, because there are streams of the Right that 
are also irreligious or have a completely secular view of politics.
In Europe, there is a reactionary, Right-wing tradition which is religious ..., 
but there is also an irreligious and pagan Right, which uses religion to its 
own advantage as an instrumentum regni. All the nouvelle droite which has 
appeared in recent decades is irreligious, and does not draw on any of the 
religious sources of the traditional Right. If you then take into account the 
distinction between extremists and moderates ..., you have to consider a 
moderate Right which has a completely secular view of politics (ibid.:43).
One such example of religion being used to political advantage was that of the 
Fascist state aspiring towards the foundation of a secular religious faith in politics. 
"In modern society, secularization has not produced a definitive separation 
between the spheres of religion and politics" (Gentile, 1990:229). Since the 
development of mass political parties, the dividing line between the two spheres 
has often been confused. During the Fascist regime, the state underwent a 
process of sacralization: "the very fact of claiming that the state had its own 
morality meant that Fascism evoked the existence of its own divinity, which was 
the inspiration of Fascist morality, and effectively put itself forward as a new 
religion" (ibid.:230). Although the Church viewed Fascism as the most effective 
bulwark against the socialist movement, the Catholic Popular Party was 
sympathetic to the socialists and by 1922 the Vatican had abandoned the Popular 
Party altogether.
In 1925, Don Luigi Sturzo, leader of the Popular Party (Partito Popolare), 
warned that Fascist ideology was 'profoundly pagan, and in contrast with 
Catholicism. We are dealing with state-worship and deification of the nation, 
because Fascism does not permit discussion or limitations: it wants to be 
worshipped for its own sake' (ibid.).
Bobbio states that Laponce erred in attributing irreligious egalitarian ideology to the 
Left, for egalitarianism has repeatedly been inspired by religious sentiment.
Precisely the consideration of egalitarian ideology ... compels us to 
recognize that egalitarianism inspired by religion has had an extensive role 
in revolutionary movements, from the English Levellers ... to liberation
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theology. Conversely, there has been a tradition of inegalitarian thought, of 
which Nietzsche was the ultimate expression, which considers 
egalitarianism and its political products, democracy and socialism, as the 
harmful effects of Christian teaching (Bobbio, 1996c:43,44).
According to some, it is religion rather than politics that constitutes a negative 
element in history. This is the very opposite of Laponce's view, which is that politics 
constitutes a negative element, and the distinction between Left and Right is a 
distinction between the religious and the profane. Ultimately, one can consider the 
ethical concept of equality as both a religious and non-religious, or political, value.
Before moving on to a consideration of Hobbes, whose theory of natural law 
underpins much of Bobbio's work, reference is made to the type of moral 
philosophy differentiating many streams of liberal thought. The two principal types 
of moral theory are i) teleological - end or good-oriented theory, and ii) 
deontological theory which is duty/right-oriented. Although all liberals declare 
allegiance to protecting the freedom of expressing and acting upon one's thoughts, 
they diverge when it comes to secular versions of Christian doctrine. The values of 
motherhood and parenting, for example, are typical of Green political parties and 
utilitarian movements, where teleological, rights-based liberal theories are 
endorsed. However, it is difficult to decide on what is "good" and "desirable", given 
individual preferences. The emphasis in such theories is on the end, not on the 
means of achieving it. Deontological supporters of liberalism emphasize that any 
good must be subordinate to "core virtues" like justice, individual rights and 
autonomy. Moreover, if one accepts the utilitarian principle of humans seeking 
good ends, then no single end can be identified that will be shared by all. Moral 
obligation is open to subjective interpretation. Although "specific demands are 
created in response to specific needs" in a context where "new needs are created 
by changes in social conditions" (Bobbio, 1996a:xii), Bobbio agrees that rights "are 
a deontic entity [and] have a precise meaning only in normative language” (Bobbio, 
op. cit.:xiii).
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2.4.4.1 Considering culture
Bobbio, as we have seen, is interested above all in human culture. In his view, the 
pattern of culture is a selection and configuration of interests and activities, and a 
particular valuation of them. Any plurality of cultures within a community can inhibit 
integration, which "is often made difficult precisely because of the different sources 
of doctrinal inspiration and the different aims which each wishes to obtain" 
(Bobbio, 1996a:66). Nevertheless, Bobbio finds it significant that the three main 
currents of modern political thought are able to find themselves in general 
agreement or convergence in adopting the non-organic and particular rights that 
protect their identity. The culture of the particular which co-exists with the 
subjective is a reaffirmation of liberalism as well as a basis for "the hoped-for unity 
of mankind" (ibid.). The ethos of all groups thrives in the established rights and 
conventions and the associated understanding of human society. Since there is 
room to pursue certain rights over others, this cultural basis for cohabitation is, 
Bobbio contends, preferable to religious or ideological value systems.
The culture of politics scorned by Bobbio follows the "dead track of ideologies, 
especially when the ideologies pompously take on theological guises and 
propriety" (Bobbio, 1996:12). Healthy democracy with the modern goals "of 
conquering a higher level of civility in customs ... and ideas, is only on the right 
course if it follows the track of interests" (ibid.). As a liberal and as a democrat, 
Bobbio rejects theology, but not only the theology of the church. For him, secular 
politics are not anti-religious, irreligious or atheist politics. Rather, the secularism 
he aims to realize "must be fed on critical spirit" (Bobbio in Tortarolo, 1998:103) to 
avoid becoming a "receptacle of all the religious grievances against the dominant 
religion that have accumulated in a country like Italy" (ibid.). In other words, his 
definition of secularism means that it must necessarily be devoid of any theological 
content, regardless of the inspiration from which it derives. What relationship can 
be seen between theology and politics in Italy? He writes:
Italy is not the place of theological controversies; ... rather, it is the old and
worn-out home of political sectarianism. The theological controversies
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originate here, and [they] rise up, become gigantic and lose all measure on 
political terrain. Two political programmes, in their natural confrontation with 
each other, become two dogmatic theologies; two social ideologies, in their 
reciprocal opposition, become two theologies; two parties, in the discussion 
that arises between their adherents, rather, between [their] followers or the 
faithful, are transformed into two religious sects, of which one possesses 
the truth and the other is possessed by error. In Italy today we are also 
witnessing this spectacle: political struggle is turning into a war of religion 
(Bobbio, 1996:11).
Bobbio is not surprised by this theological result caused by ideology, which 
continues to divide people much more than do material interests. What is required 
is the clearing of the political terrain to leave it free from struggles based on 
absolute values:
... it is another way to give to Caesar that which belongs to Caesar, to affirm 
... modern civilization's inexorable need, ... the secularity of the State, o r ... 
to give anew a meaning to the autonomy of politics. Values belong to the 
conscience, or ... to metaphysics -  both materialistic and spiritualistic -  ... 
[they are] a personal question. Therefore when one starts with a prodigal 
hand to sow the absolute, the value [and] the idea on the terrain of social 
facts, as historicism does, one must expect to see the harvest of despotism, 
in the form of the theocratic State, or of the ethical State, which is the same 
(ibid.:13).
Morality and politics -  as well as morality and private lives -  continue to figure in 
the traditional questions raised by the members of complex societies where 
various moral schools meet and often clash. Scientific and economic development 
in particular, are the stuff of moral debate. The energy of the universe is constant, 
in a place where nature "is no longer the ... order created by God, but is simply the 
set of environmental, social, and historical conditions which individuals must take 
into account in order to regulate their social life" (Bobbio, 1993b: 153).
Reason alone is sufficient to confront society’s problems: this is the spirit of the 
Enlightenment. And it was French cultural leadership that made it possible to 
recognize that the political establishment was founded on class, nothing more. 
This emphasis on the natural superiority of humans to any institution/economic 
activity constitutes a challenge to legal positivism, or anti-natural law, also referred
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to by Bobbio as the Hobbesian paradox, or "the problem of the relationship 
between natural law and civil law" (Bobbio, 1993b:115). Gramsci, too, appealed to 
the spirit of man's voluntarism: "[one] cannot say that the power of the state is 
absolute, that is, without constraints, if [one] recognizes the existence and 
legitimacy of the laws of nature" (ibid.: 117).
2.4.4.2 Values and the transformation of values
Bobbio lists three ways of demonstrating values: “deduction from a constant 
objective fact, for example human nature; their consideration as self-evident truths; 
and finally the discovery that they are generally accepted within a given historical 
period (i.e., the test of consensus)" (Bobbio, 1996a: 13). Bobbio himself seems 
inclined to the first. As we are not sure of the objectivity of human nature, however, 
it carries with it an inherent limitation:
The first method would offer us the greatest guarantee of their universal 
validity, if human nature really does exist, and supposing it does exist as a 
constant ... reality, if we were capable of understanding its essence. 
Judging by the history of natural law, human nature can be interpreted in 
the most varied of fashions, and the appeal to nature has been used to 
justify diametrically opposed value systems (ibid.).
Since there are differing views on the character of human nature, positing it as a 
starting place on which to build an ethical system is ultimately unsatisfactory. The 
second method, that of values as evident truths, such as the elimination of torture 
and violence, is equally weak, because self-evident values cannot withstand 
historical testing and have proved to be too changeable.
It probably appeared to be evident to the authors of the Declaration of 1789 
that property was 'sacre et inviolable', but today all reference to property 
rights as human rights has completely disappeared from the most recent 
documents of the United Nations. Is there anyone today who does not 
consider it self-evident that detainees should not be tortured? Yet for many 
centuries torture was accepted and defended as a normal judicial procedure 
(ibid.:14).
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This last observation by Bobbio is open to question, however, because civil wars 
on several continents have plagued this entire decade, and provide evidence that 
there are members of the human community who believe that detainees can 
legitimately be tortured. This evidence is not limited to European ethnic conflicts, 
but is a worldwide phenomenon.
The third method of justifying values is that of showing that they are 
supported by consensus, whereby a value has greater validity the more it is 
agreed to. The consensus argument replaces the test of objectivity which is 
considered impossible or at least extremely uncertain, with the test of inter­
subjectivity (ibid.).
Bobbio notes that there are three stages in the realization of legislation based on 
ideals, and he traces the evolution of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to 
make his point. Ideals are transformed into values, and ultimately into legislation. 
The ideals in stage one are found in works of philosophy and natural law. John 
Locke in particular discussed the inalienable natural rights that humans enjoy by 
virtue of being human. These can neither be renounced nor taken away by 
individual or state. The second stage marks the shift to practice:
The second stage in the history of human rights is ... the transition from 
theory to practice, from the mere perception of a right to its enactment. 
Through this transition, the assertion of human rights acquires concreteness 
but loses its universality. Rights are from then on protected as truly positive 
rights, but they are only valid within the state which recognizes them 
(ibid.:16).
The universality of human rights depends, however, on the third and final phase 
described by Bobbio, where the legislation in force protects not states, but human 
beings:
The 1948 Declaration commenced the third ... stage in which the assertion 
of human rights is both universal and positive: universal in the sense that 
the principles it contains no longer concern only the citizens of this or that 
state, but all human beings, and positive in the sense that it initiates a 
process whose end is that human rights should no longer only be 
proclaimed ... as ideals, but effectively protected even against the state
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which violates them. On completion of this process, citizens' rights will have 
been transformed into human rights as a positive reality (ibid.).
This view implies a criticism of both Marxist doctrine and Catholicism. Neither can 
be said to be truly universal, in Bobbio’s view, since they do not apply to all 
humans and all states.
Bobbio has devoted much effort to his study of the philosophy of law. He supports 
equality rather than inequality before the law. The aim of the legislator, either 
public or private, is, in his view, to influence human behaviour. The juridical system 
is a cultural product, such that normative activity is reflected in the relationship 
between the individual and the system. Carcaterra has identified Bobbio as a 
researcher of prescriptive language, who stressed that “One can influence 
behaviour with any type of proposition, also specifically through descriptive 
propositions; that which characterizes a prescriptive proposition is that it does not 
indirectly influence action, but influences it directly” (Carcaterra, 1989:157).
in law there is both a normative and a prescriptive basis for action and for 
conditioning human behaviour. The superiority of law to the moral goodness of 
humans, according to Bobbio, is evident in its largely finite interpretation and in its 
universal application.
In spite of criticisms against natural law, proclamations of human and 
citizens' rights have not only continued in the era of positivist jurisprudence, 
but have also continued to widen the scope of their demands to include the 
so-called social rights, and to break down abstract man into all his possible 
specifications, man and woman, child and the old person, the healthy and 
the sick (Bobbio, 1996a:112).
The declaration of human rights as an ethical foundation for modern society is 
accompanied by the need to protect those rights.
It is necessary to find the most effectual means to ensure that new 
obligations (the protection of a right depends on honouring an obligation) 
are 'for the most part' enforced. I am aware that saying 'for the most part' is 
vague, but in the universe in which one ... conducts moral discourse, this
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expression is needed to make clear that an obligation, even if expressed in 
the most solemn declaration, ends up by ... disappearing if no one or only a 
few fulfill it (Bobbio, 1995b: 138).
Enforcement of an ethical system can take place through persuasion, social 
pressure or force, which Bobbio says are represented, respectively, by the 
pedagogue or the priest, the social group as it reflects accepted customs, and the 
policeman. "Everyone knows through experience that the policeman is the most 
effective means of enforcement" (ibid.).
This explains why there is no real society which differs from the society of 
philosophers who discuss the legality of active euthanasia among 
themselves, for example, that does not establish, alongside the laws of 
obligation, a code of punishment, which in turn constitutes obligations that 
are not addressed towards members of the group, but to a specialized body 
of judges and executors (Bobbio, 1995b: 138).
For Bobbio, civil society is the seed bed of articulated interests and arguments that 
feed the political life of society. Tolerance ensures the life of civil society and is 
reinforced through the establishment of conventions and rights. Faith in truth 
speciously increases the value of particular views in the political arena; therefore, 
tolerance and scepticism are necessary and beneficial to the life of society, 
whether civil or political.
2.4.5 The place of tolerance, truth and scepticism in political life
Neocorporativism refers to a particular ordering of democratic societies, one that is 
so familiar that we distinguish between statist or Fascist corporativism and social 
or democratic corporativism. Bobbio asserts that neocorporativism has nothing to 
do with the phenomenon of the disintegration of the social fabric in many rival 
groups, whose undisciplined demands make global society more difficult to govern. 
Corporativism is often associated erroneously with Fascist doctrine or linked to the 
fragmentation caused by interest groups and sectarian lobbies. Indeed, rather than 
disintegration of order, neocorporativism refers to a highly structured organization
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in which there is a high concentration of interest groups, as is the case for example 
in unions. These organizations take important collective decisions which affect all 
of society through their representatives at the top working together with the organs 
of government (Bobbio, 1995b:58,59).
The study of society has become more difficult, generally, given the development 
of political battalions based on neocorporativism. In effect, Bobbio affirms, this 
neocorporative order makes for a "double State", since the representatives of 
organized interests in industrialized societies have moved to the political forefront. 
This neocorporativism he defines as (i) a doctrine that promotes collaboration 
between society's two largest antagonistic classes - the employing class and the 
employed. This replaces a state of permanent conflict in which each conflict is 
resolved separately through the modification of the rules of the game or the victory 
of one class over the other. The second definition of neocorporativism is (ii) a 
fundamental institutional instrument that "consists of the substitution of the 
immediate representation of the particular interests in conflict with ... political 
representation" (ibid.:59). An elected official, not bound by the mandate of his 
electors since the task at hand is to respond to general interests, takes on the role 
of democratic representative.
In Italy, the debate on neocorporativism got off to a slow start and Bobbio 
attributes this above ail to a liberal principle, "Italian liberal democratic doctrine has 
consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of the representation of interests 
other than those of politics" (ibid.). The Italian Constitution relegated this question 
of representation to an institute of secondary importance - the CNEL (Consiglio 
nazionale dell’economia e del lavoro) which has only consultative power. Secondly, 
in the post-war period, the nature of social conflict in Italy has differed significantly 
from that of other countries. Although the nineties have witnessed some change in 
this regard, the neocorporative system previously existed only in countries where 
there was a strong social-democratic party, strong enough to remain in 
government for relatively long periods. The Social-Democratic party was called the
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party of "compromise" and meant the "temporary acceptance of the capitalist 
system corrected through redistributive policies" (ibid.:60).
Social compromise and political compromise were not equally accepted by the 
party that represented the working class in Italy.
The strongest party of the working class [was] not and [did] not want to be a 
social-democratic party and nothing was more extraneous to its 'philosophy' 
and that of the major trade unions, even those of non-Communist 
inspiration, than the ideal of social compromise. This is not to be confused 
with political compromise, which was an integral part of the Communist 
Party's strategy (ibid.).
The question of the governability of complex societies can be interpreted through 
the dichotomy civil society/state, where "a society becomes more ungovernable the 
greater the demands of civil society and the lack of a corresponding capacity of 
institutions to respond to them" (Bobbio, 1989b:25,26). Civil society can also be 
considered simply as the formation of demands directed at the political system.
In the most recent system-theories of society as a whole, civil society 
occupies the space reserved for the formation of demands ... aimed at the 
political system and to which the political system has the task of supplying 
answers (output): the contrast between civil society and state therefore is 
posed as the contrast between the quantity and quality of demands and the 
capacity of institutions to give rapid and adequate answers (ibid.:25).
Civil society, Bobbio affirms, also includes all that remains after limiting the sphere 
of the state. Civil society is where economic, social, ideological and religious 
conflicts originate, and state institutions have the task of solving them. The well­
being of civic order, however, is more important than the nature of the state, 
Bobbio maintains.
The agents of these conflicts and therefore of civil society ... are social 
classes as well as class organizations there are interest groups, 
associations ..., ethnic emancipation movements and so on. Parties have 
one foot in civil society and the other in institutions; so much so that it has 
been proposed to enrich the dichotomous conceptual scheme by inserting 
the concept of political society between the two concepts of civil society and
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state in order to encompass the phenomenon of parties which in reality do 
not entirely belong [to either] (ibid.).
Civil society includes public opinion -  such as the views disseminated via mass 
media -  which in turn influences social movements; as Bobbio says, "public 
opinion and social movements develop together and influence each other" 
(ibid.:26). In totalitarian societies, there is no public opinion, because only official 
opinion is voiced.
Institutions represent legitimate power in the Weberian sense ..., power 
whose decisions are accepted and realized in so far as they emanate from 
an authority recognized as having the right to make binding decisions for the 
... collectivity. Civil society is the place where, especially in periods of 
institutional crisis, de facto powers are formed that aim at obtaining their 
own legitimacy even at the expense of legitimate power; where ... the 
processes of delegitimation and relegitimation take place. This forms the 
basis of the frequent assertion that the solution of a grave crisis threatening 
the survival of a political system must be sought first and foremost in civil 
society where it is possible to find new sources of legitimation and therefore 
new sources of consensus (ibid.).
Although it would seem that civil society performs a dynamic function in affirming 
new sources of legitimation and consensus, it can also act negatively as "the 
complex of apparatuses that exercise coercive power within an organized social 
system" (ibid.:22). Yet along with the notion of the state as coercive “is the group of 
ideas that accompanies the birth of the bourgeois world: the affirmation of natural 
rights belonging to the individual and to social groups independently of the state 
and which limit and restrain political power" (ibid.).
In civil society, different social groups articulate different ends. The process of 
secularization within both state and society reached its highest point in the 20th 
century. The idea of tolerance was derived and developed from the sphere of 
religious controversy. The great defenders of tolerance, Bobbio notes, fought all 
the forms of intolerance that had bloodied Europe for centuries following the 
rupture of religious universalism realized by the reformed churches and heretical 
sects. From the domain of religious controversy, the idea of tolerance gradually
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moved on to include the domain of political controversy. In truth, Bobbio affirms, 
the idea was used to oppose forms of the modern religion: ideology. Bobbio writes: 
“The recognition of religious freedom brought about non-confessional states; the 
recognition of political liberty brought about democratic states, both of which are 
the highest expression of secular spirit that characterized the birth of modern 
Europe, the secular spirit understood as that attitude of the spirit that entrusts the 
fate of regnum hominis more to critical reason than to impulses of faith, entrusting 
the profession of it to free individual conscience” (Bobbio, 1993a:207).
Bobbio respects those who believe in a God or gods, those who believe in forces 
that extend beyond the reach of mortals. Having said this, he is not a man of faith; 
rather, he sees the believer within the following context of faith: “Faith, when it is 
not a gift, becomes a habit; when it is neither a gift nor a habit, it derives from a 
strong will [volonta] to believe” (Bobbio, 1994c: 187). Bobbio suspects, however, 
that la volonta starts where reason ends, or in other words that human will at times 
overcomes reason.
At the same time, Bobbio questions faith in reason and the temptation to substitute 
the God of reason for the God of believers. Human beings grapple with the 
darkness of their origins and that of their future path thanks to the "small light or 
lamp" of reason: reason does not constitute a great shining light. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that humans continue in their eternal quest to understand 
the universe and the evil within it - injustice, hunger, economic, social and 
psychological depression. Both religion and science are tools in helping us 
interpret the universe and provide convincing answers, as opposed to illusory 
replies of consolation. Bobbio defines science as the body of knowledge acquired 
thanks to human intelligence.
Contrary to the little light of reason, faith illuminates; however, its oft 
overdone illumination results in blinding. Where do the perverse aspects of 
religion originate if not from this blindness? -  Intolerance, coercion to 
believe, the persecution of non-believers, the spirit of the crusades? I would 
not be taking up this worn argument... if this same argument were not used 
continually ... to blame the process of secularization for all the perversions
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of this century, as if the most sanguinary age before the two world wars 
were not that of the wars of religion (ibid.: 188).
Some have invited Bobbio not to be so pessimistic. However, Bobbio judges 
optimism to have the same drawbacks as pessimism - a global vision based on the 
fideistic. He accepts neither worldview because the result of adopting one or the 
other obfuscates his own need to try to understand before judging. "The important 
thing, starting with radical evil, is that [we] agree that only its antithesis, only [our] 
attempt to overcome it, constitutes the creation of moral life; that moral life 
comprises the uniqueness and the novelty of the human world" (ibid.:189).
The call to God, Bobbio claims, does not serve so much to establish prescribed 
norms, but rather to induce believers to follow them. The true reason for seeking 
justification in a morality anchored in the absolute, or in a religious vision, is not to 
provide an absolute basis on which to base morality. Rather, an appeal to supreme 
authority is a practical matter, an attempt to give greater force to one's obligation to 
respect the rules. This tendency is riddled with fault:
One addresses God as a judge (an infallible one and thus more to be 
feared than a human judge) rather than as a legislator. The golden rule of 
'Not doing to others that which you would not wish done unto you' is found 
in any rational morality, even that which seems farthest from religious 
morality, utilitarian morality (ibid.).
The earliest perception of ethics contrasts with the modern notion of ethics as 
responsibility vis-a-vis those of utility. Bobbio writes: "In the history of philosophy, 
we read of the ancients who placed the ethic of virtue opposite the ethic of 
happiness" (ibid.). Whether or not there are many strands of religious morality is 
not the question Bobbio addresses. On the other hand, there is no single secular 
morality, though there may be a secular principle: "The only principle that can be 
considered truly secular is that of tolerance; that is, the principle that from 
observing the multiplicity of moral universes, one draws the consequence of the 
necessity for pacific cohabitation amongst them (ibid.:190).
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In saying that secular thought is both an expression and an effect of the modern 
epoch, Bobbio asks the reader to reflect on Which God, whose God, and how 
one's interpretation of God can "lead one astray". When he thinks of Heidegger's 
remark in an interview that "only ein Gott can save us", he wonders why the 
reference is limited: Why ein Gott? Which one? "When has a God ever saved the 
world? For the believer, Christ came to save man from sin and from earthly death, 
not from the world, which was not his kingdom ..." (ibid.:193). On the contrary, 
historical example demonstrates man's doom or salvation as the fruit of his own 
action. As examples, Bobbio cites the plague and the genocides that took place at 
the time of the early civilization of North and South America and that of Nazi 
Germany. He asks "Who saved man from the plague; who condemned him to 
exterminate his fellow man?" (ibid.).
Why should a God save the world? Why? In the universe of infinite worlds, 
who are we? What attributes do we possess? We are intelligent enough to 
understand evil, but at the same time so stupid that we ourselves cannot 
find the remedy. Why should he who is not responsible for our misfortunes 
save us? (ibid.).
2.5 Bobbio and Italian Communism
Bobbio has expressed his sympathy for former Communists beset by problems 
deriving from the political culture of the former PCI. All the turns imposed by Stalin 
and the Comintern caused Italian Communists, at times, to isolate themselves 
from the rest of the opposition to Mussolini. The Italian Left has various roots, 
namely: lay and Catholic; liberal-socialist; and environmental ones. Deciding on the 
ethics and the content of the Left's programme of social philosophy is challenging. 
Although basic concerns like human welfare dominate the agenda, newer 
concerns continue to fill the Left's political agenda. Institutional change and social 
norms derive from that consensus produced by public opinion, where new sources 
of legitimation are formed.
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Bobbio admits that although he has never been a Communist, "he has dedicated 
the majority of his political writings to discussions with Communists on fundamental 
themes like freedom and democracy" (Bobbio, 1993a:213). He considered 
Communists as his interlocutors, "at least Italian Communists, not as enemies to 
defeat but interlocutors of dialogue on the whys and the wherefores of the Left" 
(ibid.). Even after the events of 1989, he feels a strong need to reflect on these 
circumstances, particularly as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact coincided with an 
increase in accusations against intellectuals "who had misunderstood or, worse, 
betrayed" (ibid.). This dispute amongst intellectuals derives from what Bobbio 
refers to as the "newly converted": "those who, having been Marxists and are now 
no longer, were just as pigheadedly pro-Marxist before as they are pigheadedly 
anti-Marxist now" (Bobbio, 1988:163).
This section comprises three elements: i) Bobbio's political relations with 
Communism during and after Fascism; ii) Marxism's lack of a view of culture; and 
iii) non-Soviet Communism and its impact on Bobbio, including his experience of 
1968 and his visit to China. This last aspect is also considered in the light of how 
Marxism used culture as a political tool rather than as a supreme value for the 
development of human consciousness. Bobbio and democrats of the Left prize 
culture for its autonomy over politics and its role in the development of art, 
literature and philosophy in general.
2.5.1 Bobbio's political relations with Communism during and after Fascism
Bobbio's position on Marx includes a view of the "cultural dignity of Communism, in 
opposition to that of Nazism" (// Corriere della Sera, 27/5/98:35). He asks the 
question: "Who would ever dare to compare Marx's Capital or the Manifesto of '48 
with Mein Kampf?" (ibid.). in Violi's introduction to Ne con Marx ne contro Marx 
(1997a), he describes Bobbio as neither Marxist nor anti-Marxist, but an intellectual 
who considered Marx to be a classic. Bobbio has read and re-read his works, 
above all the historical and philosophical writings, as he has also read Plato and
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Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau (Bobbio, 1997a:xxiii). Viroli informs us that for 
Bobbio a classic is achieved by an author when he “overcomes with his work the 
sudden tempests of history”. For a work to be elevated to the rank of a classic, 
Bobbio believes that an author must have three fundamental qualities: i) he must 
interpret the epoch in which he lives, so that later one cannot ignore his work in 
discovering the “spirit of the time”; ii) he must always be contemporary in the sense 
that each generation feels the need to re-read and reinterpret his work; iii) he must 
elaborate general categories of historical comprehension which one can apply to a 
reality different from that from which they were derived.
In Marxist doctrine, Bobbio says, there is a problem of the iack of a theory of the 
socialist state or of socialist democracy which offers an alternative to the theory, or 
rather theories, of the bourgeois state, of bourgeois democracy. The West veered 
“between a social democracy where the emphasis [was] more on the political 
process of participatory democracy, and democratic socialism where the emphasis 
was rather more on the public control of economic activities" (Atherton, 1994:142). 
This situation is further complicated by there "no longer being one Marxism, but 
many mutually hostile Marxisms, often displaying a profound ideological or political 
... animus towards each other and grouped ... into ’schools'" (Bobbio, 1988:47,48).
Socialism is a movement which not only aspires to eliminate economic 
exploitation but also to achieve the emancipation of humanity from all the 
historical forms of servitude inflicted on it by fellow human beings and, as 
far as possible, by nature as well. It therefore cannot help appropriating ... 
those institutions which are based on the principle of autonomy rather than 
heteronomy. I can see no other way of interpreting the 'freedom' of which ... 
Marxists talk when they contrast the realm of freedom with the realm of 
necessity, other than as autonomy, i.e., obedience ... to the law which all 
have laid down for themselves, in the ideal society, the stateless society, it 
is unthinkable that there could be no laws (Gramsci even calls it a 
'regulated' society): they will be autonomous laws instead of heteronomous 
laws, that is all (ibid.:97).
In keeping with this ambivalence, Bobbio'e anti-Fascist associates were divided 
over the question of Marxism. As Anderson explains, Rosselli sought “to purge 
socialism of its Marxist heritage and Soviet incarnation, and to recover for it the
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traditions of liberal democracy he believed were fundamental conquests of modern 
civilization” whilst Gobetti had hailed the Soviet revolution as a liberating revolution 
(Anderson, 1988:15). By 1937 Calogero and Capitini had created Liberal- 
socialismo, which was a position somewhere between that of Rosselli and Gobetti. 
Capitini differed significantly in his views towards Marxism, since he was more 
religious in outlook and therefore “more sympathetic to the Soviet experience, 
aimed at a future social order that would be both 'post-Christian' and 'post- 
Communist', combining maximum legal and cultural liberty with maximum 
economic socialization” (ibid.). Finally, Calogero was closer to Rosselli, as he 
rejected Russia as a 'totalitarian' state and he did not support general socialization 
of the means of production.
The heirs of Gobetti and Rosselli formed two separate movements that flowed into 
the PdA in 1942. Calogero advocated a mixed economy to result in reconciliation 
between freedom and justice, and this became part of the PdA’s formal 
programme.
But it was contested ... by another current that described its goal ... as 
liberal Communism. Its principal theorists48 ... were Gobetti's most direct 
descendants. From within GL in the 30s, [they] had rejected the idea of a 
two-sector economy, and insisted on the need for a revolutionary 
socialization of property relations, while at the same time calling for a 
decentralized federative state ... to safeguard liberty against the dangers of 
... despotism once capitalism was overthrown. For these thinkers, a 
Communist revolution was ... probable in post-war Italy, and the task was to 
think through the ... democratic revolution to come afterwards, that would 
historically 'right' it (ibid.:15,16).
Capitini, on the contrary, envisaged a post-Communist social order, and closely 
reflected Bobbio's stance vis-a-vis Marxism. But, in practical terms, Calogero also 
had Bobbio's support. “Personally and morally closer to Capitini, [Bobbio’s] 
practical preferences were those of Calogero, although in his case they were 
combined with a lucid sense of the likely strength of the PCI after Liberation that 
would lead him ... to a much deeper engagement with Marxist culture” (ibid.:16). 
One of the errors committed by Marxism was that of underestimating democratic
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method, for Marx was intensely concerned with "who" was to rule but dedicated 
little concentration to "how" one was to rule. Marxism, Bobbio argues, has always 
committed the error of underestimating democracy.
For Marx and Lenin, this second problematic - what Bobbio calls the 
problem of the subjects, rather than the institutions, of power - obscured the 
first ... to the point of generating ... confusion between dictatorship 
understood as any domination by one ... class of a society over another, 
and dictatorship understood as the exercise of political force exempt from 
any law - in Lenin's ... definition ... - as a social order in a generic sense, 
and as a political regime in a narrower sense (ibid.:20,21).
Bobbio observes that "what was new in Marxism was its transformation of this 
classical notion of dictatorship - as a government at once exceptional and 
ephemeral - ... into the universal and unalterable substance of all governments 
prior to the advent of Communism, ... of a classless society (Bobbio in Anderson, 
1988:20,21).
The relationship between Bobbio and the PCI followed a course and dialogue that 
are hard to define in a few words. Following the landslide victory of the DC in 1948, 
the socialists had renewed their pact of unity with the Communists, but this unity 
was really a form of subordination. The peace movement in particular is cited by 
Ginsborg to illustrate the unhappy cohabitation between Communists and 
socialists. While both campaigned actively for peace and a stop to the Korean 
War, "unlike the British peace movement of the early 1960s, the Italian one, ... 
dominated by the PCI, was unilateralist only in the sense of declaring that the 
innocent victim on an international scale was the USSR and that the constant 
aggressor was the United States" (Ginsborg, 1990:194). Bobbio decried these 
ambivalent peacemakers and their sterile mediation efforts, since from the start the 
PCI had given the edge to the USSR. His scepticism, preference for moderation of 
judgement and sense of the complexity of argument, are here clear: Bobbio 
recommends " 'a continual, slow, difficult apprenticeship', 'so slow that it is still not 
completed'" (Anderson, 1988:12).
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The thinkers who have influenced Bobbio's writings to the greatest extent were 
those who expressed loyalty to the principles of politics understood as a moral 
commitment. Although Bobbio does not hesitate to criticize Marx, he demonstrates 
a readiness to adopt the central theme of political morality as evoked by Marx in 
On the Jewish Question (1843): "The relation of the political state to civil society is 
just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth" (Internet site c:4). The 
compelling strength of Communism was its vigorous faith, compelling as any in the 
history of religion.
Gobetti in particular developed this concept of spirituality in his political vocation, 
which was based both on the politics of responsibility, concentrated on the end 
result of an action or process, and also on the ethics of conviction, concentrated 
on keeping one's principles from flagging during the process. Gobetti stressed his 
quasi disregard for the ends towards which his political means aimed because he 
accepted them as yardsticks of his actions. He believed that class struggle through 
praxis and the conflict among distinct social classes would render abstract values a 
form of concrete action. These different classes would fight for current interests 
and future ideals. The plurality of classes and of interests envisaged by Gobetti 
implies a rejection of Marx's philosophy of history.
Bobbio refers to Raymond Aron's expression, "if religion according to Marx is the 
opium of the people, then Communism was the opium of intellectuals" (Bobbio, 
1993a:213). Given intellectuals' over-hasty flight from Marx in the 1990s, in an 
attempt to set some distance between themselves and the failure of the 
Communist dream, their earlier pro-Marxism is interesting.
It cannot be denied that numerous men of culture and science, authoritative 
in their fields, did embrace the cause of Communism .... and they defended 
it against attacks ... with arguments not as men of faith but of reason. Why? 
Should Communism's perversion not have been clear from the start, which, 
according to its original critics as well as those of the latest hour ..., was 
inherent in the very doctrine from which Communism was gleaned? Was 
there any need for new historical evidence after years ... of material and 
moral horrors? And what of the fact that even after this irrefutable proof the 
ideal of a Communist society has still not faded completely? Should not
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those who ... were never Communists, yet did not oppose Communism with 
the same radical rejection of Fascism, ask themselves the same question? 
In these last years ..., I had to try and answer this second question, to make 
clear... the reasons of error, if an error had been made ... (ibid.:213,214).
The members of the PdA were well aware of the distance that separated their 
vision of democratic revolution from the class revolution sought by fellow partisans 
of Communist inspiration, which Bobbio defines as "a dictatorship under the aegis 
of the Communist Party" (ibid.:214). Still, they were convinced of the necessity for 
including the Communists as allies in the future constitutional republic, "after the 
disgraceful defeat of our army and our pre-Fascist ruling class" (ibid.). Some PdA 
members envisaged a programme of liberal-Communism.
The ideology of liberal-Communism arose out of the conviction that the 
great historical conflict was a battle between Fascism and Communism, 
thus the fall of Fascism ... would inevitably lead to the institution of 
Communist regimes. If libertarian demands were to be satisfied, the chief 
problem would not be the creation of utopian plans for a new society in 
which liberal and socialist ideals would merge harmoniously but rather the 
discovery of realistic expedients to prevent Communism from degenerating 
into totalitarianism (Bobbio, 1995e:153).
At issue was the recognition that it was imperative to adopt a practical policy to 
prevent Communism from becoming a form of totalitarianism. Communism itself 
was thus not to be feared, only its totalitarian version. "Within the sphere of the 
PdA, this vision had its perhaps most authentic expression in Pealta del Partito 
d’Azione (Turin: Einaudi, 1945), the work of one of Gobetti's followers, ... Monti" 
(ibid.). Augusto Monti stressed the contradictory elements that dominated in post­
war Italy - a desire for liberty and the certainty of Communism.
It will come ... as the necessary product of two factors that have been active 
in the history of Italy for half a century: the Marxism of the late nineteenth 
century [and] the neo-liberalism of the early twentieth century. The Marxists 
say 'Communism,1 and they are right; the neo-liberals say ’liberty,' and they 
are not wrong. The one is inevitable; the other is inevitable. In the dual 
adaptation to this dual inevitability - of the liberals to Communism, of the 
Communists to liberty - lies the secret of tomorrow's rebirth (Monti in 
Bobbio, 1995e:153,154).
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One of the difficulties of working with the Communists, in Bobbio’s view, was their 
conception of freedom as it would affect all members of society. Allegiance to 
Communist ideals and the Party were to exert an influence on, and to result in a 
move away from, traditional conceptions of freedom. The idea was that 
Communism expressed a great morality that was not to be lost but needed to be 
reformed. This idea, however, turned out to be an illusion. The inspiration came 
from far off, from Gobetti, although the time and the circumstances had changed. 
Even Gobetti, who had welcomed the October Revolution, changed his mind after 
a few years about the possibility of a real alliance with the Communists. The 
illusion of Communism’s great morality is now definitively dead. Its death, Bobbio 
claims, was not caused by the Italian Communist Party since it had done its part as 
a democratic party in Italy, starting with its contribution to the elaboration of the 
Constitution. The death of the illusion is wholly attributable to “real Communism, 
that of the leading-party, which had revealed itself to be irredeemable” (Bobbio, 
1993a:215).
With regard to the potential unity of Communists and PdA members, Bobbio insists 
that during the last days of Fascism the discussion of liberty was the central 
question. Liberty for the PdA came before the conquest of power.
We had no doubts about the 'demonic force' of Soviet power. In an article 
entitled Noi e i comunist?9 ..., Tristano Codignola stated clearly, as 
concerned a possible united front between Communists and azionisti, that 
the issue of freedom came before the conquest of power and not 
afterwards, and he maintained that it was impossible to reach freedom 
through dictatorship. But we believed in the regeneration of the Communists 
through the tough experience of the struggle for freedom from Fascist 
dictatorship, who would not have been able to govern alone. Would they 
fight one dictatorship to establish another? (ibid.:215).
Although ail round justification was sought to attenuate the evils of Soviet 
Communism, such as it having been necessary to overthrow an infamous regime 
in 1917 and its having to face the challenge of Fascism and Nazism, there could 
be no justification for its adverse effects. The Cold War did constitute another 
“grave mortal challenge to the success of the Communist revolution" (ibid.), but led
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many Communists to turn a blind eye to the side effects of Communism: "in their 
fury to find justification, those who continued to believe in the freedom of humanity 
through Communism finished up by justifying both the violent usurping of power in 
Czechoslovakia and the brutal repression of the Hungarian revolt" (ibid.).
The means used to implement Communism and the consequences that resulted 
from the use of such means were not considered fully by adherents of 
Communism. There was an over-concentration on the goal of Communism, rather 
than a weighing-up of the means used to achieve that end. It was expected that 
legality would be surpassed in waging revolution: "Marx ... taught that the 
proletariat cannot simply conquer State power in the sense that the old apparatus 
passes into new hands, but must smash ... this apparatus and replace it by a new 
one" (Colletti, 1974:106). To maintain belief in the goodness of the cause despite 
the evil methods used, Bobbio maintains, one appealed to the nobility of the end: 
the creation of a society never seen before in which all forms of exploitation of 
humans by humans would finally cease. If the maxim “the end justifies the means” 
were formulated at all times “in reference to the fatherland, how about when the 
salvation of the entire human race is at stake?” (Bobbio, 1993a:216). Ultimately, all 
arguments that the worthy end envisioned made recourse to blameworthy means 
more inevitable were exhausted. Then, Bobbio maintains, a simple willingness to 
believe took over.
Outside historical context, Bobbio warns, no judgement of Communism, be it pro- 
Communism or anti-Communism, is possible. It would also be ethically incorrect to 
form such judgements, given the context in which they were formed: Hitler’s 
regime of terror. Using the notion that a superior race had been summoned to 
dominate the world, Hitler’s regime launched a total war, from which came the 
necessity of answering violence with violence. Some, from the very beginning, had 
the dogmatic certainty of the justice of the cause of the Communist revolution and 
of its diffusion worldwide, and they did not stop even in the face of the tragic 
evidence of the facts. They sought to either justify Communist repression and 
violence or to remove all evidence of atrocities, so as to prevent the final aim being
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called into question. Yet there were also those who always had an opposite 
certainty. They consequently acted by combatting Communism with the same 
intransigence with which others had fought Fascism; there are those who through 
deep laceration go from one certainty to the opposite certainty. Finally, there are 
those who, although having no doubt as to the unacceptability of historical 
Communism, have continued to ask themselves about the reasons for the failure 
of a revolution that had kindled hopes and animated men of elevated moral 
conscience. Such people, Bobbio adds, contrast with the intellectual mediocrity 
and moral lowliness of much triumphant anti-Communism (Bobbio, 1993a:216).
After the demise of the PdA, Bobbio continued teaching and writing, mostly 
warning the Soviet-inspired Italian Communist Party of the need for balance and 
putting forth his criticism of "the polarization of Italian political and intellectual life 
during the High Cold War" (Anderson, 1988:9). Bobbio's main interlocutor was the 
PCI, but in later years he shifted his focus. One can claim that Bobbio is first and 
foremost a liberal rather than a socialist, for he maintains that "those called upon to 
take decisions must be offered real alternatives and be in a position to choose 
these alternatives" (Bobbio, 1994c:297). In the immediate post-war period, says 
Anderson, he worked to "dissuade [the PCI] from unconditional allegiance to a 
Soviet state that he numbered ... among totalitarian regimes" (Anderson, 1988:9). 
Recognizing the limits of the political climate of the time, Bobbio opened a debate 
among intellectuals to express criticism of "cultural politics" and to endorse a 
"politics of culture", based on observance and faith in discussion rather than 
definitive synthesis and hasty choice. As Bellamy describes it, he attempted to 
"deflate both the anti-Communism of cold war liberals, and the anti-liberalism of 
fellow-travelling left-wing intellectuals" (Bellamy, 1987:142). Both Anderson and 
Bellamy applaud Bobbio's civility and equanimity given the stark polarization of 
world politics after Yalta. He mediated between the two sides and stressed that the 
liberals were afflicted by self-contradiction in denying freedom of speech to the 
opposition. The rejection by the Left of the ideals of liberalism -  on the basis of 
their being bourgeois -  meant, he argued, that both political camps had to 
overcome their intransigence.
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Rather than rushing into antagonistic and mutually exclusive camps ... 
intellectuals of both sides should seek areas of ... discussion within their 
common cultural inheritance. The defenders of the liberal-bourgeois 
civilisation should reflect to what extent the new communist society is the 
inheritor of their conception of ... history, and refuse to be drawn into the 
polemic against a revived barbarism, the defenders of the new communist 
society must reflect ... on how far they should welcome, in making good 
their claim to build a new civilisation, the values contained within liberalism' 
(Bellamy, 1987:143).
In the early 1970s, the PCI continued to avoid "the issue of the compatibility of 
Communism with so-called liberal freedoms" (ibid.: 152). Bobbio continued to 
demand responses from the PCI as to "which institutional arrangements could 
replace those of representative democracy and still preserve a pluralistic and free 
society" (ibid.). He criticized the "unforgivable" scholastic repetition of the doctrines 
of Lenin and Marx which, given the lessons of history, no longer reflected an 
appropriate direction for the Left. According to Bellamy, Bobbio's later articles 
"formed part of a socialist attempt to undercut the PCI's electoral advances during 
the 1970s" (ibid.). Other intellectuals joined Bobbio in his criticism of the "scarce 
development of political theory in Marxism" (ibid.). This debate led the new leader 
of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, to change the political agenda by declaring 
capitalism and class division the real evils to be overcome.
2.5.2 Marxism's lack of a view of culture
Bobbio's view of culture as the foundation of human experience and individual 
freedom entails an institutional framework to guarantee that culture, even if 
Communism were to come to power. He "equated culture with the pursuit of all 
those activities - art, science, leisure, human relationships - which render our lives 
worthwhile; ... [he was aware] that its defence entailed a definite institutional and 
legal framework guaranteeing the individual's freedom from external interference" 
(ibid.:144). Bobbio has led a life-long battle to preserve culture from being 
subservient to politics. Above all, he endeavoured to defend the autonomy of
147
culture. This contrasts with Togliatti's mission to relegate culture to the role of 
maidservant vis-a-vis politics (Garin, 1996:299 and Mancarella, 1995:38). This 
conflict on the role of culture between Bobbio and Togliatti has been referred to as 
"a dialogue of the deaf (la Repubblica, 26/6/97:11), for both stood firm in their 
opinions. Togliatti defended the primacy of politics rather than the intellectual. For 
Togliatti, culture primarily served an ideological purpose.
Bobbio today stresses that the contrast between culture and politics does not 
involve denying politics certain rights and duties. Still, it must be clear that politics 
is not everything, and that philosophy takes precedence over politics He 
summarizes his view thus: "There are spheres that render man noble and there 
are values that must inspire man to ensure that politics do not degenerate in the 
struggle of all against all" (ibid.). Culture has the task of illustrating the exigencies 
of moral life, regardless of the influence of political force. "Rather than the politician 
who obeys the reason of State, the man of culture is the devoted interpreter of 
moral conscience" (ibid.:10).
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the advent of additional breathing space on 
the Left, Bobbio began to assert that the building of an appropriate legal 
framework for cultural freedom was conditional on the rejection of "Lenin's 
identification of the state with dictatorship, due to its origins as a means of 
oppression" (Bellamy, 1987:145). The Fascist regime in Italy constituted a 
dictatorship, and the nature of class power during Fascism was not comparable 
with the more amplified dimension of class power in liberal-democratic 
governments. Lenin's view swept away the distinction between liberal-democratic 
governments and dictatorships, Bobbio asserts in Dictatorship and Democracy 
(1954). Lenin claimed that dictatorship would inevitably precede the transition to 
Communist society and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was preferable to 
capitalist bourgeois governments, since it marked a further stage on the road to 
socialism. Bobbio, however, wished to identify the principal liberal concern. The 
relationship between liberals and Communists did not hinge on the origins of state 
power but on the question of guarantees to prevent the abuse of power. Bobbio’s
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views met with the adverse reaction of many Italian communists, including PCI 
leader Togliatti and the Marxist philosopher Galvano della Volpe. For Bobbio, the 
liberal critique was not based on the class origins of state power but on the need to 
promote liberal rather than dictatorial government: the need to prevent dictatorship 
is one of his perennial goals. Both the bourgeois and proletarian states could be 
either dictatorial or liberal. The constitutional guarantees that originated with the 
bourgeoisie would benefit all, since the independent administration of justice is as 
important for workers as for any other class. Bellamy writes that “The complete 
subordination of law to politics by Soviet jurists, on the grounds that all authority 
emanated from the workers, failed to answer the liberal objection" (Bellamy, 
1987:145,146). Liberals stressed, in particular, that the source of power came 
solely from the people in civil society and that the problem of how that power was 
exercised was the overriding one.
Bobbio's thesis was contested by della Volpe who denied some of the weaknesses 
within Marxist theory. In his criticism of Bobbio, della Volpe endeavoured to 
demonstrate, in theoretical terms, the superiority of the Soviet system vis-a-vis the 
western one.
The purpose and basis of authority could not be distinguished from the 
methods used to control it, since the means changed according to the ends 
they served. ... Marx had accused Hegel of inverting subject and predicate, 
making the real subject of history - the empirical existing world - a 
manifestation of the Idea. ... [Marx], whatever the topic, [applied] the same 
procedure to demystify the reification of abstract concepts into real entities. 
Bobbio's purportedly universal rights derived ... from exactly this error 
(ibid.: 146).
In viewing bourgeois society as dominated by competitive individualism, della 
Volpe stressed that the liberal state existed to protect the private interests of 
individuals. "The separation of powers and the need for rights, therefore, stemmed 
from the simultaneous estrangement of people from each other and from the 
community as a common bond, [resulting from] the division of labour and the 
stress on individual acquisitiveness and private property attendant upon the 
introduction of market relations in capitalism" (ibid.). Della Volpe dismissed the
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entire juridical framework of such a state as "a hypostatization of the economic and 
social conditions of bourgeois life" (ibid.). If society were based on production 
inspired by social motives, there would be a unity of interest and none of the 
distinctions of individualism.
Bobbio warned the Communists to be vigilant against a "too ardent progressivism" 
that would result in "sacrificing the conquests of an existing liberal democracy to 
the installation of a future proletarian dictatorship in the name of a perfected 
ulterior democracy" (Anderson, 1988:10). In his reply to Togiiatti, who had put 
forward counter-arguments, Bobbio reminded him that the members of the PdA 
would have put themselves at the service of the bosses if they had not sought a 
profound engagement with Marxism after the Liberation. Indeed, only a few PdA 
members, before throwing themselves into that political experience, without 
marrying the cause of Communism, preserved “the most salutary fruits of the 
European intellectual tradition, the value of enquiry, the ferment of doubt, a 
willingness to dialogue, a spirit of criticism, moderation of judgement, philological 
scruple, a sense of the complexity of things" (ibid.). Here, Bobbio illustrates the 
intellectual tool-kit, and those who left it behind or had never possessed it betrayed 
their intellectual class.
By 1954, the socialists had broken with the Communists and formed a coalition 
government with the ruling Christian Democrats. "For six years, Italy was governed 
by the formula of the so-called Centre-Left; ... Bobbio [described] this experience 
as ... 'the happiest moment of Italian political development1 in the post-war period" 
(ibid.). The coming years featured tumultuous times. The year 1968-69 was an 
arduous one, scarred as it was by student revolt and political ferment. That 
historical moment was to make a lasting impact on Bobbio:
In 1968, Bobbio for the first time entered the recently merged Unitary 
Socialist Party50... A massive popular upheaval broke out in the universities 
and factories ... The vote of the newly unified PSU ... fell precipitously. The 
Italian middle classes ... shifted rightwards and the Centre-Left rapidly 
expired. All Bobbio's subsequent references to 1968-69 are tinged with ... 
bitterness. ... The student assemblies of the time seemed to have shocked
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him a great deal, leaving disagreeable memories which can be read 
between the lines of the polemic which was going, in a subsequent phase of 
Italian politics, to make him a central figure of national debates for the first 
time (ibid.:10,11).
2.5.3 Reacting to history
After having met the immediate objective of defeating Fascism with all the other 
anti-Fascist forces, the strategy of the PCI was to "work within the new democracy 
for a major but gradual transformation of the socio-economic fabric of society" 
(Partridge, 1998:87). Bobbio adopted another strategy: that of going back to 
conduct an analysis of the earliest critiques of Marxism. He sought to cleanse 
Marxism of its contentious parts to reveal that, as a doctrine, not all of Marx 
merited dismissal. In the immediate post-war period and during the Cold War, the 
opponents of Communism viewed Communism as a threat, and judged it 
negatively tout court.
Treading the path of his intellectual predecessors, Bobbio, in formulating a socialist 
project, looked more closely at Marxism. He admits succumbing to the fascination 
of Marx's works, "especially in the years of Italy's liberation and reconstruction in 
the aftermath of Fascism" (Bobbio, 1988:162) when he translated Marx's 
Economic and Philosophic Writings of 1844. He also completed the first 
unabridged translation of Hobbes' De C/Ve at this time. What attracted Bobbio to 
both thinkers "was that they showed a realistic ... approach ... to the cruelty of 
history, the harshness of the objective conditions human beings have to face ... to 
survive ..." (ibid.:163).
For Bobbio, "a socialist party .. is quite within its rights to be neither Marxist nor 
anti-Marxist, but above a ll... it has a duty to be socialist" (ibid.:177).
This means giving the working class movement - and all those who ... 
believe that things have not yet reached the point where we should 
renounce the struggle for a more free and just society - guidelines for the 
future. ... Since the Socialist Party in Italy [was] a 'lay' party, should it not
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make more of this feature as something which distinguished] it from the 
Communist Party? And what does it mean to be 'laical' if not first ... to be 
prepared to refuse ... to swear by revealed truths or the words of the 
master? (ibid.).
Bobbio warns that in the fury to forget events one must not "lose sight of what it 
had represented for all those who had fought for the rebirth of civil life after the 
defeat of Fascism to [witness] the appearance of a communist regime in an 
immense country like China" (Bobbio, 1993a:217). At that time, one might have 
thought that Communism had a solid future in the history of the world. How could it 
have been so, Bobbio asks? It was only after what happened in Tien An Men 
square in Beijing, a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, that he thought of 
settling accounts with historical Communism once and for all. “But it is only now 
that the research has been conducted on the reasons why the attempt to realize in 
history the utopia of a society free from misery and oppression ended up as the 
opposite of that [goal], in a system of despotic power” (Bobbio, 1993a:217).
This passage appears to be about the choice of systems before the result is 
known. In Autobiografia (1997), Bobbio maintains that in considering the ethical 
dimension of contemporary societies, we cannot compare moral progress with the 
accelerated and irreversible field of science and technology. He observes that 
humans, confronted with the world of nature and fellow humans, sought to make 
life easier to live. The invention of instruments to exercise dominion over nature 
was successful and was completed rapidly. Such invention has had a more 
perturbing effect than that of the institution of rules for the control of the human 
world.
For Bobbio, moral progress and scientific progress - as systems - develop at 
different speeds. In terms of irreversibility, "human history has always been 
represented as a sequence of progress and decadence, of civilization and 
barbarity, of revolution and restoration" (Bobbio, 1997:260). While industrial 
revolution continues in a constant flux, Bobbio notes that institutional change is 
intermittent. Accordingly, the best political choices are only revealed to us
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intermittently. The lessons of history, however, assist us in our path, despite the 
fact that the direction of history outside science and technology is not easy to 
discern. Now, Bobbio affirms, the choice seems easier, for there is no longer any 
motive for asking “What if the experiment had succeeded?” We know now that the 
experiment failed. “The difference rests in the sense one wishes to give that 
catastrophic conclusion: either the inevitable result of the perverse project to 
exterminate a class, the bourgeoisie, as Ernst Nolte has said, or an equally 
inevitable failure of a grandiose design to transform the course of history, in which 
millions of men had believed or hoped for -  the just defeat of a monstrous crime or 
the upturned utopia" (Bobbio, 1993a:223). Of the two possible conclusions, Bobbio 
believes the latter to be the most tragic.
The end of Soviet Communism is not a sufficient basis on which to consider 
history. History is broader than any institution and any ideology, however much 
those institutions and ideologies remain simply historical values.
The most common answer is that utopia must remain in the sky of ideas, 
since man is damned ab origine, and cannot save himself by himself, and 
human nature being what it is, the idea of total redemption, of new man, is 
against nature. Human history is an uninterrupted series of trials and errors, 
..., without a final goal, and if this redemption must be, it is not of this world 
(ibid.:217).
Although Bobbio never visited the Soviet Union, in 1956 he went to China with the 
first Italian cultural delegation to visit that country. "The delegation comprised 
Communists, ... non-Communists and even some anti-Communists; ... 
Calamandrei was head of the delegation ..." (Bobbio, 1993a:218). Below, Bobbio 
describes the historical moment at the time he visited China.
The civil war had ended in 1949. In the same year, Mao was elected 
President of the Republic and Zhou En Lai Minister of External Affairs. ... 
Alliance with the Soviet Union was very close, based on a treaty of 
friendship of February 1950. The immense country ... was being 
industrialized with the crucial assistance of Soviet allies. It was the New 
China, pacified and headed towards transformation into a socialist republic 
of the people. ... We visited all that was visitable: factories and museums, 
cultural associations and schools, agricultural communities and government
153
housing, homes for the reformation of prostitutes and imperial palaces 
(ibid.).
During that trip, Bobbio recalls that the Italian group exercised its critical spirit. 
Every day they resigned themselves to the brief ritual speeches, which were 
always the same, that preceded the visits, in which each functionary repeated a 
little lesson that he had memorized. Bobbio declares that in spite of the 
reservations with which some of his travelling companions had undertaken the trip, 
Chinese society awakened an enormous attraction in the majority of Italians, 
Communists and non-Communists alike. This was a society in deep 
transformation, one which was trying to bury its recent past of misery and 
corruption, and which extolled the great Chinese cultural tradition. “No one then 
thought that it would fail nor, i believe, hoped it would” (ibid.:219).
During the course of that trip, there were gatherings, such as that of Italian and 
Chinese professors of philosophy, during which the visitors could ask questions. 
Bobbio recalls that one question concerned "the way in which the Chinese 
Government understood the relationship between politics and culture, and the 
extent to which a free press existed" (ibid.:221). There were cases of censorship 
and moments of uncomfortable debate; one particular instance concerned the 
writer Hu Feng, who at that time had been arrested for political conspiracy. "The 
ample and circumstantial answers given to us did not eliminate our doubts: 
naturally the persecution [of Feng had been] due to his having participated in a 
political conspiracy and not owing to his writings" (ibid.).
At this juncture, Bobbio reasserts the autonomy of culture, and describes how 
Calamandrei tried to reinforce that autonomy through a discussion of poetry. The 
conversation exemplifies the role of culture as a Communist political tool in China, 
a view which differs from that held by members of the PdA who do not embrace a 
hegemonic view of culture. Calamandrei explained the primacy of culture over 
politics to a young Chinese interpreter who defended the official Chinese 
government view that Feng should have been condemned because he predicated 
that poets did not necessarily have to take an interest in political struggles. On the
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contrary, Calamandrei argued that one can write beautiful poetry even in reference 
to the moon, and that indeed a great Italian poet had done so. There are problems 
in the world, he said, that concern not only the relations between oppressed and 
oppressors but humans: the mystery of life, the reason for pain, love and death 
(ibid.).
Bobbio invited the Chinese interpreter who defended the primacy of cultural 
transmission in the Communist cause in the above-mentioned example to make an 
effort to acknowledge the difference in all worldviews, in the name of tolerance. He 
stressed an important difference between liberals and Marxists, which was also the 
basis of his discussion with Italian Communists. The liberal has a relativistic 
conception of truth and maintains that contrasting opinions cannot be resolved 
except through comprehension and reciprocal tolerance. The Marxist, on the other 
hand, maintains that there are universal laws of history of which he alone is the 
interpreter, considers his own truth absolute, and acts accordingly. At that time, 
Bobbio left the question of who was right open, for he “had the conviction that in a 
society saturated with very powerfully charged values, ... the choice between the 
two horns of the dilemma was not that easy” (ibid.:222).
Marx criticizes the definition of liberty set out in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man of 1791 [paraphrased here]: "Liberty consists in being able to do everything 
which does not harm others". For Marx, this definition is not based on "the 
association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man" (Internet site 
c:10). This right of separation, according to Marx, makes the restricted individual 
withdraw into himself. Similarly, man's right to private property without regard to 
others "makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, 
but the barrier to it" (ibid.: 11). Marx's position here is compatible with Bobbio’s.
Bobbio focused much of his work on overcoming the inconsistencies of Marxism. 
Adler writes that while liberalism showed an "inability to adapt itself to an age of 
mass politics, to universalize itself beyond the narrow interests of the bourgeoisie 
and [failed] to oppose Fascism" (Adler, 1989:131), Marxism was afflicted by
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another type of crisis. “The crisis of Marxism was the crisis of the Second 
International: the crisis of a positivist, determinist, fatalist doctrine which had failed 
all significant political tests [for] it failed to prevent World War I, it failed to pull off a 
revolution despite the presence of 'objective conditions' in the post-war period, and 
it failed to contain Fascism” (ibid.).
Bobbio called upon socialists to abandon the idea of realizing a completely 
different social system and vision from that of liberal democracy. The correctness 
and utility of the latter’s procedural principles are a fundamental requirement of the 
modern post-Marxist state; socialist goals, he believes, can be woven successfully 
into the institutions of pluralist democracy. Representative democracy can infiltrate 
new spaces in a post-Marxian period. Constitutional mechanisms guarantee 
liberty, that is, a sphere of negative liberty of action where the individual is not 
compelled to act against his wishes. Negative liberty is here distinguished from 
true liberty and individual rights. For Bobbio, Marxist criticism was unable to 
comprehend the essential feature of the proclamation of rights. Those rights 
expressed the demand to restrict the excessive power of the state, a demand 
which contained a universal value, even if at the time it was most advantageous to 
the bourgeoisie.
One only has to read the first of the articles which concern personal liberty: 
'No one can be accused, arrested or detained, except in those cases 
defined by the law, etc.' (this is the article which upholds civil liberties, the 
principle of ... 'no punishment without a law'). One should also reflect on 
what has occurred in those countries which exhibit the ... consequences of 
contempt for that principle, and once its universality is challenged, both 
bourgeois and proletarian are affected without distinction (Bobbio, 
1996a: 110).
It is clear that Bobbio applauds the defence of all human beings, who stand to 
benefit in equal measure through law. He stresses that once a right has been 
infringed, that infringement can continue at all levels of society. "A strong dose of 
liberal-sociaiism" (Bobbio, 1995e:196) can today shape a more open Left, without 
being "forgetful of the sacred texts nor slave to them" (ibid.).
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How much does Bobbio’s liberalism result from a response to the course of 
historical events and how much is general? He separates theory from practice, 
since although many scholars, philosophers, jurists and politicians have useful 
discussions about various political problems, the subseqent task of “transforming 
noble but vague aspirations and just but weak demands into legally established 
rights” (Bobbio, 1996a:47) is difficult to achieve. For Bobbio, the politics of culture 
is an ethical thrust around which specific debates about the state are centred. It is 
grounded in the recognition that fundamental rights are necessary for the 
achievement of final values. The rights that preserve those values cannot all be 
accomplished universally at the same time, so that liberalism is necessarily an 
ongoing project. Personal preferences, political choices and different ideological 
orientations change over time on the basis of changing historical circumstances, 
but democratic procedures permit the revision of established agreements and thus 
are suited to complex western societies. But that feature of democracy is not the 
most salient one, Bobbio argues. The abuse of power is his main concern, and 
“democracy is superior because it remains the strongest antidote to the abuse of 
power” (Keane in Bobbio, 1989b:xxv).
The intellectual is entrusted with the task of using his “intelligence for clarification 
and leaving nothing undone in order to take on the challenge to reason which 
originates from uncontrolled passions and the mortal conflict of interests” (Bobbio, 
1996a:116). It must be said, however, that the experience of Fascism caused 
Bobbio to seek a plurality of intellectual views, to compare them with authoritarian 
Fascism, and to devise a politics of preference based on anti-Fascism and the 
liberal pursuit of knowledge. Above all, it is doubt that characterizes Bobbio’s 
liberalism, doubt rooted in an awareness of the difficulty of “understanding who we 
are and where we are going” (ibid.: 115).
In his account of the Resistance to Fascism, Bobbio calls attention to the role of the 
intellectual in political life. To his mind, the intellectual best serves as an example of 
moderation and impartiality rather than as an agitator who pursues a particular 
political aim. In Italy the highest form of intellectual commitment emerged in the
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aftermath to Fascism, Bobbio believes, since the opportunity to influence the 
organization of the new Italian State created great enthusiasm among intellectuals. 
Bobbio uses the condemnation of the vicious misrule of Fascism in a positive sense, 
to help check the rapacity of the rich, to prevent discrimination and to guard against 
the allure of revived nationalism and totalitarian government.
2.6 Enriching the ideal validity of Hobbes
In this section, I take a look at the differing views of Bobbio and Hobbes as 
concerns the role of the intellectual within the context of the State, and examine 
the particular contribution each makes to the doctrine of liberalism. I argue that 
Bobbio’s position is a markedly preferable one, for Hobbes’ conservative approach 
lacks the cultural preconditions necessary for genuine liberal government, and the 
full realization of individual potential in all spheres of development. Hobbes’ state 
fosters a monoculture in which individuals are prevented from developing their 
potential owing to the paternal role of the state. The state controls the content of 
the educational material citizens are able to consult, and prohibits them from 
meeting with others and debating in public. Although Oakeshott defines Hobbes’ 
principal work, Leviathan (1651), as the greatest, “perhaps sole masterpiece of 
political philosophy written in English” and deems that the history of Western 
civilization can provide only “a few works of similar scope and achievement to set 
beside it” (Oakeshott, 1946::viii), a literal interpretation of Hobbes’ doctrine of the 
state would culminate in dictatorship.
One half of Leviathan is devoted to religion owing to the fact that between 1638 
and 1650 religious conflict became the main obstacle to civil peace. Although 
today religion has been replaced by a plethora of new influences on the formation 
of public opinion, Hobbes’ text is still highly influential. The study of Hobbes is 
useful to the proponents of both Right and Left, since the questions of individual 
liberty, the function of the State and dealing with dissent and sedition remain as 
challenging for the whole of society today as they were when the Church or
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churches were the main influence on public opinion. Radicalism of the Right and of 
the Left leads to the police state and to its most damaging consequence, the 
suppression of free discourse, which entails a halt in human progress. The end of 
the bipolar world epitomized by the Cold War requires a fresh look at the local, 
national and international institutional framework on which society rests. This is 
particularly the case at a time when the themes of “borders” and “common 
European political culture” increasingly occupy the political agenda. As Halle 
writes,
The mounting threat of social disorder posed by accelerating change is 
identified with the intellectuals who promote it. Consequently, when people 
become sufficiently alarmed at the threat, they are impelled by their 
Hobbesian fears to welcome opposed movements that promise to maintain 
order by the ... imposition of discipline. Such movements wear the aspect of 
conservatism because they represent the aim of returning to an idealized 
past in which the operations of society were simpler, traditional virtues were 
unquestioned, and any ... subversive elements were kept in their place 
(Halle, 1972:109).
Hobbes defined the origin of political obligation as submission -  subjecting one’s 
own will to the will of another (Goldsmith, 1966:158). In Hobbes’ view, sovereignty 
derives from the unity of a multitude that expresses a single will. The community 
thus exists only by virtue of the sovereign who it wills to rule. Consequently, no 
individual can challenge the sovereign’s authority (ibid.: 160). Hobbes 
demonstrates the necessity of the state in the modern world, as well as the need 
for secular principles. He speaks against institutions like churches since they 
undermine the unity of the state by preaching an absolute truth. Religion, Hobbes 
maintains, must be controlled by the state; with that affirmation he established the 
secular view that political power ought to be superior to every other human sphere.
In the state of nature, the individual is his own defender and moralist, Hobbes 
believes. The individual agrees to leave that state, to live in peace among the 
community, by ceding to the sovereign the most prominent defensive role. While 
opting to have the sovereign defend him, however, the individual also endows the 
sovereign with the right to control his expression of opinion. In Hobbes’ state, the
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individual is therefore guided by the sovereign, rather than by his own conscience, 
in a system where the state/authority regulates his conduct in matters affecting him 
as an individual, as well as in his relations with the state and his peers. Trevor- 
Roper describes the situation thus: “the axiom, fear; the method, logic; the 
conclusion, despotism” (Trevor-Roper, 1957:234).
In Hobbes’ state, the moral obligations of neither the subject nor the sovereign 
require any particular study or attention; Hobbes provides prudent rules to follow 
rather than ethical imperatives. The word of God and moral philosophy take 
second place to the law, that is, to the agreement through which the sovereign 
exercises his authority over those who have agreed to leave the state of nature.
Hobbes’ main contention is that an effective state power is the only power that can 
prevent each individual from exclusively pursuing his or her own interest, thus 
causing a state of war. Since only peace can foster the development and 
flourishing of industry, trade, knowledge, arts and letters, peace is necessary and 
can be ensured only through the sovereign establishing a lasting valid covenant. In 
Hobbes’ view, “the foundations for every form of government are democratic, since 
society itself springs from the covenant between individuals that subjects them to a 
common authority” (Reik, 1977:99). That view of the democratic origins of the state 
remains open to question; many argue that Hobbes’ theory expresses a definite 
lack of democracy.
Bobbio writes that the modern political theory that has evolved from the time of 
Machiavelli "is opposed both to the primacy of spiritual power which distinguishes 
the medieval age of the great controversies between State and Church and which 
the Roman Church and other churches have never given up, and the primacy of 
economic power whose discovery coincides with the birth of the bourgeois world 
and the beginning of theorizing on the capitalist mode of production" (Bobbio, 
1989b:79). The primacy of the political is marked by its independence from -  or 
even superiority to -  moral judgement, as "there exists a raison d'etat separate 
from the reasoning of individuals [which] means that the state [or the politician], is
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free to pursue aims without having to take into account the moral precepts which 
bind any individual in his or her relations with others" (ibid.). Where political action 
is subordinated to dominant spiritual laws, spiritual values become primary. Bobbio 
instead insists on a secular politics where "the doctrine of necessary immorality or 
amorality of political action [must] aim at its own purposes, the salus rei publicae, 
without feeling itself bound ... by obstacles of another nature" (ibid.:79,80).
Just after the liberation of Italy, Bobbio taught two courses on the history of natural 
law in modern times at the University of Padua. He asked his students to read 
Hobbes and consider whether he had been a precursor of the totalitarian state. 
That exercise was particularly necessary, Bobbio believed, since Italian 
intellectuals had not given enough attention to Hobbes’ theory of the state.
Hobbes had not been included in our curriculum of philosophical studies, 
since idealism ... had set him aside. Croce did not even mention him in his 
short ... history of political philosophy. ... The main work on Hobbes [in 
Italian], written by ... Mondolfo, was published long ago, in 1903 (Bobbio, 
1993b:ix).
Bobbio is grateful to Hobbes for bringing the aspect of individual will to the forefront 
of discussion on the state’s origins, but he reaches beyond Hobbes in pursuing the 
subsequent development of society, where only some aspects of Hobbes’ theory are 
required to forge a “progressive politics” within liberalism. Modern society, Bobbio 
states, differs from the pre-modern social order and the anti-modern totalitarian State 
in that it recognizes the individual’s autonomy. In the private sphere, people are 
sovereign and individuals associate freely with others on the basis of their own 
judgement, rather than in response to the teaching of a particular church, tradition or 
political party. As a member of an association, family or community, the individual 
neither maintains order nor serves the State.
Hobbes himself notes that the words that form the pact with the sovereign are 
arbitrary. Their meaning is important only insofar as those arbitrary words imply the 
individual’s will to agree to the sovereign will. Since every act of the sovereign’s will 
is based on the subject’s accord, or is previously authorized, the sovereign can do
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no injustice to a subject, for he cannot represent the subject’s will and constitute at 
the same time a cause of injury to the subject. Goldsmith summarizes it thus: “The 
sovereign is the exclusively authorized agent of the society [and] there can be but 
one sovereign at any time in any society” (Goldsmith, 1966:178). Since for Hobbes 
the authority of all law derives from the authority of the sovereign, this signifies “an 
attack on the common-law position, and on the supporters of Parliament” 
(ibid.:231).
Bobbio, by contrast, favours legal institutions in which power emanates from the 
bottom and is not routed top-down. He fosters a culture in which language develops 
through the discussion and the function of the political Right and Left.
Bobbio describes his own approach as eclectic. He recommends gradual progress 
without any radical jumps, using analysis and historical example to shape ideas. 
Reality is richer than abstract typology: typology needs to be revised continually, 
taking new data and new interpretations into account. The historian must also realize 
that to understand, describe or lend order to reality, abstract concepts are required, 
the significance of which can be tested by intellectuals who have experienced such 
analysis. “An anthropology, that is ... an inquiry conducted by man with the object of 
elucidating his position in the cosmos, implies given ethical codes or is itself the 
source of an ethic, if by ethic is meant a system of values on the basis of which 
valuations are made and rules of action propounded” (Bobbio, 1948:26). The 
intellectual, with his models and work to compare forms of government on the basis 
of the ideas of classic and contemporary thinkers, can improve on the correct 
interpretation of history, Bobbio contends, for appropriate methods of investigation 
are just as important as the events under study.
Bobbio, unlike Hobbes, stresses above all the importance of liberalism -  even over 
democracy -  in the modern state. He writes: "Europeans are heirs of a historical 
tradition in which state power is supposed to be limited in favour of non-state 
spheres, such as religious communities, households, centres of learning and 
research, and markets" (Bobbio, 1989b:xvi). Favouring limited state intervention
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which would allow religious communities to flourish indicates that Bobbio is not 
hostile to religion. Rather, he considers it a component of private rather than public 
life. In La sinistra nell’era dei karaoke, he criticized state involvement in the three 
television channels operated by Radiotelevisione italiana (RAI), which compete 
almost exclusively with the commercial channels run by the Italian premier and 
media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Bobbio would like to have as many groups as 
possible represented on Italian television, to guarantee variety and democratic 
culture. He admits that he was careless in once having commented that "Television 
is naturaiiter of the Right" (Bobbio, 1994b: 13), since it is not television that is to be 
judged or caught up in debate, but its contents, the nature of the information and 
entertainment conveyed.
Berlusconi typifies the despotic sovereign, for he does not embrace the politics of 
culture. With his vast publishing and media empire, he has to some extent 
succeeded in blurring the discrete entity of the state with his own personality and 
political coalition, “to teach that the officials of the state work for him, not for Italy” 
(Lloyd, 2001:26). Berlusconi’s paternal state constitutes a threat to democracy and 
the politics of culture that matured during the Italian Left's experience of Fascism51, 
for culture, which Bobbio advises must precede the political, is suffocated in a 
political system based on financial interests. Lloyd reconfirms that Italian condition, 
advising the reader that Berlusconi “subsidised all the other parties in his coalition, 
and topped up the expenses and salaries of their MPs to the point where they are as 
much his employees as his colleagues” (ibid.).
In the post-Marxist political reality, both the religious state and the bourgeois 
mercantile state represent two extreme cases far from Bobbio’s ideal conception of 
the liberal state, which is secular rather than religious and abstentionist in the 
economic sphere. He eschews the religious state that busies itself with the 
religious behaviour of its subjects and thus controls their conduct, opinions and 
writings and forbids any demonstration of dissent. Indeed, the confessional state 
persecutes heretics, whereas Bobbio hails dissidents who act within the law, as 
they exercise their essential democratic and liberal function.
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There is a clear division between Hobbes and Bobbio that can be grasped through 
their opposing views of the role of intellectuals in society. For Hobbes, on the one 
hand, "it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines 
are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, 
how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people; 
and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published" 
(Leviathan, Internet site s:3). For Bobbio, on the other hand, all individuals, 
including the sovereign or those who form the sovereign assembly, are prone to 
doubt, and doubt is an intrinsically positive attribute in all individuals. For, Bobbio 
argues, the man of doubt is the “man of dialogue”, whose adversaries have a 
positive function.
The intellectual must necessarily be an empiricist, as Bobbio himself is described 
by Gustavo Zagrebelsky: “an empiricist who knows that his existence has always 
been lived under the aegis of possible error, that humility is required in order to 
recognize errors, so that they can be corrected” (Zagrebelsky, 1996:21). Bobbio, 
Zagrebelsky continues, is an intellectual who is never satisfied, who has always 
been curious about novelty, and who thinks that he has never achieved anything 
genuinely “definitive”, not even in those fields of research where he has been 
acclaimed as a maestro. Bobbio is an example of the intellectual who, by his own 
admission, is often obliged to live with insufficiency, to be an observer of facts 
rather than an engineer of great systems, one who is more inclined to carry out 
analysis than synthesis.
No amount of force, however efficient, is sufficient to overcome dissent on the part 
of an unwilling body of citizens. From here spring difficulties in legitimacy and 
justice vis-a-vis political power of any nature. Social groups need to be 
administered on a basis which goes beyond sheer force: that is the problem. 
Bobbio gives two different answers to this problem, according to whether one is 
asking "what power is or what it ought to be?" (Bobbio, 1989b:81). He writes, "it is 
one thing to assert that political power cannot be just strength alone in the sense
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that it is not possible, another that it cannot be strength alone in the sense that it is 
not right" (ibid:81). Here Bobbio refers to St Augustine's controversial comment on 
the essential need for justice: "Without justice what in reality would kingdoms be 
but bands of robbers?" (Bobbio, ibid:82). The thesis "might is right" is clearly 
wrong, in Bobbio’s view. Bodin defines the state as droit, the law, and that is 
Bobbio’s view. Hobbes, on the other hand, envisaged the security of citizens -- the 
supreme end of the state -- as conditional on someone, either "an actual person or 
an assembly 'legitimately [retaining] the ultimate power in the state'" (Bobbio, 
1989b:82). This ethical or legal justification attributed to power would suggest that 
Bobbio's theory is rooted in underlying morality, counterposed with church ethics. 
Bobbio claims that obedience is based on one of the two formulas recognized by 
Gaetano Mosca — the authority of God or the power of the people.
The most significant shift in all political thought since the French Revolution, 
according to Bobbio, is the idea of change itself, change from one form of 
government to another. "Generally considered an evil (the logical conclusion of a 
political doctrine which for centuries esteemed and exalted stability and considered 
civil war the worst of evils), this passage came to acquire a positive value for the 
revolutionary movements which saw in change the beginning of a new era" 
(Bobbio, 1989b:57). This new era faces serious challenges which encroach upon 
democracy: the large scale of modern life coupled with the trend of civil society 
becoming a mass society, and the increasing bureaucratization of the state which 
slows the democratic process. Bobbio implies that only a progressive outlook can 
permit institutions to adapt. For this, creativity and intellectual freedom are crucial 
tools for keeping "massification" to a minimum.
In Perche perde la sinistra’ (1994), Diamanti claims that in Italy the Right has 
crystallized into the Right of the profit-making producers of wealth, pitted against an 
intellectual Left. Right and Left have acquired a sudden and even more important 
division in the Italian party system. The concepts were not completely irrelevant in 
the past, but figured mostly in debate and in the culture of political values rather than 
in electoral orientation and the party system. In post-war Italy, political division was
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not a consequence of the division between Right and Left, "but of the confrontation 
between the Left, namely the Partito comunista itaiiano (PCI), and the grande centro, 
impersonated by the Democrazia cristiana (DC) and many of its satellites 
[particularly the Partito socialista]” (Diamanti, 1994:150,151). The extreme Right, 
owing to its association with Fascism, remained a residual entity until it was re­
invented with the failure of real socialism after the end of the Cold War.
Hobbes’ principal work, Leviathan, reveals a limited empiricism that is directly 
attributable to his experience of the English Civil War. Similarly, we can attribute 
Bobbio’s empiricism to his experience of Nazi-Fascism. Yet Bobbio’s role in 
diffusing the works of Gobetti and Rosselli, his repeated expression of their cultural 
validity, particularly as concerns Gobetti’s three journals and Rosselli’s Quaderni di 
Giustizia e Liberta, in addition to his key role in reviewing the works published by 
Einaudi, are proof of Bobbio’s belief that the publisher is a vehicle for ideas. 
Feltrinelli52 captured the same intellectual commitment to novelty and the 
importance of publishing following the initial publication of Pasternak’s Doctor 
Zhivago in Italy (by his publishing house):
Living novels are the ones that capture changes in the world’s intellectual, 
aesthetic or moral awareness, a new sensitivity, new problems, or that 
propose a model for these new levels of awareness, or that explode the 
superstition about the unchanging identity of human nature, or that propose 
new paradoxes -  in the here and now, in this sort of purgatory of history 
(Feltrinelli, 2001:293).
Other “living novels” in the tradition of Gobetti, Rosselli and Bobbio, among others, 
will continue to be written and shared; indeed, those who continue in reinforcing 
the anti-Fascist and liberal socialist tradition can be identified, inter alia, as Piero 
Polito, Nadia Urbinati and Maurizio Viroli. Although Feltrinelli admits that culture 
struck him as something gigantic and unworthy of being continually brought into 
play, Bobbio insists on the primacy of culture. Culture, for Bobbio, is required for 
moderate debate, research, the dissemination of points of view through listening to 
one’s opponents, and for respecting legislation on human rights and law. Culture is 
form as well as content.
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The autonomy of the intellectual precedes the political, Bobbio argues; culture 
must not primarily serve an intellectual purpose. Bobbio condemns Marxism’s lack 
of a genuine view of culture, arguing that in Marxism politics triumph fatally over 
culture, and culture is relegated to a secondary function. Politics can draw from 
culture; it even requires culture to preserve it from extremism. Culture enriches the 
quality of all levels of human life, but the politician’s decision-making stands to 
draw its greatest benefit.
In endorsing Marx’s view of the “spiritual” relation of the political state to civil 
society, as his forebear Gobetti did before him, Bobbio emphasizes the politics of 
responsibility and the ethics of conviction as part of the individual’s necessary role 
in democracy, where keeping one’s principles from flagging was both a right and a 
moral duty. Indeed, only through conflict and class struggle would abstract values 
be expressed as a form of concrete action.
Hobbes places the representatives of the Church on a par with intellectuals. To his 
mind, both constitute a threat to peace and to the integrity of the state. To thwart 
the influence of preachers and intellectuals, Hobbes waged “violent diatribes 
against the universities for imbuing future preachers and members of Parliament 
with the false doctrines of classical republicanism” (Goldsmith, 1966:239).
Another infirmity of a Commonwealth is ... the great number of 
corporations, which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the 
bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To may be 
added, liberty of disputing against absolute power by pretenders to political 
prudence; which, though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet 
animated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the fundamental 
laws, to the molestation of the Commonwealth, like the little worms which 
physicians call ascarides. (internet site q).
In Hobbes’ view, the sovereign in every commonwealth is the absolute 
representative of all his subjects; hence, no other representative or assembly is 
permissible unless the sovereign power allows it. Regular “private bodies”, which 
unite to form a one-person representative without any public authority, Hobbes
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describes as unlawful. These groups he refers to as corporations, where thieves 
share the same unlawful status as intellectuals. These unlawful private bodies are 
“the corporations of beggars, thieves, and gypsies, the better to order their trade of 
begging and stealing; and the corporations of men, that by authority from any 
foreign person, unite themselves in another’s dominion, for the easier propagation 
of doctrines, and for making a party, against the power of the commonwealth” 
(ibid.:154). Leagues, or the mere concourse of people, who unite from a similarity 
of will and inclination, are lawful or unlawful according to the design of each 
individual who participates in any league.
Factions and conspiracies can develop among the subjects of the same 
commonwealth and result in the undermining of peace and justice and the 
weakness of the State: “All uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, 
unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed” 
(ibid.). While those with a private interest can encourage debate and seek to 
acquire friends, even have their cause debated in the assembly, those with political 
responsibility, who have been designated by the sovereign to serve the State, must 
not resort to any lobbying tactics. To do so would constitute conspiracy against the 
sovereign: “If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men ... 
of the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the guidance of the 
rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the 
assembly for their particular interests” (ibid.).
A concourse of people can be lawful or unlawful, Hobbes argues, according to the 
occasion for which people assemble, and how many persons gather together for 
any purpose. Although he believes it would be lawful for a thousand men to sign a 
petition, it would be unlawful if the same number were to present it; the group 
would become a tumultuous defection and unlawful assembly.
Where he calleth an assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a 
sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say 
concerning ... assemblies of people, which may be compared ... to the 
similar parts of man’s body; such as be lawful, to the muscles; such as are
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unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural 
conflux of evil humours (ibid.: 156).
Hobbes believes that, among living creatures, only humans are endowed with the 
“privilege of absurdity”. Philosophers, in particular, are the most subject to such 
absurdity, for a clear reason. “There is not one of them that begins his ratiocination 
from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a 
method that hath been used only in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby 
been made indisputable” (Oakeshott, 1946:27). The causes that lie behind the 
absurdity of philosophers are described by Hobbes as i) lack of method; ii) use of 
absurd assertions and words that have no meaning, like “transubstantiate” or 
“eternal-now”; iii) over-use of metaphors, figurative speech and personification; iv) 
giving the name of “accidents” to names and speeches, as in the following 
phrases: “the nature of a thing is its definition” and “a man’s will is his command”. 
For Hobbes, metaphors and ambiguous words cause man’s reasoning to result in 
wandering among innumerable absurdities; which have contention and sedition as 
their end (Internet site r:4).
The study of Hobbes vis-a-vis intellectual development or direction allows one to 
weigh up the consequences of intellectuals who promote change. Both Hobbes 
and Bobbio are concerned with the ends of the State, but their claims compete. 
While Bobbio endorses the work of the social reformer and law maker -  il 
combattente - who adapts the rules by which the citizen must abide, Hobbes fears 
subversive elements. For Hobbes, subversive rhetoric may result in alliances which 
detract from the strength of the sovereign, thus shaking the foundations of the 
State. Hobbes tells us that moral virtues are relevant to ethical theory only insofar 
as they promote peace and the integrity of the State. Virtues have no moral 
significance aside from ensuring peace. The laws of the legislator must be held for 
good because they put an end to the anarchy of private judgements. The law is 
good because it preserves peace, not because it is the best one that can be 
devised.
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The highest expression of human ability is the capacity to create the artifice of the 
state. This view is at the core of Bobbio's vision of liberalism and civil society. He 
defines Hobbes' doctrine of the modern State as the most coherent of all theories 
of the State: humans created the State "to escape the uncertainty of the state of 
nature ... to dominate nature and use it to meet [their] own ends" (Bobbio, 
1996:73). While Bobbio chooses largely to praise Hobbes for his discussion of the 
role of the individual will in agreeing to the covenant of the collective will, for 
directing all theorists of the State to understand its origins, and for giving today’s 
world a model on which to build an international covenant of peace, he does 
implicitly criticize Hobbes. However, that criticism does not overshadow Bobbio's 
generally positive opinion of Hobbes’ contribution to political philosophy.
Bobbio sees Hobbes as an authoritarian who favoured blind submission to one 
authority and not as a liberal. After all, Hobbes views an excess of authority as a 
lesser evil than an excess of freedom. Nevertheless, Bobbio emphasizes the 
liberal character of Hobbes' state, which is formed on the basis of free association.
Hobbes' state was not at all monstrous ... It was merely a great machine ... 
in an age dominated by the mechanistic conception of the universe. ... 
before the state there is no people, ... but only a multitude. The Hobbesian 
state is founded on a reciprocal covenant among isolated and scattered 
individuals, and is therefore much more similar to an association than to a 
community (Bobbio, 1993b:69).
Bobbio acknowledges the “newness” of Hobbes, particularly with regard to his 
method. Hobbes’ discourse is no longer based on the principle of authority but 
exclusively on rational argument. There are four Hobbesian ideas that contributed 
to Bobbio’s political thought: individualism, contractualism, the idea of peace 
achieved through the constitution of a common power and “a certain pessimism 
vis-a-vis human nature and history” (Bobbio, 1996b:117).
Bobbio has more than due regard for Hobbes’ theory of the state of nature that 
motivates men to seek a way out of conflict through a covenant with the state. But 
Bobbio’s politics of culture requires an empiricism that takes account of all the
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epochs that emerged after Hobbes’ lifetime as well as the forthcoming history that 
has yet to be experienced. Bobbio does not share Hobbes’ view that metaphorical 
speech and rhetoric lead to incautious language and excesses, or that the oratory 
of democratic assemblies produces confusion. He attaches significant importance 
to metaphors, such as the “labyrinth”, “justice", “mosche cocchieri”.
Hobbes is no defender of democracy. Indeed, he associates democracy with the 
rhetoric of a few orators, “whereas monarchy is associated with univocity” (Reik, 
1977:52). Bobbio affirms the right to ask questions concerning all matters of vital 
importance to democracy, and he makes that very clear in an article published in 
response to a letter of Berlusconi’s concerning the organizational structure of 
Forza Italia53. The research of the political philosopher is not dangerous to the 
integrity of the State, he believes, but serves to disseminate knowledge and spark 
debate. Enzo Marzo echoes the view that a private, rather than public, 
“organization of intellectuals” which brings the weapons of research and culture to 
the political arena is important (il Corriere della Sera, 29/10/94:29). Close and even 
conflicting relations between the public sphere of government and the intellectual 
one of economic and historical analysis serve to educate citizens, to bolster the 
State and to prevent the dominance of ideological projects and particular interests. 
At the same time, cultural debate ensures that the constitution and laws of the 
nation do not remain purely abstract juridical affirmations.
The need for a thriving community of intellectuals and private organizations to 
prevent authoritarian rule is both acknowledged and encouraged in the Italian 
Constitution (Article 9), for the Italian Republic was founded to promote cultural 
development and scientific and technical research. “The memory of Fascist 
dictatorship had made the constituent assembly of 1947 anxious to curb executive 
authority” (Mack Smith, 1997:435) and the empowerment of intellectuals was 
embedded in the constitution to exercise that function. Deepening one’s 
knowledge is a constitutional obligation and results in a culture that can succeed in 
overcoming violence and intolerance54.
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Bobbio, unlike Hobbes’, emphasizes the individual’s right to ask questions and 
demands that all political power be held accountable. Powerful organizations, 
historical institutions and traditional forces are not true enemies, but have a 
particular “mental attitude” -  dogmatism -  that ensnares and invalidates good 
works. In the article Fanatici e Conformisti, (Bobbio, aa:1), Bobbio defines the 
dogmatic individual as one who “accepts a few so-called fundamental truths”, in 
order to put his conscience at ease and not because he seeks clarity. Such 
“fundamental truths” are guarded jealously by the dogmatic individual -  the 
conformist -  who is no longer willing to question them. Fanatics and conformists go 
hand in hand, Bobbio argues, and require each other to flourish.
Bobbio invites us to greet dogmatic spirit with critical spirit, a critical spirit derived 
from the bifurcated path of experience and reasoning which has characterized the 
highest forms of human civilization. “Against the exaltation of fanatics, the critical 
spirit teaches modesty and moderation, calm reflection and the sense of restraint; 
against the acquiescence of servile individuals it incites doubt, breaks the crust of 
prejudice, provokes crisis and shakes souls” (ibid.). By contrast, Hobbes clearly 
believes that only the sovereign is “to be the judge of what opinions and doctrines 
are averse, and what conducing to peace; and ... on what occasions, how far, and 
what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who 
shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published” (Oakeshott, 
1946:116). Good governing of opinions results in the good governing of men’s 
actions, for all actions derive from opinions, Hobbes argues. Therefore, the 
opinions of men must be controlled by the sovereign. The sovereign is the true 
judge of what is necessary for both peace and the defence of the sovereign’s 
subjects, and the sovereign decides all questions of controversy among the 
people.
Hobbes substituted divine right with the social contract; he “made the people, 
rather than God, the original source of the absolute power that the king exercised” 
(Halle, 1972:22). Hobbes regarded the people as “many”, and he did not make 
them sovereign. In his state the sovereign has the sole right of judicature, of
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deciding all controversies concerning the law or any fact; without that power, there 
is “no protection of one subject against the injuries of another” (Internet site s:3).
Bobbio stresses the difference between organic and non-organic intellectuals, 
associating the former with the Communist tradition and the latter with the socialist 
tradition. He hails those intellectuals who can be called “non-organic”, for Bobbio 
believes intellectuals are non-organic by nature (Bobbio, bb:1). An intellectual 
“thoroughbred” who believes in the function of ideas, who maintains that the battle of 
ideals are not just paper battles, Bobbio affirms, always challenges the institutions of 
power, or remains diffident toward them.
Bobbio looks upon Hobbes’ theory of the State as plausible. Yet he finds Hobbes’ 
theory to be insufficient, for the social contract does not adequately protect the 
community in cases where leadership becomes despotic. Bobbio reasserts the 
view of his forebear, Carlo Rosselli, who warned against anti-liberal and anti- 
political States that allow neither political parties nor political struggle, and where 
opponents are designated as “anti-state", enemies of the State. For Rosselli, the 
Fascist State was “the Leviathan of Hobbes”, a State that challenged reason and 
humanity (Pugliese, 1999:178). Bobbio echoes Rosselli’s call to all free men, in 
affirming that the Fascist State, and all states that manifest Fascist characteristics, 
must be countered through unity in a common obligation to truth, justice and 
liberty.
In his consideration of order and disorder, Hobbes compared the world of his time 
with that of ancient Greece. It is notable that he was the first English translator of 
Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War55. The importance of that war can 
be linked to modern conflicts; indeed, all wars. According to Watkins, Hobbes’ 
political theory provides “a solution to the political problems which the Puritan 
revolution posed for him” (Watkins, 1965:14).
Defeat in war, civil unrest, religious intolerance, the negative influence of market 
prerogatives: all these forms of disorder can lead to an anti-intellectual reaction,
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directed particularly against those who subject old beliefs and customs to critical 
analysis and the test of reason. For example, the commercial democracy of Athens 
and its maritime power were destroyed by the agricultural aristocracy and 
continental military might of the other members of the Peloponnesian 
Confederacy. Following this Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 
BC), “the citizens of Athens, thinking they couid thereby return to the lost past, put 
critical intelligence and free discourse to death in the person of Socrates” (Halle, 
1972:109).
Yet the attachment to traditional values is not the only factor at play in anti- 
intellectualism. Traditional values, values that have endured over the centuries, 
must give way to changing or new values in any society in transition. Often, it is not 
the superiority of one value over another, but the mental and behavioural 
challenge required by individuals in the effort to adapt to pluralism that poses the 
greatest hurdle in a changing society. This applies particularly to the effort to 
achieve liberal democracy.
Hobbes praised the attainment of cultural excellence and self-reliance through 
knowledge, although not for the same reasons as Bobbio. “Ignorance of the 
signification of words ... disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they 
know not, but also the errors; and [what] is more, the nonsense of them they trust: 
for neither error nor nonsense can, without a perfect understanding of words, be 
detected” (Internet site q:42). For Hobbes, cultural excellence lost its positive value 
when those who possessed it tried to counter the body politic or questioned the 
authority of the State. For Bobbio, modern societies are complex ones, where 
relatively autonomous “particular spheres", represented by parties, trade unions 
and other groups, perform an essential role: that of constituting a guarantee 
against absolute power. That guarantee is the criterion of distinction between free 
government and despotic government. The best way to organize a non-despotic 
government, Bobbio argues, is to ensure that the political system allows various 
groups “to express themselves politically, to participate either directly or indirectly 
in the creation of collective will” (Bobbio, cc:1).
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Hobbes’ conception of systems involves groups of men joined in one interest or 
one business. Such groups can be “regular” or “irregular”. Regular systems are 
those where one man, or assembly of men, represents the entire number of men; 
all other groups Hobbes considered to be irregular.
Irregular systems, are those which, having no representative, consist only in 
concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor 
made on evil design, such as are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or 
any other harmless end, are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the 
number be considerable), unknown, they are unlawful (Oakeshott, 
1946:146).
Hobbes does not see the “people” as a corporate person with a “general will”, with 
its own form of sovereignty. As Halle writes, “Hobbes was categorical in attaching 
the value of reality only to what manifests itself physically, and therefore in denying 
it to conceptual abstractions like that of the corporate person with the ‘general will”’ 
(Haile, 1972:21). Men are made “one person” only when they are represented by 
one person; it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that 
makes the person one.
For Bobbio, the central theme of Hobbes' political thought is the unity of the state. 
In Leviathan, Hobbes makes "the contrast between the state as machine and the 
state as person" (Bobbio, 1993b:vii). Hobbes is seen by Bobbio to be the "great 
and unparalleled builder of the first theory of the modern state" (ibid.:viii). Bobbio 
praises Hobbes for his intellectual approach, since Hobbes envisaged a state that 
took shape through the reciprocal consent of individuals who were originally free. 
That version of the State “is a pure construct of the intellect” (ibid.:3). The 
construction of the state represents political progress since the state of nature is a 
non-political, even anti-political condition. “The state of nature and civil society are 
opposed to one another, since civil society arises in antithesis to the state of 
nature, in order to correct ... the shortcomings of the latter” (ibid.). There is today 
no single definition of what civil society is, but it would certainly not be exhausted 
by governmental institutions. The state of nature permits humans to live in a
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condition of freedom and equality, but it is humans themselves who eventually 
agree to conventions, since they desire to leave the state of nature. While Hobbes 
concentrates on the individual’s role in agreeing to the contract, Bobbio 
concentrates on the equally important yet differing roles of “public” and “private”. 
Civil society and the private sphere influence policy debates as well as all the 
elements that constitute civil society, including trade unions, non-governmental 
organizations, religious groups and political parties (rather than party members in 
government). The private sphere is essential to the effective function of democratic 
forces in society.
Bobbio recommends that the power of Hobbes’ state be limited, and that closed 
systems be prevented, through the “grafting on of alien doctrines” to Hobbes’ 
theory. Such grafting must take place, he argues, for, where any society is founded 
on a single doctrine, it is closed and static. Conflict promotes perfection and 
plurality ensures that a system will be open and progressive, according to Bobbio.
Bobbio writes that the unity of the State
is the fruit of a process which is at the same time one of liberation and 
unification of liberation from the authority of the Church ... Since it is 
spiritual, this authority proclaims itself superior to any civil power. It is also a 
process of unification of the lesser institutions, associations ... and towns, 
which were a constant source of anarchy in medieval society. As a 
consequence of these two processes, the formation of the modern state 
coincides with the acknowledgement that political power ought to be 
superior to every other human dominion. Such absolute supremacy is called 
sovereignty [which] means independence, in relation to the process of 
liberation. And it means superiority of the state’s power over any other 
source of power existing in a given territory, in relation to the process of 
unification (Bobbio, 1993b:74,75).
Bobbio identifies two opposite approaches to "the problem of the origin and 
foundation of political power" (Bobbio, 1993b:7). One is the Aristotelian model 
based on the family, and the natural law conceptual model. "Between natural law 
theory and legal positivism, [Bobbio puts] Hobbes on the side of the latter"
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(ibid.:xi); he sees Hobbes as the precursor neither of the totalitarian state nor of 
the liberal one. Describing the natural law conceptual model, Bobbio writes:
The rational justification of the origin of the state and its mission in this world 
... [represents] a decisive moment in the process of the secularization of 
politics; the state ceases to be ... a remedy for sin, and becomes the 
strongest and most reliable disciplinary authority of the passions. ... human 
beings have only one way out of the natural anarchy that is a consequence 
of their nature; and they have only one way to establish peace, which is 
prescribed by the first law of nature. This way is the institution ... of a 
shared power, that is, the state (Bobbio, 1993b:xii).
The alternative Aristotelian model is useful for political philosophers, Bobbio 
argues, since those theorists who came before natural law theorists “received and 
handed down a conceptual model which was entirely different from ... the 
conceptual model of natural law theorists" (ibid.:5). Aristotle explained that the 
state or the city started with the family, for the satisfaction of daily needs, and then 
grew through the intermediate phase of the village, “for the satisfaction of 
something more than daily recurrent needs” (Aristotle in Bobbio 1993b:5). The final 
phase was based on the association of many villages (the city or polis), deemed by 
Aristotle to be perfect since that state existed for the sake of a good life.
Looking at the realistic doctrines of the state, Bobbio places Marx on the same 
plane as Aristotle, as he believes they share a common historicist approach in 
answering the question of how the state first came into being. Marx did not in the 
main concern himself with the question of the origin of the state and indeed he 
criticized individualist and contractualist theories as an artificial reconstruction of 
historical reality. That approach differs significantly from Hobbes’ rationalist 
doctrine of the state, which highlights the anti-social state of nature and the social 
state of coexistence, which is the basis of civil society. Aristotle and Marx after him 
highlight “the continuity between primitive forms of human society prior to the ... 
state, such as the family ... or clan” (Bobbio, 1988:182).
Hobbes sees the state as an artificial organism which comes about in opposition to 
the state of nature, while Aristotle sees the state as a natural entity which evolves
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as a direct extension of the family. Each model takes a different view of the 
person. “The premise of the first is that human beings are naturally antisocial; that 
of the second, that they are ‘political animals’” (ibid.:183).
For Bobbio, Hobbes’ conception of the state is superior to that of Aristotle’s since 
Hobbes’ theory is based on the legitimation of political society through consent 
rather than necessity. The family is a unit of identity and belonging that is created 
by virtue of birth; the individual is not required to agree to any form of contract in 
order to "qualify and participate” as a family member. Hobbes begins with a 
generic state of nature whereas Aristotle begins with a specific and historically 
determined kind of human society: the family. More importantly, Aristotle views the 
state as the natural outcome and continuity of previous states (from that of families 
to the civil state), rather than the antithesis of the previous associations while 
Hobbes describes original society as opposed to the state, since all individuals in 
the state of nature are free and equal.
2.7 The challenges of the mega-State
International order is still grounded in a system of unstable equilibrium. Yet it is no 
longer grounded in the “reciprocal fear”, which, according to Hobbes, characterizes 
the state of nature, where peace is nothing more than a truce between two wars. 
Reciprocal fear, particularly after the fall of the bipolar world that characterized the 
period of the Cold War, has been replaced by a multitude of fears, the most of 
important of which depends on any particular speaker or worldview. Hobbes’ state 
of nature, Bobbio suggests, corresponds to the global state of nature that currently 
characterizes the relations among nations. Bobbio notes that “there is a clear 
analogy between the multitude of individuals who must become a populus, and the 
multitude of states which must become the populus of sovereign powers, in order 
to give life to a truly global commonwealth” (ibid.:xiii).
Bobbio recommends that the constitutional structure of each individual state be 
"copied” on an international multilateral level, to form the basis of an international
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constitution. A contract of union at an international level would correspond to the 
constitution at a domestic level, whereby the members of the international 
community "must obtain the authority to unite by consent, ... through an act of 
authorization by the members o f ... every political community" (ibid.). Bobbio’s idea 
of a multilateral contract is ambitious, however, since some countries wield more 
power and influence than others. There is also the question of how to check an 
excess of power. The United Nations and transnational non-governmental 
organizations alone cannot contain a hyperpower.
Bobbio calls attention to another fundamental problem Hobbes brings to light, that 
of war and peace. Peace can only be realized by leaving the state of nature. The 
progress implicit in the human course from the state of nature, or the state of 
constant and universal war "in which human beings live without positive laws to 
force them to reciprocal respect" (ibid.: 197), to civil society "in which there exists a 
common power which forces [men], against their will, to comply with the laws 
necessary to ensure peaceful cohabitation" (ibid.) is the overcoming of inevitable 
war among men. "in order to attain the supreme good, which is peace, we m ust... 
leave the state of nature" (ibid.:46).
However, a study of the historical is not an adequate basis on which to pursue a 
politics of culture. Peace and non-violence are essential themes, as well as 
general aims, that intellectuals must necessarily prioritize. Hobbes’ original 
conception of the state, followed in more recent times by the increasing importance 
of the political party, has given way to “civil themes” (Bobbio in // Corriere della 
Sera, 25/02/97:29). Evolving societies require "new politics": each individual is his 
own “private secretary” or observer of events, and the anthropological self 
communicates unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally to "construct56 an ideal figure" 
(// Corriere della Sera, 19/7/96:29). Ethics are thus cultivated in the realm of the 
personal where a myriad of cultures communicate beyond the realm of the non- 
anthropological state, an entity with no existence or role as the state/moral person 
and/or the state/divinity. Many politicians and cultural representatives in Italy, 
particularly during the Anni di Piombo57 (1970s), were betrayed either because
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they had too much senso dello Stato, or because they had none at all. The State 
exists because humans created it; it has no independent spirit, no "law of 
development or ideal validity [of its own] superior to the validity of single 
individuals" (Bobbio, 1993b:72,73).
It was Hobbes' belief that demonstrative sciences like natural philosophy and 
mathematics could be studied alongside non-demonstrative sciences of the human 
type; "Hobbes holds that the type of knowledge most similar to geometry is politics" 
(ibid.:35). Bobbio draws attention to the "characteristic features of Renaissance 
thought, ... notably in Hobbes ..., where ... the relationship between nature and 
artifice [changes significantly] from that of the ancients" (ibid.:36). The main 
change was that artifice, machines, or a created state - also a machine - were no 
longer imitations of nature but were equal to it. "This change is a sign that things 
made by human beings ... are now seen in a new light and valued more highly" 
(ibid.). The modifications humans make to nature, based on their knowledge of it, 
serve to increase its power and even to perfect it; in other words, humans do not 
imitate nature but recreate nature. Where shortcomings in nature exist, human 
ingenuity or artificium compensate for them. The State was created by humans to 
give greater assurances of peace.
While for Hobbes only the state has total legal supremacy, Bobbio builds on that 
original premise by emphasizing the strength of law in forming a sound basis for 
society. Law can be interpreted in a largely finite manner, and can be applied on a 
universal level. Positive law was eventually expressed through individual rights, 
Bobbio argues, and the particular social rights of various groups that continue to 
grow in number. From Hobbes’ tradition of natural, and then positive law, 
intellectuals delineated, and continue to delineate, the ends to be achieved 
(ideologues) and how to achieve those ends (experts). Positive law, in other words, 
was enhanced by intellectual representatives of a power that served to correct or 
improve the two other powers of human society: economic and political ones.
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In liberal societies, “where tolerance of dissent has traditionally been accounted a 
virtue, it has become intensified ... by the increase in the number of people who 
participate in political and cultural activity” (Halle, 1972:112). Liberal societies have 
been constructed to accommodate diversity rather than impose uniformity and 
conformist thought, yet they still depend upon a minimum of cohesion among the 
individuals who animate culture and politics. National societies, political and 
cultural associations, academic communities, high numbers of international 
scholars in every field of inquiry, combined with newly developed and widely 
exportable mass media may result in the predominance of mediocrity vis-a-vis 
intellectual and cultural activities. Hobbes’ state limits the number of guarantees 
and opportunities for individuals and for those groups who comprise civil society. 
Bobbio believes that advocates of liberalism can gain from studying past theories 
and from grafting on appropriate features, and he recommends Hobbes to those 
who strive to understand liberalism. However, philosophy is best described as 
struggle [e lotta] (Bobbio, dd:1), and this is the main feature that distinguishes 
Bobbio from Hobbes.
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Chapter III: THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO
POLITICAL LIFE AND THE STATE
Eighty-six percent of people in the 13 applicant countries of the European Union see 
English as the most useful second language, German is favoured by 58 percent, 
followed by French at 17 percent and Italian trails behind (Black, 2002:6). I thought it 
therefore important to write a monograph on the status of intellectuals that derived 
from an Italian source, so as to make a contribution towards the genuine pluralism of 
European intellectual thought. Norberto Bobbio provides a twentieth-century view of 
the role of intellectuals which builds on Hobbes’ contractarianism yet contrasts with 
the outlook of “post-modern” intellectuals like Bauman and Rorty.
In this section, I discuss the status of intellectuals in modern and post-modern 
society. There were two different reformist intellectual movements of the 20th century 
-  positivism and Marxism, both of which were attacked by traditional and non-secular 
intellectual schools. Marxism reflects a form of positivism shaped by defensive 
socialism, whereas the other positivism can be defined as form of aggressive 
liberalism. Both Marxist and liberalist expressions of positivism reflect a faith in 
science, but they were built on different histories of humanity. Differing intellectual 
approaches reflect different attitudes to philosophical truth. Bobbio places much 
importance on the philosophical goal of seeking truth -  which he believes to be 
accessible to the philosopher in guiding politics. Some contemporary philosophers, 
like Rorty, do not argue for commitment to any truth while others, like Bauman, are 
concerned with the changing role of intellectuals vis-a-vis the highly developed 
modern state. Bobbio stands opposite those positions, in that he emphasizes 
commitment to certain truths as a prerequisite to political activism.
In the following pages, I look at the philosophy of Rorty and Bauman, to see how 
their thinking differs from that of Bobbio. Rorty does not believe that philosophy has 
a historical essence or mission, nor, in his view, is it able to help tackle real 
problems. Bobbio, on the other hand, is committed to “lessons learned” and the 
need to draw on intellectual biography in dealing with the issues of democracy,
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human rights and social justice. For Bobbio, it is not sufficient to have solely the 
stylistic capability or skill that Rorty praises, to be simply vivacious or novel in 
getting a message across; these qualities are not enough to make being an 
intellectual socially valuable. By contrast, to take philosophy seriously, Rorty 
argues, is “philosophically naive, positing a reality and a truth that do not exist 
[which is] politically dangerous, since essentialism encourages fundamentalism 
and fanaticism of the kind displayed by Shiites, Marxists, and Nazis” (Adler, 
1994:81).
Traditional intellectuals, progressive intellectuals and post-modern intellectuals: 
these make up the current conception of the intellectual’s role. Bobbio defines the 
jurist Piero Calamandrei as a “traditional” intellectual, and he would no doubt 
include himself partially in that group. During the post-war reconstruction of Italy, 
traditional intellectuals called for “a return to reason” rather than the adoption of 
the scientific reasoning offered by Marxism. Belonging to one group or the other 
was, Bobbio maintains, a choice between civilizations. He defines traditional 
intellectuals as mosche cocchieri, thinkers who are indeed leaders but whose 
impact is necessarily limited, since they are “coachmen the size of flies” or 
“captains on a phantom vessel”. Those traditionalists are bearers of a neo- 
Enlightenment culture, repentant historicists who have embraced reform, Bobbio 
argues. They sought an anti-nationalist and socially progressive European 
democracy on the Anglo-Saxon model, and this collided with orthodox Communists 
who believed in the ethical and political value of orthodoxy. Differing views of 
culture and its uses emerge when comparing the traditionalist view with the Marxist 
one, for Marxists considered culture not as a privilege but as a service (Bobbio, 
1995e:167). Bobbio compares the role of Marxists to that of simple sailors in the 
boiler room of a ship. Unlike the captain on the bridge who runs the ship, the 
arrival of the simple sailors in port is guaranteed by a process beyond their control. 
Similarly, Marxists have recourse to the historical process.
183
3.1 Richard Rorty’s non-philosophy and Bobbio’s perennial anti-Fascism
The primary concern of intellectuals is the diffusion of culture-based knowledge, 
and this remains at the forefront of all political discussion. But there are conflicting 
definitions of culture and varying outlooks on its place vis-a-vis politics. Following 
the events of 1989 and the collapse of the bipolar world, some argue that 
economics moved to the centre of world events, particularly as in the arms race 
both the United States and the former Soviet Union had required exorbitant and 
unsustainable levels of funding to improve their military expertise and defence. 
Others, such as Daniel Bell, argue that there has been a shift from economics to 
culture in defining the divisions that persist in society.
Rorty, one of Bobbio’s American contemporaries, attempts to draw consequences 
from a pragmatist theory of truth; a theory that "says that truth is not the sort of 
thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about” (Rorty, 
1991 :xiii). Applied to the moral realm, this means that certain acts are praiseworthy 
in certain circumstances but it is unlikely that there is something general and useful 
to be said about whether any particular action is good in of itself at any given time. 
Rorty believes that we are now experiencing post-philosophical culture, where no 
presiding discipline synthesizes or orders the results of other spheres of activity.
Bobbio’s radically different thought invites the reader to undertake a detailed 
analysis of Fascism, to document the consequences deriving from Fascism, and 
then to review the work of the forces of anti-Fascism. On the basis of this research, 
we can conclude that Fascism was evil and that anti-Fascism, including its 
Communist component, was intrinsically good, and can therefore be of significant 
use to us in evaluating historical processes and in building our political future. 
Bobbio’s philosophy of secular anti-Fascism contrasts significantly with Rorty’s 
view that philosophy can be defined as the free exercise of argumentative skill 
using novel language and creativity. Rorty’s cultural Left is not Bobbio’s cultural
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Left, and their prescriptions for seif-renovation and political programmes indicate 
the marked difference between them.
Bobbio made an important contribution to political culture in the 1950s when, as an 
adversary of the Italian Communist Party, he undertook a dialogue on politics and 
culture with its major exponents, published as Politica e cultura (Einaudi, 1955). 
That dialogue centred around three main themes: democracy and liberty, the role 
of intellectuals and the primacy of culture over politics. Bobbio welcomed the 
dialogue with the more extreme Left because of the decisive role the Communists 
played in the defeat of Fascism as well as their participation later on in the 
committees of national liberation (CLNs). Communists were key elements in these 
committees, which were the first organs of political power to emerge as Fascism 
retreated.
I think it is fair to say that Bobbio writes about culture with a particular urgency 
since Italy, under Fascism, witnessed the beating, imprisonment, exile and even 
assassination of intellectuals whose view of culture was not in line with Fascism. 
Bobbio’s forebears, Ginzburg and Rosselli58, were assassinated for their beliefs. 
They were targeted for their anti-Fascism and, in the case of Ginzburg, for the 
credo that the primary duty of the anti-Fascist intellectual was to cultivate 
humanistic studies in order to reinforce the link between the past -  which was at 
that time (from the mid-1920s) about to be buried -  and the moment of Italy’s 
rebirth after Fascism. Bobbio invites us to take special note of Ginzburg’s 
emphasis on historical reflection and research within the context of humanistic 
study. Such work can help us acquire cultural knowledge and appreciate pluralistic 
visions. Fascism constituted a form of decadence and it required an effort on the 
part of anti-Fascist intellectuals to find appropriate remedies without repeating the 
errors of the past (Bobbio, 1984:183). Ginzburg embodied an ideal held by a 
generation of historians who Gobetti predicted would consolidate a stand against 
Fascism. Bobbio endorses the cultural approach of Ginzburg who, believing the 
political catastrophe of Fascism to be imminent, delved into the study of the 
Risorgimento, just as Gobetti had done before his death in 1926.
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Rorty, in an essay entitled Philosophy in America Today, tells us that philosophy 
has “proceeded from speculation to science”. Philosophy was once exclusively 
defined “in terms of a set of identifiable, enduring problems, which were dealt with 
in awkward and unsophisticated ways in earlier periods, and are now being dealt 
with in a precision and rigor hitherto unknown” (Rorty, 1991:212). The discipline of 
philosophy was primarily “a set of research programs, an autonomous sector of 
culture” but Rorty claims that “there is no more consensus about the problems and 
methods of philosophy in America today than there was in Germany in 1920" 
(ibid.:213 and 216). Indeed, there is no agreed-upon list of central problems that 
ought to be tackled by philosophy. He suggests that the strongest feature of 
contemporary philosophy is stylistic argument rather than the content of 
philosophical debate. He believes that analytic philosophy “has been forced, by its 
own internal anti-positivist dialectic, to move away from an image of itself as a 
science which achieves results toward an image in which it is simply the free ... 
exercise of argumentative skill” (ibid.:223). Rorty believes that unlike natural 
scientists, philosophers, historians and those who study literature cannot know in 
advance what problems they need to tackle, nor do they need “criteria of identity” 
which would tell them whether the problems they do treat are identical to those 
studied in the past. In other words, humanistic culture does not try to reduce the 
new to the old, or to insist upon a canonical list of problems or methods (ibid.:218). 
Rorty does not emphasize “scientific” analysis; he simply requires a disciplinary 
matrix which maintains a reasonable balance between “standards” and openness. 
In Habermasian terms, Rorty says, the most important task of philosophy is to 
ensure that conversation be continuous and undistorted.
Rorty recommends that we should not worry about whether what we are doing is 
“really philosophy”. “We should let a hundred flowers bloom, admire them while 
they last, and leave botanizing to the intellectual historians of the next century" 
(ibid.:219). The ability to test different solutions is a philosophical ability that 
constitutes an intellectual virtue, he insists. Rorty describes the able philosopher as 
one who can spot flaws in any argument, and who can construct as good an
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argument as can be constructed for any view, even if that view is wrong-headed. 
That view is quite a contentious one. For many, the ideal of philosophical ability is 
far more than “seeing the entire universe of possible assertions in all their 
inferential relationships to one another, and thus to be able to construct, or 
criticize, any argument” (ibid.). Rorty does not at ail emphasize historical memory, 
nor the pedagogical importance of philosophy or the intellectual commitment to 
disseminate culture.
Since Rorty does not think that seeking truth is the goal of philosophy -  or at least 
does not think truth is accessible to the philosopher -  he cannot argue for 
commitment to any truth. Bobbio, on the other hand, emphasizes the necessity for 
commitment to certain truths as the essential basis on which to undertake political 
activism.
For Rorty, it is less and less important for analytic philosophy to have an answer to 
the question “What counts as a ‘specifically philosophical’ problem?” (ibid.). 
Language games are the tools now used to hone argument skills, Rorty argues, 
and not the study of common philosophical problems. It is essential that the 
philosopher, in order to be able to tell a new story, suggests a new language 
game, “in the hope of creating a new form of intellectual life” (ibid.:220). The art of 
conversation and those skilled in defending an argument are a precious cultural 
resource of the nation, Rorty continues. Unspecialized intellectuals are 
exceptionally good at putting together arguments and pulling them apart and “the 
nation would do well to have analytic philosophers advise on public projects, [for 
they can] kibitz59 at least as well as any other professional group” (ibid.:221).
A wider view of Rorty’s philosophy can be derived from the analysis of how the 
American Left developed in the post-war period. It took on a different role as it 
gradually abandoned the “Old Left”. In Achieving our Country (1998), Rorty 
distinguishes between the Leftist thought that characterized the reformist American 
Left during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century and that of the New Left, 
which began to evolve around 1968. The main difference between the two, Rorty
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maintains, is that the earlier American Left benefited mostly white males; as he 
says, “the situation of African-Americans was deplored, but not changed, by this 
predominantly white Left” (Rorty, 1998:75). Nor did the American reformist Left 
genuinely benefit women, or homosexuals and other minority groups, so that Rorty 
calls it callous towards the needs of oppressed groups. Its callousness was not 
entirely negative, however, since the reformist Left “hoped that the mistreatment of 
the weak by the strong in general, and racial discrimination in particular, would 
prove to be a by-product of economic injustice" (ibid.:76). The humiliation of 
women and black Americans and other minority groups was seen “as just one 
more example of the selfishness which pervaded an unreformed capitalist 
economy” (ibid).
The belief that ending selfishness would eliminate sadism and the practice of 
humiliation towards others slowly came to be seen as misguided. In the sixties, 
Rorty believes, the American Left realized that its economic determinism had been 
too simplistic; sadism was recognized as having roots deeper than those of 
economic insecurity. “The pleasure to be had from creating a class of putative 
inferiors and then humiliating individual members of that class was seen as Freud 
saw it -  as something which would be relished even if everybody were rich” (ibid.). 
Mark Edmundson reveals a similar view in discussing the cultural history of the 
United States during the 1960s. The great masses who had previously been 
excluded, who had led subordinate, secondary lives suddenly demanded 
recognition as full citizens. No longer was the pursuit of happiness and the right to 
liberty the domain of the “box-shouldered, male, heterosexual norm” (Edmundson, 
1999:64). The United States at the turn of the century continues to reel under 
those demands, which have led to an age of chaos.
Rorty believes that the sea-change in the American Left occurred when Marx was 
partially substituted by Freud as a source of political theory, so that sadism rather 
than selfishness or economic disparity became the Left’s main target. That change 
marked the creation of a cultural academic Left that emphasized a politics of 
difference or identity -  a politics of stigma rather than money. “This cultural Left
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thinks more about ... deep and hidden psychosexual motivations than about 
shallow and evident greed” (Rorty, 1998:77). Consequently, intellectuals of the 
American cultural Left began to lose interest in trade unions and, “simultaneously, 
the leftist ferment which had been centered, before the Sixties, in the social 
science departments of ... the universities moved into the literature departments” 
(ibid.). At the same juncture, the study of philosophy replaced political economy as 
"an essential preparation for participation in leftist initiatives” (ibid.). The new 
cultural Left severed its ties with what remained of the pre-60s reformist Left -  the 
Old Left -  although Rorty does emphasize that one significant remnant remains: 
“That saving remnant consists of labour lawyers and organizers, congressional 
staffers hoping to rescue the welfare state from the Republicans, journalists, social 
workers, and the people who work for foundations” (ibid.). Such professionals were 
concerned about the effect of the policies of the Reagan administration, its 
budgetary constraints and efforts to carry out the reversion of welfare programmes 
to state and local governments. The residual and reformist Left is characterized by 
thinking “more about laws that need to be passed than about a culture that needs 
to be changed” (ibid.:78).
Although the cultural Left approves of the activities of surviving reformists, 
reformism is nonetheless felt to be inadequate. The cultural or academic Left is 
convinced that “the system, and not just the laws, must be changed” (ibid.). The 
cultural Left is concerned with the primary task of naming the system, “because the 
... vocabulary of liberal politics is infected with dubious presuppositions which need 
to be exposed” (ibid.). The precise aim of the cultural Left is to teach us how to 
recognize otherness, through the teaching of academic disciplines like women’s 
history, minority and migrant studies. Rorty writes: “The principal motive behind the 
new directions taken in scholarship in the United States since the Sixties has been 
the urge to do something for people who have been humiliated -  to help victims of 
socially acceptable forms of sadism by making such sadism no longer acceptable” 
(ibid.:80).
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The post-60s cultural Left in the United States does not concern itself with the 
study of alternatives to a market economy, “or about how to combine political 
freedom with centralized decisionmaking" (ibid.:79). This creates a vacuum in 
thinking on the Left, since the previous concern of how much a welfare state can 
afford to spend has been abandoned. The cultural Left prefers to talk about 
matters other than money, the consequences of poverty, and unbridled free trade, 
Rorty maintains; indeed, “when the Right proclaims that socialism has failed, and 
that capitalism is the only alternative, the cultural Left has little to say in reply" 
(ibid.).
The traditional concerns of Left-wing movements worldwide have been the 
eradication of poverty and the achievement of a society of equal opportunity. The 
cultural Left in the United States has shifted its mandate to set about eradicating a 
particular mind-set rather than a set of economic arrangements. That mind-set it 
sees as the bastion of selfishness and sadism, typically called “Cold War ideology” 
or technocratic rationality, Rorty advises, “a mind-set nurtured by the patriarchal 
and capitalist institutions of the industrial West, and its bad effects are most clearly 
visible in the United States” (ibid.).
The politics of identity pursued by the American cultural Left is based on a 
distinction between interest groups and identity groups. Although individuals may 
move between interest groups, or in and out of one interest group, say, the 
employed or unemployed, it is the individual’s identity that constitutes his/her 
genuine otherness; “the sadism of your neighbours may not let you move out of an 
identity group” (ibid.:147). To experience the sense of “other”, “you must bear an 
ineradicable stigma, one which makes you a victim of socially accepted sadism 
rather than merely of economic selfishness” (ibid.:80).
The Old Left sought to uplift people who were humiliated by poverty, whereas the 
initiatives of the New Left are aimed at those humiliated for reasons other than 
economic status. As Rorty sees it, the victim possessing an ineradicable stigma, 
resulting in "socially accepted sadism” is placed above those who suffer
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consequences deriving from “merely economic selfishness”. The New Left, by 
endeavouring to shift the level of concern to the politics of identity rather than the 
politics of social economy, can be said to condone injustice, even in its defence of 
“the justice of identity”. Economics takes a back seat to social stigma of minority 
identity; thus the Left is robbed of much positive content.
We can accept Rorty’s assertion that the new academic programmes that emerged 
as a result of the New Left’s work constitute centres of genuinely original 
scholarship. But the “extraordinary success" Rorty claims the cultural Left has 
achieved is perhaps exaggerated, it is true that the change has taken place: 
casual infliction of humiliation is now less socially acceptable than it was during the 
first two thirds of the last century, particularly among college graduates. As Rorty 
says “The tone in which educated men talk about women, and educated whites 
about blacks, is very different from what it was before the Sixties” (ibid.:81). Yet it 
can surely be argued that the college graduates who benefited from learning about 
political correctness were, at the outset, more predisposed to overcome prejudice 
than the common citizen. Are college students in any society not more likely to 
question tradition and the dictates of authority?
Bobbio sees the role of the intellectual as the secular philosopher who upholds the 
primacy of justice rather than solidarity. He understands the principle of justice as 
both moral rightness and fairness along with the administration and procedure of 
the law. Our best resource in pursuing justice, Bobbio argues, lies in the study of 
the Italian example. We need to understand the period beginning with the crisis of 
Fascism up to the early years of the post-war period and particularly how it was 
experienced in Turin. Fascism engendered the most complex forces of opposition 
and resulted in the formation of a group of anti-Fascist intellectuals who set out a 
prescriptive agenda for transforming politics, post-Fascism. The condition of 
Fascism compelled exponents of Italian culture to take up a struggle and face 
problems that otherwise would not have been tackled with such urgency.
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The mind-set Rorty describes, that way of thinking often referred to as “Cold War 
ideology” or “technocratic rationality”, was never accepted by Bobbio and his fellow 
anti-Fascist intellectuals. Although a terrible price was exacted by the 
implementation of Communism in Eastern Europe, culturally speaking, the Berlin 
Wall never existed for Bobbio and the group of intellectuals who in 1950 founded 
the Societa Europea di Cultura. To say, as Rorty does, that the Cold War mind-set 
was nurtured by the patriarchal and capitalist institutions of the industrial West is to 
ignore the multi-faceted and pluralist streams of the pre-1960s Left. The 
Communist Left was not the only Left, Bobbio argues, and, therefore, there was no 
need to replace Marx . Rather, Marx needed to be reformed.
The Italian example of the Partito d ’Azione (PdA) provides an alternative way of 
treating Marxism. In 1942 the PdA consisted of two distinct groups. The first group 
was composed of Italian exiles living in France from the time of early Fascist 
persecution, but who took on greater importance from 1930 when Carlo Rosselli 
founded Giustizia e Liberta in Paris. The other group adhered to the liberal socialist 
movement consolidated by Calogero and Capitini in 1937. Calogero and Capitini 
took up a position somewhere between that of Rosselli and Gobetti. Both groups 
interpreted the war of liberation not as a class war but as the harbinger of a 
democratic revolution. PdA members fought alongside the Communists in the 
Resistance and recognized the great ideals that Communism inspired. However, 
their alliance was weakened by different perceptions of liberty: the PdA insisted 
that liberty came before the conquest of power.
For some PdA members, Marxism was to be surpassed: Calogero and Rosselli 
rejected Russia as totalitarian and did not support a general socialization of 
economics. For them, a mixed economy would best achieve a reconciliation 
between freedom and justice. Capitini can be linked with Gobetti, his predecessor 
in pursuing a form of liberal Communism; they both influenced Bobbio’s 
formulation of the politics of culture. Capitini, more religious in approach, was also 
more sympathetic to the Soviet experience, and he was adamant that the 
individual was the initial and primary source of history. History, for Capitini,
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preceded even the Church in importance. In cultural terms, he looked forward to 
the establishment of a society that would be both post-Christian and post- 
Communist, where maximum legal and cultural liberty would be complemented by 
maximum economic socialization. Around 1940, the grouping of the PdA to which 
Capitini belonged believed that a Communist revolution was probable in Italy and 
that the task at hand was clear: to think through the democratic revolution to come 
afterwards, which would historically "right it”.
Given Communism’s trademark goal of uplifting the masses, Bobbio accepts 
Communism’s superiority as an “ism” and identifies it as a humanist ideology -  an 
interest in the welfare of the people, based on individuals’ ingenuity rather than on 
religion. He believed Communists to be his interlocutors, not his enemies, in 
discussing the whys and wherefores of the Left.
Rorty, referring to the United States, maintains that “there has been little change 
for the better in our country’s laws since the Sixties, but the change in the way we 
treat one another has been enormous” (Rorty, 1998:81). This change he attributes 
to teachers who have brought students to understand the humiliation inflicted on 
their fellow citizens by previous generations. Teachers have accomplished this 
through the use of texts by authors from diverse cultural and minority identities. 
That trend has also been complemented by universities helping to improve the 
relations between men and women, “by favouring women in academic hiring ... 
and by encouraging writing about the subjugation of women” (ibid.). According to 
Rorty, “the American academy has done as much to overcome sadism during the 
last thirty years as it did to overcome selfishness in the previous seventy” (ibid.:82). 
This view is somewhat contentious. In terms of equality, political correctness does 
not have the same importance as historically acquired rights. Furthermore, it is 
unclear the extent to which the universities’ teaching and hiring practices have 
actually affected society as a whole, particularly with regard to concrete changes in 
legislation for equal rights.
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Bobbio proposes liberal politics and liberal values against a “permanent” backdrop 
of Left and Right. The widening gap between the third and fourth worlds -  the 
developing world -  presents the dichotomy in its starkest form. For Bobbio, a third 
way based on submerging the Left/Right distinction can never actually be put into 
practice. The intellectual must take cognizance of the fact that a discussion of Left 
and Right does not constitute a moral tract but an investigation of criteria on which 
the dichotomy is based. It is only when that distinction has been reasserted, 
Bobbio maintains, that we can make an individual choice to belong to either the 
Left or the Right, and that choice is primarily a moral one.
The intellectual, Bobbio maintains, must tell all who will listen that humanity does 
have choices. In particular, it is necessary to reject the argument that the Left has 
been defeated definitely or is obsolete, since that would mean that there was no 
real choice for the electorate. The task of the intellectual in insisting on the 
possibility of choice dispels the view that the fundamental political approach is 
static. Governance is not simply a matter of leadership by different groups of 
technocrats who, given the demise of Communism, differ only in terms of efficiency 
and honesty. Bobbio believes that the deconstruction of the Left/Right distinction 
would lead to alienation from the political system and would undermine democracy 
and human rights.
Bobbio is less concerned by global markets than Rorty is; he emphasizes instead 
the moral thrust of the PdA’s goals which he believes to be as valid in today’s 
world as it was in the 1940s. That entails an acceptance of the dialectical method 
and a mobile political position, both of which Bobbio sees as crucial to the role of 
the intellectual as a sower of doubt rather than an advocate of certainties. The task 
of renovating Italian political life is primary and he advises us that this goal is now 
within easier reach, for the proletariat has been dispersed. The revolution of the 
proletariat no longer occupies political forces which previously concentrated their 
efforts on expressing virulent anti-Communism. Given the effects of international 
development and the transfer of industrial production to more economically
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advantageous areas of the globe, we must, however, take stock of the fact that 
labour parties and trade unions are having to reinvent themselves. This is a time of 
political opportunity for the Left but also a time of post-industrial challenge; today's 
great economic forces are international in range, and they must be matched with 
political processes of comparable reach and power.
Many members of the PdA were intellectuals, professors of history and philosophy 
like Bobbio himself whose direct political experience had been brief. Their ideals 
were not successfully translated into action after the liberation, owing to the onset 
of the Cold War and the ensuing partition of Europe. There were also internal 
forces at work in the Italy of the immediate post-war period that prevented the 
implementation of the PdA’s programme, such as those centred around the 
Church and forces of economic, social and politico-bureaucratic conservatism. 
Historical analysis must necessarily form one of the intellectual’s tools.
Rorty warns us of the challenges of global economic development, and advises 
that the “measures which might cope with this new problem have hardly even been 
sketched” (Rorty, 1998:85). Moreover, the social benefits and wage levels enjoyed 
by workers in developed nations “no longer bear any relation to the newly fluid 
global labour market” (ibid.). The minority of those who constitute the international, 
cosmopolitan super-rich will designate intellectuals to carry out a new task: "[their 
job ...] will be to make sure that the decisions made by the Inner Party are carried 
out smoothly and efficiently” (ibid.:87). Intellectuals will be called upon to distract 
the populace by pursuing a cultural agenda, while the super-rich continue to 
promote their own exclusive economic agenda. Rorty foresees a bleak future for 
intellectuals, and fears their manipulation by the super-rich, who will endeavour to 
ensure the relative prosperity and happiness of their class alone.
[The super-rich ...] need people who can pretend to be the political class of 
each of the individual nation-states. For the sake of keeping the proles 
quiet, the super-rich will have to keep up the pretense that national politics 
might someday make a difference. Since economic decisions are their 
prerogative, they will encourage politicians ... to specialize in cultural issues.
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The aim will be to keep the minds of the proles elsewhere -  to keep the 
bottom 75 percent of Americans and the bottom 95 percent of the world’s 
population busy with ethnic and religious hostilities, and with debates about 
sexual mores. If the proles can be distracted from their own despair by 
media-created pseudo-events, including the occasional brief ... war, the 
super-rich will have little to fear (ibid.:87,88).
Rorty argues that globalization is producing a world economy in which any attempt 
to prevent the immiseration of workers may result only in depriving them of 
employment.
In terms of human progress, perhaps Rorty places undue emphasis on economic 
matters. Bobbio, on the other hand, portrays the intellectual as an interpreter of 
moral conscience. The economic immiseration of workers should not distract us 
from acknowledging that there are spheres that render humans noble, and among 
them are values that inspire us to prevent politics degenerating into a war of each 
against all.
In acknowledging Communism as a constitutive and necessary component of anti- 
Fascism -  a bulwark against Nazi-Fascism -  Bobbio takes us back in history. This 
step backwards derives from his conviction that certain revisionists must be 
condemned, since they equate those who fought to prevent Auschwitz with those 
who fought to maintain and expand Auschwitz on a worldwide scale. Bobbio 
reminds us of our obligation to recognize that Nazism, as a “theory" based on the 
superiority of one race, was evil in itself. At the same time, in fulfilling his role as an 
intellectual, he believes that politics is not “everything”, that philosophy takes 
precedence over politics. Rather than the politician who obeys reasons of state, 
the intellectual, as one who upholds the autonomy of culture, is an interpreter of 
moral conscience.
Rorty sees post-1960s intellectuals on the American Left as bearers of a cultural 
remedy for American sadism and, to a lesser extent, selfishness. The ability of 
Leftist intellectuals to reduce sadism gives them a good deal to be proud of, Rorty 
believes; conversely, the conservative critics of that Left have much to be
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ashamed of and do not really deserve the name of “intellectuals”. American 
conservatives have ridiculed intellectuals on the Left for their part in effecting the 
politicization of universities, thereby betraying their role as intellectuals. There is no 
question of betrayal, Rorty counters, for intellectuals are meant to be aware of and 
address issues of social justice by rendering universities centres of social protest. 
In the past, such protests aimed to resist Communism and apartheid laws.
As discussed above, the economic question or the thrust to eliminate selfishness 
was pushed to the background of the Left’s agenda for post-1960s intellectuals 
including Rorty. Herein lies the dark side of the success story of the cultural Left, 
Rorty acknowledges: "During the same period in which socially accepted sadism 
has steadily diminished, economic inequality and economic insecurity have 
steadily increased.” (Rorty, 1998:83). Rorty explains this by suggesting that the 
American Left could not handle more than one initiative at a time, that it had to 
choose between concentrating on stigma in order to ignore questions of money, or 
vice versa.
Today, however, Rorty recognizes that the problems which can be cured by 
governmental action have more to do with selfishness than sadism or forms of 
minority discrimination. From the 1970s, he argues, American middle-class 
idealism entered a weak phase, deriving from the fact that under President 
Carter60 and later under Clinton, the Democratic Party distanced itself from the 
unions and redistribution policies. That position signalled a move to the centre of 
the political ground, “moving into a sterile vacuum” (Rorty, 1998:86). The formerly 
noisy left wing of the Democratic Party then lost its message of economic 
momentum upon which the unions and many intellectuals of the Left had relied. “It 
is as if the distribution of income and wealth had become too scary a topic for any 
American politician ... ever to mention” (ibid.:87).
For Rorty, the cultural Left requires urgent reform and must transform itself into a 
genuine political Left. Rather than political reform, which should be the Left’s main 
focus, the American Left’s decision to embrace culture resulted in “dreams ... of
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inexplicable, magical transformations” (ibid.:102). In particular, Rorty believes that 
the Left was mistaken in its reliance on the myth of “the people” as a valid force 
with which to challenge capitalism. The cultural Left will have a hard time 
transforming itself into a political Left similar to the Sixties Left, Rorty argues, for it 
still dreams of being rescued by an angelic power called “the people”. "The people” 
represent a redemptive preternatural force whose demonic counterpart is named 
“power”. Indeed, Rorty believes, the cultural Left inherited the slogan “Power to the 
people” from the Sixties Left, whose members forgot to ask how the transference 
of power was supposed to work, and the question has still not yet been asked 
(ibid.).
Rorty cautions intellectuals against using “too much theory”. Sociopolitical theory 
conducted at a high level of abstraction is simply exasperating. To his mind, such 
abstraction is typical of the Left, more so than of the Right.
The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of 
abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The 
more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your 
critique (ibid.:92,93).
Rorty refers to the current discussion of “individualism versus communitarianism” 
as a typical example of the “sterile debate” that characterizes the cultural Left. 
Engaging in national politics and dealing effectively with the consequences of 
globalization are tasks that lie beyond the reach of the cultural Left, unless it 
transforms itself “by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and 
in particular with the labor unions” (ibid.:91). it would have to emphasize money 
and the curbing of selfishness, even at the cost of talking less about stigma, he 
believes. He makes two suggestions as to how the transition might be effected:
The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to 
kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize 
what remains of our pride in being Americans (ibid.:91,92).
Bobbio, by contrast, is adamant that theory must accompany the intellectual 
through the labyrinth of philosophical research. He began his study of the history of
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ideas by reading the works of Carlo Cattaneo61 during the German occupation of 
Turin, in an effort to counter the spiritualistic philosophy that dominated the Italy of 
that day. Cattaneo was an enlightened reformist whose ideas constituted “the 
antithesis of spiritualistic philosophy; his ideas can definitely be considered the 
ones that formed the philosophical basis of the PdA’s programme" (Bobbio, 
1997:86). In 1997, Bobbio reaffirmed the theoretical validity of Cattaneo’s definition 
of the State as a "great transaction”, which stood opposite to the Fascist doctrine 
of the ethical State. During the Fascist regime, other liberal and anti-Fascist 
intellectuals like Luigi Einaudi, Mario Fubini and Luigi Salvatorelli also undertook 
the study of Cattaneo.
In 1944-45, Bobbio published a series of essays called the La citta del so/e62; 
named after Tommaso Campanella, which gives an indication of the place of 
honour Bobbio ascribes to that Renaissance thinker. Earlier, in 1941, Bobbio 
edited the Italian and Latin text of Campanella’s La citta del sole63. In addition to 
the Italian classics, Bobbio has always acknowledged the theoretical contribution 
of non-Italian intellectuals. “When the barriers of cultural nationalism had been 
broken down, Italian intellectuals were forced into a rapid course of study to bring 
them up to date" (Bobbio, 1995e:174).
Bobbio recalls that after the liberation of Italy, he took up the study of the procedural 
conception of democracy inspired by Hans Kelsen. Bobbio’s first theoretical text on 
democracy, Stato e democrazia (1945) was published the same year that, thanks to 
the British Council, he travelled to England. The purpose of that trip was to permit a 
group composed mainly of Italian jurists to attend a course in civic education, 
particularly those who had been educated during the Fascist dictatorship. As the Italy 
of that time was preparing to make a choice between the institution of the monarchy 
and the republic, Bobbio acknowledges the lack of democratic culture among the 
youth educated during Fascism.
Bobbio would consider Rorty’s call to mobilize pride in being American insufficient 
as a model for the Left. Human rights, alongside the other great problems of our
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time, like war and poverty -  excess power that results in genocide, for example, 
and the excess of impotence that results in hunger -  must form the primary and 
international agenda of the Left. The Left’s aim should be, in the following order: 
the positivization, generalization and then subsequent internationalization of 
human rights. To consolidate democracy and peace, Bobbio argues, there must be 
a basic foundation of human rights on which to build those ends. Moreover, Bobbio 
maintains that fundamental rights are necessary for the achievement of final 
values and therefore constitute an appeal to those final values. As concerns 
constituted powers, there are only two types of human rights: either they restrict 
the ability of those powers to do harm or encourage their ability to do good.
Rorty advises us differently: “For purposes of thinking about how to achieve our 
country, we do not need to worry about the correspondence theory of truth, the 
grounds of normativity, the impossibility of justice, or the infinite distance which 
separates us from the other” (ibid.:97). We ought, he advises, to just get on with 
trying to solve human problems. The normativity that Rorty would not worry about 
forms the basis of Bobbio’s cultural tool-kit. He believes that man’s attempts to 
transform the world, to make it less hostile, rely just as much on rules of behaviour 
as they do upon techniques for producing instruments and laws. Such tools or 
instruments form the world of “culture” as opposed to the world of “nature”.
Human rights created as universal natural rights begin in the abstract, which is an 
essential phase, and then develop into specific national positive rights. Their full 
implementation as universal positive rights occurs only when they become 
concrete. That final phase of implementation is, in Bobbio’s view, no longer a 
philosophical problem but a legal/political one. Rights, once proclaimed, require 
the successive creation of conditions for wider and more rigorous implementation 
of those rights.
Bobbio reminds us that up to the present, fundamental values have emerged from 
the proclamation of human rights, although final values develop into sources of
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conflict. Human rights arise to contrast one person’s or one group’s increasing 
power over another, and they can also be construed as the consequence of 
technological progress, which increases the ability to dominate both nature and 
other humans.
Bobbio sees the Left’s agenda as part of a continuum. Still, we must acknowledge 
a new reality and the fact that the Left is undergoing a period of transition. In this 
transitional period, he believes, there is unprecedented curiosity about Right-wing 
culture, just as in the past there was much debate about the “hegemony” of Left- 
wing intellectuals, and about the reasons behind that purported hegemony. We 
must recognize, however, that some of the assumptions on which the Left based 
its strength and plans for the transformation of society have not materialized. That 
challenge, Bobbio believes, is perhaps less threatening than the need to adapt the 
Left to new current world problems which the the traditional Left did not have to 
face.
Although the Left is not what it used to be, Bobbio reminds us that as long as there 
are people motivated by distress over the iniquities of contemporary societies, the 
ideals which have characterized Left-wing movements for over a century will be 
kept alive.
Culture is a supreme value for the development of human consciousness, Bobbio 
believes, and he prizes culture for its autonomy over politics and its role in the 
development of art, literature and philosophy. Its defence, he argues, requires an 
institutional and legal framework that guarantees individual freedom, such that the 
individual is free from external interference. Bobbio’s politics of culture must 
necessarily reject Lenin’s view of the State. Lenin identified the State with 
dictatorship, due to its origins as a means of oppression. For Bobbio, the State’s 
legal framework acts as a guarantee in preserving the autonomy of culture.
Yet the State’s institutional and legal framework alone is not sufficient to preserve 
it; culture must be protected from subservience to politics. Lenin swept away the
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distinction between liberal democratic government and dictatorship and argued 
that a dictatorship of the proletariat would be preferable to any form of capitalist 
bourgeois government. In the Soviet Union and in other Communist regimes, 
culture was used to further political ends. The lesson learned through that loss of 
cultural autonomy is an eternally valid one. When culture and politics merge into 
one, both liberalism and pluralism suffer. For Bobbio, this last point is of supreme 
importance, for the individualistic and organic conceptions of society are 
irreconcilable. Whatever our cultural baggage, only the individualistic conception of 
society is true for understanding and explaining the nature of democracy (Bobbio, 
1996a:90). This view contrasts starkly with Rorty’s theory that truth is simply the 
name of a property which ail true statements share, like “It rained yesterday” or 
“Love is better than hate” (Rorty, 1991 :xiii).
The dictatorship constituted by the Fascist regime also resulted in the elimination 
of pluralism and the fostering of monoculture, Bobbio argues. He insists that the 
nature of class power under Fascism is not comparable to the more amplified 
dimension of class power in liberal democratic governments. Even the relationship 
between liberals and Communists hinges on guarantees to prevent the abuse of 
state power, and does not depend on the origins of that power.
Rorty cautions those who fall prey to the cultural Left. To step into the intellectual 
world which some of these leftists inhabit is to move out of a world in which the 
citizens of a democracy can join forces to resist sadism and selfishness. He calls 
following that route a lapse into a “Gothic world”64 in which democratic politics has 
become a farce. “It is a world in which all the daylit cheerfulness of 
Whitmanesque65 hypersecularism has been lost, and in which ‘liberalism’ and 
‘humanism’ are synonyms for naivete -  for an inability to grasp the full horror of our 
situation” (ibid.:95,96).
Bobbio’s pursuit of culture as a good and pluralist end in itself contrasts with 
Rorty’s invitation to "give philosophy and religion a pass”, to set them aside. 
Bobbio is committed to philosophy and tells us that the politics of culture requires
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spiritual goods as well as material goods, for a good life involves more than 
material goods. The liberty to practice or not to practice religion is an indispensable 
condition of the spiritual good that consists in living in accordance with one’s 
conscience.
Bobbio’s conception of the politics o f culture expresses culture’s autonomy from 
politics and, in a certain sense, its purity compared to politics. This purity derives 
from culture perceived as the knowledge-based totality of socially transmitted 
phenomena. Rorty does not share that view of culture, where “philosophers are 
forever claiming to have discovered methods which are .. purer than those of 
nonphilosophers” (Rorty, 1991:19). Politics, on the other hand, easily becomes 
corrupt, perhaps resulting in the weakening of the State’s authority. We can safely 
say that culture is not subject to corruption in the same way that politics is, 
although culture can take on many other negative qualities.
Bobbio implores us to take stock of all cultures before we iron out the essential 
elements of the “best culture" that we, as individuals, finally choose to adopt. That 
best culture must not remain static, however; new elements can be grafted on to 
our original cultural base to improve it. A pluralist approach is needed to assist us 
in gathering all the cultural raw material required to effect comparisons and to 
make choices. Bobbio insists, as Gobetti and Rosselli did before him, that it is 
necessary to draw on national and international sources of culture.
Philosophy is the realm of culture, Bobbio affirms, not the realm of politics, 
although politics needs the tool of culture to develop in a way that benefits 
humanity. Culture is a moral guide that assists one to decide judiciously on all 
questions. But rigorous research and personal familiarity with available data are 
needed to make informed decisions. We can follow Gobetti’s example in drawing 
out the meaning of events, in exploring the role of the intellectual; he himself lived 
in a time when it was crucial to interpret the international significance of the 
Russian Revolution in political, historical and humanist terms. In Paradosso dello 
spirito russo (Einaudi, 1976), Gobetti tackles the subject through four separate
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sections: the conflict of ideas, Russian literature, with particular emphasis on 
Gogol, various other examples of Russian literature “con spunti66 d’interpretazione” 
(ibid.:vi) and, finally, historical writings on the Russian Revolution. In the 
introduction to Gobetti’s book, Vittorio Strada calls our attention to the fact that 
Gobetti brings us to see the resemblance shared by the Russian writers. We need 
the intellectual to find “the source of thought”; in this particular example, Gobetti 
identifies a political interest -  the question of the Russian intelligentsia and the 
Bolshevik revolution -  which unites the work of Andreiev, Dostoyevsky, Pushkin 
and Lermontov, among others. Strada notes that the sphere of Gobetti’s research 
is marked by the “major zone” of his entire political thought and the “minor zone” of 
Russian literary study. The question of the revolution and the intelligentsia was 
taken up in Russia and elsewhere, particularly through a group of political 
emigres67.
Bobbio emulates Gobetti in reaffirming the role of political philosophy as an 
effective tool with which to interpret the course of political life. Philosophers are 
needed to organize consensus and to bolster the “political industry” by acting as an 
extension of particular power bases. Every political action, whether executed in line 
with a global design or just as a small step in realizing the overall aims of a political 
party or movement, needs to clarify its aims -  its values, ideals and worldviews, 
and needs the scientific and technical knowledge to achieve those ends. Any 
political goal, to succeed, must therefore have its basis in culture, in the ideas that 
precede politics. Achieving a better, cleaner environment, for example, can only be 
“activated” through culture, which allows us to express our beliefs and values.
Bobbio agrees with his fellow Turinese Gianni Vattimo that the debate on the 
nature of institutions and the future of democracy could safely be left to the 
philosopher-scholar. After all, it would be nonsensical and unrealistic to postulate 
that a society could exist in which all adults have the right to directly or indirectly 
influence the way political decisions are made. Despite the fact that cable 
television, the internet and other forms of technology have made it easier for
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intellectuals to reach the public, we must take stock of the fact that not every 
citizen is equipped to inform public opinion and take action. The general public 
neither reads or listens to every media broadcast nor concerns itself with the 
completeness of its information. This situation constitutes a problem for democracy 
since, increasingly, public decisions require specialist knowledge. For instance, 
Vattimo asks if there is a referendum concerning the question of nuclear-power 
stations, are those called to vote sufficiently knowledgeable in physics to be able to 
make an informed decision? (Vattimo, 2001). Democracy and political liberty will 
never be achieved through universally-diffused scientific competence, but through 
the possibility of each individual being able to choose which “experts” are to lead 
him. The way we select those experts is “based on a complex affinity that, without 
exaggerating, we can call existential" (ibid.).
There remains in question the risk of accepting a democracy in which the charisma 
of leaders, often a construct of mass media, replaces rational debate. We must 
also realize, however, that even in less mediatic societies, “the rational purity of 
political debate is profoundly conditioned by belonging, friendship and ‘trust’” 
(ibid.).
It is useful to consider Bobbio’s view of the republic as the opposite of a moral 
idea. In politics, he is a realist and advises that “one can speak of politics only by 
casting a cold eye on history” (Bobbio and Viroli, 2001: 8). Politics, whether 
monarchical or republican, constitutes a struggle for power. Bobbio warns us that 
to speak only of ideals is just plain rhetoric. “I understand politics as a struggle for 
power but to speak of politics that has as its aim a republic based on the virtue of 
citizens, I ask what this citizens’ virtue is” (ibid.). We have no example of a State 
that functions as a result of citizens’ virtue rather than by force, Bobbio argues. 
The “recurrent definition” of the State is that of holder of the monopoly of legitimate 
force. That force is necessary “as the majority of citizens is not virtuous but erring 
(viziosa)” (ibid.). This is Bobbio’s Hobbesian conception of politics. He invites the 
reader to abandon Montesquieu’s conception68 of the State as a moral model,
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given that, in his view, all States, including republics, exist to curb the acts of sinful 
citizens rather than to promote economic gain. Again, there is no State that is built 
on the virtue of citizens; each State functions on the basis of “a written or an 
unwritten constitution that establishes the rules for citizens’ conduct, with the 
premise that, generally, citizens are not virtuous” (ibid.:9).
Viroli has asked Bobbio why, as a political theorist, he has never tackled the 
themes of republicanism and the republic, particularly since Cattaneo, an advocate 
of republicanism, figures in Bobbio’s intellectual biography (ibid.: 6). Bobbio’s reply 
is that he never saw Cattaneo through his view of the republic but through his view 
of federalism which advocates a republic based on a federation of smaller 
republics. The concept of the republic constitutes a minimal part of the categories 
that make up Cattaneo’s conceptual system. Bobbio acknowledges Cattaneo’s 
contribution as “the federalist of the Risorgimento”; Cattaneo enlarged the notion 
of federalism to include Europe, not just the republic. Yet Cattaneo’s federalism 
was not historical or geographical, but ideological. He argued that the unitary State, 
as such, cannot be other than authoritarian; it ultimately becomes despotic since 
unity suffocates autonomies, free initiative and liberty (la Stampa, 12/10/97:24). 
Secular anti-Fascism -  Bobbio speaks of secular anti-Fascism to distinguish it from 
Communist and Catholic anti-Fascism -  was naturaliter federalist. Federalism, both 
external and internal, made up an integral part of the PdA’s programme, and Bobbio 
joined the party from the moment it was first created (ibid.). The association of the 
intellectuals of the PdA with federalism demonstrates the link between culture and 
politics, where political action expresses an initial cultural idea.
Whatever form of government is adopted by the leader or leaders of a polity, 
Bobbio affirms, there is no ideal form of the State and the State can never function 
as a moral model. The ideal State does not exist; it exists only in literature, both 
ancient and modern.
The politics of culture espoused by Bobbio’s maestri rests on civil virtue, virtue 
“activated” as a result of the individual’s willingness to be vigilant, to commit
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himself to the public good, to strive to resist injustice. The State curbs the acts of 
the arrogant, the overly-ambitious and the erring, but citizens are also required “to 
keep their hands on liberty, as Cattaneo wrote citing Machiavelli” (ibid.:9).
In 2001 Bobbio reiterated the advice he provided in the immediate post-war period 
in the pages of Giustizia e Liberta, the PdA daily: “Democracy requires good laws 
and good habits” (ibid.:10). Such good habits or customs are the genuine virtues to 
which we ought to aspire, while at the same time encouraging the diffusion of 
ideas and points of view and the free play of the intellect. Good laws and openness 
allow culture to counter politics, a path recommended by Croce. Elsewhere, 
Bobbio writes "The inner dialectical force of Croce’s ... thought moved ... between 
the two poles of an affirmation of political activity as economic activity or vital force 
(and as such, autonomous of morality, since it had its own reasons and its own 
laws) and liberty, identified as the moral force that ... directed politics and that 
good governance must always take into account” (Bobbio, 1995e:133). What 
Croce called “liberty”, Bobbio would call pluralism: ultimately, it means the liberty of 
culture.
The cultural debate, from Bobbio’s viewpoint, must necessarily include a critical 
look at Marxism. The friend/enemy polarization of history and politics is precisely 
one of the main things he holds against Marxism. Nevertheless, Bobbio is keen to 
prove the cultural dignity of Communism in opposition to that of Nazism, indeed, 
he asks the reader to imagine whether anyone would ever dare to compare Marx’s 
Das Kapital or The Manifesto of 1848 with Mein Kampf. He considers Marx to be a 
classic. He has read Marx’s works several times, particularly the historical and 
philosophical oeuvres, just as he has re-read Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and 
Rousseau. Bobbio is committed to theoretical research, while Rorty questions its 
value.
The classic author makes a contribution to the politics of culture by overcoming the 
tempests of history through the successful interpretation of an epoch, so much so 
that one cannot ignore that work in discovering the spirit of that author's lifetime. In
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Bobbio’s definition of a classic, the author must always be contemporary and each 
generation feels the need to re-read the work, perhaps giving it a new 
interpretation. Finally, a classic author must have elaborated general categories of 
historical comprehension, without which we cannot interpret a reality different from 
the one from which they were derived and to which they were applied. The 
possibility of interpreting new realities using those general categories of historical 
comprehension allows us to make a contribution to the development of human 
consciousness. This ability corresponds to Gobetti’s call for interpretation of culture 
as a form of historical consciousness. The Centro Studi Piero Gobetti, founded in 
1961, remains faithful to this cultural aim by organizing seminars on ethics and 
politics69.
Although Bobbio criticizes Marx’s emphasis on subjects rather than the institutions 
of power - his concern with “who” was to rule rather than “how” one was to rule - 
Bobbio is ready to adopt the central theme of political morality as evoked by Marx.
We saw that Rorty is convinced that there is no agreed-upon list of central 
problems that philosophy ought to tackle, but Bobbio has a specific goal to pursue. 
He speaks out against inequality and all forms of Fascism. He warns that the 
existence of inequality inhibits freedom, as Vittorio Foa sustains: “it appeared quite 
clear to us young anti-Fascists that you cannot be free unless you get rid of the 
fundamental social, cultural and moral features of inequality” (Bobbio, 1996c:97). 
Bobbio sees historical development in terms of emerging rights, for all rights have 
been historically acquired, although their content can vary overtime. He writes:
Rights, which were declared absolute at the end of the eighteenth century, 
such as the sacre et inviolable right of ownership, have now been subjected 
to radical restrictions in contemporary declarations, while prominence is now 
given to rights, such as social rights, which in the seventeenth century did 
not even get a mention. It is not difficult to foresee that new demands will 
emerge which at the moment we can only catch a glimpse of, such as the 
r ig h t... to respect the lives of animals and not just humans. Thus rights are 
not fundamental by their nature. That which appears to be fundamental in a 
given historical era or civilization, is not fundamental in other eras or 
civilizations (Bobbio, 1996a:6).
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As we saw, Rorty suggests that the strongest feature of contemporary philosophy 
is stylistic argument rather than the content of philosophical debate. Although 
Bobbio himself admits that he has a certain difficulty in wading through his own 
writings; in identifying a common thread that ties them together, he pursues 
doggedly his intellectual mission of carrying out research, publishing books, 
organizing seminars and providing support to centres of knowledge. The Societa 
Europea di Cultura was formed in 1950 with the conviction that there was a need 
to preserve the spiritual unity of Europe from the politics of the two rival blocs 
(Bobbio, 1993a:202). For Bobbio, that task was the specific mandate of 
intellectuals. He is referring to the political task of intellectuals, a task which is 
theirs alone and which, since the founding of the Societa, was called the politics of 
culture.
The unity of Europe remains an important question, although the politics of culture 
may now be redefined since the two blocs that menaced the unity of Europe are no 
longer a political reality. The political order and institutions that took shape during 
the Resistance to Fascism were designed on the basis of a societal analysis that 
today can be called into question. International development, scientific capability 
and the enhanced power of the media constitute dynamic, rapidly evolving forces 
of change that “push” the intellectual to act, yet require a level of much greater 
expertise. Amidst this intense period of change, Bobbio reminds us that the terms 
Right and Left are still valid cultural and political tools.
Following five years of World War, the German occupation of Italy and the end of 
civil strife, Bobbio’s research took a new direction. His research, during the years of 
Fascism, consisted of coerced and politically ascetic philosophy but the end of the 
war brought about what he refers to as "a natural encounter with the great problems 
that required solution: democracy and peace” (ibid.). The themes of democracy and 
peace are the magnets that attract his attention as a theorist, and constitute the main 
thrust of his work. As we saw in Chapter li, Bobbio’s democracy is a liberal 
constitutionalist one that comprises social as well as civil and political rights.
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Democracy, he believes, is the only feasible and legitimate form of rule for modern 
societies.
As a philosopher, Bobbio aims to wed the liberal concern with individual freedom 
and human rights based on the rule of the law, to the socialist concern with social 
justice and equality. His democratic theory includes a criticism of participatory 
theorists, particularly adherents of the extreme Left and the extreme Right. Such 
theorists, in Bobbio’s view, concentrate on who holds power in society rather than on 
the more important question of how power is exercised. The intellectual must be 
vigilant in monitoring the moral and practical implementation of power.
The best intellectual, Bobbio argues, promotes a specific policy, that of illustrating 
that democratic decision-making should be extended over a vast range of centres of 
power, including intellectual ones. Central government alone does not foster 
democratic progress. Intellectuals should enrich cultural pluralism by replacing the 
debate over "who can vote" with a different and more pressing battle concerning 
“what you can vote for”. In Western democracies, citizens have acquired the right to 
vote in mainstream political elections but remain outside spheres of influence in 
many other areas of human activity.
Lintner, author of ‘Does European Integration Narrow Regional Disparities or Does 
it Increase Them?’, points to the academic consensus that the increased freedom 
of the market, part of the European integration project, has resulted in greater 
regional disparities (Lintner, 1997:3). By contrast, Bobbio’s primary emphasis is not 
market influences; he is less concerned with economic liberalism than he is with the 
general question of measuring and improving social welfare. Bobbio is a member of 
a unique group of “bourgeois heroes” who followed in Gobetti’s tracks; as we have 
seen, Gobetti was the first Turinese bourgeois to take up the banner of the workers’ 
movement, to improve the Italian nation. Gobetti was the harbinger and first 
adherent of resistance. Gobetti’s example as an intellectual brought Bobbio out of 
his doppiezza or double life70. He acted as a Fascist among Fascists and as an anti- 
Fascist among anti-Fascists, what he refers to as his political self and his cultural
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self. Bobbio’s cultural and anti-Fascist self was superior to the Fascist one and 
eventually won out. In ‘Bobbio e I’lnquisizione’, Lerner underlines the importance of 
analyzing fully Bobbio’s contribution to anti-Fascism and democratic theory deriving 
from Gobettianismo. Neo-Fascist advocates, he points out, use Bobbio’s earlier 
political self-history to “banalize rights and wrongs, and to neutralize historical 
judgement of the Italian trauma of the 20th century" (Lerner, 1999). In the nineties, 
Bobbio discussed his “link to Fascism", and his earlier “political self’ with the neo- 
Fascist journalist Pietrangelo Buttafuoco. Bobbio told Buttafuoco that in 1927 at the 
age of 18 he joined the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (GUF) and took three trips 
abroad with the GUF (ibid.). That interview, lauded by some as an example of 
intellectual rigour as Bobbio attempted to come to grips with his past, led others to 
condemn Bobbio for having become anti-Fascist so late (in the 1930s).
Bobbio is full of self-criticism and praises the intellectual example of Leone Ginzburg 
and Vittorio Foa, who forgave him for his early lack of interest in political affairs. 
Bobbio “does not forgive himself for that lack when others had already chosen active 
political resistance” (ibid.).
Bobbio’s status as an intellectual and the cultural importance of the Turinese 
intellectuals between the two wars, some seventy years ago, must be examined 
within the context of each intellectual’s individual choice of waging anti-Fascism. 
Bobbio’s intellectual approach is “Gobettismo”, an ethical and heuristic conception of 
politics resting on the conviction that political action is regulated by the ethics of 
goodwill and pure intention, not results or successes (Bobbio, mm:1). That 
conception implies a net distinction between the politics of intellectuals and the 
politics of politicians. Ethical politics differ from practical politics in that they are not 
subject to compromise. The politics of intellectuals is inspired by principles rather 
than by the interests of particular groups. The most important features of the politics 
of culture -  the politics of intellectuals -  are coherence, intransigence, and the firm 
ability to defend the ideals in which the intellectual believes. These count and not the 
certainty of achieving an end, not success, Bobbio argues. Important rather, are the 
effort, the tension among ideals, total commitment and the willingness to make
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sacrifices. The intellectual must obey the voice of his conscience, the appeal of that 
“hidden god” (ibid.), who is the intellectual himself. The politics of politicians follow 
another set of imperatives.
Although the politician-intellectual acts out of deep moral inspiration and strong 
pedagogical vocation, he cannot take advantage of all available means to reach his 
end. Some means are to be ruled out from his utilitarian calculations. “The end 
justifies the means” belongs to the credo of the politician’s politics, rather than the 
intellectual’s politics. The intellectual looks far beyond the day-to-day concerns of the 
politician who does not know where his labour may lead him. The politics of the 
intellectual have “remote ends”, and one of his virtues is intransigence, for he cannot 
accept the compromises of the politician.
Politics needs the influence of culture to be ethical. By its very nature, politics is 
quick to adapt to new conditions and embrace trasformismo in Machiavellian fashion. 
Intellectuals, however, believe trasformism to be a scandal that results in a betrayal 
of their role. Intellectuals must keep a certain distance from political parties in order 
to maintain the autonomy necessary to execute their primary task: criticism. In 
describing Gobetti, and in endorsing Gobetti’s intellectual approach, Bobbio uses 
Weber’s distinction between the intellectual as prophet and the intellectual as priest. 
The prophetic conception of politics contrasts with that of the intellectual as priest: 
the prophet announces the message or strategy to be followed and the priest 
transmits it.
Gobetti was diffident towards all political parties and he sought to demonstrate the 
necessity for a new, more enlightened political class, a class different from that 
which had unsatisfactorily governed the Italy of his time. Gobetti’s example, Bobbio 
urges, is one to follow. He believes that even today Gobetti’s view that ideas are 
suffocated by organizations and the confines of party discipline should be heard and 
found relevant. Party discipline should be jettisoned in favour of voicing deep-rooted 
convictions, so that intellectuals can truly declare themselves not as organs of an 
organism, but as non-organic thinkers. Intellectuals who aspire to be non-organlc
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can wage the liberal revolution that Gobetti envisaged and that Bobbio sets out as 
an agenda to follow. Bobbio also recommends that each intellectual seek a forebear, 
a maestro who can guide him in his research, for without that inspiration, it is hard 
going.
The relationship between morals and politics and morals and private life causes 
several contrasts to emerge, Bobbio argues, although moral rules were established 
to enable “a good coexistence”. That good coexistence is one “where mutually 
inflicted suffering between humans due to their behaviour has been reduced, and 
where some essential principles, such as liberty, justice, peace, and basic welfare, 
are protected” (Bobbio, 2000:72). In the study of history it can be observed that in 
the political sphere, actions that are considered wrong in a moral sense are executed 
repeatedly and actions that are considered to be morally right are neglected.
The function of intellectuals remains an important issue within the context of 
opposing theories of “modern” and “postmodern” cultural strategies. By 
undertaking the study of intellectuals as a class, one can appraise the historical 
tendency of recent centuries as well as the salient discontinuities of history in the 
contemporary sense. Bauman emphasizes the opposition between modernity and 
postmodernity, claiming that postmodernity has brought human life beyond the 
structure of domination of one set of values over another and the unquestioned 
acceptance of this hierarchy. Indeed, he believes we have reached a stage 
marked by “a coexistence or armistice between values, ... which makes the 
questions of objective standards impracticable and hence theoretically futile” 
(Bauman, 1992:24). The present time of postmodernity compares starkly with the 
previous age of modernity where intellectuals controlled “the universal criteria of 
truth, judgement and taste” (ibid.). For James Martin, “the formation of the modern 
state recast the practice of regulating ... social order around the attainment of 
supracommunal uniformity” (Martin, 1998:68).
The status of the intellectual is debated by intellectuals themselves but it is also the 
theme of a wider debate concerning the intellectual’s responsibilities and what the
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intellectual can contribute to modern society. Bobbio’s main emphasis concerns the 
importance of intellectuals as promoters of a politics of culture. The cultivation of 
culture serves to preserve the ideas of the thinkers of the Enlightenment. Despite the 
general lack of unity that characterizes their very varied ideas, Bobbio attributes the 
first condemnation of torture and the death penalty, and the affirmation of human 
rights to the thinkers of the Enlightenment (Bobbio, 1995b: 120). Their contributions 
to the history of political theory and action brought about the constitution of a State 
based on the rights and freedoms of those governed, rather than of governors. 
Individuals, taken separately or as part of a group, become seen as the legitimate 
holders of sovereignty.
Industrialization and economic progress, coupled with the formation of trade 
unions and socialist parties, caused the relationship between citizens and their 
leaders to change. Martin, in his article ‘Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s 
theory of intellectuals’, puts it thus: “Traditional elites and professions ... found 
themselves increasingly marginalized throughout Europe by ‘mass’ constituencies 
voicing demands for social reform and political participation” (Martin, 1998:69). 
European social thought underwent a period of change owing to new social 
dynamics and economic development, and the contemplative intellectual was 
thrust into a political reality that wrenched thought from a generally progressive 
view of history. The experience of war caused society to question the meaning of 
progress and to look to intellectuals for an explanation of that changing era.
Bobbio has sought to demonstrate what can specifically be derived from political 
philosophy and how the latter can enrich political life. The “new” type of intellectual, 
the sociologist, had, in the years preceding 1968, differed from the traditional 
intellectual in that he was obliged to “establish a relationship with policymakers ..., 
with the people in all sectors who held the power and made the decisions" (Bobbio, 
1995e:188).71 This marked a milestone in the changing role of the intellectual, 
“between the intellectual as ideologue and the intellectual as expert” (ibid.). Bobbio 
writes that “Here, the history of ideas becomes entwined with the history of the 
development of the social sciences: economics, political science, and sociology”
214
(ibid.). The resulting academic debates among philosophers of various schools 
“gave way to discussions between experts on how to interpret the profound changes 
taking place in Italian society” (ibid.). The role of political philosophy is an effective 
tool in interpreting the course of political life.
Philosophers with a solid university culture are needed in order to organize 
consensus. Bobbio writes: “Just as industrial culture emerges when more ... 
individuals gain access to the necessary means to enjoy the fruits of cultural life, so 
the political industry emerges with the extension of the power base" (Bobbio, 
1988:72,73). Political debate on the nature, institutions and future of democracy can 
safely be left to the philosopher-scholar, he argues, “for it would be nonsensical and 
... unrealistic ... to postulate that a society could exist in which all adults have the 
right to influence directly or indirectly the way political decisions are made” (ibid.). All 
societies require the use of techniques for the organization of consensus and not 
every citizen is equipped to inform public opinion and take action; “for politics is not 
just feeling or opinion, but action” (ibid.:73).
Every political action, which is or claims to be the result of rationality, “needs general 
ideas on aims to be pursued, which I [Bobbio] call ‘principles’, but they could also be 
called ‘values’, ‘ideals’, 'worldviews’, as well as the scientific and technical knowledge 
required to achieve the established ends” (Bobbio, 1993a: 159). Bobbio defines 
ideologues as those who provide guiding principles, while experts are those who 
provide the “knowledge-means”. He borrows from Weber the distinction between 
rational actions based on value and rational actions based on purpose: “Ideologues 
elaborate principles on the basis of an action being called rational as much as it 
conforms to certain values proposed as ends to achieve; experts suggest the most 
appropriate knowledge to achieve an end” (ibid.). The degree to which the action can 
be considered rational is a measure of its conformity to achieving the aim at hand.
The distinction between ideologues and experts can be further refined by noting that 
classic discussion on the best form of government is a typical discussion of 
ideological character; a discussion on the pros and cons of undertaking a particular
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purpose, on the other hand, such as the construction of a nuclear power station, is a 
typical discussion undertaken by experts (ibid.). However, it might be argued against 
Bobbio here that rational actions executed according to value(s) or according to the 
purpose at hand do not neatly conform to our social reality. Social reality is more 
complicated than the categories that Bobbio suggests using to "mentally dominate” 
it. To elaborate his principles, the ideologue needs the aid of technical knowledge 
just as much as the expert needs to have an idea of the general aims pursued to 
give sense to his analyses. However, whether an ideologue or an expert, the 
philosopher is a representative of a power that serves to correct or improve upon two 
other societal powers: economic power and political power.
For Bobbio, who uses the examples of Julien Benda and Gramsci (Bobbio, 1993a) in 
examining the relationship between politics and culture, the political philosopher can 
be described as one who either betrays culture or reduces its effect. The more the 
intellectual resembles the politician, the more he betrays culture. On the other hand, 
the extent of the intellectual’s refusal to become a politician is matched by a 
corresponding increase or decrease in the effect culture can achieve. In remaining 
aloof from politics and in executing an exclusively professorial role, the intellectual is 
able to exert little effect on the outcome of politics. Conversely, if the intellectual 
plays a very central role in affirming the benefits of a particular ideology, he/she is 
said to “have betrayed his[/her] mission as a cleric”, as a person of scholarship and 
learning. Both positions, Bobbio maintains, are extreme. There is an element of risk 
in making culture and politics two antithetical terms, as there is in giving them 
identical meanings.
Bobbio admires Benda’s commitment to the tradition of rationalism, even at the risk 
of seeming anachronistic, given that “it seems increasingly clear that this first half 
century, in the history of culture, is marked by the triumph of irrationalism” (ibid.:52). 
As concerns the figure of Benda, the intellectual, Bobbio says:
We see how unflagging he is as we see him around us each day. Faced with 
those who denigrate science, he defended the scientific method and thus 
contributed to its transmission. Faced with iconoclasts, owing to having taken
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sides or vanity, he gave the example of his unconditional love for the classics. 
Faced with those who adored the new, he defended the old. Against lack of 
discipline passed off as inventive geniality, he delivered a eulogy of discipline, 
of order, of the system. Against those who adored the different, he ... sought 
that which is not changeable in the history of man but that which is always 
true of man. Against romantic decadence, he reaffirmed the supremacy of 
reason (ibid.).
Bobbio clearly sees the intellectual Benda as “a militant philosopher”. Indeed, Benda 
often shot into action not because he had something to say, but because “more than 
to defend his own theses, he had to fight those of others” (ibid.:38). Bobbio had such 
a mission in writing articles for the publication of GL’s newspaper, recently re­
published as Tra due repubbliche (Bobbio, 1996).
In finding a solution to the question of the relationship between culture and politics, 
Bobbio looks to Croce, who maintained:
Each of us can contribute daily, in the most varied ways, to restore, and 
strengthen ... the love of liberty, without expecting or waiting for the absurd [to 
happen] - that politics would change its nature. [We can] counter politics with 
a non-political force, which politics can never radically suppress because this 
[liberal] force re-germinates anew in the breast of man; politics will always 
have to reckon with this force (Croce in Bobbio, 1993a:24).
We saw that for Bobbio, politics and culture are not antithetical terms and they 
cannot be considered as a unified concept. They are, as Croce described, distinct 
terms, but terms which can be integrated with each other. “There exists a non­
political force, and therefore politics does not embrace and does not suffocate all of 
man" (Bobbio, ibid.). Accordingly, political life must recognize this non-political force 
which is also a vital part of “the life of the city”. In its non-political dimension, this 
force was also a moral one, says Bobbio in his interpretation of Croce. This moral 
force is “the mission of the man of culture” which Bobbio calls the politics of the man 
of culture. This conception of cultural politics as a moral force does not culminate in 
the betrayal of culture or in the reduction of its effect. For, Bobbio says,
Since [the man of culture] defends and nurtures moral values, no one can 
accuse him of being a slave to particular passions. But, at the same time,
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since he acquires a clear awareness that no republic can do without these 
moral values, his work as an artist, poet, philosopher and critic is efficacious 
to the society in which he is a citizen. He becomes, therefore, a man of 
culture, a conscious ... bearer of this non-political force (ibid.).
For Bobbio, the political philosopher is a bearer of culture, of a non-political force. 
However, he goes on to say that the class of intellectuals “has its own political 
function” (ibid.:31). This function must be different from all the other categories or 
classes in society. In setting out the problem of the relationship between intellectuals 
and the political class, Bobbio suggests that two preliminary conditions must be met: 
i) in a given country, intellectuals must comprise, or believe they comprise, a 
category unto themselves; and ii) this category must have, or believe it has, its own 
exclusive political function. In considering intellectuals and political class, Bobbio 
notes that Anglo-Saxon and continental experiences differ. In Anglo-Saxon 
countries, he contends, the two conditions described above are not met and, 
therefore, “the problem either does not make sense or cannot be brought clearly into 
focus" (ibid.). Bobbio has attempted to synthesize the case of the United States by 
claiming that American intellectuals are not a cohesive group and work in isolation 
from one another.
In describing intellectuals, Bobbio says that it is true that intellectuals comprise a 
category unto themselves but this category does not have its own exclusive political 
function. “There are intellectuals who tend to constitute a homogeneous and 
differentiated group but ... they see themselves to be pure intellectuals, and are 
given little credit by society; therefore, it would be out of place to speak of their 
political characterization” (ibid.).
His style of philosophizing is “traditional”, in that he places philosophy alongside 
political science. Political science as he defines it is the body of research that adopts 
the principle of verification or falsification as a criterion of the acceptability of its 
results; it uses scientific techniques which allow a strong or weak causal explanation 
of the phenomenon investigated; and abstains from value judgements (Bobbio,
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1989b:46,47). However, in Bobbio’s examination of these three forms or conditions 
of political philosophy, he notes that each one lacks all the characteristics of science.
Political philosophy, as research into the best form of republic, does not have 
a value-free character. As research into the ultimate foundations of power it 
does not mean to explain the phenomenon of power but to justify it, an 
operation which has as its aim the characterization of behaviour as either 
permitted or forbidden. This cannot be done without recourse to values 
(Bobbio, 1989b:47).
Any investigation into the essence of politics will reveal that it cannot be defined on 
the basis of empirical verification or falsification, “because what is presumptuously 
called ‘the essence of politics’ derives from a nominal definition and as such is 
neither true nor false” (ibid.).
Philosophy stands to benefit from the political which involves party politics, 
especially, as well as acts either for or against a government or political system. The 
pluralist character of politics, the existence of dissenting voices, enriches philosophy 
and the cultural heritage from which philosophy is formed.
3.2 From Antonio Gramsci to Zygmunt Bauman
Marx has civil society coincide with economic relations rather than with the 
superstructure of ideologies and institutions. Antonio Gramsci rejects this 
economic-determinist view of Marxism and instead identifies two superstructural 
levels: civil society and political society. For Gramsci, civil society comprised a 
group of private organisms while political society existed at the level of the state. 
Civil society and political society correspond to “the functions of hegemony which 
the dominant group exercises throughout society and direct domination which 
manifests itself in the State and legal government” (Bobbio, 1989b:29). Civil 
society is the sphere in which ideological apparatuses operate; its task, Gramsci 
believes, is to exercise hegemony and obtain consensus. Gramsci uses several 
categories to represent the contrast between civil society and the state:
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“consensus/force, persuasion/coercion, morality/politics, hegemony/dictatorship, 
leadership/ domination” (ibid.:30). Bobbio comments that Gramsci has “recovered 
the natural law meaning of civil society as a society founded on consensus”, 
although that society of consensus is what will rise out of the extinction of the state 
rather than through the state whose legitimacy of power is achieved through the 
social contract.
Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals on the basis of Bauman’s distinction between 
“legislators” and “interpreters” has been taken up by James Martin in ‘Between 
ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’ (1998). He calls attention to 
the importance and enduring value of Gramsci’s theory, saying that it points us to 
the agents through which particulars are made universal (ibid.:83). The tension 
between the ethical and political functions of “organic intellectuals”, Martin argues, 
can be seen through Gramsci’s liberal-bourgeois assumption that knowledge and 
power could remain distinct (ibid.:68). Martin assesses the ambiguity of Gramsci’s 
theory that “as agents of hegemony, intellectuals were argued to mediate ethics 
and politics by adapting people to the dominance of particular social groups ... 
through their articulation of cultural norms” (ibid.). The intellectual function of 
setting examples to follow within a precise political context revealed the peculiarity 
of intellectuals. On the basis of that view, we can see that Gramsci’s 
recommendation for revolution subordinated the ethical to the political. Their 
hegemonic role brought intellectuals to a position of privilege.
Bauman expresses the theme of culture as “the ideology of intellectuals”. Here, 
intellectuals of modern and postmodern ilk propose, respectively, legislative and 
interpretive strategies of culture. The legitimation of class, once carried out through 
the work of intellectuals, results in ideology, and the construction of ideology 
constitutes organic intellectuals’ major skill and function. Gramsci thought that 
class potential could develop fully through the values elaborated by “organic” 
intellectuals who legitimized both the class’s claim to power and its historical role 
(Bauman, 1992:1). That form of culture Bauman describes as the story of the man-
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made world, a story “guided by man-made values ... and reproduced through the 
ongoing process of learning and teaching” (ibid.:2). The phenomenon of culture 
expresses values and thus legitimizes the role of intellectuals. Bauman delineates 
three premises that reconfirm that function of culture. First, at birth, the individual is 
not socialized, though this incompleteness is gradually mitigated through the 
nurturing process; second, humanization occurs through a learning process based 
on the imposition of social norms that govern individual passion and instinct; third, 
educators hold the key to successful cohabitation in society, for learning cannot 
take place without intellectuals who set examples. There is a need for culture to 
form the individual, to prepare him for his role as a citizen.
Bauman’s distinctions are useful in considering the crisis of modernity that 
occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, although the transition from 
legislators to interpreters took place “in a contradictory way with elements of each 
coexisting simultaneously” (ibid.:69). Bauman believes that intellectuals no longer 
exercise great cultural control, for “the prevalence of interpretive strategy signifies 
a radical departure in the cultural discourse” (ibid.). The original introduction of the 
concept of culture, followed by the establishment of the culture-oriented vision of 
society, Bauman argues, has in more recent times given way to postculture. The 
radical shift in the role of intellectuals who now provide interpretive strategies 
rather than legislative ones, is also associated with their clear judgement that some 
values are superior to others. But since the hierarchy of particular cultural values 
has been contested, the current situation of the west cannot be described as a 
“cultural” one (ibid.). Bauman foresees the emergence of a new phase in the 
experience of intellectuals, which will result in “a reorientation of cultural discourse” 
(ibid.). He suggests that both the interpretive role as well as the more traditional 
legislative role of intellectuals have been superceded and that the social function of 
intellectuals must be re-established on an alternative basis. Bobbio’s very different 
belief is that the role of intellectuals is to watch over and be ready to criticize the 
ends pursued by political institutions, and the form the institutions take.
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Although Bauman provides two differing conceptions of the intellectual’s role, that 
of the modern intellectual and that of the postmodern intellectual, Bobbio steers 
clear of the postmodern school, in that he endorses the original view of the 
intellectual’s role as “an articulator of universal knowledge”. He does recognize that 
intellectuals may be either ideologues or experts (technicians), and not purely 
disseminators of culture. Bobbio is interested in the role intellectuals can play in 
reinforcing democracy within the context of some of the paradoxes that all 
contemporary societies must contend with. These paradoxes derive from the 
tension between the democratic process and the development of mass society. 
Although democracy presupposes the free development of human faculties, “the 
effect of the rise of mass culture is a general conformism” (Bobbio, 1988:72). Mass 
society tends to suppress the individual’s sense of personal responsibility, 
particularly since “a highly efficient media machine aims to reduce to a minimum 
the area reserved for personal and rational choices, for convictions which do not 
rely on instant emotional reactions or the passive imitation of others” (ibid.). The 
cultural industry must preserve a pluralism of views and convictions, and foster 
critical thought -  culture serves to widen the individual’s accessibility to conflicting 
worldviews, just as political industry depends on the extension of the power base.
Bobbio does not believe that intellectuals can argue in support of any position they 
like and remain innocent. Marx abolished the legality of the representative state in 
his theories, and argued that the “essential thing was that the historical subject 
changed for all to work out for the best, irrespective of the forms in which the new 
historical subject ‘organized’ its authority” (ibid.:106). As a result, actually existing 
states that were dictatorships came into being. In a similar fashion, Pareto, who 
scorned the bourgeoisie of his day for not opposing revolutionary violence with 
counter-revolutionary violence, bore some responsibility for the rise of Fascism 
(ibid.). Indeed, Bobbio argues, “it is much too convenient to detach intellectual 
works from the historical process which has generated them ... and classify them 
as a species ... in a state of perpetual innocence, unsullied by the mud of history” 
(ibid.: 106,107). Intellectuals are responsible for what they write, and the most
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important question, irrespective of whether it is examined by traditional intellectuals 
or by the intellectual who represents a political class, is “getting the issue of 
institutions onto the agenda of the Left” (ibid.:108).
The distinctive feature of the working-class movement, Bobbio maintains, “is that it 
transcended the separation between intellectuals and the masses” (ibid.:107). The 
working class movement did not rely on individual intellectuals, but on the 
“collective intellectual”. For Bobbio, the most important aspect of intellectual pursuit 
is the problem posed by the call for new institutions that would replace the 
bourgeois hegemony, and the relationship of continuity between old institutions 
and the new ones.
Bobbio prefers lucid thought to the excited shouting of those taking part in mass 
demonstrations and open-air rallies, which is one of the features of participatory 
democracy. Imagination and insight and the primacy of discussion over harangues 
serve to facilitate the intellectual’s endevour to reduce the gap that separates “a 
product of mass culture from the true citizen” (ibid.:73).
3.3 Bobbio comments on philosophy as culture
As we saw in Chapter II, in Bobbio's early writings, he was inspired by the English 
contractarians Locke and Hobbes. He sought to prevent the progressive political 
division of Europe at the height of the Cold War through the tactics of observation 
and debate and by summoning the intellectual back to his primary duty: "to remain 
perplexed by all solutions" (Bellamy, 1987:142). Bobbio's tactics and strategy of 
peaceful co-existence have been supplemented by the need to find techniques and 
instruments that foster tolerance and inquiry, with a view to embracing the merits of 
liberalism, and of a socialism, finally liberated from its Communist past.
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For Bobbio, philosophy improves political life and political life enhances the State. 
The degree to which this occurs varies across historical time.
After World War I, Italy was still in a phase of intensive industrialization and nothing 
had improved. The new generation of young people had no corresponding new 
generation of intellectuals or mentors to guide them, since the thinkers of the 
preceding generation still dominated Italian philosophy.
The new generation’s mentors (Gobetti’s, for instance) were men of the 
preceding generation: Croce and Gentile, Pareto and Mosca, Einaudi and 
Salvemini. ... When we read about the intellectual formation of the young of 
the new generation -  men like Carlo Rosselli ... -  they seem to take their 
models from the generation of the Risorgimento (more from Mazzini than 
from Marx); they seem the last disciples of idealism rather than the standard- 
bearers of a new consciousness. Their paths diverged later, however, leading 
some into and others out of Marxism (Bobbio, 1995e:103).
In essence, Croce sought the rebirth of idealism to combat positivism, that is, he 
attempted to diminish the theoretical relevance of economic factors in the historical 
process. Croce was concerned with the role of human will in the fashioning of 
history. Bobbio undertook a critique of idealist historians: “Idealist historians thought 
history could be written by approaching historical events from the wrong side (that is, 
from men’s ideas, not from their socioeconomic relations)” (Bobbio, 1995e:9). In 
developing this position and distancing himself from idealism, Bobbio rejected the 
attempt to separate liberalism from the ideology of the free market. Croce, “during 
the 1920s debate with Luigi Einaudi, made clear the distinction between ethical- 
political liberalism and economic liberalism” (Urbinati in Rosselli, 1994:xxxvii). 
Bobbio, in agreement with Einaudi, has always maintained that “the free market was 
the foundation of liberal institutions” (ibid.) whereas Croce maintained that it was 
“theoretically inconsistent to recognize the primacy of economic over ethical 
liberalism” (ibid.).
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, philosophy was considered to be an area 
of knowledge that offers neither easy solutions nor important truths; many of the 
issues that seem urgent to contemporary philosophers do not concern individual
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priorities. Bobbio’s approach to philosophy is more about method than clear 
answers. His approach is essential to unravelling national political scenarios; he 
does not offer any therapeutic ideals, but rather an approach that puts freedom 
alongside authority, that emphasizes equality as the identifying trait of the Left and 
refutes the presumed symmetry between Fascism and Communism, ex-Fascists 
and ex-Communists. Philosophy’s place is that of marking “the first major distinction 
in the world of political doctrines” (Bobbio, 1988:180). That distinction concerns 
idealist and realist theories of the best form of the state and individual development.
It is possible to include within the category of idealist theories those which 
propose a model of the state based on the combination ... of historically 
existing forms ... and those which idealize a historical form. This is what 
happened in ancient times to Athens, Sparta, or the Roman Republic and in 
the modern era to the ... English monarchy ..., and in our own time to the 
Soviet Union ... (ibid.:181).
Realistic theories, Bobbio adds, are those which consider pragmatically the state and 
politics in general “as relations of power and dominion” (ibid.). Machiavelli started the 
realist tradition and it was taken further by Hegel, who defined philosophy “as the 
comprehension of the present and of the real which must have no truck with ‘the 
search for some beyond whose whereabouts God only knows’” (ibid.). Marx’s 
doctrine also belongs to the category of realistic doctrines, Bobbio claims, since 
Marx negates the state and predicts its disappearance. “The recurrent theme of 
nineteenth-century ... philosophy is that the direction in which historical progress is 
moving is towards the diminution ... of political power, understood as the ultimate 
power because as a last resort it has recourse to force in order to assert its validity” 
(ibid.).
But at the end of the twentieth century, the structure of philosophy for this purpose 
has changed. Bobbio considers the state of philosophy today: “Whoever moved 
towards philosophy with the purpose of finding in it a safe and universal guide to the 
journey throughout the varied territories of knowledge is disorientated and 
disappointed, and easily reaches this conclusion: ‘many philosophies, no 
philosophy”’ (Bobbio, 1996e:8).
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If one interprets philosophy as a theory that explains a sphere of activity or thought, 
there would appear to be no complete theory: “How can each one of these 
orientations claim the name of philosophy if none of them succeeds in imposing itself 
as a universal guide to a determined culture?” (Bobbio, 1996e:8). In that case, is one 
to think that all philosophical schools are a matter of opinion, or “express specific 
psychological, cultural and political situations -  as simple ideologies?” (Bobbio, 
1996e:8). As these questions acquire more intensity and philosophy undergoes 
increasing fragmentation, many areas of individual science are now tending to join 
forces, with the result that those disillusioned by philosophy are in turn enthused by 
science.
The enthusiasm regarding scientific progress casts a shadow ... on the 
immobility of philosophy, yet it cannot remain indifferent to this attempt by the 
sciences to ... organize knowledge in a unitary form, with the secret ambition 
... of doing away ... all with the guidance and control of philosophy. If 
something beyond unitary scientific knowledge remains, to the scientist and 
his admirers it seems only to be a matter of unverifiable affirmations, an 
expression of moral or religious exigencies, of indistinct intuitions, ..., in short, 
‘ideologies’ yet again (Bobbio, 1996e:9).
On taking stock of philosophy today, then, the two salient facts, according to Bobbio, 
are that there is no longer “one Philosophy but many philosophies, not many 
sciences, but Science” (Bobbio, 1996e:9). This state of affairs in which philosophy 
and science seem to have reversed roles, dates back in history, Bobbio says.
The ancient and traditional relationship between philosophy and science 
seems to have reversed: the philosophy of universal reason has descended 
towards the ‘personal fact’; science has ascended from specific data, or 
claims to have ascended, to legislative reason. But these events are not new. 
There are good reasons to maintain that the origin of this situation should be 
considered to derive from long ago ..., after Hegel’s attempt to conceive 
philosophy as ‘total knowledge’ failed ... (Bobbio, 1996e:9).
Today, Bobbio maintains, vis-a-vis philosophy we ask ourselves the same question: 
“Between religion and science, what is the place of philosophy today?" (Bobbio, 
1996e:9).
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Either we maintain as valid the claim of absolute truth -  and thus it seems 
that one cannot fail to invoke religious experience -  philosophy has to yield to 
religion, or one renounces absolute validity, and then one has good reasons 
to believe that the sciences are sufficient -  philosophy has to yield to science. 
In other words: .... What is left for philosophy? ... One is tempted to reply that 
between revelation’s (or intuition’s) claim of absolute truth and science’s 
empirically verifiable truth, there is no place fo r ... personal certainties, which 
have a historically determined validity and are therefore ephemeral -  little 
flames that between two great ... fires do not generate any heat at all 
(Bobbio, 1996e:9,10).
In philosophy, Bobbio claims, all agree that tolerance should be understood as the 
renunciation of the centuries-old tug of war to have one's own ideas prevail. As 
Locke warned, "No man can believe or know for any other man, and the attempt to 
take responsibility for the beliefs of another is therefore as absurd as it is offensive" 
(Redhead, 1995:110).
One view of truth is a form of solipsism, i.e., that the truth perceived by the individual 
is the only truth, which is his own truth. Bobbio asserts that this truth will not triumph 
over error, either (i) through the providential law of history or (ii) through the 
increased intensity of its persuasive force. Rather, error is to survive alongside truth, 
acceptable by virtue of the moral principle of respecting others. He writes: "It would 
seem to be a conflict between theoretical reason and practical reason, between the 
logic of reason and that of the heart; in reality, though, it is a conflict between two 
moral principles -- the morality of coherence that will bring me to place my truth 
above anything else, and that of benevolence/respect" (Bobbio, 1994c:59). What is 
sacred is each person's conscience; this liberty of conscience that has weathered 
religious wars well, is characterized not by indifference, "but by the deep sense that 
in each man there is something beyond reach and inviolable" (Bobbio, 1994c:59). 
Today's personalistic conceptions of philosophy reinforce the integrity of each 
individual's conviction of his own truth. Here, Bobbio acclaims those who stop 
looking for others who resemble them, and who instead accept others’ singularity as 
well as their own in an effort to re-connect, or to join in harmony. It is clear, Bobbio 
states, that there is an aspect of moral personalism that benefits from tolerance, as
227
expressed in the following maxim: "Act according to conscience and ensure that 
others are not induced to act against conscience" (Bobbio, 1994c:60). Truth can thus 
be preserved without doubling as an instrument to condemn the error of others.
For a start, tolerance is required. Tolerance, independent of moral reasoning, is also 
a practical utilitarian posture -  the lesser evil according to Bobbio. The level of 
tolerance can fluctuate with changing group dynamics and relationships. In a sect or 
a particular school, truth exists in proportion to the individual's relationship to that 
school or sect, and it is distinct from the error of others, and other members of that 
entity. Bobbio explains: "If I am the strongest, accepting error may be astute: 
persecution leads to scandal, scandal enlarges the patch I would like to keep hidden, 
and error propagates to a greater extent under persecution than under silence" 
(Bobbio, 1994c:60). Bobbio contrasts this position with that of the weakest, where 
putting up with error is prudent, as any rebellion the weakest could initiate would be 
crushed. In both cases, one hopes that silence will pay off more than rebellion. If two 
group members are equal, a principle of reciprocity comes into play "and tolerance 
becomes an act of interpersonal justice" (Bobbio, 1994c:60). In cases where one 
attributes to an individual the persecution of others, one is at the same time 
endowing others with the right to persecute. In all three cases, Bobbio affirms, 
tolerance is a calculation that has nothing to do with one's conception of truth.
Because religious and ideological controversies are more often characterized by the 
hard and fast positions discussed above than is philosophical debate, Bobbio 
maintains that the "exclusive faith" of the religious man makes for a clear separation 
of truth from error. The philosopher, unlike the religious man, is open to doubt and "is 
always moving on, following a path not to a port but on an endless trip, ever ready to 
depart anew" (Bobbio, 1994c:61). This observation by Bobbio is most important 
because it sheds light on his view that no religion should be reflected in the affairs of 
state. The line between truth and error cannot be drawn categorically because there 
is no absolute divide. Exclusivism is defined as the acceptance of only one doctrine 
as being true and scepticism is the position that no doctrine is true. Bobbio finds that
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between the two positions is another view: true doctrines can be many, and there is 
no exclusive conception of truth.
Bobbio contrasts exclusive truth with the idea of inclusive truth, which is that many 
truths exist in association. For the proponents of exclusive truth, tolerance can be an 
expedient or a lesser evil, whereas from the point of view of inclusive truth it is 
something much more important. Indeed, tolerance is a necessary condition for life 
and the development of philosophical thought. In it both the philosophy of liberty and 
the liberty of philosophy find perfect harmony.
There are various alternatives to exclusivism. The customary view, according to 
which one aspires to reach a total conception of reality by manipulating many 
opposing doctrines "to reconcile, blend or confuse them into one", Bobbio calls 
"syncretism" (Bobbio, 1994c:61). If the exclusivist is tolerant by calculation, the 
syncretist is tolerant by necessity, for he finds peace only through his conviction of 
the sheer vanity of the great philosophical and ideological controversies. "For this 
demonstration to be possible, each doctrine must therefore be expressed, 
manifested, fused and contrasted with opposite doctrines" (Bobbio, 1994c:62). The 
syncretism of the Reformation was one of the ideals of Christian humanism, yet in 
contemporary philosophy Bobbio would be more inclined "to consider as products, 
more or less lasting and wise, of the syncretist combination, the reconciliation of 
idealism with spiritualism, of idealism with existentialism, of existentialism with 
spiritualism, then Marxism with pragmatism, of neopositivism with historicism, of the 
end of Marxism with neopositivism" (Bobbio, 1994c:62). The most rash syncretist 
operations, aimed at finding a common meeting ground, were articulated during the 
impassioned years of the bipolar world when "the conciliation between Communism 
and Christianity, and in more strictly philosophical terms, sometimes even between 
Marxism and Thomism [doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas]" (Bobbio, 1994c:62) were 
attempted. Although one can accuse the syncretist of mixing impure combinations, 
he is not a sceptic, Bobbio cautions. Rather, if any admonition is called for at all, it 
would be that he believes too much in the truth of others and not too little. He is 
perhaps too trustful -- hardly a fault.
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Eclecticism differs from syncretism, since it holds that every system of truth is mixed 
with error, thus no specific system is thought to be completely true or completely 
false. The eclectic refuses nothing from any of the various schools of thought; he 
looks for truth through the wise gathering together of each system's fragments of 
truth to create a new system. This contrasts with the syncretist's fusing of two or 
more systems. The eclectic's tolerance derives not from his indifference, as does the 
sceptic's, but from his belief that there is a little truth in every doctrine, and that truth 
"is the fruit of a compromise or of a comparison of different doctrines" (Bobbio, 
1994c:63). Within the context of current ideological controversy, Bobbio roughly 
defines the varying positions of the "third way" as eclectic, and the position of 
Marxist-inspired Christianity as syncretist.
Syncretism and eclecticism, which emerged during the wars of religion and in 
the wake of the Napoleonic wars, respectively, express the exigencies [of 
peace and justice]. It is no coincidence that the turmoil caused by World War 
II led to some rather evident incarnations of both (Bobbio, 1994c:63).
Another position reflected most widely in contemporary philosophy is that of 
historicism, according to which truth is explained thus: doctrines are necessarily 
many -  each one is true at a specific time and place. Historicism differs from 
eclecticism and syncretism, which share the conviction that complete truth is the 
result of a combination or sum of many partial truths. Bobbio explains that on the 
historicist view, the truth changes as historical situations change -  veritas filia 
temporis, all truth in a determinate historical situation is the only truth. However, 
there are two versions of historicism -  the absolute and the relative.
Absolute historicism, which combines the affirmation of the historicity of the 
truth with that of the rationality of history, where every phase includes the 
preceding one and is included by the next one, should lead rather, ... to 
intolerance: he who is convinced that he incarnates a necessary moment in 
the development of the absolute Spirit arrogates the right to trample those 
who impede his course. But often the idealization of history is corrected by a 
dialectic conception of truth, whereby every doctrine emanating from history is 
partial and the truth emerges from a contrast between the synthesis of 
opposites. On the other hand, the doctrine of tolerance is relative historicism, 
for which the affirmation of the historicity of truth does not imply a providential
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conception of history: the various doctrines cohabit on different levels in 
different social milieux, not in a relationship of exclusion but of reciprocal 
integration (Bobbio, 1994c:64).
Bobbio reminds the political observer that "punishment continues to be meted out to 
those who have no fault and that in the general economy of the universe, it has in no 
way been demonstrated that those who suffer most are the wicked" (Bobbio, 
1994c:209). Montesquieu's belief that "the principle merit of liberalism, apart from the 
development of trade and knowledge and the separation of powers, was the 
alleviation it brought to human suffering" (Manent, 1994:111), is also professed by 
Bobbio.
Bobbio holds that the prime value in human life is la mitezza, which translates as 
mildness or moderation72, which he sees as an apolitical concept and virtue. The 
rightful perception of ethical doctrine is that based on natural right, and the correct 
conception of morals is that based on legal and cultural rules. Virtue and law lead to 
positive action: virtue provides an example to follow and law prescribes the Good as 
one’s responsibility. A more detailed discussion of la mitezza can be found in Elogio 
della mitezza e altri scritti morali (Bobbio, 1994c).
Bobbio stresses that // mite is not submissive in his peacefulness and warns one not 
to confuse la mitezza with the Christian virtue of humility. He describes la mitezza as 
both a feminine virtue (Bobbio, 1994c:30) and a pure virtue in the sense that it 
embraces simplicity and non-violence. The cultivation of intrinsic individual morality 
supplants the role of religion in Bobbio's work:
Intellectuals ... have always existed because, in every society, alongside 
economic power and political power rests ideological power, which exerts an 
influence not on bodies like political power [which is] never separate from 
military power, not on the possession of material goods, which one requires to 
live and survive, like economic power, but on minds through the production 
and transmission of ideas, symbols, worldviews, practical teaching, and 
through the use of speech (ideological power is closely dependent on the 
nature of man as a talking animal). Every society has its disseminators of 
ideological power, whose function changes from one society to the next, from 
epoch to epoch, just as relations, sometimes of contrast, sometimes of 
alliance, change vis-a-vis other powers. There are societies in which
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ideological power is the monopoly of a caste, and others in which the centres 
that radiate ideological power are numerous, and compete with one another 
(Bobbio, 1993a:12,13).
Culture’s political role is that of renewal: “Cultural renewal [is] not simply a 
broadening of cultural horizons but also a new awareness of the role of the 
intellectual in society’’ (Bobbio, 1995e:166). An intellectual, according to Bobbio, 
does not make things but rather he reflects on things; he does not handle objects but 
deals in symbols; his working instruments are ideas, not machines. Rather than the 
history or sociology of intellectual thought, Bobbio takes up the theme of ethics and 
the politics of intellectuals. He defines this not as an analytical matter, but as a 
prescriptive or normative one. What is it that intellectuals should be or do? Our task 
is not to discover whether intellectuals are rebels or conformists, but to exchange 
some ideas on what intellectuals perceive as their political role. Above all, Bobbio 
says, the debate on the relationship between culture and politics can be discussed 
on the basis of two types of intellectuals: ideologues and experts. The political tasks 
of the inteliectual-ideologue and the intellectual-expert, according to Bobbio, differ 
according to whether they are creators or transmitters of ideas.
A common pejorative definition of intellectuals is that of creators of consensus; yet 
for Bobbio, there are also intellectuals who realize their duty to cause dissent. 
"Particularly today in the countries afflicted with manipulated consensus, intellectuals 
are the only dissenters and this function should not be forgotten” (Bobbio, 
1993a:118). The intellectual who has been assigned the role of promoting 
consensus by the powerful is an ideologue, not an expert. Clearly, if we think back to 
Bobbio’s initial description of intellectuals as mosche cocchieri, he would aspire to be 
an expert rather than a creator of consensus.
But what does Bobbio think then of the role of the intellectual, the philosopher-expert 
as it has been played out in recent history? How do his words about tolerance apply 
to a vicious past? As a form of oppression, the dangerous adventure of Fascism 
which, perhaps, began as early as 1914-15, with “Mussolini’s expulsion from the 
Socialist Party, the launching of the Tascio rivoluzionario di azione internazionale' ,
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the founding of ‘II Popolo’, financed by industrialists then in favour of entering the 
war, which was to remain the regime’s newspaper till the very end” (Internet site 1:1), 
was, as we have seen, also the historical epoch on which Bobbio concentrates most 
intensely. Ideology, Bobbio warns, can guide both governors and the governed. His 
basic tenet in discussing Left and Right is that Fascism was on the Right and 
Communism was on the Left, and therefore opposite to the Right Proponents of 
Fascism discriminate against their opponents by banning, inter alia, free speech and 
freedom of the press. As free speech and freedom of the press are the cornerstones 
of democracy, we can start out by describing Fascism as undemocratic. Having 
made this distinction, Bobbio defines himself as a "democrat by conviction, ... who 
has always sought to represent and defend democratic principles in Italy -  a country 
with a weak democracy" (Bobbio in Glotz and Kailscheuer, 1989:140). Gentile writes:
From the beginning, the Fascists lived and represented their action through 
religious metaphors. One can outline the Fascist religion as a sacred-imbuing 
rhetoric and a liturgy that repeated Christian ritual in language and in 
manners, modifying it also through D'Annunzian utilization, with a marked 
propensity of the Fascists to immediately transfigure the vicissitudes of their 
politics into epic-religious terms, feeling themselves to be emulators and heirs 
of the heroism of the first patriots of the Risorgimento: 'Fascism ... is an open 
carboneria [coalfire] of sacrifice'. The Fascists considered themselves 
prophets, the apostles and soldiers of the new 'religion of the fatherland' [that 
had risen from the] 'immense pyre of war', sanctified by the blood of heroes 
and martyrs who sacrificed themselves to complete the 'Italian revolution'" 
(Gentile, 1994:46).
The blood of war victims served to renew the sacred character of the nation, and the 
carboneria provided the metaphorical fuel that fed the process of Fascist moral 
action.
At the outset of all philosophical discussion, Bobbio’s message is repeatedly voiced. 
He has always had little tolerance for what he refers to as the “opposite 
admonishments” directed towards members of the PdA: that they were bland anti­
communists and overly severe as anti-Fascists, that is, they did not remain equally 
distant from anti-Communism and anti-Fascism (Bobbio, 1996b:8). Bobbio believes 
that there was more than sufficient reason to adopt that non-equidistant position, and
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he defends that position even today. Over recent years, which have been 
characterized by historical revisionism, he says, the rejection of anti-Fascism in the 
name of anti-Communism has often culminated in "another form of equidistance that 
he finds equally abominable, between Fascism and anti-Fascism" (ibid.). Those who 
aimed to achieve democratic reconstruction in acknowledging the necessity to go 
beyond Fascism and anti-Fascism recommended that equidistance in the immediate 
post-war period. Bobbio disagrees with this view since going beyond Fascism and 
anti-Fascism would mean “preventing younger generations from being able to grasp 
the difference between a police state and a state based on law, between a 
dictatorship, albeit not as ferocious as the Nazi one, and a lame democracy like the 
First Republic” (ibid.:8,9). He is adamant that the negative aspects of Fascism be 
emphasized repeatedly so as to remind us that following World War I within the 
centre of Europe, Fascism was the first dictatorship imposed. Although it was 
subordinate to its powerful ally, Germany, Fascism was responsible for “unleashing 
World War II and it was a disgrace in the history of a country that had for some time 
numbered among civilized nations” (ibid.:9).
Italy can rid herself of this shame, the disgrace of Fascism, only if its citizens realize 
fuliy the price the country paid for what Bobbio calls the unpunished tyranny of a few 
and the obedience of many, albeit a forced and often not well tolerated obedience.
3.4 The Left’s task in “taking stock” of philosophy
The fall of the Berlin Wall caused many modern political thinkers to think that the 
Right-Left dichotomy had become sterile, but more recently the phenomenon of 
globalization has been the principal cause of a call for an end to the Right-Left 
distinction. That call is based on a belief that economic, political and cultural 
problems cannot be examined only in terms of national states, within which the 
distinction between Right and Left was formed. Those who argue for doing away 
with the distinction consider that such a “great reshuffling of the cards” has 
occurred that the distinction has lost all of its descriptive efficacy. Yet the opposite
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has occurred, Bobbio maintains, and the Right-Left distinction is stronger and more 
valid than it has ever before been in our history. Only those who believe in the 
pervasiveness of the market and trust the market to find solutions to all the 
problems of civil cohabitation can believe that there is only one road: the complete 
marketization of human relationships through globalization.
The Left-Right distinction, Bobbio argues, contains the crucial value dichotomy, 
which needs to be brought into political life by the “culture” he defines in his concept 
of the politics of culture. As global markets expand, there is a corresponding 
increase in the problems that the market creates or cannot solve.
The tyrannical or totalitarian element shared by both Communism and Fascism 
occupies the political sphere. But there are two other spheres which exert power in 
any society: economic and cultural ones. In these spheres, Bobbio says, lie the most 
significant differences between Fascism and Communism. There was a cultural 
polemic against Marxism and Leninism, such that these ideologies were seen to be 
the cause of the degeneration of power in Communist regimes. There was an 
economic criticism according to which collectivism, the planned economy and 
elimination of the market, was the reason for the downfall of Communism. The third 
criticism, concerning the totalitarian form of power, is the only criticism under which 
Communism and Fascism can be considered to be similar, Bobbio argues.
Communism represents a distorted attempt to realize a great universal ideal and free 
humanity from slavery. On a cultural level, Communism was a strong idea that “runs 
through the entire history of man, from Plato onwards, through to the Fathers of the 
Church, but Fascism had an opposite inspiration, particularistic and nationalistic” 
(Bobbio, 1996d:44). Despite the fact that both historical movements resulted in 
political regression and mass violence, they are antithetical in their worldviews and 
ends.
If we proceed to the economic sphere, there were significant differences:
Hitler’s Germany, unlike Stalin’s Russia and even Mussolini’s Italy, accepted
the capitalist system. ... Has Italian culture reached such a point that it can no
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longer understand the difference between Communism and Nazism? No 
longer sees the distance that separates Marx’s Capital from Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf? If that were true, we would really have to be worried (ibid.:44,45).
There are several different philosophies that can either limit or broaden one’s 
philosophical worldview. An awareness of the philosophies that could have served to 
modify and/or improve the direction of Italian politics is crucial because this 
awareness increases the Left’s chances of flourishing.
The positive and negative value-judgements of the Left and Right are integral 
features of the political struggle, where the spatial metaphor has completely 
lost its original meaning, which represents areas without axiological 
connotations, because sitting on the Right or on the Left no longer refers to a 
common father, but only to the speaker, a neutral institution (Bobbio, 
1996c:41).
The Right-Left dichotomy that Bobbio is certain exists has become muted to the 
extent that nostalgia now characterizes or afflicts the Left rather than the Right. In 
the 1970s the Left had a privileged relationship with the future; therefore, it was the 
Right that experienced nostalgia, whether monarchist or Fascist. The Left now looks 
ahead with some effort, blighted by having been thrown off the course that appeared 
natural in former times.
Historically, one of the obstacles that has confronted the Italian Left is the fact that 
it is in fact threefold: there is the Catholic left, the Actionist left and the Communist 
Left, and then there is the conflictual relationship between all three. In addressing 
the question of the Left in general, and in examining the political-cultural debate, 
one has to reckon with this three-pronged identity. The interpretation of liberty as 
envisaged by each strand of the Left is a major obstacle to surmount in 
establishing the Left’s future political programme. Bobbio considers the 
democratization of the Left and its embrace of the democratic method to be of 
paramount importance. Democracy must be reinforced by all the forces of the Left, 
for it remains the strongest antidote to the abuse of power.
236
Although Bobbio is adamant in his conviction that the body politic is permanently 
divided by competing attitudes towards change and political order, he emphasizes 
that the theoretical significance of the Left changed after the events of 1989 and the 
fall of the Soviet empire. At one time, Leftists could be defined as progressives, with 
faith in science and rationality, as compared with the conservatism of the Right. 
Since the time of World War I, the Left has gradually become more hostile towards 
industrialism and has become more cautious about modernity while “the Right, from 
Mussolini to Thatcher, has pressed home reformist policies based on a deep faith in 
scientific and economic modernization” (Keane in Bobbio, 1989b:viii).
Bobbio still sees all reality in terms of Left and Right, and good and evil. The struggle 
against the Fascist Right has been, is now, and will continue to be, a constant 
feature of man's existence. This fact of human existence is the reason why one "has 
a duty to be a pessimist" (Bobbio, 1984:99). Since Bobbio lived and fought against 
Mussolini's Fascist state and cultural intrusion, one may be tempted to argue that he 
is a product of that particular historical time and has consequently developed a 
worldview that rests on the need to resist all brutality, whether it be ideological, 
physical and/or intellectual.
The Left must, in general, take stock of contemporary society, and not fall into the 
trap of believing that the distinction between Right and Left has lost its meaning. 
Particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the more recent phenomenon of 
globalization, Bobbio warns, the Left must take care to refuse to adopt a conception 
of economic, political and cultural problems that go beyond national States. The 
distinction between Left and Right emerged in national States and there is no need 
to believe that the cards have since been reshuffled. For Bobbio, the distinction 
remains. The Left has a precise role to play in the future, Bobbio warns, as the 
global market expands.
The phenomenon of globalization proceeds in all the more economically 
developed countries, along with the movement of populations from poor 
countries to richer countries. If there is a phenomenon that re-proposes the 
distinction between egalitarians and non-egalitarians or ... between those
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who opt for a politics of inclusion and those who opt for a politics of exclusion, 
it is precisely that of emigration (ibid.).
In Italy, emigration is one of the main issues that serves to separate Right from Left, 
Bobbio thinks. As concerns “human relationships, decisions taken in legislative fora 
and, even in more general terms, conceiving the treatment of others, politics towards 
immigrants distinguishes the Left’s policy from the Right’s, on a daily basis” (ibid.).
Another fundamental difference between Left and Right concerns the applicability of 
Left and Right to the political struggle today. For example, it can be argued that the 
politics of the Left resembles the politics of the Right, or that “in the recent past the 
Left had bit by bit invaded the space of the Right, so much so as to render the Left 
politically irrelevant” (ibid.). It is not true, Bobbio argues, that the Left has lost its 
raison d’etre. The ideals of the Left, which inspire the struggle for human 
emancipation from a condition of servitude vis-a-vis the capitalist system, have not 
withered. What is important, Bobbio argues, is that the Left does not accept defeat. 
The difference between Right and Left rests in the different way in which equality -  
the relationship between equality and inequality -  is conceived by Right and Left.
The man of the Left is he who considers that which men have in common 
rather than that which divides them. For the man of the Right, on the contrary, 
that which differentiates one man from another is also politically more relevant 
than that which unites them. The difference between Right and Left is 
revealed in that for the Left equality is the rule and inequality is the exception. 
It follows that any form of inequality must be in some way justified, while for 
the man of the Right exactly the contrary is true -  inequality is the rule and, if 
a relationship of equality among different subjects is to be accepted, it must 
be justified (ibid.:2).
When confronted with difference, such as the difference between men and women 
or between citizens and the immigrant population, it is not that those on the Left 
include all and those on the Right exclude all. “Rather, the rule of the Left is 
inclusion, save for exceptions and the rule of the Right is exclusion, save for 
exceptions” (ibid.). According to Bobbio, in answering the “three traditional questions 
-  ‘equality among whom? equality in terms of what? equality based on what 
criterion?’ - the Left tends to give a more extensive reply” (ibid.) in terms of inclusion.
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To the first question, we are obliged to proceed by degrees. Universal male and 
female suffrage is more egalitarian than only universal male suffrage, while universal 
male suffrage is more egalitarian than suffrage limited to literate males or to those 
who own property (Bobbio, 1996c:62). To be Left-wing, however, one need not 
proclaim that each person is equal in ail things, since that would be a purely utopian 
vision. “The assertion that the Left is egalitarian does not mean that it is 
egalitarianist, advocating equality for everyone in everything” (ibid.:63). We can 
define egalitarians as those who, “while not ignoring the fact that people are both 
equal and unequal, believe that what they have in common has greater value in the 
formation of a good community” (ibid.:66,67).
To the second question, equality in terms of what, “the Left gives preference to 
fundamental human rights regarding consumer goods ...” (ibid.). Concerning the 
criterion for equality, the third question, “one usually considers the criterion of need 
and of work to be that of the Left while the Right [uses] the criterion of merit and of 
rank” (ibid.). The ethos of equality inspired the Russian Revolution as much as it did 
European social democracy. The history of socialism is largely the history of 
egalitarian ideals, pursued either through the complete abolition of private property 
or through policies designed to promote social justice by different forms of income 
redistribution.
Bobbio is against all forms of tyranny since tyrannical regimes do not foster a social 
and political environment where all can flourish intellectually and economically. In his 
thinking, the ideal state would bear the stamp of de Tocqueville and Cavour who 
shared the same anxiety about humanity's progress towards excessive democracy. 
De Tocqueville in particular represents one of the two wings of European liberalism; 
his conservatism is counterposed with Mill's more radical liberalism. Bobbio believes 
that de Tocqueville and Cavour made the most significant contribution to today's 
conception of liberalism. De Tocqueville "was firmly convinced that life in society 
must be based on and animated by liberty, above ail religious and moral liberty" 
(Bobbio, 1990:52). As for Cavour, Bobbio’s attitude is clear in his lengthy description
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of the tug of war between the Italian statesmen Cavour and Mazzini in the mid 19th 
century:
"Mazzini proclaimed the educational role and responsibility of the state, in opposition 
to the liberal view of [the state] as a necessary evil whose functions should 
accordingly be restricted to the policing of society" (ibid.:71). Cavour had faith in the 
"progressive adaptation of institutions to the changing needs of society; .. [he] held 
the view that economic progress, far from conflicting with spiritual and moral 
progress, in fact runs parallel to it" (ibid.:72). Referring to Mazzini as a revolutionary 
and to Cavour as one who seeks to reach balance through the golden mean, Bobbio 
makes his commitment to liberalism and temperance clear -- somewhere "between 
reaction and revolution" (ibid.:71). He is a fervent opponent of paternalism and 
patronage, and this is echoed in his praise of how la mitezza influences the ethics of 
political culture.
in Italy during the late 1930s, "that minor Hegelism, which [constituted] Italian 
idealism was broken into two opposite streams, [one] leaning towards science (new 
positivism) and the other towards the rediscovery of religious experience, if only in 
the form of an upturned theology, such as that of Heidegger's existentialism" 
(Bobbio, 1984:241). Capitini was captivated by the spiritual crisis experienced at that 
time and felt motivated by a personal and radical need to find a solution that went 
beyond the social or the political, or "even less the merely institutional, [to consider] 
whether there did exist a streak of the most genuine existentialism". Capitini 
expressed the principal motives which inspired existentialism in stating that 
"I'essenza della religione e la coscienza appassionata della finitezza" (ibid.) [the 
essence of religion is the passionate consciousness of finiteness]. It is one's 
passionate awareness that is to be emphasized rather than one’s finiteness, for, as 
Bobbio has commented, it serves to mark that which distinguishes it. He writes 
eloquently of "the tension towards the overcoming of limit, not its acceptance, [but] 
travelling beyond it towards the intimate you [fu] of you all73, not so much to stay 
within the situation, as existentialism does, as to keep from catching a glimpse of
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'liberated reality'" (ibid.:242). For Bobbio, one of the tasks of the Left is to maintain a 
stance of passionate awareness.
Bobbio's intellectual heritage reflects his conviction that one’s theoretical as well as 
rational orientation and progressive development derive from the dyad right-left. He 
believes that this view is also reflected widely in the work of both ancient and 
contemporary authors from heterogeneous disciplines. The objective reality Bobbio 
sees in the political dyad is reinforced by the mathematical or scientific one. This 
“instinct of combinations” (inspired by Pareto) which pushed him to examine all 
possible arguments can be found in every book and article Bobbio has ever written, 
within every address given at conferences and round tables, at the heart of each 
newspaper commentary, as well as in his myriad of letters to other thinkers (Bobbio, 
1996b:81). The completeness of the bibliography produced by Carlo Violi (Laterza, 
1995) on the entirety of Bobbio’s works shows the completeness of Bobbio’s 
discussion of culture. It was in 1950 that he contributed to the founding of the 
Societa Europea di Cultura. Today he looks back on this experience through his 
perception of himself as an old man:
The Greeks used to say that things can be distinguished from one another 
according to whether they are 'of nature or of conviction’. Age is of nature and 
things of nature are precisely those that do not depend on us. I also 
remember Machiavelli’s other distinction, which is just as famous: virtue and 
luck. Old age is good fortune, not a virtue ... (ibid.:109,110).
The purpose of establishing the Societa Europea di Cultura, along with "Urs von 
Balthazar, ... the scientist [John B .]... Haldane, ... Antonio Banfi, Henri Lefebvre the 
historian, Andre Siegfried [and] the English poet Stephen Spender” (ibid.:110), was 
to counter the Cold War through moral resistance. Morality is one of the most difficult 
spheres to fathom in terms of Right and Left. Today, Giuliano Amato has put his 
finger on the moral difference between the two, saying that the Right is willing to help 
the downtrodden and the weak while the Left is ready not simply to give aid or 
assistance but to enable the weakest in society to walk on their own (Amato, 2000).
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3.5 The upturned utopia: the road ahead
Production of things and the production of human relations, in Lenin's view, are the 
only vital forces at work in society. Colietti writes: "Marx ... [studied] ... 'modern1 
society, the capitalist mode of production and exchange, not Britain, France, etc., 
as such" (Colietti, 1974:9). Marx confronted us with an organic unity that was to be 
the basis of ail history. It was not the first time that intellectuals have foisted 
organic unity on communities of people, but Marx’s Communist Manifesto was 
different. It successfully aroused the working public’s rebellion against the ravages 
of uncontrolled free-market society so that the workers desired organic unity. 
Intellectuals have great power or, as Zygmunt Bauman maintains, had great 
power.
In the article entitled “The Upturned Utopia” (Bobbio, 1989a), Bobbio refers to the 
crisis of Communism as a world movement which promised “emancipation of the 
poor and oppressed, the ‘wretched of the earth”’ (1989a:37). Not only has the 
Communist regime stumbled on its revolutionary ideology, and the Soviet 
superpower been defeated, but a dream has died. Communist revolution and ideals, 
which led many people into morally-inspired action, but also exposed many to 
cruelty, sacrifice, or indeed death, have left a trail of material and spiritual 
bankruptcy. "From the Red Army in Russia to Mao's Long March, from the conquest 
of power by a group of resolute men in Cuba to the desperate struggle of the 
Vietnamese people against the mightiest power in the world", this inexorable force, 
Marx's "solution to the enigma of history" (ibid.), has ended, fragmented and torn, yet 
it continues to bleed in the memory of some of those who took up the Communist 
banner. "The first utopia that tried to enter history, to pass from the realm of 'words' 
to that of things, not only came true but is being upturned, has already almost been 
upturned in the countries where it was put to the test" (ibid.:38).
Bobbio sees the end of the Soviet empire as giving way to animated popular 
movements that have confirmed the Communist failure, movements which are
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adamant in their demands for what he refers to as the four great freedoms of 
modern man:
individual liberty, or the right not to be arrested arbitrarily and to be judged in 
accordance with clearly defined penal and judicial rules; freedom of the press 
and of opinion; freedom of assembly, [and finally] the most difficult to achieve 
-- the freedom of association out of which free trade unions and free parties 
were born, and with them the pluralist society in whose absence democracy 
does not exist. The completion of this centuries-long process was political 
liberty, or the right of all citizens to participate in collective decisions that 
concern them (ibid.).
These freedoms, Bobbio contends, are not those of progressive or popular 
democracy but liberal democracy "which emerged and consolidated itself through 
the slow and arduous conquest of [the above-mentioned] basic freedoms" (ibid.). 
The fact that popular movements in former Communist regimes are demanding the 
great freedoms of liberal democracy "all at once" (ibid.) implies at worst revolution, 
and varying forms of counter-revolution or graduality at the other extreme. Here, 
Bobbio compares the present state of the new democracies of eastern Europe with 
the political evolution of western Europe:
In Europe the State of freedoms [i.e., the liberal state] came after the law- 
based State, the democratic State after the State of freedoms. But on those 
squares today people are simultaneously demanding the law-based State, the 
State of freedoms and the democratic State (ibid.).
The demands for democracy made by the popular movements of the former eastern 
bloc cannot be met promptly, given that western democracy is in continual transition. 
More and more it is the group -  trade unions, organizations, professional 
associations, political parties -- rather than the individual that dominates political life 
in today's democracies. No longer is there a sovereign organic power but a plethora 
of conflicting groups trying to achieve supremacy; hence the need to distinguish 
"between elites which impose themselves and elites which propose themselves" 
(Bobbio, 1994a:303).
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Television is at the centre of this discussion of groups and elites which impose 
themselves. In particular, Bobbio fears the possibility of a society modelled on 
television, which he considers to be naturaliter of the Right. The entry into politics of 
Silvio Berlusconi, Bobbio argues, reflects an Italian society increasingly "created by 
television” (Bobbio in Bobbio, Bosetti and Vattimo, 1994:36). In the sense that 
television is naturaliter of the Right, Berlusconi and his political supporters are 
naturaliter of the Right. They possess "interests that are not those of the Left; the 
Left thrives on great principles and is associated with human suffering” (ibid.). In 
March 1994, the election was won not by Berlusconi, Bobbio contends, "but by the 
society that his empire of mass media and advertising created” (ibid.). That society 
enjoys “watching silly families at table who glorify this or that product” (ibid.). 
Moreover, in such a society, the Left and its traditional values has no grip, Bobbio 
argues.
The hope of revolution has remained constant despite the failure of the Communist 
utopia, but the democratic challenge is not easy to meet. Although "the conquest of 
the freedom of the modern world ... cannot but be the starting point for the countries 
of the upturned utopia" (Bobbio, 1989a :38), Bobbio reminds us that the realization 
of the law-based liberal-democratic state is insufficient to deal effectively with the 
"original problems" that provided the basis for the generation of the proletarian 
movement. The need, hope or desire for revolution is doubly clear today.
The poor and forsaken are still condemned to live in a world of terrible 
injustices, crushed by unreachable and apparently unchangeable economic 
magnates on which the political authorities, even when formally democratic, 
nearly always depend (ibid.:38,39).
The very same problems continue to plague humanity. The failure of Communism 
does not mean that the problems are not still there. The injustices that Communism 
failed to address and eradicate are still with us. Bobbio perceives one overriding 
question: "Are the democracies that govern the world's richest countries capable of 
solving the problems that Communism has failed to solve?" (ibid.:39). There is
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nothing for one to rejoice about, as "the end of historical Communism ... has [not] put 
an end to poverty and the thirst for justice" (ibid.). The scale of these problems has 
increased our sense of being overwhelmed owing to technological developments 
hastening the globalization process. Bobbio reminds the reader that a material and 
spiritual abyss rests between "our world" and the "rest of the world", and that life 
after Communism is still no picnic.
The path to follow to make an important contribution to socio-political balance would 
be one that combines liberalism and socialism, despite the fact that “opposition 
between liberalism and democracy remains as strong as ever” (Bobbio, 1990:73). 
The two terms do not represent antagonistic political traditions, Bobbio says, but can 
draw from one another as long as socialism is interpreted as "social responsibility". 
Perry Anderson applauds Bobbio's synthesis of liberalism and socialism as "bold 
and creditable" (Anderson, 1988:1), but lacking in coherence.
'The cause of liberalism will be lost ... if it is not prepared to socialize the 
forces of production now at hand', even -  if necessary -- resorting to 
'intelligent force' to 'subdue and disarm the recalcitrant minority'. The aims of 
classical liberalism now require the achievement of socialism. For the 
'socialized economy is the means of free individual development' (Bobbio in 
Anderson, 1988:6).
What Anderson describes as Bobbio’s lack of coherence in merging liberalism with 
socialism has become even more apparent in recent years, owing to Bobbio’s battle 
to prevent the reform of the first part of the Italian Constitution by Berlusconi and his 
followers. In the tutelage of the fundamental values of the Italian Republic Bobbio 
has strived to prevent the judiciary becoming subordinate to political power. Bobbio’s 
emphasis is that of protecting the rights-based State from all abuses of power74.
According to Bobbio, judging by the literature produced in the past century, it is 
possible to identify at least three arguments in support of the view that socialist 
democracy is preferable to liberal democracy, (a) Liberal democracy, also referred to 
as bourgeois or capitalist democracy, came into existence as representative
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democracy, with elected representatives. Socialist democracy, on the other hand, is 
a direct democracy
in the double sense either of a democracy of all the people without 
representatives or else of a democracy based ... on mandated delegates 
subject to recall, (b) Bourgeois democracy has allowed people to participate 
in political power ... through the extension of the suffrage to the point where 
ail ... enjoy the vote; but only socialist democracy will allow them to participate 
also in decisions on economic matters, which in capitalist society are taken 
automatically. ... (c) Finally, and above all, libera! democracy offers the right 
to participate directly or indirectly in political decisions, but this is not 
paralleled by any increased equality in the distribution of economic power... 
Socialist democracy, by contrast, holds a more equal distribution of economic 
power to be one of the prime aims of the changes which it aims to institute in 
the economic regime, and thus transforms the formal power to participate into 
a real and substantial power, at the same time bringing democracy itself to its 
ideal fulfilment, a greater equality among men (Bobbio, 1990:76,77).
The liberal movement and the socialist movement have both embraced liberal 
democratic ideals and, consequently, both liberal-democratic and social-democratic 
governments have emerged. However, the commitment to democracy of each form 
of government differs. The dyad liberalism-democracy “means above all universal 
suffrage” (ibid.:77) and free expression. In governments based on socialism and 
democracy, however, “it signifies above all the egalitarian ideal, which can only be 
achieved by the property reforms proposed by socialism” (ibid.). The basic difference 
between the two forms of government is that “in the former case democracy is a 
consequence, in the latter it is a presupposition” (ibid.). There is a significant 
difference between their democratic identities for, “as a consequence, it is the 
political liberty which follows from and completes the series of more particular 
liberties; as a presupposition, it remains to be completed under the changed 
conditions which socialism aspires to create through the transformation of capitalist 
society” (ibid.:77,78).
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3.5.1 The Italian problem
Today’s Italy is wrestling with the thorny question of constitutional reform, a delicate 
question in itself, and further complicated by the admonitions expressed by departed 
or ageing members of the Resistance movement who participated as members of 
the Constituent Assembly back in 1948, and who drafted the present-day 
Constitution. This Constitution was written in the aftermath of two concurrent wars, 
an international war and a civil war, and after emerging from a phase of destruction, 
hardship, and the dramatic end of Mussolini. The keenest supporters of 
parliamentary reform are convinced that if constitutional reforms are not effected, 
Italy cannot realistically aspire to "enter Europe" (La Stampa, 19/7/1996:7). In 
addition to the thorny question of institutional reform, the other major questions 
facing Italy are the efficacy of its government coalitions, the unrelenting flow of 
immigrants and a solution to Tangentopoli [Bribesville]. Rather than tactical 
strategies concerning the balance of government and relations with the centre and 
Catholic representatives in Italian politics, Bobbio has called for yet another 
consideration of “what the Left is” (Bosetti, 1997:21), documented in an interview 
with Giancarlo Bosetti. The decline of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the 
political experiment known as real Communism have provoked “a crisis of social 
democracy, tout court' (Bosetti, 1997:21).
Despite this, we cannot say that Bobbio holds the task of preserving the Left to be 
more important than the construction of a future based on an inclusive strategy. 
Bobbio endorses the strategy of political intransigence a la Gobetti, who stressed 
that political intransigence is the essential condition necessary for apertura culturale, 
cultural reawakening and openness. The Left thus defends a process, calls attention 
to the need for cultural openness; this defence of culture is one of the Left’s defining 
characteristics.
Bosetti argues that given today’s pressing political problems, such as pension reform 
and the European agenda, Bobbio is overly concerned with theoretical issues. 
However, Bobbio believes that all sides, and particularly adversaries of the Left, are
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repeatedly and more and more vigorously demanding where the Left is headed. 
Following years of worldwide electoral failure and the dominance of the free-market 
Right, social democrats recognize the fragility of the Left’s position as well as the 
need for reforms that carry the support of the public.
This problem is not a tactical one at all. It is not only a matter of tactical 
problems or of strategic problems. These are essential problems of historical 
perspective that we must at least address, despite our being aware of the 
enormous difficulty posed by trying to find solutions that are not simply 
interlocutory. I thus ask myself the question: ‘Are we sufficiently prepared for 
a serious debate on these themes?’ ... ‘Where is the Left headed?’ (Bosetti, 
1997:21),
Bobbio has placed himself left of centre in the ideological mind-set, but to get to the 
core of his thinking, one has to consider other notions of "the Left": the new Left, 
Euro-Communism of the genre promoted by Enrico Berlinguer75, Marxism, 
communitarian socialism, Fabianism, social democracy and all the movements 
coined in the name of leaders like Lenin, Trotsky and Mao. This task, however, is not 
sufficient to give one an accurate idea of what ‘‘the Left” is; indeed, one might just as 
well begin with what it is not, and examples abound to the extent that the reader gets 
lost, interested/disinterested or bound on a rocky road to forms of meaning that do 
not connect with the present. Part of the solution would be to concede that change 
itself moves faster than any human potential to gauge it. As soon as one recognizes 
that one cannot speak of socialism tout court or any pure form of what “the Left” 
constitutes, the mist begins to clear. We can gain a clearer idea of Bobbio’s vision of 
the Left if we consider the thinkers whose thoughts converge in his, namely, 
Mondolfo, Gobetti, Salvemini, Rosselli, Capitini, and Calamandrei.
One remaining element of the Italian Left, the Refounded Communists (RC), led by 
Fausto Bertinotti, has placed much importance on its tactical strategy. The 
relationship between the PDS and RC is a matter of party tactics, as Bobbio 
confirms, but even this relationship can best be handled by urgently addressing the 
future of the Left.
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Even this problem, I would say, cannot be solved entirely but can only be 
clarified or mediated through our tackling the problem of the Left today, from 
the point of view of a long-term perspective, and from our proposing, yet 
again, the general theme of what the Left’s task in contemporary society is -  
in a way which is appropriate to the difficulty that the Left, if it continues to 
exist, as I am sure it will, is going to face in the next century (Bobbio in 
Bosetti, 1997:21).
At this juncture, when Bosetti wonders whether the differences within the Italian Left 
can be overcome, Bobbio recalls that the weakness of today’s Italian Left, or the 
controversial relations between different Lefts, is but a repetition of what occurred in 
January of 1921, when the Communist faction split from the Socialist Party to form 
the Communist Party.
That after so many years ... this wound has still not healed is intolerable.... It 
is still an obstacle to the creation of a strong and winning Left. An obstacle so 
grave that on the eve of a congress that ought to constitute the basis for a 
reinforcement of the Left’s ranks ... it is an almost preliminary condition that it 
be resolved to ensure the success of the debate. ... One of the anomalies of 
Italian socialism is that inevitable internal disagreements are almost always 
resolved, rather than through a majority and a minority within the party, which 
usually happens in other countries, through splits that gave rise to new 
parties. [These new parties are] almost always in stiff competition with the 
parties from which they split. The adverse results of these ruptures are there 
for all to see. In addition to the catastrophic split of 1921, it is useful to recall 
... the current one between PDS and RC (Bobbio in Bosetti, 1997:21).
These splits have always benefited the Right, Bobbio insists, and weakened the Left. 
In the first years of the Republic the Left experienced a dramatic and troubled 
existence, through unifications, divisions, fusions on the Left and splits on both the 
Right and the Left, Bobbio says, but always in the Socialist Party’s search for 
autonomy from the Communist Party. “This autonomy was sought sometimes from 
the Right, sometimes from the Left, from the centre, or from who knows where, and 
ended in Craxi’s break that could not be remedied, so drastic as to shift the Socialist 
Party so far towards the centre that it led it right out of the traditional area of the Left" 
(Bobbio in Bosetti, 1997:21).
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In 1996, however, a centre-Left coalition finally won the elections. Bobbio sees that 
moment as a turning point which spells an opportune moment for overcoming “the 
wound of division” (ibid.:22).
Bobbio contends that part of the reason for considering whether a Left still exists is 
to ask oneself what history means. But asking oneself what history means “is to 
believe that there is an intentionality in historical development, which has to be 
understood as a conscious direction towards an end” (Bobbio, 1996a: 116). History, 
which is necessarily ambiguous, is described, expressed or recounted with “different 
answers according to who [questions it] and in what circumstances” (ibid.). As we 
confront the failure of real Communism and “the disappearance of a myth, it is more 
ambiguous than ever” (ibid.). At present, we cannot guess or bet on the destiny of 
history:
The two interpretations that dominated the last century were Hegel’s, which 
triumphed and which perceived history as the progressive realization of the 
idea of liberty (the Hegelian and clearly also the Marxian view of history as the 
transformation of the realm of need into the realm of liberty), and Nietzsche’s 
catastrophic one according to which humanity is moving towards the age of 
nihilism (ibid.).
In his consideration of philosophy and the task of philosophy, Bobbio assures us that 
there is no pre-established historical plan that we can attribute to Providence or 
Nature. Yet he believes that the outcome of humanity’s historical condition is headed 
in either a positive or a negative direction. “The human world is either going towards 
universal peace, as Kant predicted, or it is going towards a war of annihilation, and 
thus the word genocide has been coined in contrast to pacifism . . . "  (ibid.). He 
entreats us to admit, however, that “no one can believe in a universal cause when 
modern thought is so fragmented, so diffident towards general ideas ...” 
(ibid.:116,17).
It is clear that socialism has developed new constituencies and the task of realizing 
socialist ideals is much more difficult after the failure of real Communism, owing to 
modern dividedness. However, the strategy of much of the Italian Left, particularly
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the policies of Walter Veltroni, Giuliano Amato and Massimo D’Alema, leaves much 
to be desired. Bobbio would prefer that the current mainstream party of the Left 
forget about reproposing a “liberal revolution”, since all of its members have become 
liberals, and instead hoist anew the flag of “social justice”. Social justice, Bobbio 
argues, had always been the main concern of the millions of men and women who 
“made the history of socialism” (Bobbio, 1996:137). Social justice cannot, he 
believes, be limited to solidarity or charitable generosity. The Left today should aim 
at implementing "severe justice”, since even when mendicants crowded on the steps 
of the churches in former times, generous solidarity was a feature of society. 
Solidarity cannot ensure justice as it can be endorsed, or eschewed, by any citizen. 
Only through law can the guarantees required for a just society be ensured. Law 
does not have the moral weakness or volubility of men. Accordingly, a just society 
can only be realized through legal protection, and not simply through the goodness 
of fellow human beings.
To be kept in mind, however, is that the “salvation” of Italy has less of a chance of 
materializing if it is linked to constitutional reform. “I remain convinced, as I have for 
the last fifty years, that costumi are of greater value than institutions” (ibid.:138). 
Here, we can translate costumi not only as modes of life, conditions of society and 
outward bearing or behaviour, but also as established usage having the force of law.
3.6 Politics of culture or inclusion
Any theory of forms of government has both descriptive and prescriptive features.
In its descriptive function, the treatment of forms of government rests in ... a 
classification of the various types of political constitution [which] in historical 
experience ... can be discerned by the observer, in this case, the political 
writer acts like a botanist who, after having observed and studied attentively a 
certain number of plants, divides them up according to differences or draws 
them together according to similarities and, in the end, is able to classify them 
according to a particular order. The first great classifications of forms of 
government, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, are of this type: drawn from
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the data generated by historical observation, and reflecting the variety of 
forms organized in Greek cities (Bobbio, 1976:3).
Bobbio chooses a "politics of culture" to facilitate the liberalization process, rather 
than the "culture of politics". In other words, it is important to recognize the political 
character of cultural commitment, but it is also important to maintain an awareness 
of its autonomy from any form of bureaucratic meddling. Bobbio’s concern is 
primarily with the man of culture, (meaning) the intellectual, who should not, he 
argues, divide the world into two opposing camps, such as often occurred at the time 
of the Cold War. Although Bobbio stated this opinion as early as 1951, it serves as a 
lesson to us today, for instead of two “truths” - a red (Left) and a black (Right) truth - 
there are many versions of truth. The task of the intellectual, “who ought to shy away 
from alternatives which are too clearly-cut", is not an easy one (Bobbio, 1955:9). The 
man of culture’s first responsibility is to reflect, to doubt and to avoid taking up hasty 
solutions (ibid.).
For Bobbio, the task of the man of culture is to re-establish trust in discussion and to 
ensure that dialogue continues, even among opposing parties. Dialogue is both an 
identifying feature of individual liberty and the political duty of the intellectual. Bobbio 
evokes the foundation of the Societa Europea di Cultura in 1950 as an example of 
inclusion among heterogeneous cultures, for one of the Societa’s main principles 
was that of maintaining fruitful dialogue among its members. “Time would seem to 
give credit not to those who saw either all red or all black, but to those who did not 
fear to insinuate some doubt into the overly excited defenders of one side or the 
other" (ibid.). In other words, the man of culture must have one sole ambition - that of 
playing no one’s game - “which is advantageous to all” (ibid.:11).
Bobbio writes that “The task of the man of culture is today more than ever that of 
sowing doubts, not of gathering certainties” (ibid.: 15). Certainties, steeped in dogma 
or in the pomp of myth, are “the stuff of the chronicles of pseudo-culture of 
improvisers, of amateurs, of impartial propagandists” (ibid.). Culture, on the other 
hand, means “measure, careful judgement, circumspection, the assessment of all 
arguments before pronouncing oneself, listening to all witnesses before deciding,
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and ... never deciding, in the manner of an oracle, any question on which a ... 
definitive choice depends" (ibid.).
One might say that the man of culture cannot stand aloof, that he also must 
commit himself, that is, choose one of two alternatives. But the man of culture 
has his own way of not remaining aloof, which is to reflect more on the 
problems of collective life than is normally done in official institutions of 
academic culture ... He has his way of committing himself: that of acting in 
the defence of the very conditions and presuppositions of culture. He too has 
his way of deciding, as long as it is clear that he can only decide in favour of 
the rights of doubt rather than the claims of dogmatism, of the duties of 
criticism rather than the seduction of infatuation, of the development of 
reason rather than the empire of blind faith, of the veracity of science rather 
than the deceits of propaganda (ibid.).
Bobbio praises what he calls “la fecondita del colloquio” or enrichment provided 
through calm discussion, particularly when the discussion is undertaken by men of 
culture. The enrichment derives from going beyond the barriers or [iron] curtains put 
in place by “official politics". By 1952, the year in which Bobbio wrote of la fecondita 
del colloquio, the Cold War had already resulted in the division of the world into two 
extreme poles - Communism and anti-Communist ones.
In the 20th century, scientific research came to occupy a large part of the terrain 
previously left to philosophers, for many metaphysical arguments about human 
destiny have been tackled with greater success by biologists, economists and 
sociologists. Today, Bobbio argues, science is the only great enterprise of 
knowledge, and it spreads across many fields of specialized research. The 
biologist or scientist gives more convincing replies than the philosopher, who, 
Bobbio says, speculates on a few abstract problems. Given the great increase in 
the mass of scientific data, it is impossible for the philosopher to try and dominate 
the entire scientific world.
The politics of culture comprises a view of liberty that is universal. Liberty belongs to 
everyone, and has been achieved historically, in Bobbio’s view. Individual liberty is 
the historical result of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie, fighting for its own 
emancipation. It is not therefore possible to say with Marx that individual liberty is a
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bourgeois value that is destined to perish with the bourgeoisie. Individual liberty is a 
universal value, and Bobbio “challenges anyone to find a man, bourgeois or 
proletarian, who would be more of a man by renouncing it” (Bobbio, 1955:68). Even 
though liberty was acquired by the bourgeois class who intended it for a few only, it 
was in fact acquired for all. For Bobbio, individual liberty was achieved through an 
age-old struggle waged by the bourgeois against two Leviathans -  the absolute state 
and the absolute Church. It created an aggregate of constitutional mechanisms 
against the return of these powers and as a guarantee for the individual; these 
mechanisms proved to be genuinely effective. Indeed, Bobbio argues, those who 
deride constitutional mechanisms should be careful, since they have not been able 
to offer any other more effective guarantees of individual freedoms. Any Leviathan, 
whether political, religious, mediatic, among others, is a danger to individual liberty.
In a similar vein, the advent of the republic in Italy and the framing of the Italian 
Constitution have helped preserve democracy and individual liberty in the post-war 
period, and this has successfully reinforced Italy’s position within Europe. Efforts to 
discredit the heritage of anti-Fascist republicanism, as well as moves to have the 
Italian Constitution modified so that a semi-presidential or presidential system 
results, could undermine the liberty achieved. Whether the threat is from the Right or 
from the Left, intellectuals must work continually to spell out the differences in the 
political aims and methods of these two poles to preserve liberty.
We must show the maximum respect for the institutions that emerged from the 
bourgeois revolution, for these structures, Bobbio says, have been historically 
attained and maintained. “It would be a sign of scarce historical consideration if one 
were not able to distinguish the countries where these structures exist, even if they 
creak or function poorly (where it is a matter of making them function better, not of 
destroying them) and those countries where they have never existed” (Bobbio, 
1955:69). Just as one relies on the Left-Right dichotomy to relate and explain a 
political position, the human condition with regard to individual rights is to be 
perceived according to whether those rights exist, regardless of the fact that they 
emerged out of bourgeois struggle. The benefits are the patrimony of all.
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Another aspect of the politics of culture is tolerance. Truth emerges only as history 
unfolds, and therefore truth is always in the process of being defined; only a part of it 
can be seized by us:
As for the idea of tolerance, it rests on the philosophical principle of 
awareness of the historicity of truth and therefore on the incapability of man to 
arrive at a definitive and absolute truth. Those who are willing to topple the 
state of rights without batting an eye must remember that they must first 
topple completely this deep conviction from which modern thought and life 
were born, and substitute it with not only the principle that absolute truth can 
be arrived a t ... but also that this absolute truth is consigned to a power of this 
world such as the state (or the party) (Bobbio, 1955:70).
Bobbio argues that it would really be a great leap forward, after the long struggle 
against the churches who claimed to have the only truth, to end up saying that a 
public entity like the state or the party possessed absolute truth, without the help of 
any supernatural revelations or divine intervention. This claim is not new. It was 
sustained during the time when the struggle for the principle of tolerance was being 
waged, and it was precisely the most stubborn adversaries of bourgeois parties who 
sustained it -  those people who any modest progressive today would not hesitate to 
call reactionaries.
Bobbio concludes his reflections on tolerance by suggesting that readers consult 
“Chapter XII of Hobbes’ De C/Ve”. There they will read that
among seditious theories, ... among those theories that in the Leviathan state 
it is not legal to maintain, the first is precisely that according to which judging 
between good and evil can be determined by the individual. Why should it be 
‘seditious’, according to Hobbes, to maintain that the individual can judge 
good and evil? Because judging good and evil is only to be done by the state 
(Bobbio, 1955:70).
By contrast, Bobbio insists that judging between good and evil is the right and the 
duty of the individual. This was not immediately apparent in Hobbes’ time owing to 
the need to secure peace. Demands for liberty at that time gradually rose up from 
those who struggled against the dogmatism of the churches and the authoritarianism
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of the state; each social reality brings different changes and requests for the 
expansion of rights. Now, we need to move from Hobbes’s rational hypothesis “to 
the analysis of real societies and their histories” (Bobbio, 1996a:53), for humans are 
no longer “a generic entity but seen in their ... concrete situation in society: as a 
child, old person, sick person” (ibid.:48). There is now more “status for the single 
individual” and as the social context develops, that status increases.
Hobbes’ teaching is an admonishment to thinkers who consider the great questions 
of liberty and equality from “a narrow angle, without having fully understood the 
importance and the gravity of their discussion” (ibid.). In addition to the Communists 
and the Catholics, Bobbio’s strategy of inclusion makes room for the bourgeois 
class, and all other classes as well, with a view to ensuring diversity and the 
elaboration of truth.
If we were to examine better the principles on which our civilization rests, we 
would not be so easily inclined to consider them the ephemeral conquests of 
a class, which can be swept away, without necessarily sweeping away the 
values that it brought. Bourgeois civilization, just like all other civilizations, 
must be developed and integrated, but it cannot be eliminated. The politics of 
the 'tabula rasa’ are the politics of barbarians. Therefore, it would be a ‘grave 
evil’ if we were to witness its decline (to the decline of that which it brought, 
whether good or evil) without being troubled, rather, by giving it ... the final 
blow (ibid,:70,71).
256
Chapter IV: CONCLUSIONS
Politics in today’s world takes place largely on cultural terrain. A correct reading of 
Bobbio’s work brings to light the importance of culture in human development and 
in the mind-set, each individual having been shaped by a plethora of media and 
other anthropological influences. Bobbio believes that, in the few societies which 
have reached a certain level of culture, the political class does not justify its power 
solely on the grounds of possessing it. Rather, the attempt is made to give it a 
moral and legal basis, to make it seem to originate as a necessary consequence of 
doctrines and beliefs generally recognized and accepted in the society that it 
directs (Bobbio, 1989b:83).
In this chapter, I emphasize that Bobbio teaches that philosophy is the Left’s best 
political tool, even after the fact that the traditional Left has been routed. The neo­
liberal Right, while hailing the “end of history” and the victory of capitalism on a 
worldwide scale has brought people on to the streets in protest. Those protesting 
represent a new gathering of political and social forces, be they of the far Left, 
minority groups, of Catholic inspiration or precarious workers of the post-industrial 
age, that can inject new energy into the Left’s cause. Bobbio is convinced that this 
Left wishes to voice its commitment to philosophy -  to those perennial ideals of 
equality and justice. The unbridled marketization of society, the tendency of 
multinational corporations to dictate policy and the mediatic control of individual 
conscience have aroused the anger of many on the Left. Bobbio is satisfied that 
their commitment to act epitomizes “steering clear of elusion”, of grappling with 
politics rather than avoiding the practical issues that affect the dimension of the 
liberty one can live, day to day.
The intellectual, Bobbio believes, can work to prevent the realization of the “new 
poverty” of neo-liberalism. That task involves recognition of the deficit of “workerist 
culture” (Negri, 2002:5) and of its attachment to hegemonic values. All sectors of 
society, not merely the shrinking group of industrial workers, have a right to civil 
liberties as well as representative inclusion in society and a share in common
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goods like ecology and wealth. Social democracy has not exhausted its historic 
mission, Bobbio argues, for abuses of power accompany every age.
The new systems of hegemony that involve “immaterial labour”, those which 
produce information and cultural content rather than commodities, must be as 
pluralistic as possible. Otherwise, Bobbio warns, human endeavour and public 
opinion will fall prey to particular powers, be they political, economic or spiritual.
His formula for liberalism thus rests on the lesson of anti-Fascism, where 
conflicting voices and different modes of expressing culture are ensured through a 
legal framework that guarantees pluralism and human rights.
There are both advantages and difficulties that spring from an analysis of Bobbio’s 
philosophy. Bobbio’s conception of the intellectual differs from that of several other 
contemporary thinkers. For Rorty, as I discussed above, the philosopher ought to 
seek originality and promote pluralistic idealism; others should not look to 
philosophers for wisdom and essential morality since the genuinely original thinker 
is driven by curiosity and is not limited by practical morality. For Bauman, 
intellectuals emerge as the elite of the modern age who carry out the task of 
regulating society and converting “inferior elements” by educating them. The 
intellectual sets the rules based on a conformist understanding of truth, judgement 
and taste. This technique fulfills the centralist ambitions of the state in regulating 
society through a “cultural” operation, one that artificially inculturates the primitive 
and non-universal aspects of humanity. In the postmodern age, intellectuals have 
become dispossessed of cultural authority, since the state has gradually become 
more dependent on “a self-sustaining legal rationality" (Martin, 1998:69). In other 
words, the intellectual’s legislative function has diminished. In the postmodern age, 
the intellectual takes on the new role of interpreting the acceptance of the plurality 
of cultures. The degree to which the legislative function overlaps with that of the 
interpretative function remains open to debate.
It is not absolutely necessary that we draw a political and moral synthesis from the 
work of Bobbio based on his contribution to democratic and anti-Fascist theory.
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Bosworth argues that for more than a generation the Italian Left was linked in one 
way or another to the Italian Communist Party and forged its identity on the ‘myth of 
the Resistance’ (Bosworth, 2002:2). Bobbio, however, conceives the Resistance as 
a movement that exemplifies opposition to the Fascist dictatorship which punished 
the majority of Italians and which resulted in the ultimate evil of alliance with Nazi 
Germany. In this thesis, I have sought to prove the validity of Bobbio’s moral claim.
A perennial issue is that individuals cannot simply rely on intellectuals to resolve 
society’s problems. Each person, in grappling with important questions, must take 
stock of the fact that many intellectuals defend ideas that promote their own 
particular interests and political agendas. The role of the intellectual is to guide 
others, to provide the raw data, analysis and conclusions that allow those without 
expert knowledge to make their own decisions. Bobbio’s belief that intellectuals are 
little more than mosche cocchieri reveals how little politics, particularly Italian politics, 
has been influenced by intellectual thought and guidance.
Bobbio’s opposition to Fascism generates a politics of culture that contrasts with the 
religious anti-Fascism of Catholics and the ideological anti-Fascism of Communists. 
The heritage of the PdA is a cultural legacy that sought to combine people from all 
walks of life in a movement that scorned the order, hierarchy and inertia of Fascism. 
For members of the PdA, Fascism had taken away the political [pluralism] and had 
depoliticized the masses, since it was a regime that “organized consensus” (ibid.:5). 
Mussolini’s main targets were the trade unions and socialist sympathizers and, by 
abolishing the Italian parliament altogether in 1939, he curtailed their political 
representation.
In their cultural genealogy, Bobbio and his forebears Gobetti and Rosselli, among 
others, are connected by a common anti-Fascist tradition or thread that both 
precedes and goes beyond political affiliation, where “liberty is not only a blessing 
but also a conquest, an ethical form that is superior to that of those who live 
emphatically up on high and do not see the immorality of indifference, of apathy” 
(Crifo, 1994:105). In the tradition of anti-Fascism espoused by Bobbio, liberalism
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does not represent general interests but is in itself the struggle for the conquest of 
liberty. In that conquest, philosophy has a major role in that it is a form of militant 
engagement.
Although Bobbio affirms that the bulk of his political writings concern peace and 
democracy, any genuine understanding of his philosophy requires an in-depth 
knowledge of the Italian experience of Fascism and the Resistance. That is Bobbio’s 
point of departure, and it is an important one, for in Italy an attempt is currently under 
way to treat Fascism and anti-Fascism with “equal cultural dignity" (Mack Smith, 
2000:19). Bobbio and the group of intellectuals who endorse his philosophy have 
taken on the task of preventing what they believe to be a move to establish cultural 
uniformity, which would be incorrect in terms of historical, political and moral 
teaching.
Bobbio fears that the democratic method is being threatened by a number of 
historical trends. Current political problems and public debates will be followed by 
new ones; increasingly, technical knowledge is required to solve these problems and 
lead these debates. These conditions result in government by expert technicians 
and, perforce, diminishes the applicability of democratic principles. Professional 
experts only comprise a small, albeit increasing, percentage of society, thus the 
sovereignty of ordinary citizens is decreasing, Bobbio warns. He also draws our 
concern to the “undemocratic and atomizing impact of the mass media” which 
continue to undermine popular sovereignty (Keane in Bobbio, 1989b:xxi). 
Democracy presupposes the free development of the individual’s learning faculties, 
but the modern mass media violate that tenet by exercising a form of mental power, 
through persuasion (or dissuasion) (Bobbio, 1989b:70).
The contemporary problem of the governability of complex societies is, in Bobbio’s 
view, caused by the increasing demands of civil society and the inadequate capacity 
of institutions to respond to them. The capacity of the state may have already 
reached its absolute limits, he warns, and this serious condition generates a crisis of 
the state’s legitimacy deriving from its ungovernability. The institutions of the state
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represent legitimate power: Bobbio recalls the Weberian sense of legitimate power, 
that decisions emanate from an authority endowed with the right to make binding 
decisions for the collectivity.
Processes affecting the legitimacy of the state as the sole collective authority, 
especially at times when the state cannot meet public demand, lead to what Bobbio 
refers to as delegitimation and reiegitimation. In periods of institutional crisis, powers 
are formed in civil society. These aim to achieve their own legitimacy, despite the 
undermining of legitimate authority. In truth, civil society (or public opinion), Bobbio 
argues, holds the key to finding solutions in times of crisis and actually provides the 
political system with new sources of legitimation and consensus. Public opinion 
influences and forms the basis of social movements, and even if the opinions held 
by the public are diffused by mass media, still the functioning of public opinion is 
essential to democracy. Note that the totalitarian state absorbs public opinion with 
official opinion (ibid.:26).
The mass media are necessary, vital to the formation of public opinion and a 
prerequisite of democracy, Bobbio maintains, but they must embrace pluralist views, 
rather than views that reflect “the delirium of power” that derives from the close 
relationship between the state and the media (Bobbio, 1995f:1). Editorial and 
proprietorial regulation in the media industry merits further study; in the Italian case 
there is an urgent need for regulation since political power is manifestly tied to that of 
mass communication. The right to complete information cannot play second fiddle to 
political consensus and economic revenue.
The way forward is to preserve and promote democratic political culture and the 
democratization of the international system, according to Bobbio. That task, 
however, is somewhat difficult. Protesters in both democratic and authoritarian states 
have taken to the streets in recent years and, some would argue, market power has 
gone into retreat because the question of “security” has moved to the forefront. The 
imperatives of war and politics are displacing democracy.
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Bobbio strives to establish, promote and maintain a democratic political culture. 
“Establishing” that culture on an enduring basis has been a constant challenge for 
Italian intellectuals, owing to the country’s late start in diversified and technology- 
based economic development, as well as its traditional dependence on agrarian 
society and the unyielding influence of landowners. The spurt of industrial growth 
that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century did not significantly change 
the economic and political scenario, because the new class of more liberal 
industrialists were dwarfed by the predominance of landowners. The “old” problem of 
combining socialism and democracy remains a topical and urgent problem, Bobbio 
insists. The history of the last century has not provided any evidence that such a 
combination is possible. Indeed, the past hundred years have hindered the belief 
that the combination of democracy and socialism is feasible. The only way forward, 
therefore, is to “patiently begin to clarify the terms of the debate” (Bobbio, 1988:89).
First, it is necessary to define democracy as government by the majority, as opposed 
to government by one, by a few, or by a minority. Then, Bobbio advises the reader to 
review the entire history of political thought, to discern that the concept has changed 
-  not in terms of its descriptive use, but in terms of its prescriptive use, or the value 
judgement anyone applies to the concept of democracy. That value judgement 
comprises either a positive or negative view of democracy. The adoption of a politics 
of culture hinges not only upon the positive view of democracy, despite its possible 
dangers, but on a clear distinction between government by the people and 
government for the people. The introduction of a little scepticism by intellectuals can 
only stand to benefit human welfare. Bobbio’s scepticism is “an invitation for people 
to reflect... on the events of history, to renounce slogans, ready-made formulas, ... 
to give up showing off doctrinal unity with a high and mighty air” (ibid.:101). The 
politics of culture requires busying oneself with the study of the mechanisms of 
power, and not merely the ideologies which legitimate or refute those ideologies. 
What does it matter, Bobbio argues, if one is taken for someone who has everything 
to learn?
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To foster Bobbio’s politics of culture, one cannot believe in taking short cuts. Rather, 
one must follow the example of the historical Left in Italy by attempting to get back 
on the democratic highway. An indication of the Left’s renewed fervour is its 
numerous contributions to the debate on the democratic and socialist paths to a 
better society. Intellectuals can reinforce democracy by asserting their 
independence, by standing apart from pure politicians, and by distancing themselves 
from day-to-day problems that need to be resolved. Politics and culture, Bobbio 
says, are two different and unmistakable ways of acting within society.
Socialist intellectuals are difficult to identify because they do not form a 
homogeneous group, and there is no doctrine that all socialists accept. The 
anomalous configuration of the Italian political system resulted in a tough life for the 
PSI. It needed to keep one eye on the so-called democratic political area and the 
other on the Communist Party, given its great tradition of battling for the cause of 
workers. The period of the Cold War was characterized by the fictitious democracy 
of the so-called democratic countries and the equally false socialism of the so-called 
socialist countries.
The highway to democracy for both socialist and capitalist states, Bobbio argues, 
involves recognition of one particular feature common to both states: the major 
decisions in economics are taken autocratically. He is certain that there are grounds 
“for suspecting that the progressive widening of the democratic base will eventually 
run into an insuperable barrier... when it tries to pass the factory gates" (ibid.:101). 
The battle for socialist democracy will be won or lost in the field of democratic 
control.
The question of the relationship between means and ends depends on the decisive 
influence which the means adopted exert on final outcomes. For Bobbio, the precept 
that “the end justifies the means” ought to read “the end justifies the means which do 
not modify, and thereby corrupt, that end” (ibid.:99). As Laski puts it, “The classic 
purposes of the State, liberty, equality, social justice, ... need examination not 
merely in terms of their virtue as ends, but in terms of their practicability as ends in
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the light of the institutions through which they are to be achieved” (Laski, 1932:54). 
The years of anti-Fascist resistance led by the partisans and the Italian people was a 
formative epoch in the history of Italy and that epoch has been interpreted and 
analysed in different ways. Bobbio highlights the motives behind the enduring 
controversy, in a context where the “resistance question” is accompanied by 
“enemies, sincere friends, false and calculating friends and those who stress the 
limits [of the Resistance] and who contest its significance” (Fofi, 1996:4). The 
enemies of the Resistance constitute past and current Fascists, those who like to 
“lead a quiet life", a life of order, where the form may be changed as long as the 
substance remains -  the maintaining of privilege. Sincere friends of the Resistance 
are either those who experienced dictatorship and do not wish to repeat a similar 
experience, or those who saw in the Resistance the possibility of a new openness to 
democracy (ibid.5).
For Bobbio, democratic culture must necessarily be based on social justice. He 
continues to prefer stringent justice to generous solidarity, since solidarity is a 
facultative virtue. Bobbio argues that generous solidarity has always been with us, 
since beggars first occupied the steps at the front of churches, as they do today. In 
struggling to bring about social justice, Bobbio looks to the Left, and urges the Italian 
Left to cease being seduced by “liberal revolution”, since “all have now become 
liberals, particularly the adversaries of the Left” (Bobbio, 1996h:17). He believes it is 
time for the Left to once again lift the banner of social justice, the same banner that 
accompanied the long path of millions of men and women who contributed to the 
history of socialism.
As a boy, Bobbio was educated in the cult of the Risorgimento. As an adult, he has 
been particularly aggrieved by recent interpretations of World War II and the events 
that occurred at the signing of the armistice with the allies, but he is nonetheless 
against the portrayal of that historical moment as a sign of “the death of the nation”76. 
The year 1943 marked the end of la patria matrigna or stepmother of the nation, 
which had sent thousands of young men to fight and die in an unjust war of
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aggression, in far away countries like France, Greece, northern Africa and the former 
States of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
The loss and shame deriving from that episode of Italian history resulted in Bobbio 
becoming part of the group of Italian patriots who chose to return to Italy its dignity 
as a nation. Fie rejects the concerns raised by those revisionists who question 
whether Italy was indeed a genuine nation and to whom the responsibility can be 
attributed if it was not. indeed, he calls them “proclaimers that seek the applause of 
millions of forgetful Italians” (ibid.).
Bobbio’s politics of culture includes the matter of style and human qualities. He 
compares the personal style of Romano Prodi and Silvio Berlusconi in the media vis- 
a-vis the Italian public, where the former comes from the school of “politics” whilst 
the latter exemplifies the school of “politics as entertainment”. While Prodi converses 
calmly with his listeners, and answers their questions, Berlusconi gives long 
speeches to celebrate his triumph, interrupted by thunderous applause and shouts 
of approval. According to Bobbio, Berlusconi believes himself to be the saviour of the 
nation and makes a show of his Christianity, defining himself the Lord’s chosen one. 
Berlusconi is committed to the task of protecting Christian values, values that are 
threatened by “atheist Communism”. By contrast, Bobbio describes Prodi as a good 
politician, an anti-Berlusconi, characterized by good humour, seriousness, simplicity, 
stubbornness and bonhomie mixed with astuteness. Prodi’s non-ostentatious 
affirmation of his Christian beliefs renders Prodi a more credible politician in Bobbio’s 
view.
The fact that Berlusconi’s Forza Italia constitutes a political party based on the 
personality of one man means that the voters of Forza Italia chose a person rather 
than a programme. Bobbio takes Berlusconi as an example of an authoritarian 
personality, one who is absolutely confident of himself, of his capacity to resolve 
even the most difficult problems for himself and for others. He leads the Freedom 
Alliance, he holds the monopoly on private television channels. There is thus a clear 
incompatibility between his business empire and his leading political role.
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[Berlusconi’s] preferred motto is ‘Let me get on with it, I work for you’. Why 
was he not able to keep his election promises? Because he was not allowed 
to work. He always speaks in the first person. He leads, others follow. ... 
(ibid.).
Bobbio’s life cycle has coincided with the span of the last century, for he was born in 
1909. He reached the age of eighty just a few days before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Yet Bobbio, one of the founding members of the Societa Europea di Cultura, was 
one of a group of European intellectuals for whom, culturally speaking, the Wall 
never existed. It must be said that the position and experience of many intellectuals 
living in Eastern Europe during the Cold War did not allow them to share his 
perception of European intellectual harmony. At the end of the twentieth century, 
Bobbio is certain that Communists, ex-Communists and even socialists have gone 
through a slow and difficult apprenticeship: so slow that it has still not been 
completed.
The totalitarian degeneration that occurred in the Soviet Union and in several 
Warsaw Pact countries in the post-war period was incompatible with socialist ideals. 
The implementation of Communism was based on an indictment of capitalist 
methods of production and principles of distribution, which, it was claimed, denied 
the gains of living to the majority of workers, and culminated in the establishment of 
regimes that did not guarantee justice and the elimination of privilege. Through their 
obstinacy, proponents of Communism produced the very situation they sought to 
prevent -  the absence of political and intellectual freedom. A terrible price was paid 
for the establishment of Bolshevism in Russia and Communism in Eastern Europe.
In Italy, the experience of Fascism culminated in the formation of a group of anti- 
Fascist intellectuals who, in their anti-Fascism, set out a prescriptive agenda for 
transforming politics. Fascism brought about what has been described as “the most 
complex opposition that would ever have been possible" (Capitini, 1996:67). The 
presence of Fascism compelled the exponents of Italian culture to take up a struggle 
and to face problems which otherwise would not have been tackled with such
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urgency. Paradoxically, as noted by Garin, without the advent of Fascism, Croce 
would have never written his beautiful pages on the “religion of liberty” and historians 
and intellectuals like Bobbio and his predecessors would not have theorized with 
such vigour on justice and liberty (Garin, 1996:vii).
From 1976 to 1996 Bobbio was a regular contributor to the Turinese daily 
newspaper, La Stampa. His editorials address, among other issues, the role of the 
intellectual, the secular philosopher, and the primacy of justice over solidarity in a 
just society. The best resource to fully grasp Bobbio’s message lies in the study of 
the period from the crisis of Fascism until the early post-war years, and how it was 
experienced in Turin. He stands out as an advocate of a non-dogmatic and laical 
socialism based on the force of ideas, yet he is somewhat attracted by the more 
cohesive, disciplined and severe Communist Party (Bobbio, bb:1). Together with a 
group of intellectuals inspired by Gobetti and Rosselli, he has continued a tradition of 
politics that can be defined as liberal socialism or Socialismo liberate. Gobetti 
demonstrated that a liberal need not contaminate his/her ideas and values by a 
commitment to militancy in practical activity on the Left, for:
we, as serious anti-Fascists, although we do not defend lost positions ..., 
want to counter Mussolini’s Italy with the uncompromising revolution of a 
people who have decided to conquer their self-government with liberty, 
without tutors or tyrants; we prefer harsh and bitter victuals to insipid food, 
even if that food is poison ... Our provocations will induce the regime to take 
up bolder positions that will spur the revolt of dignity against attempts at 
corruption (Gobetti, 1997:633).
In October 1942, when Bobbio joined the PdA, its members interpreted the war of 
liberation not as a class war but as the harbinger of a democratic revolution; they 
fought alongside the Communists in the Resistance and recognized the great ideals 
Communism inspired. Despite the PdA’s recognition of the idealistic thrust of 
Communism, and the fact that its members waged the anti-Fascist struggle through 
a united front with the Communists, the question of liberty was the question that 
eventually weakened that political alliance. Bobbio recalls:
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For us [members of the PdA], Socialismo Liberale was a kind of ‘little red 
book’ of the Resistance; the same criticism Rosselli directed against the 
Italian dictatorship was adopted by the Action Party with respect to Stalin’s 
Soviet dictatorship. We thought the socialist and Communist movement77 
had created a new dictatorship in the Soviet Union precisely because it had 
forgotten the liberal tradition of freedom (Glotz and Kallscheuer, 
1989:134,135).
The identity of the PdA differed from that of the Communist party; the PdA 
comprised two main groups: one group represented the Italian anti-Fascists living in 
exile in France, many of whom had escaped Fascist repression at home, while the 
other group constituted the liberal-socialist movement founded in 1936-37 by Capitini 
and Calogero. The GL movement was inspired around 1930 by Rosselli’s book 
Socialismo liberale, whereas the liberal-socialist movement was born a few years 
later as a clandestine movement that formed at the Scuola normale di Pisa.
The ideologies and political and social programmes that characterized the 
Resistance movement merit further study. As Valiani has noted, the question 
remains as to whether the Italian Resistance was an attempt at genuine revolution 
and, if so, to what extent (Valiani, 1983:493). Its legacy today remains controversial 
although Bobbio believes that its historical analysis is necessary to shape the best 
politics.
The goals of the PdA are described by Bobbio below; the moral thrust of those goals 
is still valid today. The dialectical and mobile political position adopted by the PdA 
remains a method that is crucial to the role of the intellectual as the sower of doubt 
rather than the advocate of certainties. The possibility of achieving the renovation of 
Italian political life is within easier reach today, for the proletariat has dispersed and 
the revolution of the proletariat no longer occupies other political forces that 
previously concentrated their efforts on expressing virulent anti-Communism.
We had clear and firm moral positions, but our political positions were 
subtle and dialectical -  and therefore mobile and unstable, continually in 
search of an insertion in Italian political life. ... Moralists above all, we 
advocated a complete renovation of Italian political life, beginning with its 
customs. But we thought that for such a renovation there was no need of a
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revolution. We were consequently rejected by the bourgeoisie, which 
wanted no renovation, and by the larger part of the proletariat, which did not 
want to renounce revolution. We were thus left tete-a-tete with the petty- 
bourgeoisie, which was the class least inclined to follow us ... it was a rather 
painful spectacle to see us, ... thrown together with the most fearful and 
feeble layers of Italian society, minds in perpetual motion trying to make 
contact with the most ... withered mentalities, provokers of scandal winking 
complicity at the most ... conformist of citizens, these super-intransigent 
moralists preaching to specialists in compromises' (Bobbio in Anderson, 
1988:8).
Bobbio promotes a view of socialism that features a strong element of realism, as 
prescribed by Rosselli, “by doing away with the mediation of schematic Marxism" 
(Rosselli, 1994:123). Marxism did provide a stepping stone to liberal socialism; 
however, already in 1930 Rosselli warned that Marxism had to be surpassed.
The materialistic theory of history undoubtedly served a valuable purpose at 
the outset by providing an alternative to views of the historical process that 
were excessively ... narrow, but when it had fulfilled this critical function and 
was forced into slavish obedience to a preconceived thesis, it paved the 
way for dire excesses (ibid.).
Bobbio does not share Rosselli’s view that Marxism is tantamount to false realism. 
Most of Rosselli’s writings are dedicated to discussion with Communists on 
fundamental political themes like freedom and democracy. Unlike Rosselli, Bobbio 
does not contest the realism of Communism but considers Communists to be his 
interlocutors, “not as enemies to defeat but interlocutors of dialogue on the whys 
and wherefores of the Left” (Bobbio, 1993a:213). The inspirational ideal behind 
Communism was thus acknowledged by both Rosselli and Bobbio. For Rosselli, 
the ideal itself, the uplifting and empowerment of the masses, is limiting. The ideal 
of a perfect society of free and equal persons, with no classes, no struggle, and no 
state, is being transformed more ... every day into a limiting ideal that in itself is 
worthless but that serves as a stimulus ... for the spirit (Rosselli, 1994:84).
For Bobbio, the main ideal of Communism is a trademark of its superiority as a 
political ism and he identifies Communism as a humanist ideology. In Ne con Marx 
ne contro Marx (1997a), Bobbio’s view of Communism as a bulwark against Nazi-
269
Fascism emerges. He sharply condemns the increasing tendency of some 
revisionists to equate those who fought to prevent Auschwitz with those who fought 
to maintain and expand the implementation of camps like Auschwitz on a 
worldwide scale” (La Stampa, 13/12/97:23).
The views that shaped the PdA are to a great extent the same views shared by 
Bobbio today. Of paramount importance is how Fascism and Communism are 
perceived. Fascism, in Bobbio’s view, should be judged to be irredeemable as a 
political choice while Communism can be seen as simply requiring mediation and 
dialogue. Although much of Communism’s moral superiority lies in the fact that it 
sought to combat the evil of Fascism, Bobbio reminds the reader that the cause of 
liberalism can be bolstered by any novel approach to politics. Thus he invites the 
intellectual, in fulfilling his role as a political scientist rather than that of the politician, 
to re-read Marx. The liberal must not limit his research to particular views, but should 
consider all views. Similarly, the translation of aims and values, be they from the 
Right or the Left, whether they are religious values and/or other particular values, 
keeps the liberal state alive and helps it to develop a moral conscience. “The 
important thing is, starting from the observation of radical evil, one agrees in 
maintaining that the only antithesis of evil, the only attempt to overcome it, is to be 
found in the creation of moral life, comprising the uniqueness and the novelty of 
the human world” (Bobbio, 1994c: 189). That uniqueness results in Kant’s view that 
social competition results in the development of human talent.
As the representative of liberal socialism, the PdA held that Fascism, which 
had been anti-liberal in politics and anti-socialist in economics, was the 
complete negation of liberal socialism. Vis-a-vis Communism, on the contrary, 
[the PdA] considered itself to be its dialectic negation; ... a negation which at 
the same time was an affirmation of all that Communism had represented in 
defeating Fascism and as the antithesis of capitalism. Fascism had been the 
enemy. In those years, the Communists were adversaries with whom one 
needed to establish a dialogue on the great themes of liberty, social justice 
and, above all, democracy, to resist the counteroffensive of the reactionary 
Right... (Bobbio, 1996b:130,131).
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Bobbio’s investigations ultimately culminate in his endorsement of the goal of 
socialism, using liberalism as the means of reforming socialism. Through that 
combination, it would be possible to improve on both liberalism and socialism. 
Following World War II, the CLN attempted to realize this marriage, but it was driven 
from the top echelons of Italian post-war government by those who feared 
Communist expansion, or rather by those who feared any policies to the left of 
centre. As a result of American dictates, this fear had to be respected in exchange 
for material help with reconstruction.
Modern men and women, Bobbio warns, enjoy private independence but have lost 
the liberty of participating in collective power; hence the waywardness and misguided 
ethics of European society today. If, as Bobbio holds, political power is legitimate 
only when based upon the voluntary consent of those governed, then clearly 
individuals possess certain rights independent of the institution of sovereignty. "The 
individual must be taken into account not as an abstract entity but as a producer, 
consumer, citizen; to each activity must correspond some associationai function and 
the state, as a supra-functional entity, has the job of coordination and not 
domination" (Bobbio, 1989b: 130). Once again, we are reminded that the good 
society must ensure that human beings are not reduced to mere instruments of 
political power, such as occurred during Fascism.
After the historical experience of Communism, Bobbio is concerned with whether 
socialism can still be considered the continuation of the "immortal" principles of 
1789. For Bobbio, the role of scientific socialism in the evolutive process of modern 
culture is not to be underestimated: he looks to the Left today to capture and 
capitalize on that heritage.
Bobbio’s dialogue with Marxism aims to extract all its positive elements for use in 
shaping the modern state. He recalls that Communism derives from an honourable 
tradition which dates back to the beginning of western thought. Marxism has 
compelled “the adjustment of one’s own philosophy to a richer and wider
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perspective; it emphasizes neglected aspects of history and, by the authority of its 
emphasis, translates them into demands" (ibid.). Most importantly, “like any other 
system of belief, [Marxism’s] rise is the outcome of its environment, and its 
acceptance by large bodies of men is no more unnatural than their acceptance of 
other creeds” (ibid.:238), Marxism, like Christianity, had a positive impact on the 
development of liberalism -  the existence of both philosophies ensures debate and a 
pluralist recognition of difference.
Bobbio’s analysis of liberalism and his study of the challenges liberalism raises for 
modern Italian democracy constitute sources of contemporary reference on the 
persistence of a separate identity for the Left and the Right. His work urges us to 
assess anti-Fascism and anti-Communism in formulating our moral judgements of 
the Right and the Left. Although Bobbio accepts the comparison of Communism with 
Nazism on a historical level, he is convinced of the superiority of Communism’s 
ideals.
Since Bobbio was never a Communist, it is inaccurate to suggest that he mended his 
ways or corrected his view of Communism. He does not underestimate the crimes 
committed in the name of Bolshevism, nor does he believe that these are constituent 
elements of Communism. Rather, they can be considered a political decline in the 
countries that implemented Communism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
suppression of the independence of Poland, among other deeds, brought about a 
critical review of Communism, particularly as concerns the lack of democracy in all 
regimes. Despite all this, the ideals that inspired Communism are still noble; this 
premise he considers sufficient for Communism “to move pacifically towards a more 
advanced form of democracy, or at least be capable of being integrated with western 
democracy" (ibid.), if socialist reformers were able to exert their influence.
Bobbio criticizes Communism for its failings in the process of liberalization and the 
emancipation of the state from religious affairs. The confessional state of divine 
inspiration reappeared in the form of the doctrinal state that tolerated one doctrine
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alone: Marxist-Leninism. Once again the distinction sprang up between the orthodox 
and the heretical (Bobbio, 1989b: 124).
We saw in Chapter I that the city of Turin, where Bobbio lives, and the region of 
Piedmont in general played a significant role in the political modernization of Italy. As 
Italy’s industrial vanguard and the city that gave birth in the early 1920s to the 
Communist-inspired factory councils as well as the journals of Gramsci and 
Gobetti, Turin is distinct. It was also home to a group of intellectuals who 
considered the working class to be the modern expression of the “liberal spirit”.
In April 1923, when Gobetti established his publishing house in Turin as the voice 
of anti-Fascism, it was a move to constitute an organized cultural landscape to 
oppose the mono-culture of the Fascist hierarchy. Many intellectuals of various 
inspirations gathered round Gobetti to support his endeavour. The city of Turin 
played an extraordinary role in preserving the intransigent voice of humanist 
political culture; dialogue was sought with all cultural voices, reformist and 
conservative alike.
Gobetti wanted to show that the real Italian problem stemmed from the need to 
remedy the betrayal of the Risorgimento. Rosselli took Gobetti's analysis one step 
further, saying that Italy’s problems were part of a larger, European problem. The 
bourgeois classes conspired to thwart any efforts that would adversely influence 
their wealth during the Risorgimento, and at the same time the participation of the 
people had been completely overlooked.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the special conditions prevailing in Turin 
as the leading industrial city of Italy culminated in a change of political direction. 
“Culturally speaking, Turin had been prevalently positivist and socialist-leaning 
[whereas] the dominant culture in the Italy of the twentieth century was anti- 
positivistic and anti-socialist” (Bobbio, 1996b:68).
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Bobbio finds Gobetti’s analysis of Fascism as “the autobiography of the nation” 
correct, but Gobetti called exclusively for an Italian revolution in the national 
cultural tradition, “rather than seeing the solution to Italy’s problems as part of a 
European problem" (Bobbio, 1995e:117). Under Fascism, diversity was difficult if 
not impossible, whereas the "abstract totalitarian idea of equality [meant] the 
elimination of those who [were] not the same” (Bobbio, 1996c:111). In Italy and in 
the rest of the world, those who seek to reduce inequality between people 
constitute “a dangerous threat to those who are satisfied with the situation” 
(ibid.:82). Part of the way to prevent Fascism would be liberalism in the full sense, 
a liberalism not limited strictly to economic development and the expansion of the 
market. We must recognize, Bobbio says, that “traditional Communism has failed 
but its challenge remains” (ibid.). We have created affluence for two-thirds of 
society in the western world but not for the other third, and we cannot close our 
eyes to the fact that poverty afflicts most countries. “One has only to shift one’s 
attention from the social questions within individual states which gave rise to 
socialism in the last century to the international social question in order to realize 
that the Left has not only not completed its task, it has hardly commenced it” 
(ibid.).
Bobbio writes that “The history of modern ethics, starting with the theory of natural 
right, is an attempt, or rather a series of attempts, to form an objective ethics, 
either rational or empirical, or both rational and empirical; in other words, secular” 
(Bobbio, 1994c; 173). One could say with McLeish that liberalism is “grounded in 
the belief that there is no natural moral order which can be confidently known by 
states or churches, and that individuals must be free to pursue their own 
conceptions of the good” (McLeish, 1994:423). But there are still many related 
ideas to consider in examining the Italian case for secularity: it begins with 
Gobetti’s adoption of culture as a method, a daily exercise in initiative to ensure 
the ascendancy of the working class, and continues through to Aldo Capitini’s 
philosophy of persuasion, his ethics of non-violence and rejection of lies, and his 
strategy of non-collaboration as a form of protest.
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One of Bobbio’s most important influences, Hobbes, is at the forefront of his 
discussions, for Bobbio sees Hobbes as the chief architect of the modern state. He 
has occupied himself with Hobbes over the course of his entire life. In his study of 
Hobbes, Bobbio acknowledged that Leviathan was not a portrayal of the totalitarian 
State, but of the modern State that was born out of the ashes of medieval society. 
Leviathan is the title-holder of the monopoly of legitimate force: legitimate because 
it is founded on the consensus of its citizens. The authority of the state is the basis 
of justice for all citizens. Although Bobbio looks to the state for its fundamental role 
in the establishment and exercise of laws to ensure justice, he would not wish to 
see the liberty of intellectuals and their prime duty of critical engagement be 
regulated by the state. Individual liberty is a moral value. The maintenance of 
internal and external order is the government’s sphere of action; to proceed 
beyond its sphere of action, however, would result in uniformity of behaviour.
One of Bobbio’s overriding concerns about government, which arose as part of his 
anti-Fascist commitment, is the abuse of power. Yet one of the most distinctive 
features of Hobbes’ theory of the state is the unaccountability of its sovereign. The 
power of the sovereign, to whom Hobbes attributes absolute legal and theoretical 
authority, is void only in the event that the sovereign cannot guarantee protection 
for his citizens. The sovereign has no obligation to citizens other than providing 
that protection; thus, in Hobbes’ state, there is “the lack of any sanction ... other 
than the covenant, together with the good faith of the subjects who obey the law of 
nature which tells them that self-interest is best served by observing their 
obligations and remaining acceptably docile” (Reik, 1977:99).
The docility of citizens is anathema to Bobbio. He invites citizens to be mite [mild 
or meek], such that they listen to their opponents and engage in dialogue, adopt an 
attitude of moderation, and develop the habit of not only living with dissenting 
opinion, but of encouraging it. They must, he believes, be “engaged", preferably 
militantly engaged. While Hobbes stresses the necessity of obedience to the 
sovereign, Bobbio, anxious to prevent dictatorship and the abuse of power,
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underscores the importance of individual vigilance and democratic procedures 
which can allow for the alternation of political power.
It is difficult, Bobbio argues, to capture the ethical charge of early liberalism, and to 
see that religious freedom brought about non-confessional states and political 
liberty brought about democratic states. Today too many intellectuals have 
become too accustomed to pursuing an economic critique of the western state; 
Bobbio advises them to seize anew the significance of the one truly secular 
principle of tolerance.
At the same time, Bobbio recognizes that it is hard to promulgate only such laws 
as are necessary, and to remain ever faithful to the authentic constitutional 
principle of society. In his description of Hobbes, who had not the slightest 
hesitation in choosing between the excess of freedom and the excess of authority, 
Bobbio perhaps speaks for himself: “He fears the former as the worst of all evils; 
he is resigned to the latter as the lesser evil” (Bobbio, 1993b:70).
Bobbio's study of Husserl’s phenomenology formed part of his quest for clearer 
thinking and meaning, an attempt to dispel all forms of existentialism and 
mystification. He condemns what Hobbes described as those '"empty words' ... part 
of a whole language of abstractions propagated by the 'Kingdome of Darknesse'" 
(Hampsher-Monk, 1992:13). Bobbio takes up the dialectical method, primarily by 
examining dyads which are later analysed and interpreted as belonging on the Right 
or the Left. The history of political thought is traced through this dichotomy, with the 
help of classic political thinkers and modern intellectuals. Bobbio also tackles the 
question of whether the responsible intellectual acts on the basis of conviction or 
ethics of pure intention.
Most of Bobbio’s academic teaching years were spent at the University of Turin78. 
He had, since the time of his research under Solari in 1934, conceived of the 
philosophy of law as a discipline of the jurist rather than the philosopher; this 
approach to the philosophy of law contrasted with the philosophy of law then
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dominant in Italy, prevalently inspired by the spiritualistic philosophy idealism. This 
was concentrated on two main themes: the “concept” of law and the “idea” of law, 
from which were derived the two classical tasks of the philosophy of law: the 
ontological and the deontological. Bobbio undertook to overcome the limits of 
speculative philosophy to embrace what later became known as analytical 
philosophy.
Bobbio’s conversion or move away from speculative philosophy occurred over a long 
period of progressive maturity during which he freed himself from the cultural 
influences of his formative years. That particular cultural milieu was influenced by the 
dominant philosophy of the time: idealism. Bobbio’s academic path began to change 
when he realized that the totalitarian realities of Nazi-Fascism had brought only 
tragedy to Europe. Moreover, the end of what had been eulogically referred to as the 
“world of yesterday” and the difficult reconstruction ahead in a very uncertain world 
brought with them the realization that speculative philosophy alone was entirely 
inadequate to interpret the tragedy that had occurred. Post-war reconstruction 
caused him to eschew the other-worldli ness of philosophy, for he believed that one 
needed to start from studies that were less lofty and more terrestrial: economics, law, 
sociology, history. The attempt to travel a new path through phenomenology that had 
claimed to establish philosophy as a rigorous science did not satisfy Bobbio, at least 
as concerns the understanding of law and of the science of law.
Following the turbulent world events of 1989, Bobbio continues to confront the 
collapse of political certainties by returning repeatedly to a discussion of the 
dichotomy of Left/Right. Above all, he insists that this dichotomy is useful and valid 
today and that it will be well into the future. The indispensable influence of language 
in our processes of understanding, as well as the expressions and artistic revelation 
one uses to denote Right and Left, are but small fractions of political reality; the 
essence of certain realities and the way the world "is" present a picture of concrete 
facts that utterly defy post-modern nihilism, in his criticism of historical materialism, 
Bobbio focuses on extra-linguistic reality where particular interests are defended by
277
erecting walls against the undesired effects of democracy, socialism, and all forms of 
political radicalism.
Bobbio comes back repeatedly to his own personal experience of Fascism, his 
participation in the Italian Resistance and the reality of occupied Italy during World 
War II. Today, the Fascist question continues to figure prominently in the debate of 
both the Right and the Left. Spontaneously formed groups of citizens ousted the 
Nazis. But even today the Italian Right strives to deny the importance, numbers and 
impact of these groups. Bobbio, on the other hand, continues to perceive the 
Resistance as the key to understanding the Left’s formation, active political 
participation and historical memory: the Resistance movement today remains, for 
Bobbio, an example of democratic and socialist ideals. He holds that Fascism was a 
negative experience for Italy, but it had universal significance; it was not simply "one 
story" amidst the history of various peoples in the world. All Fascism is dictatorship 
based on a class regime -  the opposite of democracy.
The historical vulgata of the Cold War years worked adversely to legitimate the 
Italian Republic that was born from the anti-Fascist victory, and to purify the post-war 
government from the poison of nationalism, De Felice79 states. For Bobbio, if the 
idea of "nation" is a necessary for a sense of community to emerge, then “nation” 
should at least conform to the democratic and republican Constitution, and its spirit 
should be formed on the basis of patriotism emanating from that Constitution. De 
Felice criticizes Bobbio's glorification of his Resistance memories. He objects to 
Bobbio's description of the Resistance, saying that his account portrays how one 
would like it to have been, not how it was. De Felice argues that the effect of such 
glorification is that Resistance ideals were woven into the ideological fabric of the 
Italian Left; as a result, the Left has never shaken loose from the stereotyped notions 
of historical hegemony. Bobbio insists, however, that the Left was anti-Fascist and 
can be equated with anti-Fascism.
Bobbio states that he positions himself on the Left, as an anti-Fascist. The anti- 
Fascist Resistance ensured liberation from foreign powers, and promoted national
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unity at a time of crisis. However, immediately following the Liberazione the Catholic 
philosopher Augusto Del Noce spoke out about anti-Fascist Italy's need to pursue a 
politics of the centre rather than of the Right or the Left. It was time to go beyond 
anti-Fascism, he said, to overcome it. Del Noce was convinced that the PCI would 
eventually undergo a process of gradual democratization based on prudence and 
mediation; indeed, this was to be hoped for, as bipolarity had too many negative 
effects and resulted in the clash of Right and Left. Moreover, the monoculture of anti- 
Fascism would only lead to another form of dictatorship, this time an anti-Fascist 
one. Bobbio takes Del Noce to task80, reiterating his conviction that Communism is 
characterized by anti-Fascism, part of the positive legacy of the Resistance. 
Moreover, he says, the multi-faceted identity of the PdA was no monoculture, as was 
Fascism.
Critics of anti-Fascism accuse the Left of having overbearing power over the city of 
Turin and of having effected the “homologation” of all culture within the designs of an 
’’intellectual class, comprising Bobbio, Galante Garrone and Einaudi, that has 
concluded its own propulsive thrust” (La Stampa, 20/1/97:20). That criticism has 
been indicative of a project under way to diminish the importance of the ideas that 
crystallized in the PdA. Giulio Einaudi was asked to comment on this accusation of a 
tendency by the Left to homologize culture, and he replied: “Cultural alternatives are 
born independently of the legislator" (ibid.). It is a statement that emphasizes the 
autonomy of culture. Bobbio and his fellows from Turin continue to be the 
representatives and “concrete expression of the reconquest of freedom, following the 
Fascist regime and dictatorship" (ibid.).
Intellectual culture, which can be defined as responsibility, is different from apolitical 
culture. Bobbio thinks that "the two prime values that ought to be defended by 
political function of culture are freedom and truth" (Bobbio, 1993a:55,56). Bobbio 
returns repeatedly to the turn of phrase used by Cattaneo: "Brahmin schools", where 
philosophy works from the knowledge gained through experience; this is the sphere 
of experimental philosophy.
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Bobbio takes the example of the ventennio81 of Italian Fascism to illustrate the 
existentialist tendency of many historians, critics and lettered men who hid away or 
"took refuge in the intimacy of their own work" and he attributes their withdrawal to 
the blossoming of poetic hermitism as well as negative philosophical existentialism. 
This isolation was also a consequence of the desire to distance oneself and one's 
creation from Fascism.
Bobbio notes that following Italy's liberation from Fascism, this intellectual tendency 
underwent a complete turnaround.
The figure of the committed intellectual emerged, new in part, who brandished 
his uncontaminated, total, indomitable civil passion against I'anima bella, the 
intellectual who speaks only from his chair and never descends or bends 
towards the misery and errors of the poor people. A generation of strong 
spirits succeeded a generation of decadents [sic], leaning towards a culture 
wielded as a reformative and revolutionary weapon (Bobbio, 1993a:56).
Bobbio considers himself among this second group. He views the acceptance of 
politicians' arguments without discussion as a form of betrayal and "academic 
desertion" and certainly not as allegiance. The modern intellectual who may be 
involved in formulating consensually acceptable policy has to interact and converge 
with politicians, but their relationship is one of apolitical complicity. Bobbio asks, 
rhetorically, why one ought to tackle the problem of the relationship between politics 
and culture. He and intellectuals like him tackle that question because they are not 
satisfied with the way in which this relationship is lived -  that is, either as divorce or 
subjection. The two most common attitudes of the person of culture vis-a-vis politics 
are either an intolerance or lack of patience towards political life, considered to be an 
inferior sphere in which one is obliged to get down from one's pedestal, or a total 
dedication to the movement, party or ideology that one remains forever conditioned 
by -  in other words, either apolitical culture or politicized culture.
Bobbio is significant in that he bridges the gap between theory and politics. 
Through the use of historical example, he documents his presence at the limits of 
both Fascism and Communism. He puts the politics of culture on the contemporary
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political agenda since this key formulation is the glue that bonds liberalism with 
socialism.
The use of antithesis offers the advantage, in its descriptive use, of allowing 
one of the two terms to shed light on the other, so much so that often one (the 
weak term) is defined as the negation of the other (the strong term); for 
example, private as that which is not public; in its axiological use, it draws 
attention to a positive or negative value judgement that ... can fall on one or 
on the other of the two terms ... (Bobbio, 1995a:ix,x).
With the Russian Revolution and the rise to power of the Bolsheviks, who pursued 
a philosophical and economic doctrine that constituted a radical critique of 
bourgeois society, it had seemed as if a process of complete transformation had 
begun. Historically, this process was unprecedented. Instead of forgetting about 
the history of Marxism, or dwelling too much on the mistakes that were committed 
in its name, Bobbio invites us not to lose sight of what Marxism represented for all 
those who fought for the renewal of a better life after the fall of Fascism. He asks 
us to consider what the constitution of a Communist regime represented in an 
immense country like China. At that time, “would it not have been legitimate to ask 
oneself whether the advent of Communism was written in the future history of the 
world?” (Bobbio, 1993a:217). After the events of Tien An Men in Beijing just a few 
months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bobbio thought he had definitely settled 
all open accounts with actually existing Communism. He concludes that “only now 
has the search for the reasons why the attempt to create a utopia - a society free 
from poverty and oppression - culminated in the realization of its opposite, in a 
system of despotic power that came ever closer to the reign of Big Brother 
described by Orwell” (ibid.).
Bobbio makes this reference to China not only because China’s system of 
government and political doctrine remain Communist, but since, for Bobbio’s 
generation, China represented the country which, in a certain sense, epitomized 
the inexorable expansive force of Communism. At the time of Mao’s conquest of 
power in 1949, Fascism had been defeated -  or so he believed then -  but 
Communism was stronger than ever. However, for Bobbio, the events of Tien An
281
Men Square, after 40 years of Chinese Communism, signalled the end. Yet he is 
still convinced of the moral superiority of Communism as compared with Fascism.
For Bobbio, Marx is useful in his function as a critic rather than as a system- 
builder. However, he does not weigh up the pros and cons of Marxism. Instead, he 
wishes to "draw attention to certain major consequences of turning Marx's work 
into a doctrine which is complete in itself, ... and from which answers can be 
logically deduced which are valid for any sort of problem" (ibid.:164). To conduct 
genuine research, Bobbio argues, it must be clear in the mind of the researcher 
that all answers cannot be "derived from a sole text or its interpretation" (ibid.).
Bobbio warns of the "typical distortion" that can occur whenever a doctrinaire 
position is based on authoritative writings. The doctrinaire thinker is bound to err in 
cases where reality does not fit the doctrine he upholds: "Rather than accept that 
the doctrine has provided an inadequate interpretation of reality, [the doctrinaire 
thinker, the ideologue] tends instead to want to prove that it is the doctrine which 
has been interpreted badly, and seeks to reconcile the two, not in a new 
interpretation of reality but in a new interpretation of the doctrine" (ibid.).
Our task, Bobbio advises, is to steer clear of the range of different brands of 
Marxism, since most Marxisms derive from "a problem which Marx either left 
unsolved, or which he did not solve satisfactorily" (ibid.: 164,165). The conflict that 
results from the different interpretations of Marx may, Bobbio argues, be 
interesting, but it "is often useless for the advance of our understanding of reality" 
(ibid.: 165). To illuminate the course of history, however, Bobbio does recommend 
that we examine critically Marx's works:
Marx's writings must be critically examined in the light of theoretical, 
historical and political science, as must every other work of human thought, 
and accorded their place within the history of human knowledge by being 
compared to the other great works which have illuminated the course of 
history (ibid.:168,169).
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Combinations of Marx's philosophy with other philosophies have led to what 
Bobbio calls "genuine revisions" and the purpose for which these combinations 
have been carried out constitutes "a problem which has not been accorded the 
attention it deserves" (ibid.:169). Indeed, Bobbio draws attention to the fact that no 
other philosophies have undergone the same ordeal as Marxism. Revisionist 
combinations have been carried out as philosophical exercises, with two aims in 
mind. Such revisionist combinations are typically philosophical exercises, 
undertaken as the circumstances demand, either to tone down the aggressive 
implications of Marx's revolutionary theory by emphasizing instead its 
respectability, or to prove its credentials to academic philosophers by 
demonstrating its legitimacy as a system of thought (ibid.).
Today, part of the confusion is that a process of deindustrialization is under way in 
developed countries, accompanied, as Keane writes, by “the growth of a new 
underclass and the emergence of more ‘flexible’ technologies, production methods 
and consumer styles” (Keane in Bobbio, 1989b:ix). Bobbio, in the midst of this, 
attempts to tackle the post-1989 impasse of the Left. In terms of political philosophy, 
his message is that “the people who use the words ‘left’ and ‘right’ do not appear to 
be using the words unthinkingly, because they understand each other perfectly” 
(Bobbio, 1996c:29). The task at hand is not to ask whether the Left continues to 
exist, for Bobbio believes it implicitly does, but to work on defining “what is there left 
of the Left”.
Bobbio is convinced that “The proclamation of human rights ... cut the course of 
human history in two” and has facilitated the “convergence of the three main 
currents of modern political thought, liberalism, socialism and social Christianity” 
(Bobbio, 1996a:65,66). A particular way of life, reflected in institutions and 
common behaviour, is now underpinned by a form of cultural convergence such 
that these three different groups “retain their own identity in the preference they 
show for some rights over others, and thus they create an increasingly complex 
system of fundamental rights” (ibid.:66).
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For Bobbio, the essential methods of a politics of culture involve the strategy of 
criticism and hard argumentation, as well as a concern for the means used to 
achieve political aims. Cultured individuals must urge politicians to exercise ethicai 
responsibility and to take honest account of the consequences of their actions. 
Even a good end does not justify a bad means to achieve it.
Intellectuals do not betray their role when they participate in politics, but only when 
they participate in a certain kind of politics. “Culture and politics are not 
incompatible: it depends on the politics one adopts" (Bobbio, 1955:200). Cultural 
life and progress, however, are incompatible with the “crude and violent myths of 
the autocratic state” (ibid.). They are not incompatible, Bobbio argues, with a 
liberating and democratic politics. The intellectual must choose a politics which is 
closest to the fundamental duties of the man of culture, which are “the promotion 
of liberty and the search for truth” (ibid.). Once that politics has been chosen, 
however, it is his duty to seriously practise that politics. Bobbio warns that the 
intellectual must not allow himself to be the instrument of a particular politics by 
giving up his rights and delegating his powers. To do so would be to exhibit fearful 
behaviour, result in unhappiness and, worse, reveal cunning and a loss of 
independence.
Those who participated in the Resistance had foreseen a course of Italian politics 
that did not materialize. For those radical yet not fanatical intellectuals who 
eschewed Fascist myths and were not inclined to create new ones, “the time 
quickly came when there was nothing for us to do” (ibid.). Just when, after their 
hard struggle, intellectuals like Bobbio finally hoped after years of preparation to 
enter the political playing field, “the challenge slipped beyond reach” (ibid.). They 
suddenly felt unemployed, just at the time when they had learnt an important 
lesson and were best placed to “swim”. Their deep attachment to the theory of 
political commitment was left without a group or party to which such commitment 
would be worthwhile. Italian intellectuals were then most occupied with protesting, 
both within and outside political parties.
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This protest took several forms, such as that of the PdA, where intellectuals 
representing the movement of popular unity protested against socialist parties, that 
of the liberals who protested against their own party, and that of the Catholics who 
proposed social reforms that their party had no intention of pursuing. Protest, 
Bobbio maintains, is both a right and a duty. However, it is important to distinguish 
between periods of great crisis and change and oppression, where protest is the 
only remedy left to people of liberal inspiration, and periods of reconstruction and 
necessary collaboration. During times of reconstruction, such as that of post-war 
Italy, protest derived from a feeling of impotence. Bobbio writes: “When a patient 
and productive common task needs to be undertaken, there is a need for modest 
and hard-working people who have no illusions of greatness” (ibid.:201).
In finding “a job”, intellectuals had to ask themselves whether the culture of which 
they were exponents and heirs was a culture suited to the construction of a 
democratic society. Here, Bobbio mentions that he is speaking of philosophy since 
it is a mirror of a cultural epoch, of anti-Fascism. During the years of Fascism, “in 
Italy we experienced the philosophy of evasion, that attitude of seeing history as 
condemned and filled with nostalgia for a lost paradise” (ibid.:203,204). But the 
“philosophy of avoidance” was most prominent in Italy’s recent history and 
influenced intellectuals to the greatest extent, Bobbio argues. That philosophy 
went from attualismo to spiritualism, and resulted in the philosopher finding not a 
refuge to escape his responsibility as a man of the time (Fascism), but instead a 
subterfuge through which he took on false responsibilities. According to De Felice 
and Duro (1993), attualismo is a contemporary Italian doctrine where all reality 
exists through the spirit alone. The perception of this reality is lived through action, 
whose “pure acts” culminate in self-realization (autocoscienza) and individual 
identity82.
The philosopher thus got a bad name as a deft conjuror of words and syllogisms, 
using that system to enclose himself, “like a spider that weaves a web and then 
waits for flies to fall into it” (ibid.:204). Regardless of how big the outside world is, 
“the system is logically perfect and harmonious, and that is enough for its creator
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to feel self-satisfied and confident in the fate of humanity" (ibid.). Gradually, that 
system becomes an end in itself and those who look beyond it never encounter 
facts but only find other similar systems based on ideal formulae. For Bobbio, the 
history of philosophy under Fascism took the form of a continual and monotonous 
dispute among ideal formulae where words acquired a sacred and absolute value.
Ordinary people, the masses, never took part in that dispute and, had they done 
so, could have taken no comfort from it. Consequently, in the aftermath of the 
successes of the Resistance movement, the situation was that “people were not 
interested in philosophy since philosophers were not interested in the people, but 
only in themselves" (ibid.). Philosophy then took no account of the problems and 
errors of men and was therefore useless, Bobbio maintains. Both the philosophy of 
evasion and that of elusion were useless. “Both knew that the world was a scandal, 
but one hid it, by placing a world without misery and error in opposition to the 
scandalous world, either outside history, or at the end of history; the other 
disguised it, by saying that the world was a scandal, but that had been established 
by eternal decree, or was rational because it was real, or that real society, the real 
state was not the external one that made laws, made one pay taxes, brought us to 
die in wars, but the internal one existing within each of us ..., a magnificent society 
where there are neither bosses nor servants, neither oppressed nor oppressors" 
(ibid.:204,205).
Evasion and avoidance cannot foster a democratic society; such philosophies do 
not compare with the Enlightenment which was undergirded by an illuminating 
philosophy which was also militant in combatting ignorance and slavery. A militant 
philosophy, Bobbio insists, describes the philosophizing of those who do not look 
down from on high in fossilized wisdom but study concrete problems at the grass­
roots level. Only after having conducted minute and methodical research do they 
take up a position. He writes: “Taking a position does not mean obeying orders; it 
means listening to all voices that emanate from the society in which we live and not 
listening to those seductive voices that come from our laziness or from our fear
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that are exalted as virtues, it means listening to the calls of experience, ... not only 
those that pass off as interior Enlightenment” (ibid.:205).
It is only after having listened and having tried to understand, Bobbio warns, that 
the philosopher can take up his share of responsibility. "To speak of militant 
philosophy is to ask a philosopher not only what he thinks but also whose side he 
is on” (ibid.). In Bobbio’s personal experience, the philosophers of evasion and 
elusion have always been on the side opposite his own. He belongs to a minority 
with “an Enlightenment programme, the programme of a few which has not 
become an atmosphere or a custom” (ibid.). Bobbio does not perceive philosophy 
as wisdom but as an enlightening [rischiaramento]. Empirical philosophy -  where 
only an approach based exclusively on observation and experience can lead to 
truth -  must be the philosophy of democratic society and those societies that 
aspire to democracy.
Bobbio believes that one of the conditions that must be met to re-endow 
philosophy with a social function is that the speculative mentality be abandoned. 
He defines that mentality as an old conception of philosophy, as hidden knowledge 
that renders the philosopher a kind of priest who interprets absolute truth that he 
alone possesses. Moreover, a broadened positive mentality among philosophers 
and persons of culture is required. Rather than being above the questions that 
derive from different sciences and common experience, the philosopher should be 
at the heart of such discussion. The philosopher’s contribution should be 
conceptually enlightening.
Bobbio calls upon intellectuals, citizens, to aspire to be individuals of the 
Enlightenment, and neither romantic nor decadent. The romantic, Bobbio says, 
believes that the world is to be created anew, that some revolution is around the 
corner; the decadent thinker imagines that “the world has always gone along the 
same road, there is nothing that can be done to change that” (ibid.:202). To be an 
Enlightenment thinker, it is not sufficient to protest against constituted powers; one
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must propose reforms, work towards new institutions and endeavour to influence 
public opinion to transform society.
Bobbio attributes Enlightenment thinkers with three characteristics: i) faith in 
reason rather than myths; ii) an aspiration to use science in a practical way to 
produce social benefits rather than contemplative knowledge; and iii) faith in the 
indefinite progress of humanity rather than the acceptance that history 
monotonously repeats itself. He describes himself as an Enlightenment thinker 
who has learnt the lessons of Hobbes and Marx. The Enlightenment thinker, as a 
man of reason, is more prone to pessimism than optimism, for “optimism always 
comprises a certain dose of infatuation and the man of reason must not be 
infatuated” (ibid.). Optimists believe history to be a drama, but one with a happy 
ending. Bobbio, on the other hand, believes that history is a drama but he does 
not, and cannot, know if it will be a drama with a happy ending. In today’s world, he 
hears "not song but roars” which cause him to be a pessimist.
I do not intend this pessimism to be understood as a surrender. It is an act 
of healthy abstinence after many orgies of optimism, a refusal ... to 
participate in the banquet of ever jovial rhetoricians. It is an act of satiety 
rather than disgust. And pessimism does not restrain industry, it renders it 
more taut and to the purpose. ... I have my own yardstick to judge my 
peers, and it is based on the antithesis seriousness-fatuity, where the 
serious are good and the fatuous bad. 1 am not saying that optimists are 
always fatuous, but the fatuous are always optimists (ibid.:203).
In his philosophy and politics of culture, Bobbio no longer separates blind faith in 
historical or theological providence from the vanity of those who believe they are 
the centre of the world and that things happen as they command. He appreciates 
and respects those who “act well without asking for any guarantee that the world 
will get better”, for only the “good pessimist is able to act with a clear mind, with 
firm will, with a sense of humility and full devotion to his task” (ibid.).
intellectuals, Bobbio believes, must necessarily adopt empiricism as their method. 
As philosophical tools, neither revelation, “interior illumination”, magic nor occult 
knowledge can compare with the lesson of experience. Above all, Bobbio “believes
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strongly in taking the wrong road” (ibid.:210), in finding the best way forward 
through experience. “In countries where empiricism is considered to be the 
national philosophy, there is a higher degree of democracy” (ibid.:208). In the 
years before the Republic was established, Italy had relied on philosophers of 
“speculative genius” who had rendered no service to the nation, with the 
consequence that society did not progress. Bobbio maintains that there is no need 
today to encourage the vices of seeing visions or drawing great syntheses that are 
not built on facts. “It is time to teach the philosopher that he should consider 
himself, Socraticaliy, an artisan helping other artisans to better understand their 
occupation” (ibid.:207). Bobbio warns intellectuals that there is a need for more 
rigour in the study of facts and greater caution in formulating general theses, even 
at the risk of asking further questions rather than providing answers.
Moreover, Bobbio invites the philosopher who aspires to achieve a politics of 
culture to work harder, indeed to work like those who produce useful items, like 
ordinary workers in the factory or the shop. He advises persons of culture to avoid 
appearing like players in a limited or exclusive game that is played purely for their 
own purposes. Other major pitfalls that the person of culture should avoid are 
presumption and arrogance.
One of the reasons for the “divorce between politics and culture” in Italy is the 
endurance of a lazy attachment to speculative genius. Democratic political 
renewal, Bobbio affirms, corresponds with cultural renewal. Just as democracy is 
based on the principles of dialogue, consensus and social progress, “the culture 
suited to democratic society should not be dogmatic but critical, not closed but 
open, not speculative but positive” (ibid.).
Intellectuals are the expression of the society in which they live, and, he writes, 
“culture and society condition each other to such an extent that any talk of the 
possibility of cultural renewal in Italy must take account of the different types of 
society that developed in parallel” (ibid.:209). Two major components of Italian 
society were the industrial and farming groups, the former with longer
289
individualistic-bourgeois and trade union-socialist traditions and the latter with a 
semi-feudal and anarchic tradition. The two Italies of north and south, Bobbio 
contends, were exposed to cultural renewal that took one of two directions: that of 
the Enlightenment and radical liberalism or that of neo-Marxist historical 
materialism. These directions, the liberal revolution or the Communist revolution 
were symbolized respectively by the figures of Gobetti and Gramsci.
At the beginning of the Cold War, the enemy to be confronted was Communism. 
But in a country like Italy where a strong Communist party had developed “through 
a courageous and extensive contribution to the Resistance, and had participated in 
the elaboration of the new Republican Constitution, the problem had to be tackled 
not with the criticism of arms but with the arms of criticism” (Bobbio, 1996b: 167). 
This criticism, Bobbio believed, was best undertaken through the spirit of dialogue 
rather than that of a crusade, with the purpose of definitely winning over 
Communist militants to democracy. This dialogue in the defence of democracy 
proceeded at the same pace as Bobbio’s participation in the debate on the pros 
and cons of the Soviet Union.
His debate with Communist intellectuals began in the 1950s and took place in 
acknowledgement of what he refers to as the intellectual honesty and serious 
scholarship of Italian Communists. At that time, Bobbio aimed to persuade those 
intellectuals of the error they had committed, owing to their unconditional 
admiration for Soviet Russia. That error consisted in interpreting the rights of liberty 
as bourgeois rights which the proletarian state could do without -  and would do 
without, were it to predominate.
Twenty years later, it became apparent that Italian democracy, which was always 
governed by the same party, the Christian Democratic Party, needed to opt for a 
change. Since it seemed clear that change could come about only through less 
antagonistic relations with the Communist Party, Bobbio concentrated on a 
discussion of the general theory and rules of the democratic state. By that time, 
after many years of democratic practice, the rights of liberty had been accepted by
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all. Bobbio posed the question “Does Marxism have a democratic theory of the 
state that can rival the modern democratic model?” (ibid.:168). He had to reply that 
Marxism had no such theory of the state.
Since Marx argued that the State was destined to disappear, he “had not worried 
much about foreseeing what the rules ought to be in the realization of a State ‘with 
a human face”’ (ibid.) The State neither disappeared nor seems to be destined to 
do so in the near future. The real problem for Bobbio is "what State”, although he 
admits that there is no acceptable alternative to representative democracy. This 
emphasis on the type of State required to meet society’s needs indicates, as 
Bobbio himself claims, that his distance from old interlocutors like Marx had 
diminished (ibid.). In other words, the Marxist theory of the State had no place in 
Bobbio’s conception of the State.
Through his intellectual endeavours, Bobbio was successful in effecting the 
reformation of Italian Communism. This reform was possible owing to the 
approach he adopted: pursuing a politics of culture. A good empiricist, he affirms, 
must assess any problem from all sides, because reality has many faces and it is 
difficult to grasp all of them. Therefore, the intellectual must exercise caution in 
elaborating his criticism and, in spite of all the verification he has done, he must be 
ready to accept the possibility of error. From the possibility of error derive two 
commitments that must be respected, Bobbio advises: that of not persevering in 
error and that of being tolerant of the errors that others commit.
Bobbio made a cultural attempt to free socialism from its overly narrow and 
dogmatic ideology, to render it a revolutionary yet non-violent force capable of 
interpreting in an unbiased way the new changes that occurred in the economy 
and society of contemporary Italy. In exploring and summarizing, in Chataway’s 
words, the “most significant stages in the development of the major ideological 
currents that polarized the intellectual debates and political conflicts in Italian society” 
(Chataway, 1998:412), he takes the reader on a journey that justifies the meditative 
and rational response of the State envisaged by Hobbes, one that derives from the
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privilege of a monopoly of force. The autonomy of culture from politics, Bobbio 
teaches, obliges intellectuals to refrain from competing with politicians. The task of 
the intellectual who does not want to remain indifferent to the drama of his time is 
that of noting contradictions, of revealing paradoxes, even at the risk of elaborating 
inappropriate solutions (Bobbio, 1993a:206). The genuine difference between 
intellectuals and politicians is that the former use the method of dialogue while the 
latter adopt the method of struggle.
Bobbio maintains that forming a synthesis involves starting with analysis, and to 
reach a system it is necessary that the criticism of systems be undertaken. Yet he 
adds that if philosophy is synthesis and system, much of his work cannot be 
considered philosophical. In his own words, Bobbio has sought to put together a 
philosophy of history -  the only philosophy that interests him -  while being aware 
that “a piece is always missing” (ibid.:1). Not only is there an excess of things to 
understand, but “the acceleration of history is such that when you start to become 
oriented the wind has already changed” (ibid.). Bobbio does not believe that 50 
years from now any historian of philosophy would describe the current epoch as a 
particular “ism”; post-modernism is no exception.
In all epochs, politicians cannot do without intellectuals because appropriate 
decisions cannot be made if all the aspects of a question are not clear; “politics 
require knowledge as a resource" (La Stampa, 2/07/98:19). But, caught between the 
“giants” of science and religion, Bobbio contends, philosophers and intellectuals only 
have the role of mosche cocchieri; in other words, they are the size of flies or minute 
coachmen vis-a-vis future policy and democratic practice, and their influence is 
limited. However, the theory framed by intellectuals is reflected in practice, and the 
intellectual must be capable of translating his theories into concrete political action if 
he is to contribute to democratic theory.
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1 First published in 1934; unless otherwise stated, translations from the Italian are by the author 
2See Autobiografia, pp, 10-11 where Bobbio states that his family was pro-Fascist, as most of the 
bourgeoisie of that time were; his family welcomed Mussolini’s march on Rome because it was 
thought that it would stop those who wanted Italy to “do as in Russia”; in October 1922, Bobbio was 
13 years old
3There are letters that attest to Bobbio’s correspondence with Giovanni Gentile and to the 
intervention of Bobbio’s paternal uncle who requested General Emilio De Bono, one of the 
quadrumvirates of the March on Rome in 1922, to ask Mussolini to arrange for Bobbio to sit a public 
examination on the philosophy of law to accede to a teaching position at the University of Urbino. 
Bobbio’s father and Bobbio himself also wrote to Mussolini to reiterate that request. Gentile, as a 
follower of Croce in early 1900, embarked on a crusade of idealism, to disabuse the middle classes 
of positivism and contributed to a variety of journals such as Leonardo (1903) that attacked 
materialism; later, Gentile became the Fascist regime’s Minister of Public Instruction. See ‘Sono 
cose note, ma io non posso dimenticarle!’ in Mezzosecolo, no. 11, Annali 1994-1996, FrancoAngeli, 
pp. 217-222
4Leone Ginzburg, his close friend and fellow intellectual, was held in semi-liberty from 1936 to 1940 and 
was then forced into exile in a small town of the Abruzzo region; he died in 1944 at the German prison 
on via Tasso in Rome
5See ‘Oltre la ferita italiana’ in Bobbio, N., De Felice, R. and Rusconi, G.E., 1996d. Italiani} amici, 
nemici. Milan:Reset, page 71
6Giorgio Amendola, one of the most prestigious leaders of the PCI
7Foa uses the example of ethnic cleansing as a phenomenon that can be compared with evils of the 
past, although memory alone is not sufficient to comprehend the present; see Del disordine e della 
liberta, p. 33
8Casucci also believes that a comparison can be drawn between Spain’s final emergence from 
Franco’s dictatorship where democratic forces experienced difficulty in developing a coherent 
political programme and Italy’s immediate post-war governance of democratic rule under the CLNs 
The biographer of Benito Mussolini
10Gramsci’s journal Ordine Nuovo and Gobetti’s journal Rivoluzione Liberale, initially constituted to 
promote a policy of culture, became the voice of the Factory Councils that surfaced in Turin during 
the two “red years" of 1919 and 1920
11The Christian Democrats were stiil in the process of formation and the party was formally born 
after World War II
121921 -1943; from 1943-1991 Partito Comunista Italiano 
13Serra made this accusation in 1995, long after the events of 1989 
14Togliatti’s pen name: Roderigo di Castiglia 
15See Politica e cultura (1955)
16Del Noce’s role in the debate is a posthumous one; the articles included in Bobbio’s book, published 
by Reset in 1995, were actually written by Del Noce in 1945, immediately following the Liberation of 
Italy: Bobbio’s “dialogue" with Del Noce is based on a discussion of these articles which appeared in 
the Turin daily newspaper "II Popolo Nuovo” -  the daily newspaper reflecting the views of the Christian 
Democrats at that time. From the pages of GL, one of the eight newspapers published in the city of 
Turin in 1945, Bobbio also worked out a formula for the democratic renewal of the country; these 
articles were republished in 1996 by Donzelli, as Part I of Tra due repubbliche 
17See ‘L’intellettuale socialista’, Bobbio, II)
i8Soon after their escape from the island of Lipari in the summer of 1929, Lussu, Nitti and Rosselli 
were met by Turati and Salvemini at the Gare de Lyon in Paris (see Lussu, 1997:10). The GL 
movement was constituted roughly a year later
19Serra accuses Bobbio of being an intellectual who set out to prove and further the idea that 
innovation only requires that the past be destroyed. That purported destruction of the past has 
caused Italians to lose sense of the continuity of history and to grapple problematically with the 
creation of the 2nd republic. Only by destabilizing the 1s republic, Serra argues, was it possible to 
disseminate to al! society that “sickness of uprootedness” that causes one to listen to a new and 
better history that does not compare with the unhappy existing one
20From the verb vulgareldivulgare = to make known, spread, divulge, often associated with a 
particular tradition or lesson, as in the vulgata of a philological text; plural vulgate
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2114 October 1998; Lezione magistrate at the University of Turin on the date Giulio Einaudi received
an honorary degree from the Faculty of Letters; source La Stampa, 2/1/99:21
22Launched in 1922
23Last year of publication was 1956
24Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino; auto workers at FIAT today number 130,000, one-third of the 
city’s workers in the manufacturing sector (Revelli, M., in il manifesto, 5/4/00)
^Initially this term described coalitions of the historical Left and Right parties in the post- 
Risorgimento period; “it came to be extended to describe the more general process whereby liberal 
politicians kept themselves in power by ‘transforming’ erstwhile opponents into allies by the use or 
abuse of government patronage, legislative concessions and compromises” (Glossary of terms in 
Gramsci, 1994:xl)
n o  '  |U
From Waldenses or Valdenses; a Christian sect arising in southern France in the 12 century, 
adopting Calvinist doctrine in the 16th century, later living chiefly in Piedmont 
27Thersites of Homer’s Iliad', epic later depicted in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida 
28A militant Italian Catholic movement that gained influence in the right wing of the former Christian 
Democrats; stiil a strong political force in northern Italy, especially Milan 
29Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803), Piedmontese aristocrat, dramatist and Italian patriot, noted for first 
having used the word ‘Risorgimento’ at the time of the French Revolution, in a clear call for Italian 
unity and liberty
30Giovanni Gentile, a staunch critic of Communism and an advocate of spiritualism; Gentile 
supported an intellectual approach based on the theory of absolute immanence rather than 
transcendence
31The lower clergy in particular had favoured the Resistance for it had borne more official Fascist 
pressure than the high ecclesiastical dignitaries 
The Democratic Labour party of Meuccio Ruini was soon to disappear 
33Laicismo
34ln the original text, all verbs appear in the present tense 
35 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985:1328)
36Rossel!i took up a teaching position in economics at the University of Turin in 1922 shortly after the 
biennio rosso of 1919/21, at the time of a clamorous series of strikes and the occupation of the 
factories by workers’ councils
37Called Pitigrilli, who was related to a GL member of the Turin group
38Geymonat’s books were published by Antonicelii’s publishing house, De Silva
39ln Italy the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the collapse of the dominant class and a
series of corruption scandals that have opened the way to the Left in government and, in particular,
to the Party of the Democratic Left as the party best placed to guarantee responsible government
and the defence of the Welfare State
40Subsequently revised in 1985
41 In addition to discussions on the abolition of tithes in Sardinia, the abolition of religious orders, as 
well as the design to introduce civil marriage in 1852 
42ln his well-known speech of 27 March 1861 
43lndividual conscience, self-perception, awareness
44ln Italy the current Right-wing coalition government of Berlusconi is trying to abolish the provisions 
of Articolo 18, concerning legislation that rules on the dismissal of workers without just cause by 
employers; the government’s confrontation with representatives of the main trade unions has been 
characterized by industrial action, public demonstrations and harsh debate 
45Re-published in 1923 and 1939 
46Quoting Cattaneo
47Approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948 
48Augusto Monti and Silvio Trentin 
49Printed in the PdA's clandestine newspaper
50A reunification of Nenni's PSI [Partito socialista italiano] and Saragat’s Social-Democratic PSD! 
[Partito social-democratico italiano]
Journalist Oriana Fallaci, who published Anger and Pride in Italy in December 2001, lumps 
together Islam, terrorism and the presence of Muslims in Europe; she affirms that the attack on the 
World Trade Centre in New York revealed the essence of Islamic civilization; “on April 12 the weekly
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Panorama, which is owned by Berlusconi, gave the controversy a new lease of life when it published 
a violent diatribe by Fallaci on anti-semitism” (Rouard, 2002:34)
52Through his great cultural project of establishing a library in Milan to document the history of the 
workers’ movement, Feltrinelli made the name of his publishing house by acquiring the rights to the 
novel everywhere except the Soviet Union, where it was banned until 1989 
53// diritto di fare domande, La Stampa (date)
54Words of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic, in II Messaggero, 04/04/2002 
55lnternet site t
56Bobbio quoting Giacomo Leopardi
57Period marked by threats to the Italian State that derived from organized crime in the south and the 
challenge of terrorism in the north -  from both neo-Fascist and Left-wing groups 
58They were killed in 1944 and 1937, respectively
59To look on and offer unwanted advice or comment, especially at a card game 
60President of the United States from 1977-1981 
61Published by Le Monnier, 1881-1892
G2Carlo Cattaneo: Stati Uniti d’ltalia, edited by Bobbio (1945, Turin:Chiantore)
63Nuova raccolta di classlci italiani annotati, 2 (Turin:Einaudi)
64Rorty takes this description of Gothic from Mark Edmundson’s book, Nightmare on Main Street: 
Angels, Sadomasochism, and the Culture of the Gothic, Harvard University Press (1999)
65Referring to the revolutionary American poet Walt Whitman (1819-1892); see Stoutenburg, A. and 
Baker, L.N., Listen America: A Life of Wait Whitman, Charles Scribner’s Sons (1968)
66Starting point, impulse, start
67in 1921 a collection of articles written by some members of that group was published in Prague, 
called A Change in Orientation (Smena vech), by Kljucnikov, J.V., et al.
68Montesquieu wrote that the sterility of the country determined the citizens toward an economic 
commerce in which it was necessary that they be laborious to supply what nature refused 
69From March to December 2001, ten seminars were held on the theme “1900: Definitions and 
interpretations of the century”
70See Buttafuoco, P. in II Foglio, Friday, 12 November 1999
71 Problem first raised in 1961 by Renato Treves in speech at the Centro nazionale di prevenzione e 
difesa sociale
72Also translated as “meekness” by Chataway, T.
73 All of humanity
74See ‘Appello di Bobbio per la democrazia’ of 3 May 2001 [petition circulated by email]
75Berlinguer was the former leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); the proponents of Euro­
communism admitted the impracticaiity of western Communist revolution and distanced themselves 
from Soviet foreign policy
760n 8 September 1943 General Badogiio announced, via radio, the signing of the armstice with the 
Allies; the Italian armed forces were instructed to stop fighting the Allies and to react to attacks from 
all quarters. The ambiguity of that message, and the failure to provide precise instructions to the 
soldiers resulted in the dissolution of the Italian army and, as soldiers travelled homewards, more 
than half a million were captured by the Germans and deported to Germany 
77ln the singular (movement)
78He began teaching in the Faculty of Jurisprudence in 1948 and left that faculty in 1972 to join the 
newly constituted Faculty of Political Science
79Mussolini’s biographer, who contested Bobbio’s separation of Left and Right; he saw the main task 
of today’s leaders as that of freeing history from ideology, and separating historical reality from 
current poiiticai needs
80In Centrismo: vocazione o condanna (1995)
81Twenty years
82The philosopher generally associated with attualismo is Giovanni Gentile, Minister of Public 
Instruction during Mussolini’s regime
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C. Hardy 
WFP-MSDA
Roma
2 settembre 1996
page 1 o f 3
Alla cortese attenzione della
Sig.ra Carla Gobetti 
Centro Studi "Piero Gobetti" 
10122  Torino
Fax no. 01 1 -5 3 1 -4 2 9
Gentile Sig.ra Gobetti,
* In seguito alia nostra conversazione telefonica del 3 1 / 0 8 /1 9 9 6 ,  la prego di 
trovare in allegato alia presente una nota per il Prof. Bobbio nonche le tre 
domande che potrebbero servire da base per I'incontro che avra Iuogo 
giovedi prossimo.
Sard all'aeroporto di Torino mercoledi prossimo, 4 /0 9 , alle ore 16.25.  Ci 
vedremo al Centro Studi un po' piu tardi.
_ La ringrazio e sono contenta di poter fare la sua conoscenza di persona. 
Cordiali saluti,
322
C  Hardy 
WFP-MSDA 
Rome, Italy
2 settembre 1996
Professor Norberto BOBBIO 
c/o Centro Studi "Piero Gobetti”
Via Fabro, 6  
1 0 1 2 2  Torino
Fax no. 0 !  1-531-429  
Egregio Professor Bobbio,
In allegato alia presente la prego di trovare ie tre domande citate nella mia 
precedente comunicazione.
V orre i esprimere i miei ringraziamenti piti viva per !a sua disponibiiiti. 
Neirattesa di poter ringraziarla personalmente, le porgo distinti saluti.
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2/09/1996
La politica della cultura: Quail sono le grand! Hnee dr questo concetto? 
Si pud fnterpretare questo termine anche come II confront© 
deirindlvlduo stesso con I suoi valori "antropologici" nef tentative dl 
rinnovare la politica con Papporto deila cultura? Con "la fine" deila 
i * Repubblica In Italia e la caduta del Muro del Berlin©, sono maggiori 
le prospettive per uno sviluppo culturale della politica?
Come si pud conciliare !a responsabilita [concetto fermo], le regole 
del gioco [modificabilil e la fenomenologia [puntata verso la 
modernita] quando Penfasi non e sul valori da scegllere bensi sulIa 
loro reafizzazione? La Dichiarazione universale del diritti delPuomo 
( 1948) , anche se non definitiva, "rappresenta la coscienza storica che 
Pumanita ha dei propri valori fondamentali nella seconda meta del 
secolo ventesimo". E una questione legale/politica perche i diritti 
stabiliti dovrebbero esistere in Iegge, ed essere garantlti. Per 
procedere nella direzione giusta, come si formula i metodi pin adatti 
ed efflcad per raggiungere la fase della Koro realizzazione?
C 'e una tendenza umana dl collocarsi a destra o a sinistra, a, In ogtii 
case, piii viefno a sinistra o a destra. La sola definizione di "destra" e 
"sinistra", almeno per me, e nn compito etemo, anche nelle scelte e 
nei comportamenti giomalieri. II "discorso facile” — semplice in 
termini di linguaggio e metafore, con poche riferimenti a programmi 
politic! — di certe figure della politica italiana odiema annebbia ancor 
di pitx fa comprensione. In ogni state democratico e liberale si deve 
accogliere tutte le espressioni d'opinione possibili; perd, quando si 
paria del patrimonio storico deila destra o della sinistra, certamente 
e Pesperienza stessa che fa emergere la politica di destra o di sinistra. 
Come lei ha gi£ precisato, "Non £ important© la mobilitazione 
[political in quanto tale, bensi il tema sul quale si riesce a convogfiare 
fa partedpazione della gente”. Che dire delle polemiche sollevate 
dalle analisi di Ernst Nolte sul rapporti tra comunismo e nazismo e 
quelle provocate dalle critiche di Francois Furet ail'antifascismo in 
quanto afibf storico di quella peculiare forma di fotaQtarismo che £ 
stato il comunismo? Inoltre, afcuni dubbi sulPtotera azione deila 
Reslstenza in Italia, svolta da piu formazioni pofitiche, sono stati 
sollevati da Renzo De Felice. Come componente delPidentita della 
sinistra, qua! e Pimportanza della Reslstenza come tema?
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